Network Working Group T. King
Internet-Draft D. Kopp
Intended status: Standards Track DE-CIX
Expires: October 28, 2016 A. Lambrianidis
AMS-IX
A. Fenioux
France-IX
April 26, 2016
Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-Server to Peers
draft-kklf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light-01
Abstract
This document defines the usage of the BGP Prefix Origin Validation
State Extended Community [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]
to signal prefix origin validation results from a route-server to its
peers. Upon reception of prefix origin validation results peers can
use this information in their local routing decision process.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] only when they appear in all
upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English
words, without normative meaning.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 28, 2016.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-
Server to Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Operational Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Local Routing Decision Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. Route-Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation
State Extended Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.3. Error Handling at Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Introduction
RPKI-based route origin validation [RFC6480] can be a significant
operational burden for BGP peers to implement and adopt. In order to
boost acceptance and usage of RPKI and ultimately increase the
security of the Internet routing system, IXPs may provide RPKI-based
prefix origin validation at the route-server
[I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server]. The result of this route origin
validation is signaled to peers by using the BGP Prefix Origin
Validation State Extended Community as introduced in
[I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling].
Peers receiving the route origin validation result from the route-
server(s) can use this information in their local routing decision
process for acceptance, rejection, preference, or other traffic
engineering purposes of a particular route.
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2. Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-Server to
Peers
The BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community (as defined
in [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]) is utilized for
signaling prefix origin validation result from a route-server to
peers.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] proposes an encoding of
the prefix origin validation result [RFC6811] as follows:
+-------+-----------+
| Value | Meaning |
+-------+-----------+
| 0 | Valid |
| 1 | Not found |
| 2 | Invalid |
+-------+-----------+
Table 1
This encoding is re-used. Route-servers providing RPKI-based origin
origin validation set the validation state according to the prefix
origin validation result (see [RFC6811]).
3. Operational Recommendations
3.1. Local Routing Decision Process
A peer receiving prefix origin validation result from the route
server MAY use the information in its own local routing decision
process. The local routing decision process SHOULD apply to the
rules as described in section 5 [RFC6811].
A peer receiving a prefix origin validation result from the route
server MAY redistribute this information within its own AS.
3.2. Route-Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State
Extended Community
An IXP route-server receiving routes from its peers containing the
BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community MUST remove the
extended community before the route is re-distributed to its peers.
This is required regardless of whether the route-server is executing
prefix origin validation or not.
Failure to do so would allow opportunistic peers to advertise routes
tagged with arbitrary prefix origin validation results via a route-
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server, influencing maliciously the decision process of other route-
server peers.
3.3. Error Handling at Peers
A route sent by a route-server SHOULD only contain none or one BGP
Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community.
A peer receiving a route from a route-server containing more than one
BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community SHOULD only
consider the largest value (as described in Table 1) in the
validation result field and disregard the other values. Values
larger than two in the validation result field MUST be disregarded.
4. IANA Considerations
None.
5. Security Considerations
A route-server could be misused to spread malicious prefix origin
validation results. However, peers have to trust the route-server
anyway as it collects and redistributes BGP routing information to
other peers.
The introduction of a mechanisms described in this document does not
pose a new class of attack vectors to the relationship between route-
servers and peers.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended
Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360,
February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, DOI
10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
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6.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server]
Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker,
"Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", draft-ietf-idr-ix-
bgp-route-server-09 (work in progress), October 2015.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]
Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R.
Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended
Community", draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-07
(work in progress), November 2015.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
Authors' Addresses
Thomas King
DE-CIX Management GmbH
Lichtstrasse 43i
Cologne 50825
DE
Email: thomas.king@de-cix.net
Daniel Kopp
DE-CIX Management GmbH
Lichtstrasse 43i
Cologne 50825
DE
Email: daniel.kopp@de-cix.net
Aristidis Lambrianidis
Amsterdam Internet Exchange
Frederiksplein 42
Amsterdam 1017 XN
NL
Email: aristidis.lambrianidis@ams-ix.net
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Arnaud Fenioux
France-IX
88 Avenue Des Ternes
Paris 75017
FR
Email: afenioux@franceix.net
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