Network Working Group Li Zhiming (editor)
Internet Draft Huawei
Nora Dabbous
Gemplus
JunHyuk Song
Samsung Electronics
Jian Wang
DMT
Expires: 15 October, 2004 15 April, 2004
EAP CAVE Authentication
draft-lizhiming-pppext-eap-cave-00.txt
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
of Section 10 of RFC2026.
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Comments should be submitted to the eap@frascone.com mailing list.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Abstract
This document specifies an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
mechanism for authentication and session key distribution using the
cdma Universal Identity Module (UIM). The mechanism includes
network authentication, user anonymity support and a
re-authentication procedure.
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Table of Contents
Status of this Memo.........................................1
Abstract....................................................1
Table of Contents...........................................2
1. Introduction.............................................3
2. Terms....................................................4
3. Overview.................................................6
4. Operation................................................8
4.1. Version Negotiation....................................8
4.2. Identity Management....................................9
4.3. Re-Authentication.....................................26
4.4. EAP/CAVE SSD Update...................................30
4.5. EAP/CAVE Notifications................................32
4.6. Error Cases...........................................33
4.7. Key Generation........................................35
5. Message Format and Protocol Extensibility...............38
5.1. Message Format........................................38
5.2. Protocol Extensibility................................39
6. Messages................................................39
6.1. EAP-Request/UIM/Start.................................40
6.2. EAP-Response/UIM/Start................................40
6.3. EAP-Request/UIM/Challenge.............................41
6.4. EAP-Response/UIM/Challenge............................41
6.5. EAP-Request/UIM/Re-authentication.....................42
6.6. EAP-Response/UIM/Re-authentication....................42
6.7. EAP-Request/UIM/Update................................42
6.8. EAP-Response/UIM/Update-server-challenge..............42
6.9. EAP-Request/UIM/Update-server-challenge...............43
6.10. EAP-Response/UIM/Update-client-success...............43
6.11. EAP-Request/UIM/Update-challenge.....................43
6.12. EAP-Response/UIM/Update-challenge....................43
6.13. EAP-Response/UIM/Client-Error........................44
6.14. EAP-Request/UIM/Notification.........................44
6.15. EAP-Response/UIM/Notification........................44
7. Attributes..............................................44
7.1. Table of Attributes...................................45
7.2. AT_MAC................................................46
7.3. AT_IV, AT_ENCR_DATA and AT_PADDING....................47
7.4. AT_VERSION_LIST.......................................49
7.5. AT_SELECTED_VERSION...................................50
7.6. AT_NONCE_MT...........................................50
7.7. AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ...................................51
7.8. AT_ANY_ID_REQ.........................................51
7.9. AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ....................................51
7.10. AT_IDENTITY..........................................52
7.11. AT_RAND..............................................52
7.12. AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID....................................53
7.13. AT_RANDU.............................................53
7.14. AT_RANDBS............................................54
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7.15. AT_RANDSSD...........................................54
7.16. AT_NOTIFICATION......................................54
7.17. AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE.................................55
7.18. AT_SSD_UPDATE_SUCCESS................................55
7.19. AT_ESN...............................................56
7.20. AT_AUTHR.............................................56
8. IANA Considerations.....................................56
9. Security Considerations.................................58
9.1. Identity Protection...................................58
9.2. Mutual Authentication.................................58
9.3. Key Derivation........................................59
9.4. Dictionary Attacks....................................59
9.5. Credentials Reuse.....................................59
9.6. Integrity and Replay Protection, and Confidentiality..60
9.7. Negotiation Attacks...................................60
9.8. Fast Reconnect........................................61
9.9. Acknowledged Result Indications.......................61
9.10. Man-in-the-middle Attacks............................61
9.11. Generating Random Numbers............................62
10. Security Claims........................................62
11. Acknowledgements and Contributions.....................63
11.1. Contributors.........................................63
11.2. Acknowledgements.....................................63
Normative References.......................................63
Informative References.....................................64
Editors' and Contributors' Contact Information.............64
Annex A. Pseudo-Random Number Generator....................65
1. Introduction
This document specifies an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
[EAP] mechanism for authentication and session key distribution
using the cdma Universal Identity Module (UIM).
CDMA uses the standardized CAVE (Cellular Authentication and Voice
Encryption) algorithm to generate a 128-bits sub-key called the
"Shared Secret Data" (SSD). The A-Key, the ESN(Electronic Serial
Number) and the network-supplied RANDSSD are the inputs to the CAVE
that generates SSD. The SSD has two parts: SSD_A (64 bits), for
creating authentication signatures and SSD_B (64 bits), for
generating keys to encrypt voice and signaling messages.In cdma,
authentication is based on a challenge-response mechanism. The UIM
runs CAVE algorithm, which takes the RANDU(24bits) or RAND(32bits),
the ESN(32bits) ,MIN(34bits) and SSD-A as input, and produces a
response AUTHU(24bits) or AUTHR(24bits).The UIM uses the SSD_B and
the CAVE algorithm to generate a Cellular Message Encryption
Algorithm (CMEA) key (64 bits). The CMEA key is used to encrypt of
signaling messages sent over the air and to decrypt the information
received. In this protocol, CMEA key is used for deriving keying
material and not directly used. Please find more information about
cdma authentication in [3GPP2 S.S0053].
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The lack of mutual authentication is a weakness in cdma
authentication. In EAP/CAVE the client issues a random number
NONCE_MT to the network, in order to contribute to key derivation,
and to prevent replays of EAP/CAVE requests from previous exchanges.
The NONCE_MT can be conceived as the client's challenge to the
network. EAP/CAVE also extends the RAND or RANDU challenges
and other messages with a message authentication code in order to
provide message integrity protection along with mutual
authentication.
EAP/CAVE specifies optional support for protecting the privacy of
subscriber identity using the same concept as cdma, which is using
pseudonyms/temporary identifiers.
The security of EAP/CAVE builds on underlying cdma mechanisms. The
security properties of EAP/CAVE are documented in Section 9 of this
document.Implementers and users of EAP/CAVE are advised to carefully
study the security considerations in Section 9 in order to determine
whether the security properties are sufficient for the environment
in question, especially as the secrecy of CEMA keys is key to the
security of EAP/CAVE. In brief, EAP/CAVE is in no sense weaker than
the cdma mechanisms. In some cases EAP/CAVE provides better security
properties than the underlying cdma mechanisms, particularly if the
UIM credentials are only used for EAP/CAVE and not re-used from
cdma. Many of the security features of EAP_CAVE rely upon the
secrecy of the CMEA values, so protecting this values is key to
the security of the EAP-CAVE protocol. In any case, if the cdma
authentication mechanisms are considered to be sufficient
for use on the cellular networks, then EAP/CAVE is expected to be
sufficiently secure for other networks.
2. Terms
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119].
The terms and abbreviations "authenticator", "backend authentication
server", "EAP server", "Silently Discard", "Master Session Key
(MSK)", and "Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)" in this document
are to be interpreted as described in [EAP].
This document frequently uses the following terms and abbreviations:
AAA protocol
Authentication, Authorization and Accounting protocol
AC
Authentication Centre. The cdma network element that manages the
authentication information related to the subscriber.
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A-Key
A 64-bit cryptographic key stored in the mobile station and
AC, it is used to generate or update the mobiel station's SSD.
AUTHBS
Authentication response of the RANDBS challenge from the AC,which
together with the RANDSSD authenticates the network to the peer,
24bits.
AUTHR
Authentication response of the global challenge from the peer,
which together with the RANDU authenticates the peer to the server,
24bits.
AUTHU
Authentication response of the unique challenge from the peer,
which together with the RAND authenticates the peer to the server,
24bits.
cdma
Code Division Multiple Access.
CAVE
Cellular Message Encryption Algorithm used in the cdma system.
EAP
Extensible Authentication Protocol.
ESN
A 32-bit number assigned by the mobile station manufacturer,
uniquely identifying the mobile station equipment.
IMSI
International Mobile Subscriber Identifier, used in cdma to
identify subscribers.
MAC
Message Authentication Code
NAI
Network Access Identifier
Permanent Identity
The permanent identity of the peer,including an NAI realm portion
in environments where a realm is used. The permanent identity is
usually based on the IMSI. Used on full authentication only.
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Permanent Username
The username portion of permanent identity, ie. not including any
realm portions.
Pseudonym Identity
A pseudonym identity of the peer, including an NAI realm portion
in environments where a real is used. Used on full authentication
only.
Pseudonym Username
The username portion of pseudonym identity, ie. not including any
realm portions.
RAND
Random number generated by the AC or EAP server, 32 bits.
RANDBS
Random number generated by the peer for network authentication
in SSD update procedure, 32 bits.
RANDSSD
Random number generated by the AC for updating SSD currently
stored at the peer and the AC, 56 bits.
RANDU
Random number generated by the EAP server for unique challenge,
24 bits.
SSD
Shared Secret Data consists of SSD_A and SSD_B,128bits.
SSD_A
Shared Secret Data_A used for authentication response
calculation, 64bits.
SSD_B
Shared Secret Data_B used for encryption information derivation,
64bits.
UIM
Universal Identity Module. The UIM is an application
traditionally resident on smart cards distributed by cdma
operators.
3. Overview
Figure 1 shows an overview of the EAP/CAVE full authentication
procedure. The authenticator typically communicates with an EAP
server that is located on a backend authentication server using an
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AAA protocol. The AAA communications is not shown in the figure.
The first EAP Request issued by the network is EAP-Request/Identity.
On full authentication, the peer's response includes either the
user's International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) or a
temporary identity (pseudonym) if identity privacy is in effect, as
specified in Section 4.2.
Following the peer's EAP-Response/Identity packet, the peer receives
EAP Requests of type xx (UIM) from the EAP server and sends the
corresponding EAP Responses. The EAP packets that are of the Type
UIM also have a Subtype field. On full authentication, the first
EAP-Request/UIM packet is of the Subtype xx(Start). EAP CAVE packets
encapsulate parameters in attributes, encoded in a Type, Length,
Value format. The packet format and the use of attributes are
specified in Section 5.
The EAP-Request/UIM/Start packet contains the list of EAP/UIM
version supported by the EAP server in the AT_VERSION_LIST
attribute. This packet may also include attributes for requesting
the subscriber identity, as specified in Section 4.2.
The peer responds to EAP-Request/UIM/Start with the EAP-
Response/UIM/Start packet, which includes the AT_NONCE_MT attribute
that contains a random number NONCE_MT, chosen by the peer, the
AT_SELECTED_VERSION attribute that contains the version number
selected by the peer, and the AT_ESN attribute that contains the
ESN of the peer. The version negotiation is protected by
including the version list and the selected version in the
calculation of keying material (Section 4.7).
After receiving the EAP Response/UIM/Start, the EAP server stores
the ESN value and determins which kind of challenge will be used
for full authentication. If global chanllenge is slected, the EAP
server generates a fresh random number RAND. If unique challenge is
selected, the EAP server interacts with AC to get authentication
vector including RANDU and AUTHU.
The next EAP Request the EAP Server issues is of the type UIM and
subtype Challenge (11). It contains the RAND or RANDU challenges and
a message authentication code attribute AT_MAC to cover the
challenges.
On receipt of the EAP-Request/UIM/Challenge message, the peer runs
the cave algorithm and calculates a copy of the message
authentication code. The peer then verifies that the calculated MAC
equals the received MAC. If the MAC's do not match, then the peer
sends the EAP-Response/UIM/Client-Error packet and the
authentication exchange terminates.
Since the RAND or RANDU given to a peer are accompanied with the
message authentication code AT_MAC, and since the peer's NONCE_MT
value contributes to AT_MAC, the peer is able to verify that the
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EAP CAVE message is fresh (not a replay).
If all checks out, the peer responds with the EAP-
Response/UIM/Challenge. If the peer receives the AT_RAND attribute,
the EAP-Response/UIM/Challenge contains the AT_MAC attribute and
AT_AUTHR attribute. If the peer receive the AT_RANDU attribute,
the EAP-Response/UIM/Challenge contains the AT_MAC attribute that
covers the peer's AUTHU response values (Section 6.4).
On receipt of the EAP-Response/UIM/Challenge message,The EAP server
verifies the MAC. If unique challenge is used, the EAP server can
get authentication result directly through check the MAC. If global
challenge is used, the EAP server gets AUTHR value from the EAP-
Response/UIM/Challenge message. The EAP server sends random number
RAND and response AUTHR to the AC for verification of the
subscriber, and obtain authentication result and encryption
informaiton(including CMEA key) and SSD information from the AC.
From the encryption information and SSD information, the EAP
server derives the keying material, as specified in Section 4.7.
If authenticatin is successful, the EAP server sends the EAP-Success
packet, indicating that the authentication was successful.If
authentication fails, the EAP server may notify the AC the failure
of authentication, the AC may initates a SSD update procedure when
the AC determins to execute SSD update procedure. If authentication
successes, the EAP server may notify the AC the authentication
result and get SSD information from the AC.
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Peer Authenticator
| |
| EAP-Request/Identity |
|<---------------------------------------------------------|
| EAP-Response/Identity |
|--------------------------------------------------------->|
| EAP-Request/UIM/Start |
| (AT_VERSION_LIST) |
|<---------------------------------------------------------|
| EAP-Response/UIM/Start |
| (AT_NONCE_MT, AT_SELECTED_VERSION, AT_ESN) |
|--------------------------------------------------------->|
| EAP-Request/UIM/Challenge |
| (AT_RAND or AT_RANDU, AT_MAC) |
|<---------------------------------------------------------|
| |
+-------------------------------------+ |
| Peer runs CAVE algorithms, | |
| verifies AT_MAC, derives | |
| AUTHR or AUTHU and session keys | |
+-------------------------------------+ |
| |
| EAP-Response/UIM/Challenge |
| (AT_MAC, AUTHR) |
|--------------------------------------------------------->|
| +-------------------------------------+
| | Server checks the response |
| | and MAC, if success, derives |
| | session keys |
| +-------------------------------------+
| EAP-Success |
|<---------------------------------------------------------|
| |
Figure 1 EAP/CAVE full authentication procedure
EAP CAVE also includes a separate re-authentication procedure. which
use the Shared Secret Data shared in the server. Re-authentication
is based on keys derived on full authentication.
If the peer has maintained state information for re-authentication
and wants to use re-authentication, then the peer indicates this by
using a specific re-authentication identity instead of the permanent
identity or a pseudonym identity. The re-authentication procedure is
described in Section 4.3.
EAP CAVE also includes a separate update procedure, which handle the
asynchronous SSD between the peer and the AC. When the AC determins
that the SSD currently stored at the peer should be update,the EAP
server executes SSD update procedure as described in section 4.4.
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4. Operation
4.1. Version Negotiation
EAP/CAVE includes version negotiation so as to allow future
developments in the protocol. The version negotiation is performed
on full authentication and it uses two attributes, AT_VERSION_LIST,
which the server always includes in EAP-Request/UIM/Start, and
AT_SELECTED_VERSION, which the peer includes in EAP-
Response/UIM/Start on full authentication.
AT_VERSION_LIST includes the EAP/UIM versions supported by the
server. If AT_VERSION_LIST does not include a version that is
implemented by the peer and allowed in the peer's security policy,
then the peer MUST send the EAP-Response/UIM/Client-Error packet
(Section 6.13) to the server with the error code "unsupported
version". If a suitable version is included, then the peer includes
the AT_SELECTED_VERSION attribute, containing the selected version,
in the EAP-Response/UIM/Start packet. The peer MUST only indicate a
version that is included in AT_VERSION_LIST. If several versions are
acceptable, then the peer SHOULD choose the version that occurs
first in the version list.
The version number list of AT_VERSION_LIST and the selected version
of AT_SELECTED_VERSION are included in the key derivation procedure
(Section 4.7). If an attacker modifies either one of these
attributes, then the peer and the server derive different keying
material. Because K_aut keys are different, the server and peer
calculate different AT_MAC values. Hence, the peer detects that
AT_MAC included in EAP-Request/UIM/Challenge is incorrect and sends
the EAP-Response/UIM/Client-Error packet. The authentication
procedure terminates.
4.2. Identity Management
4.2.1 Format, Generation and Usage of Peer Identities
General
In the beginning of EAP authentication, the Authenticator or the EAP
server usually issues the EAP-Request/Identity packet to the peer.
The peer responds with EAP-Response/Identity, which contains the
user's identity. The formats of these packets are specified in
[EAP].
cdma subscribers are identified with the International Mobile
Subscriber Identity (IMSI) [3GPP2 N.S0009]. The IMSI is composed of
a three digit Mobile Country Code (MCC),a two or three digit Mobile
Network Code (MNC) and a not more than 10 digit Mobile Subscriber
Identification Number (MSIN). In other words, the IMSI is a string
of not more than 15 digits. MCC and MNC uniquely identify the cdma
operator and help identify the AC from which the authentication
result need to be obtained for this subscriber.
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Internet AAA protocols identify users with the Network Access
Identifier (NAI) [RFC 2486]. When used in a roaming environment, the
NAI is composed of a username and a realm, separated with "@"
(username@realm). The username portion identifies the subscriber
within the realm.
This section specifies the peer identity format used in EAP/CAVE.In
this document, the term identity or peer identity refers to the
whole identity string that is used to identify the peer. The peer
identity may include a realm portion. "Username" refers to the
portion of the peer identity that identifies the user, i.e. the
username does not include the realm portion.
Identity Privacy Support
EAP/CAVE includes optional identity privacy (anonymity) support that
can be used to hide the cleartext permanent identity and thereby to
make the subscriber's EAP exchanges untraceable to eavesdroppers.
Because the permanent identity never changes, revealing it would
help observers to track the user. The permanent identity is usually
based on the IMSI, which may further help the tracking, because the
same identifier may used in other contexts as well. Identity privacy
is based on temporary identities, or pseudonyms, which are
equivalent to but separate from the Temporary Mobile Subscriber
Identities (TMSI) that are used on cellular networks. Please see
Section 9.1 for security considerations regarding identity privacy.
Username Types in EAP/CAVE identities
There are three types of usernames in EAP/CAVE peer identities:
(1) Permanent usernames. For example,
1123456789098765@myoperator.com might be a valid permanent identity.
In this example, 1123456789098765 is the permanent username.
(2) Pseudonym usernames. For example, 3s7ah6n9q@myoperator.com might
be a valid pseudonym identity. In this example, 3s7ah6n9q is the
pseudonym username.
(3) Re-authentication usernames. For example,
53953754a@myoperator.com might be a valid re-authentication
identity. In this case, 53953754 is the re-authentication username.
The first two types of identities are only used on full
authentication and the last one only on re-authentication. When the
optional identity privacy support is not used, the non-pseudonym
permanent identity is used on full authentication. The re-
authentication exchange is specified in Section 4.3.
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Username Decoration
In some environments, the peer may need to decorate the identity by
prepending or appending the username with a string, in order to
indicate supplementary AAA routing information in addition to the
NAI realm. (The usage of a NAI realm portion is not considered to be
decoration.) Username decoration is out of the scope of this
document. However, it should be noted that username decoration might
prevent the server from recognizing a valid username. Hence,
although the peer MAY use username decoration in the identities the
peer includes in EAP-Response/Identity, and the EAP server MAY
accept a decorated peer username in this message, the peer or the
EAP server MUST NOT decorate any other peer identities that are used
in various EAP/CAVE attributes. Only the identity used in EAP-
Response/Identity may be decorated.
NAI Realm Portion
The peer MAY include a realm portion in the peer identity, as per
the NAI format. The use of a realm portion is not mandatory.
If a realm is used, the realm MAY be chosen by the operator and it
MAY a configurable parameter in the EAP/CAVE peer implementation.In
this case, the peer is typically configured with the NAI realm of
the home operator. Operators MAY reserve a specific realm name for
EAP/CAVE users. This convention makes it easy to recognize that the
NAI identifies a cdma subscriber. Such reserved NAI realm may be
useful as a hint as to the first authentication method to use during
method negotiation. When the peer is using a pseudonym username
instead of the permanent username, the peer selects the realm name
portion similarly as it select the realm portion when using the
permanent username.
If no configured realm name is available, the peer MAY derive the
realm name from the MCC and MNC portions of the IMSI. A recommended
way to derive the realm from the IMSI using the realm
3gpp2network.org will be specified in 3GPP2.
Alternatively, the realm name may be obtained by concatenating
"mnc", the MNC digits of IMSI, ".mcc", the MCC digits of IMSI and
".owlan.org". For example, if the IMSI is 123456789098765, and the
MNC is three digits long, then the derived realm name is
"mnc456.mcc123.owlan.org".
The IMSI is a string of digits without any explicit structure, so
the peer may not be able to determine the length of the MNC portion.
If the peer is not able to determine whether the MNC is two or three
digits long, the peer MAY use a 3-digit MNC. If the correct length
of the MNC is two, then the MNC used in the realm name includes the
first digit of MSIN. Hence, when configuring AAA networks for
operators that have 2-digit MNC's, the network SHOULD also be
prepared for realm names with incorrect 3-digit MNC's.
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Format of the Permanent Username
The non-pseudonym permanent username SHOULD be derived from the
IMSI. In this case, the permanent username MUST be of the format "1"
| IMSI, where the character "|" denotes concatenation. In other
words, the first character of the username is the digit one (ASCII
value 0x31), followed by the IMSI. The IMSI is an ASCII string that
consists of not more than 15 decimal digits (ASCII values between
0x30 and 0x39) as specified in [3GPP2 N.S0009].
The EAP server MAY use the leading "1" as a hint to try EAP/CAVE as
the first authentication method during method negotiation, rather
than for example EAP/AKA. The EAP/CAVE server MAY propose EAP/CAVE
even if the leading character was not "1".
Alternatively, an implementation MAY choose a permanent username
that is not based on the IMSI. In this case the selection of the
username, its format, and its processing is out of the scope of this
document. In this case, the peer implementation MUST NOT prepend any
leading characters to the username.
Generating Pseudonyms and Re-authentication Identities by the Server
Pseudonym usernames and re-authentication identities are generated
by the EAP server. The EAP server produces pseudonym usernames and
re-authentication identities in an implementation-dependent manner.
Only the EAP server needs to be able to map the pseudonym username
to the permanent identity, or to recognize a re-authentication
identity. Regardless of construction method, the pseudonym username
MUST conform to the grammar specified for the username portion of an
NAI. The re-authentication identity also MUST conform to the NAI
grammar. The EAP servers that the subscribers of an operator can use
MUST ensure that the pseudonym usernames and the username portions
used in re-authentication identities they generate are unique.
In any case, it is necessary that permanent usernames, pseudonym
usernames and re-authentication usernames are separate and
recognizable from each other.
In general, it is the task of the EAP server and the policies of its
administrator to ensure sufficient separation in the usernames.
Pseudonym usernames and re-authentication usernames are both
produced and used by the EAP server. The EAP server MUST compose
pseudonym usernames and re-authentication usernames so that it can
recognize if a NAI username is an EAP CAVE pseudonym username or an
EAP CAVE re-authentication username. For instance, when the usernames
have been derived from the IMSI, the server could use different
leading characters in the pseudonym usernames and re-authentication
usernames (e.g. the pseudonym could begin with a leading "3"
character). When mapping a re-authentication identity to a permanent
identity, the server SHOULD only examine the username portion of the
re-authentication identity and ignore the realm portion of the
identity.
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Because the peer may fail to save a pseudonym username sent to in an
EAP-Request/UIM/Challenge, for example due to malfunction, the EAP
server SHOULD maintain at least one old pseudonym username in
addition to the most recent pseudonym username.
Transmitting Pseudonyms and Re-authentication Identities to the Peer
The server transmits pseudonym usernames and re-authentication
identities to the peer in cipher, using the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute.
The EAP-Request/UIM/Challenge message MAY include an encrypted
pseudonym username and/or an encrypted re-authentication identity in
the value field of the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute. Because identity
privacy support and re-authentication are optional to implement, the
peer MAY ignore the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute and always use the
permanent identity. On re-authentication (discussed in Section 4.3),
the server MAY include a new encrypted re-authentication identity in
the EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication message.
On receipt of the EAP-Request/UIM/Challenge, the peer MAY decrypt
the encrypted data in AT_ENCR_DATA and if a pseudonym username is
included, the peer may use the obtained pseudonym username on the
next full authentication. If a re-authentication identity is
included, then the peer MAY save it and other re-authentication
state information, as discussed in Section 4.3, for the next re-
authentication.
If the peer does not receive a new pseudonym username in the EAP-
Request/UIM/Challenge message, the peer MAY use an old pseudonym
username instead of the permanent username on next full
authentication. The username portions of re-authentication
identities are one-time usernames, which the peer MUST NOT re-use.
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Usage of the Re-authentication Identity by the Peer
On re-authentication, the peer uses the re-authentication identity,
received as part of the previous authentication sequence. A new re-
authentication identity may be delivered as part of both full
authentication and re-authentication. The peer MUST NOT modify the
username part of the re-authentication identity received in
AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID, except in cases when username decoration is
required. Even in these cases, the "root" re-authentication username
must not be modified, but it may be appended or prepended with
another string.
4.2.2 Communicating the Peer Identity to the Server
General
The peer identity MAY be communicated to the server with the EAP-
Response/Identity message. This message MAY contain the permanent
identity, a pseudonym identity, or a re-authentication identity. If
the peer uses the permanent identity or a pseudonym identity, which
the server is able to map to the permanent identity, then the
authentication proceeds as discussed in the overview of Section 3.
If the peer uses a re-authentication identity, and the server
recognized the identity and agrees on using re-authentication, then
a re-authentication exchange is performed, as described in 4.3.
The peer identity can also be transmitted from the peer to the
server using EAP/CAVE messages instead of EAP-Response/Identity. In
this case, the server includes an identity requesting attribute
(AT_ANY_ID_REQ, AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ or AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ) in the
EAP-Request/UIM/Start message, and the peer includes the AT_IDENTITY
attribute, which contains the peer's identity, in the EAP-
Response/UIM/Start message. The AT_ANY_ID_REQ attribute is a general
identity requesting attribute, which the server uses if it does not
specify which kind of an identity the peer should return in
AT_IDENTITY. The server uses the AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ attribute to
request either the permanent identity or a pseudonym identity. The
server uses the AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ attribute to request the peer to
send its permanent identity.
The identity format in the AT_IDENTITY attribute is the same as in
the EAP-Response/Identity packet (except that identity decoration is
not allowed). The AT_IDENTITY attribute contains a permanent
identity, a pseudonym identity or a re-authentication identity.
Obtaining the subscriber identity via EAP/CAVE messages is useful if
the server does not have any EAP/CAVE peer identity at the beginning
of the EAP/CAVE exchange or does not recognize the identity the peer
used in EAP-Response/Identity. This may happen if, for example, the
EAP-Response/Identity has been issued by some EAP method other than
EAP/CAVE or if intermediate entities or software layers in the peer
have modified the identity string in the EAP-Response/Identity
packet. Also, some EAP layer implementations may cache the identity
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string from the first EAP authentication and do not obtain a new
identity string from the EAP method implementation on subsequent
authentication exchanges.
As the identity string is used in key derivation, any of these cases
will result in failed authentication unless the EAP server uses
EAP/CAVE attributes to obtain an unmodified copy of the identity
string. Therefore, unless the EAP server can be certain that no
intermediate element or software layer has modified the EAP-
Response/Identity packet, the EAP server SHOULD always use the
EAP/CAVE attributes to obtain the identity, even if the identity
received in EAP-Response/Identity was valid.
Please note that the EAP/CAVE peer and the EAP/CAVE server only
process the AT_IDENTITY attribute and entities that only pass
through EAP packets do not process this attribute. Hence, if the EAP
server is not co-located in the authenticator, then the
authenticator and other intermediate AAA elements (such as possible
AAA proxy servers) will continue to refer to the peer with the
original identity from the EAP-Response/Identity packet regardless
of whether the AT_IDENTITY attribute is used in EAP/CAVE to transmit
another identity.
Choice of Identity for the EAP-Response/Identity
If EAP/CAVE peer is started upon receiving an EAP-Request/Identity
message, then the peer performs the following steps.
If the peer has maintained re-authentication state information and
if the peer wants to use re-authentication, then the peer transmits
the re-authentication identity in EAP-Response/Identity.
Else, if the peer has a pseudonym username available, then the peer
transmits the pseudonym identity in EAP-Response/Identity.
In other cases, the peer transmits the permanent identity in EAP-
Response/Identity.
Server Operation in the Beginning of EAP/CAVE Exchange
If the EAP server has not received any identity (permanent identity,
pseudonym identity or re-authentication identity) from the peer when
sending the first EAP/CAVE request, or if the EAP server has received
an EAP-Response/Identity packet but the contents do not appear to be
a valid permanent identity, pseudonym identity or a re-
authentication identity, then the server MUST request an identity
from the peer using one of the methods below.
The server sends the EAP-Request/UIM/Start message with the
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ message to indicate that the server wants the
peer to include the permanent identity in the AT_IDENTITY attribute
of the EAP-Response/SIM/Start message. This is done in the following
cases:
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- The server does not support re-authentication or identity privacy.
- The server received an identity that it recognizes as a pseudonym
identity but the server is not able to map the pseudonym identity to
a permanent identity.
The server issues the EAP-Request/UIM/Start packet with the
AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ attribute to indicate that the server wants the
peer to include a full authentication identity (pseudonym identity
or permanent identity) in the AT_IDENTITY attribute of the EAP-
Response/UIM/Start message. This is done in the following cases:
- The server does not support re-authentication and the server
supports identity privacy
- The server received an identity that it recognizes as a re-
authentication identity but the server is not able to map the re-
authentication identity to a permanent identity
The server issues the EAP-Request/UIM/Start packet with the
AT_ANY_ID_REQ attribute to indicate that the server wants the peer
to include an identity in the AT_IDENTITY attribute of the EAP-
Response/UIM/Start message, and the server does not indicate any
preferred type for the identity. This is done in other cases, such
as when the server does not have any identity, or the server does
not recognize the format of a received identity.
Processing of EAP-Request/SIM/Start by the Peer
Upon receipt of an EAP-Request/UIM/Start message, the peer MUST
perform the following steps.
If the EAP-Request/UIM/Start does not include any identity request
attribute, then the peer responds with EAP-Response/UIM/Start
without AT_IDENTITY. The peer includes the AT_SELECTED_VERSION,
AT_NONCE_MT attributes and AT_ESN attribute, because the exchange
is a full authentication exchange.
If the EAP-Request/UIM/Start includes AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ the peer
MUST either respond with EAP-Response/UIM/Start and include the
permanent identity in AT_IDENTITY and AT_ESN attribute or respond
with EAP-Response/UIM/Client-Error packet with code "unable to
process packet".
If the EAP-Request/UIM/Start includes AT_FULL_AUTH_ID_REQ, and if
the peer has a pseudonym available, then the peer SHOULD respond
with EAP-Response/UIM/Start and includes the pseudonym identity in
AT_IDENTITY. If the peer does not have a pseudonym when it receives
this message, then the peer MUST either respond with EAP-
Response/UIM/Start and include the permanent identity in AT_IDENTITY
and AT_ESN attribute or respond with EAP-Response/UIM/Client-Error
packet with code "unable to process packet." The Peer MUST NOT use
a re-authentication identity in the AT_IDENTITY attribute.
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If the EAP-Request/UIM/Start includes AT_ANY_ID_REQ, and if the peer
has maintained re-authentication state information and the peer
wants to use re-authentication, then the peer responds with EAP-
Response/UIM/Start and includes the re-authentication identity in
AT_IDENTITY. Else, if the peer has a pseudonym identity available,
then the peer responds with EAP-Response/UIM/Start and includes the
pseudonym identity in AT_IDENTITY. Else, the peer responds with EAP-
Response/UIM/Start and includes the permanent identity in
AT_IDENTITY and AT_ESN attribute.
An EAP/CAVE exchange may include several EAP/UIM/Start rounds. The
server may issue a second EAP-Request/UIM/Start, if it was not able
to recognize the identity the peer used in the previous AT_IDENTITY
attribute. At most three EAP/UIM/Start rounds can be used.
AT_ANY_ID_REQ can only be used in the first EAP-Request/UIM/Start,
in other words AT_ANY_ID_REQ MUST NOT be used in the second or third
EAP-Request/SIM/Start. AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ MUST NOT be used if the
previous EAP-Request/UIM/Start included AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ. The
peer operation in cases when it receives an unexpected attribute is
specified in Section 4.6.1.
AT_ESN attribute must not be included if a pseudonym identity or a
re-authentication identity is contained in the
EAP-Response/UIM/Start message.
Attacks against Identity Privacy
The section above specifies two possible ways the peer can operate
upon receipt of AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ. This is because a received
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ does not necessarily originate from the valid
network, but an active attacker may transmit an EAP-
Request/UIM/Start packet with an AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ attribute to
the peer, in an effort to find out the true identity of the user. If
the peer does not want to reveal its permanent identity, then the
peer sends the EAP-Response/UIM/Client-Error packet with the error
code "unable to process packet", and the authentication exchange
terminates.
Basically, there are two different policies that the peer can employ
with regard to AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ. A "conservative" peer assumes
that the network is able to maintain pseudonyms robustly. Therefore,
if a conservative peer has a pseudonym username, the peer responds
with EAP-Response/UIM/Client-Error to the EAP packet with
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, because the peer believes that the valid
network is able to map the pseudonym identity to the peer's
permanent identity. (Alternatively, the conservative peer may accept
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ in certain circumstances, for example if the
pseudonym was received a long time ago.) The benefit of this policy
is that it protects the peer against active attacks on anonymity. On
the other hand, a "liberal" peer always accepts the
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ and responds with the permanent identity. The
benefit of this policy is that it works even if the valid network
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sometimes loses pseudonyms and is not able to map them to the
permanent identity.
Processing of AT_IDENTITY by the Server
When the server receives an EAP-Response/UIM/Start message with the
AT_IDENTITY (in response to the server's identity requesting
attribute), the server MUST operate as follows.
If the server used AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, and if the AT_IDENTITY does
not contain a valid permanent identity, then the server sends EAP
Failure and the EAP exchange terminates. If the server recognizes
the permanent identity and is able to continue, then the server
proceeds with full authentication by sending EAP-
Request/UIM/Challenge.
If the server used AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ, and if AT_IDENTITY contains a
valid permanent identity or a pseudonym identity that the server can
map to a valid permanent identity, then the server proceeds with
full authentication by sending EAP-Request/UIM/Challenge. If
AT_IDENTITY contains a pseudonym identity that the server is not
able to map to a valid permanent identity, or an identity that the
server is not able to recognize or classify, then the server sends
EAP-Request/UIM/Start with AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ.
If the server used AT_ANY_ID_REQ, and if the AT_IDENTITY contains a
valid permanent identity or a pseudonym identity that the server can
map to a valid permanent identity, then the server proceeds with
full authentication by sending EAP-Request/UIM/Challenge.
If the server used AT_ANY_ID_REQ, and if AT_IDENTITY contains a
valid re-authentication identity and the server agrees on using re-
authentication, then the server proceeds with re-authentication by
sending EAP-Request/UIM/Re-authentication (Section 4.3).
If the server used AT_ANY_ID_REQ, and if the peer sent an EAP-
Response/UIM/Start with only AT_IDENTITY (indicating re-
authentication), but the server is not able to map the identity to a
permanent identity, then the server sends EAP-Request/UIM/Start with
AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ.
If the server used AT_ANY_ID_REQ, and if AT_IDENTITY contains a
valid re-authentication identity, which the server is able to map to
a permanent identity, and if the server does not want to use re-
authentication, then the server sends EAP-Request/UIM/Start without
any identity requesting attributes.
If the server used AT_ANY_ID_REQ, and AT_IDENTITY contains an
identity that the server recognizes as a pseudonym identity but the
server is not able to map the pseudonym identity to a permanent
identity, then the server sends EAP-Request/UIM/Start with
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ.
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If the server used AT_ANY_ID_REQ, and AT_IDENTITY contains an
identity that the server is not able to recognize or classify, then
the server sends EAP-Request/UIM/Start with AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ.
4.2.3 Message Sequence Examples (Informative)
This section contains non-normative message sequence examples to
illustrate how the peer identity can be communicated to the server.
Full Authentication
This case for full authentication is illustrated in the figure
below. In this case, AT_IDENTITY contains either the permanent
identity or a pseudonym identity. The same sequence is also used in
case the server uses the AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ in EAP-
Request/UIM/Start.
Peer Authenticator
| |
| +------------------------------+
| | Server does not have any |
| | Subscriber identity available|
| | When starting EAP/CAVE |
| +------------------------------+
| |
| EAP-Request/UIM/Start |
| (AT_ANY_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
| EAP-Response/UIM/Start |
| (AT_IDENTITY, AT_NONCE_MT, |
| AT_SELECTED_VERSION, AT_ESN) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
If the peer uses its full authentication identity and the
AT_IDENTITY attribute contains a valid permanent identity or a valid
pseudonym identity that the EAP server is able to map to the
permanent identity, then the full authentication sequence proceeds
as usual with the EAP Server issuing the EAP-Request/UIM/Challenge
message. AT_ESN attribute must not be included if a pseudomnym
identity is contained in the EAP-Response/UIM/Start message.
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Re-authentication
The case when the server uses the AT_ANY_ID_REQ and the peer wants
to perform re-authentication is illustrated below.
Peer Authenticator
| |
| +------------------------------+
| | Server does not have any |
| | Subscriber identity available|
| | When starting EAP/CAVE |
| +------------------------------+
| |
| EAP-Request/UIM/Start |
| (AT_ANY_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
| EAP-Response/UIM/Start |
| (AT_IDENTITY containing a re-authentication identity) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
On re-authentication, if the AT_IDENTITY attribute contains a valid
re-authentication identity and the server agrees on using re-
authentication, then the server proceeds with the re-authentication
sequence and issues the EAP-Request/SIM/Re-authentication packet, as
specified in Section 4.3.
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Fall Back to Full Authentication
The case when the server does not recognize the re-authentication
identity the peer used in AT_IDENTITY, and issues a second EAP-
Request/UIM/Start message is illustrated below.
Peer Authenticator
| |
| +------------------------------+
| | Server does not have any |
| | Subscriber identity available|
| | When starting EAP/CAVE |
| +------------------------------+
| |
| EAP-Request/UIM/Start |
| (AT_ANY_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
| EAP-Response/UIM/Start |
| (AT_IDENTITY containing a re-authentication identity) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
| +------------------------------+
| | Server does not recognize |
| | The re-authentication |
| | Identity |
| +------------------------------+
| |
| EAP-Request/UIM/Start |
| (AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
| EAP-Response/UIM/Start |
| (AT_IDENTITY with a full-auth. identity, AT_NONCE_MT, |
| AT_SELECTED_VERSION, AT_ESN) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
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Requesting the Permanent Identity 1
The figure below illustrates the case when the EAP server fails to
map the pseudonym identity included in the EAP-Response/Identity
packet to a valid permanent identity.
Peer Authenticator
| |
| EAP-Request/Identity |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| EAP-Response/Identity |
| (Includes a pseudonym) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
| +------------------------------+
| | Server fails to map the |
| | Pseudonym to a permanent id. |
| +------------------------------+
| |
| EAP-Request/UIM/Start |
| (AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
| EAP-Response/UIM/Start |
| (AT_IDENTITY with permanent identity, AT_NONCE_MT, |
| AT_SELECTED_VERSION, AT_ESN) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
If the server recognizes the permanent identity, then the
authentication sequence proceeds as usual with the EAP Server
issuing the EAP-Request/UIM/Challenge message.
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Requesting the Permanent Identity 2
The figure below illustrates the case when the EAP server fails to
map the pseudonym included in the AT_IDENTITY attribute to a valid
permanent identity.
Peer Authenticator
| |
| +------------------------------+
| | Server does not have any |
| | Subscriber identity available|
| | When starting EAP/CAVE |
| +------------------------------+
| |
| EAP-Request/UIM/Start |
| (AT_ANY_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
|EAP-Response/UIM/Start |
|(AT_IDENTITY with a pseudonym identity, AT_NONCE_MT, |
| AT_SELECTED_VERSION) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
| |
| +-------------------------------+
| | Server fails to map the |
| | Pseudonym in AT_IDENTITY |
| | to a valid permanent identity |
| +-------------------------------+
| |
| EAP-Request/UIM/Start |
| (AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
| EAP-Response/UIM/Start |
| (AT_IDENTITY with permanent identity, |
| AT_NONCE_MT, AT_SELECTED_VERSION, AT_ESN) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
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Three EAP/UIM/Start Roundtrips
In the worst case, there are three EAP/UIM/Start round trips before
the server has obtained an acceptable identity. This case is
illustrated below.
Peer Authenticator
| |
| +------------------------------+
| | Server does not have any |
| | Subscriber identity available|
| | When starting EAP/CAVE |
| +------------------------------+
| |
| EAP-Request/UIM/Start |
| (Includes AT_ANY_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| EAP-Response/UIM/Start |
| (AT_IDENTITY with re-authentication identity) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
| +------------------------------+
| | Server does not accept |
| | The re-authentication |
| | Identity |
| +------------------------------+
| |
| EAP-Request/UIM/Start |
| (AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
|EAP-Response/UIM/Start |
|(AT_IDENTITY with a pseudonym identity, AT_NONCE_MT, |
| AT_SELECTED_VERSION) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
| +-------------------------------+
| | Server fails to map the |
| | Pseudonym in AT_IDENTITY |
| | to a valid permanent identity |
| +-------------------------------+
| |
| EAP-Request/UIM/Start |
| (AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, AT_VERSION_LIST) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
| EAP-Response/UIM/Start |
| (AT_IDENTITY with permanent identity, AT_NONCE_MT, |
| AT_SELECTED_VERSION,AT_ESN) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
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After the last EAP-Response/UIM/Start message, the full
authentication sequence proceeds as usual. If the EAP Server
recognizes the permanent identity and is able to proceed, the server
issues the EAP-Request/UIM/Challenge message.
4.3. Re-Authentication
In some environments, EAP authentication may be performed
frequently. Because the EAP CAVE full authentication procedure
requires the authentication informatin from the Authentication
Centre, the full authentication procedure is not very well suitable
for frequent use. Therefore, EAP CAVE includes a re-authentication
procedure that does not need new authenticaiton and encryption
information from the Authentication Centre. Re-
authentication can be performed in fewer roundtrips than the full
authentication.
After a succesful full authentication, the Authentication Center
should share the Shared Secret Data with the Server. In following
re-authentication procedure, the server can locally perform global
challenge or unique challenge without interaction with the
Authentication Center.
Re-authentication is optional to implement for both the EAP CAVE
server and peer. On each EAP authentication, either one of the
entities may also fall back on full authentication if they do not
want to use re-authentication.
Re-authentication is based on the keys derived on the preceding full
authentication. The same K_aut and K_encr keys as in full
authentication are used to protect EAP CAVE packets and attributes,
and the original Master Key from full authentication is used to
generate a fresh Master Session Key, as specified in Section 4.7.
In order to use re-authentication, the peer and the EAP server need
to store the following values: Master Key and the next
re-authentication identity. K_aut, K_encr may either be
stored or derived again from MK. The server may also need to store
the permanent identity of the user.
4.3.2 Re-authentication Identity
The re-authentication procedure makes use of separate re-
authentication user identities. Pseudonyms and the permanent
identity are reserved for full authentication only. If a re-
authentication identity is lost and the network does not recognize
it, the EAP server can fall back on full authentication.
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If the EAP server supports re-authentication, it MAY include the
skippable AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID attribute in the encrypted data of EAP-
Request/UIM/Challenge message (Section 6.3). This attribute contains
a new re-authentication identity for the next re-authentication. The
peer MAY ignore this attribute, in which case it MUST use full
authentication next time. If the peer wants to use re-
authentication, it uses this re-authentication identity on next
authentication. Even if the peer has a re-authentication identity,
the peer MAY discard the re-authentication identity and use a
pseudonym or the permanent identity instead, in which case full
authentication MUST be performed.
In environments where a realm portion is needed in the peer
identity, the re-authentication identity received in
AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID MUST contain both a username portion and a realm
portion, as per the NAI format. The EAP Server can choose an
appropriate realm part in order to have the AAA infrastructure route
subsequent re-authentication related requests to the same AAA
server. For example, the realm part MAY include a portion that is
specific to the AAA server. Hence, it is sufficient to store the
context required for re-authentication in the AAA server that
performed the full authentication.
The peer MAY use the re-authentication identity in the EAP-
Response/Identity packet or, in response to server's AT_ANY_ID_REQ
attribute, the peer MAY use the re-authentication identity in the
AT_IDENTITY attribute of the EAP-Response/SIM/Start packet. The peer
MUST NOT modify the username portion of the re-authentication
identity, but the peer MAY modify the realm portion or replace it
with another realm portion.
Even if the peer uses a re-authentication identity, the server may
want to fall back on full authentication, for example because the
server does not recognize the re-authentication identity or does not
want to use re-authentication. In this case, the server starts the
full authentication procedure by issuing an EAP-Request/UIM/Start
packet. This packet always starts a full authentication sequence if
it does not include the AT_ANY_ID_REQ attribute. If the server was
not able to recover the peer's identity from the re-authentication
identity, the server includes either the AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ or the
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ attribute in this EAP request.
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4.3.3 Re-authentication Procedure
The following figure illustrates the re-authentication procedure.
Encrypted attributes are denoted with '*'. The peer uses its re-
authentication identity in the EAP-Response/Identity packet. As
discussed above, an alternative way to communicate the re-
authentication identity to the server is for the peer to use the
AT_IDENTITY attribute in the EAP-Response/UIM/Start message. This
latter case is not illustrated in the figure below, and it is only
possible when the server requests the peer to send its identity by
including the AT_ANY_ID_REQ attribute in the EAP-Request/UIM/Start
packet.
If the server recognizes the re-authentication identity and agrees
on using re-authentication, then the server firstly determins which
way of challenge, e.g. global challenge or unique challenge, will
be used, generates a corresponding fresh random number RAND or
RANDU as challenge, then sends the EAP-Request/UIM/Re-authentication
packet to the peer. The EAP server also runs CAVE algorithm to
produce coresponding response AUTHR or AUTHU. This packet MUST
include the encrypted AT_RAND or AT_RANDU attribute that contains a
random number chosen by the server, the AT_ENCR_DATA and the AT_IV
attributes used for encryption, and the AT_MAC attribute that
contains a message authentication code over the packet. The packet
MAY also include an encrypted AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID attribute that
contains the next re-authentication identity.
Re-authentication identities are one-time identities. If the peer
does not receive a new re-authentication identity, it MUST use
either the permanent identity or a pseudonym identity on the next
authentication to initiate full authentication.
The peer verifies that AT_MAC is correct. The peer MAY save the next
re-authentication identity from the encrypted AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID for
next time. The peer takes RAND or RANDU value as input of CAVE
algorithm to produce response AUTHR or AUTHU. The peer also
calculates a new MAC covering the packet concatenated to the AUTHR
or AUTHU. The peer responds with the EAP-Response/UIM/Re-
authentication packet.
The server verifies the AT_MAC attribute. If the checks is
successful, the re-authentication has succeeded and the server
sends the EAP-Success packet to the peer.
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Peer Authenticator
| |
| EAP-Request/Identity |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| EAP-Response/Identity |
| (Includes a re-authentication identity) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
| +--------------------------------+
| | Server recognizes the identity |
| | and agrees on using fast |
| | re-authentication. Server |
| | determins global challenge or |
| | unique challenge is used, then |
| | generates random number RAND |
| | (global challenge)or RANDU |
| | (unique challenge) |
| +--------------------------------+
| |
| EAP-Request/UIM/Re-authentication |
| (AT_IV, AT_ENCR_DATA, *AT_RAND or *AT_RANDU, |
| *AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID, AT_MAC) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+ |
| Peer verifies AT_MAC and runs CAVE algorithm | |
| to calculate response AUTH or AUTHU. Peer MAY | |
| store the new re-authentication identity | |
| for next re-auth. | |
+-----------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| EAP-Response/UIM/Re-authentication |
| (AT_IV, AT_ENCR_DATA, AT_MAC) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
| +--------------------------------+
| | Server verifies AT_MAC |
| +--------------------------------+
| |
| EAP-Success |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
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4.4. EAP/CAVE SSD Update
In full authentication, the Authentication Center may determins
that the SSD stored at the peer must be updated if the full-
authenticaiton failed. The following figure illustrates the
SSD update procedure.
On SSD Update, the server obtains the RANDSSD challenge and a pair
of parameter RANDU and AUTHU from the AC. The server sends this
challenge in AT_RANDSSD attribute of the EAP-Request/UIM/Update
packet containing the AT_MAC attribute to the peer.
When the peer receive this challenge, the peer check the AT_MAC. If
check is successful and the the peer agrees to start SSD update
procedure,the peer runs CAVE algorithm to generate a new pending SSD,
then generates a new random number RANDBS as a challenge for
network. The peer runs CAVE algorithm again to calculate the
corresponding response AUTHBS.
The peer responds the server with a EAP-response/UIM/Update-Server-
challenge packet containing the AT_RANDBS and AT_MAC attribute.
The server verifies the AT_MAC attribute, then forwards the RANDBS
value to the AC and obtains the response AUTHB from the AC. The
server responds with the EAP-request/UIM/Update-Server-challenge,
containing the AT_MAC attribute covering the packet concatenated to
the AUTHBS values.
The peer checks the AT_MAC attribute.If check is successful, the
peer updates the SSD of UIM with the pending SSD, and responds to
the server with EAP-response/UIM/Update-Client-success packet
containing AT_MAC attribute and AT_Update_Success_indication
attribute indicating the ssd update success of the peer.
The server verifies the AT_MAC attribute and checks the peer's AT_
SSD_Update_Success attibute. If these check are succesful, the
server sends EAP-request/UIM/Update-challenge packet to the peer,
which contains AT_RANDU attribute as a challenge to the peer and
AT_MAC attribute.
The peer checks the AT_MAC attribute and runs CAVE algorithm to
calculate the response AUTHU, then the peers responds with EAP-
response/UIM/Update-challenge packet containing AT_MAC attribute
that cover the AUTHU value.
The server verifies the AT_MAC attribute. If the
checks are successful, the server notifies the AC that the SSD
update procedure has been successfully completed and obtains the
new SSD value from the AC, then the server sends the EAP-Success
packet to the peer.
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Peer Authenticator
| |
| |
| +----------------------------------------+
| | Based on the SSD update information |
| | received from the AC, the server |
| | agrees to start SSD update procedure |
| | and gets the corresponding parameter |
| | including RANDSSD,RAND,AUTHU from the |
| | Authencation Center. |
| +----------------------------------------+
| |
| EAP-Request/UIM/Update |
| (AT_RANDSSD,AT_MAC) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+ |
| Peer verifies AT_MAC and runs CAVE algorithm | |
| to calculate the new SSD, then the peer | |
| generates a fresh random number RANDBS, runs | |
| CAVE algorithm again to calculate AUTHBS. | |
| Peer must keep the old SSD if SSD update | |
| fail. | |
+-----------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| EAP-Response/UIM/Update-Server-challenge |
| (AT_RANDBS, AT_MAC) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| +--------------------------------+
| | Server verifies AT_MAC , |
| | forwards RANDBS value to the |
| | AC, and obtain response AUTHBS |
| | from the AC |
| +--------------------------------+
| |
| |
| EAP-Request/UIM/Update-Server-challenge |
| (AT_MAC) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
+-----------------------------------------------+ |
| Peer verifies AT_MAC, if success, | |
| Peer update SSD, then send success message | |
+-----------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| EAP-Response/UIM/Update-Client-success |
| (AT_SSD_Update_Success, AT_MAC) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| |
| |
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| |
| |
| +--------------------------------+
| | Server verifies AT_MAC and |
| | SSD Update Success indication. |
| +--------------------------------+
| EAP-Request/UIM/Update-challenge |
| (AT_RANDU, AT_MAC) |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
+-----------------------------------------------+ |
| Peer verifies AT_MAC and runs CAVE algorithm | |
| to calculate AUTHU | |
+-----------------------------------------------+ |
| EAP-Response/UIM/Update-challenge |
| (AT_MAC) |
|------------------------------------------------------>|
| +--------------------------------+
| | Server verifies AT_MAC. |
| | Server notifies the AC |
| | the success of SSD Updating, |
| | and gets new SSD from the AC |
| +--------------------------------+
| |
| EAP-Success |
|<------------------------------------------------------|
| |
4.5. EAP/CAVE Notifications
The EAP-Request/Notification, specified in [EAP], can be used to
convey a displayable message from the EAP server to the peer.
Because these messages are textual messages, it may be hard for the
peer to present them in the user's preferred language. Therefore,
EAP/CAVE uses a separate EAP/CAVE message subtype to transmit
localizable notification codes instead of the EAP-
Request/Notification packet.
The EAP server MAY issue an EAP-Request/UIM/Notification packet to
the peer. The peer MAY show a notification message to the user and
the peer MUST respond to the EAP server with an EAP-
Response/UIM/Notification packet, even if the peer did not recognize
the notification code.
The notification code is a 16-bit number. The most significant bit
is called the Failure bit (F bit). The F bit specifies whether the
notification implies failure. The code values with the F bit set to
zero (code values 0...32767) are used on unsuccessful cases. The
receipt of a notification code from this range implies failed
authentication, so the peer can use the notification as a failure
indication. After receiving the EAP-Response/UIM/Notification for
these notification codes, the server MUST send the EAP-Failure
packet.
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The receipt of a notification code with the F bit set to one (values
32768...65536) does not imply failure, so the peer MUST NOT change
its state when it receives such a notification. (This version of the
protocol does not specify any notification codes with the F bit set
to one.)
The second most significant bit of the notification code is called
the Phase bit (P bit). It specifies at which phase of the EAP/CAVE
exchange the notification can be used. If the P bit is set to zero,
the notification can only be used after the EAP/CAVE/Challenge round
in full authentication or the EAP/CAVE/Re-authentication round in
reautentication. For these notifications, the AT_MAC attribute MUST
be included in both EAP-Request/UIM/Notification and EAP-
Response/UIM/Notification.
If the P bit is set to one, the notification can only by used before
the EAP/CAVE/Challenge round in full authentication or the
EAP/CAVE/Re-authentication round in reauthentication. For these
notifications, the AT_MAC attribute MUST NOT be included in either
EAP-Request/UIM/Notification or EAP-Response/UIM/Notification. (This
version of the protocol does not specify any notification codes with
the P bit set to one.)
Some of the notification codes are authorization related and hence
not usually considered as part of the responsibility of an EAP
method. However, they are included as part of EAP/CAVE because there
are currently no other ways to convey this information to the user
in a localizable way, and the information is potentially useful for
the user. An EAP/CAVE server implementation may decide never to send
these EAP/CAVE notifications.
4.6. Error Cases
This section specifies the operation of the peer and the server in
error cases. The subsections below require the EAP/CAVE peer and
server to send an error packet (EAP-Response/UIM/Client-Error or EAP
Failure) in error cases. However, implementations SHOULD NOT rely
upon the correct error reporting behavior of the peer,
authenticator, or the server. It is possible for error and other
messages to be lost in transit or for a malicious participant to
attempt to consume resources by not issuing error messages. Both
the peer and the EAP server SHOULD have a mechanism to clean up
state even if an error message or EAP Success is not received after
a timeout period.
4.6.1 Peer Operation
In general, if an EAP/CAVE peer detects an error in a received
EAP/CAVE packet, the EAP/CAVE implementation responds with the EAP-
Response/UIM/Client-Error packet. In response to the EAP-
Response/UIM/Client-Error, the EAP server MUST issue the EAP Failure
packet and the authentication exchange terminates.
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By default, the peer uses the client error code 0, "unable to
process packet". This error code is used in the following cases:
- the peer is not able to parse the EAP request, i.e. the EAP
request is malformed
- the peer encountered a malformed attribute
- wrong attribute types or duplicate attributes have been included
in the EAP request
- a mandatory attribute is missing
- unrecognized non-skippable attribute
- unrecognized or unexpected EAP/CAVE Subtype in the EAP request
- A RAND challenge repeated in AT_RAND
- invalid AT_MAC
- invalid pad bytes in AT_PADDING
- the peer does not want to process AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ
Separate error codes have been defined for the following error cases
in Section 7.18.
As specified in Section 4.1, when processing the AT_VERSION_LIST
attribute, which lists the EAP/CAVE versions supported by the server,
if the attribute does not include a version that is implemented by
the peer and allowed in the peer's security policy, then the peer
MUST send the EAP-Response/UIM/Client-Error packet with the error
code "unsupported version".
If the peer believes that the RAND challenges included in AT_RAND
are not fresh e.g. because it is capable of remembering some
previously used RANDs, the peer MUST send the EAP-
Response/UIM/Client-Error packet with the error code "RAND are not
fresh".
4.6.2 Server Operation
If an EAP/CAVE server detects an error in a received EAP/CAVE
response, the server MUST issue the EAP Failure packet and the
authentication exchange terminates. The errors cases when the server
issues an EAP Failure include the following:
- the server is not able to parse the peer's EAP response
- the server encounters a malformed attribute, a non-recognized non-
skippable attribute, or a duplicate attribute
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- a mandatory attribute is missing or an invalid attribute was
included
- unrecognized or unexpected EAP/CAVE Subtype in the EAP Response
- invalid AT_MAC
4.6.3 EAP Failure
As normally in EAP, the EAP server sends the EAP-Failure packet to
the peer when the authentication procedure fails on the EAP Server.
In EAP/CAVE, this may occur for example if the EAP server does not
recognize the peer identity, or if the EAP server is not able to
obtain the cdma authentication informatin for the subscriber or
the authentication exchange times out. The server may also send
EAP Failure if there is an error in the received EAP/CAVE
response, as discussed in Section 4.6.2.
The server can send EAP-Failure at any time in the EAP exchange. The
peer MUST process EAP-Failure.
4.6.4 EAP Success
On full authentication, the server can only send EAP-Success after
the EAP/CAVE/Challenge round. The peer MUST silently discard any EAP-
Success packets if they are received before the peer has
successfully authenticated the server and sent the EAP-
Response/UIM/Challenge packet.
On re-authentication, EAP-Success can only be sent after the
EAP/CAVE/Re-authentication round. The peer MUST silently discard any
EAP-Success packets if they are received before the peer has
successfully authenticated the server and sent the EAP-
Response/UIM/Re-authentication packet.
On SSD Update, EAP-Success can only be sent after the
EAP/CAVE/Update round. The peer MUST silently discard any
EAP-Success packets if they are received before the peer has
successfully authenticated the server and sent the EAP-
Response/UIM/Update-Challenge packet.
If the peer receives an EAP/CAVE notification (section 4.5) that
indicates failure, then the peer MUST no longer accept the EAP-
Success packet even if the server authentication was successfully
completed.
4.7. Key Generation
This section specifies how keying material is generated.
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On EAP CAVE full authentication and SSD Update procedure, a Master
Key (MK) is derived from the underlying cdma encryption information
(CMEA keys), the NONCE_MT and other relevant context as follows.
MK = SHA1(Identity|CMEA | NONCE_MT| Version List| Selected Version)
In the formula above, the "|" character denotes concatenation.
Identity denotes the peer identity string without any terminating
null characters. It is the identity from the AT_IDENTITY attribute
from the last EAP-Response/UIM/Start packet, or, if AT_IDENTITY was
not used, the identity from the EAP-Response/Identity packet. The
identity string is included as-is, without any changes and including
the possible identity decoration. The notation CMEA denotes the CMEA
key value, which is derived from SSD_B based on CAVE algorithm
[3GPP2 N.S0005]. NONCE_MT denotes the NONCE_MT value (not the
AT_NONCE_MT attribute but just the nonce value). The
Version List includes the 2-byte supported version numbers from
AT_VERSION_LIST, in the same order as in the attribute. The Selected
Version is the 2-byte selected version from AT_SELECTED_VERSION.
Network byte order is used, just as in the attributes. The hash
function SHA-1 is specified in [SHA-1]. If several EAP/UIM/Start
roundtrips are used in an EAP/CAVE exchange, then the NONCE_MT,
Version List and Selected version from the last EAP/UIM/Start round
are used, and the previous EAP/UIM/Start rounds are ignored.
The Master Key is fed into a Pseudo-Random number Function (PRF)
which generates separate Transient EAP Keys (TEKs) for protecting
EAP CAVE packets, as well as a Master Session Key (MSK) for link
layer security and an Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) for other
purposes. On re-authentication, the same TEKs MUST be used for
protecting EAP packets, but a new MSK and a new EMSK MUST be derived
from the original MK and new values exchanged in the re-
authentication.
EAP CAVE requires two TEKs for its own purposes, the authentication
key K_aut to be used with the AT_MAC attribute, and the encryption
key K_encr, to be used with the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute. The same
K_aut and K_encr keys are used in full authentication and subsequent
re-authentications.
Key derivation is based on the random number generation specified in
NIST Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication
186-2 [PRF]. The pseudo-random number generator is specified in the
change notice 1 (2001 October 5) of [PRF] (Algorithm 1). As
specified in the change notice (page 74), when Algorithm 1 is used
as a general-purpose pseudo-random number generator, the "mod q"
term in step 3.3 is omitted. The function G used in the algorithm is
constructed via Secure Hash Standard as specified in Appendix 3.3 of
the standard. It should be noted that the function G is very similar
to SHA-1, but the message padding is different. Please refer to
[PRF] for full details. For convenience, the random number algorithm
with the correct modification is cited in Annex B.
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160-bit XKEY and XVAL values are used, so b = 160. On each full
authentication, the Master Key is used as the initial secret seed-
key XKEY. The optional user input values (XSEED_j) in step 3.1 are
set to zero.
The resulting 320-bit random numbers x_0, x_1, ..., x_m-1 are
concatenated and partitioned into suitable-sized chunks and used as
keys in the following order: K_encr (128 bits), K_aut (128 bits),
Master Session Key (64 bytes), Extended Master Session Key (64
bytes).
On re-authentication, the same pseudo-random number generator can be
used to generate a new Master Session Key and new Initialization
Vectors. The seed value XKEY' is calculated as follows:
XKEY' = SHA1(Identity|RAND| MK) (1) or
XKEY' = SHA1(Identity|RANDU| MK) (2)
In the formula above, the formula selection is based on the type of
cdma challenge. The formula (1) is slected when the server determins
that global challenge is used, the formula (2) is slected when the
server determins that unique challenge is used. The Identity denotes
the re-authentication identity, without any terminating null
characters, from the AT_IDENTITY attribute of the
EAP-Response/UIM/Start packet, or, if EAP-Response/UIM/Start was
not used on re-authentication, the identity string from the
EAP-Response/Identity packet. The RAND denotes the 32bits RAND value
from the AT_RAND attribute used in the
EAP-Request/UIM/Re-authentication packet.The RANDU
denotes the 24bits RANDU value from the AT_RANDU attribute
used in the EAP-Request/UIM/Re-authentication packet. The MK is
the Master Key derived on the preceding full authentication.
The pseudo-random number generator is run with the new seed value
XKEY', and the resulting 320-bit random numbers x_0, x_1, ...,
x_m-1 are concatenated and partitioned into 64-byte chunks and
used as the new 64-byte Master Session Key and the new 64-byte
Extended Master Session Key.
The first 32 bytes of the MSK can be used as the Pairwise Master Key
(PMK) for IEEE 802.11i.
When the RADIUS attributes specified in [RFC 2548] are used to
transport keying material, then the first 32 bytes of the MSK
correspond to MS-MPPE-RECV-KEY and the second 32 bytes to MS-MPPE-
SEND-KEY. In this case, only 64 bytes of keying material (the MSK)
are used.
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5. Message Format and Protocol Extensibility
5.1. Message Format
As specified in [EAP], EAP packets begin with the Code, Identifiers,
Length, and Type fields, which are followed by EAP method specific
Type-Data. The Code field in the EAP header is set to 1 for EAP
requests, and to 2 for EAP Responses. The usage of the Length and
Identifier fields in the EAP header are also specified in [EAP]. In
EAP/CAVE, the Type field is set to xx.
In EAP/CAVE, the Type-Data begins with an EAP/CAVE header that
consists of a 1-octet Subtype field and a 2-octet reserved field.
The Subtype values used in EAP/CAVE are defined in Section 8. The
formats of the EAP header and the EAP/CAVE header are shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Subtype | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The rest of the Type-Data, immediately following the EAP/CAVE header,
consists of attributes that are encoded in Type, Length, Value
format. The figure below shows the generic format of an attribute.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Attribute Type
Indicates the particular type of attribute. The attribute type
values are listed in Section 8.
Length
Indicates the length of this attribute in multiples of four
bytes. The maximum length of an attribute is 1024 bytes. The
length includes the Attribute Type and Length bytes.
Value
The particular data associated with this attribute. This field is
always included and it may be two or more bytes in length. The
type and length fields determine the format and length of the
value field.
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Attributes numbered within the range 0 through 127 are called non-
skippable attributes. When an EAP/CAVE peer encounters a non-
skippable attribute that the peer does not recognize, the peer MUST
send the EAP-Response/UIM/Client-Error packet which terminates the
authentication exchange. If an EAP/CAVE server encounters a non-
skippable attribute that the server does not recognize, then the
server sends the EAP Failure packet which terminates the
authentication exchange.
Attributes within the range of 128 through 255 are called skippable
attributes. When a skippable attribute is encountered that is not
recognized it is ignored. The rest of the attributes and message
data MUST still be processed. The Length field of the attribute is
used to skip the attribute value in searching for the next
attribute.
Unless otherwise specified, the order of the attributes in an
EAP/CAVE message is insignificant and an EAP/CAVE implementation
should not assume a certain order to be used.
Attributes can be encapsulated within other attributes. In other
words, the value field of an attribute type can be specified to
contain other attributes.
5.2. Protocol Extensibility
EAP/CAVE can be extended by specifying new attribute types. If
skippable attributes are used, it is possible to extend the protocol
without breaking old implementations. However, any new attributes
added to the EAP-Request/UIM/Start or EAP-Response/UIM/Start packets
would not be integrity protected. Therefore, these messages MUST NOT
be extended in the current version of EAP/CAVE.
When specifying new attributes, it should be noted that EAP/CAVE does
not support message fragmentation. Hence, the sizes of the new
extensions MUST be limited so that the maximum transfer unit (MTU)
of the underlying lower layer is not exceeded. According to [EAP],
lower layers must provide an EAP MTU of 1020 bytes or greater, so
any extensions to EAP/CAVE SHOULD NOT exceed the EAP MTU of 1020
bytes.
Because EAP/CAVE supports version negotiation, new versions of the
protocol can also be specified by using a new version number.
6. Messages
This section specifies the messages used in EAP/CAVE. It specifies
when a message may be transmitted or accepted, which attributes are
allowed in a message, which attributes are required in a message,
and other message specific details. The general message format is
specified in Section 5.1.
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6.1. EAP-Request/UIM/Start
In full authentication the first CAVE specific EAP Request is EAP-
Request/UIM/Start. The EAP/UIM/Start roundtrip is used for two
purposes. In full authentication this packet is used to request the
peer to send the AT_NONCE_MT attribute to the server. In addition,
as specified in Section 4.2, the Start round trip may be used by the
server for obtaining the peer identity and ESN value of the peer.
As discussed in Section 4.2, several Start rounds may be required
in order to obtain a valid peer identity.
The server MUST always include the AT_VERSION_LIST attribute.
The server MAY include one of the following identity requesting
attributes: AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ, AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ, and
AT_ANY_ID_REQ. These three attributes are mutually exclusive, so the
server MUST NOT include more than one of the attributes.
If the server has received a response from the peer, it MUST NOT
issue a new EAP-Request/UIM/Start packet if it has either previously
issued an EAP-Request/UIM/Start message without any identity
requesting attributes or with the AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ attribute.
If the server has received a response from the peer, it MUST NOT
issue a new EAP-Request/UIM/Start packet with the AT_ANY_ID_REQ or
AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ attributes if it has previously issued an EAP-
Request/UIM/Start message with the AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ attribute
If the server has received a response from the peer, it MUST NOT
issue a new EAP-Request/UIM/Start packet with the AT_ANY_ID_REQ
attribute if the server has previously issued an EAP-
Request/UIM/Start message with the AT_ANY_ID_REQ attribute.
This message MUST NOT include AT_MAC, AT_IV, or AT_ENCR_DATA.
6.2. EAP-Response/UIM/Start
The peer sends EAP-Response/SIM/Start in response to a valid EAP-
Request/SIM/Start from the server.
If and only if the server's EAP-Request/UIM/Start includes one of
the identity requesting attributes, then the peer MUST include the
AT_IDENTITY attribute. The usage of AT_IDENITY is defined in Section
4.2.
The AT_NONCE_MT attribute MUST NOT be included if the AT_IDENTITY
with a re-authentication identity is present for re-authentication.
AT_NONCE_MT MUST be included in all other cases (full
authentication).
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The AT_ESN attribute must be including if the server's EAP-
Request/UIM/Start do not include the identity requesting attribute
or the permanent identity of the peer is included in the EAP-
Response/UIM/Start packet.
The AT_SELECTED_VERSION attribute MUST NOT be included if the
AT_IDENTITY attribute with a re-authentication identity is present
for re-authentication. In all other cases, AT_SELECTED_VERSION MUST
be included (full authentication). This attribute is used in version
negotiation, as specified in Section 4.1.
This message MUST NOT include AT_MAC, AT_IV, or AT_ENCR_DATA.
6.3. EAP-Request/UIM/Challenge
The server sends the EAP-Request/UIM/Challenge after receiving a
valid EAP-Response/UIM/Start, containing AT_NONCE_MT, AT_ESN and
AT_SELECTED_VERSION, and after successfully obtaining the subscriber
identity.
The AT_RAND or AT_RANDU attribute MUST be included. The selection of
the AT_RAND or AT_RANDU attribute is based on the way of challenge,
i.e., global challenge or unique challenge is selected.
The AT_MAC attribute MUST be included. For EAP-
Request/UIM/Challenge, the MAC code is calculated over the following
data:
EAP packet| NONCE_MT
The EAP packet is represented as specified in Section 5.1. It is
followed by the 16-byte NONCE_MT value from the peer's AT_NONCE_MT
attribute.
6.4. EAP-Response/UIM/Challenge
The peer sends EAP-Response/UIM/Challenge in response to a valid
EAP-Request/UIM/Challenge.
The AT_MAC attribute MUST be included. For EAP-
Response/UIM/Challenge, when the AT_RANDU attribute is included in
the EAP_Request/UIM/Challenge, the MAC code is calculated over the
following data:
EAP packet| AUTHU
The EAP packet is represented as specified in Section 5.1. The EAP
packet bytes are immediately followed by one AUTHU
values concatenated. The AUTHU is the response of AT_RANDU.
For EAP-Response/UIM/Challenge, when the AT_RAND attribute is
included in the EAP_Request/UIM/Challenge,the MAC code is calculated
over the EAP packet and AT_AUTHR attribute must be included.
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6.5. EAP-Request/UIM/Re-authentication
The server sends the EAP-Request/UIM/Re-authentication message if it
wants to use re-authentication, and if it has received a valid re-
authentication identity in EAP-Response/Identity or EAP-
Response/UIM/Start.
AT_MAC MUST be included. No message-specific data is included in the
MAC calculation. See Section 7.2.
The AT_IV and AT_ENCR_DATA attributes MUST be included. The
plaintext consists of the following nested encrypted attributes,
which MUST be included: AT_RANDU or AT_RAND. The selection of
the AT_RAND or AT_RANDU attribute is based on the way of challenge,
i.e., global challenge or unique challenge is selected.In addition,
the nested encrypted attributes MAY include the following
attributes: AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID and AT_PADDING.
6.6. EAP-Response/UIM/Re-authentication
The client sends the EAP-Response/UIM/Re-authentication packet in
response to a valid EAP-Request/UIM/Re-authentication.
The AT_MAC attribute MUST be included. For EAP-Response/UIM/Re-
authentication, the MAC code is calculated over the following data:
EAP packet| AUTHR or AUTHU
The EAP packet is represented as specified in Section 5.1. It is
followed by the 3-byte AUTHR or AUTHU value, which is the response
to the RAND or RANDU value.
The AT_IV and AT_ENCR_DATA attributes may be included. The
AT_PADDING attribute MAY be included.
6.7. EAP-Request/UIM/Update
The server sends the EAP-Request/UIM/Update if the server agree to
executes SSD update procedure based on the received information from
the Authentication Center.
AT_MAC MUST be included. No message-specific data is included in the
MAC calculation. See Section 7.2.
The AT_RANDSSD must be included.
6.8. EAP-Response/UIM/Update-server-challenge
The peer sends the EAP-Response/UIM/Update-server-challenge packet
in response to a valid EAP-Request/UIM/Update.
AT_MAC MUST be included. No message-specific data is included in the
MAC calculation. See Section 7.2.
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AT_RANDBS MUST be included.
6.9. EAP-Request/UIM/Update-server-challenge
The server sends the EAP-Request/UIM/Update-server-challenge packet
in response to a valid EAP-Response/UIM/Update-server-challenge.
The AT_MAC attribute MUST be included. For EAP-
request/UIM/Update-server-challenge, the MAC code is calculated over
the following data:
EAP packet| AUTHBS
The EAP packet is represented as specified in Section 5.1. The EAP
packet bytes are immediately followed by one AUTHBS which is
obtained from the Authentication Center.
6.10. EAP-Response/UIM/Update-Client-Success
The peer sends the EAP-Response/UIM/Update-Client-Success packet
in response to a valid EAP-Request/UIM/Update-server-challenge.
AT_MAC MUST be included. No message-specific data is included in the
MAC calculation. See Section 7.2.
AT_SSD_UPDATE_SUCCESS MUST be included.
6.11. EAP-Request/UIM/Update-challenge
The Server sends the EAP-Request/UIM/Update-challenge packet
in response to a valid EAP-Response/UIM/Update-client-success.
AT_MAC MUST be included. No message-specific data is included in the
MAC calculation. See Section 7.2.
AT_RANDU MUST be included.
6.12. EAP-Response/UIM/Update-challenge
The peer sends the EAP-Response/UIM/Update-challenge packet
in response to a valid EAP-Request/UIM/Update-challenge.
The AT_MAC attribute MUST be included. For EAP-
response/UIM/Update-challenge, the MAC code is calculated over
the following data:
EAP packet| AUTHU
The EAP packet is represented as specified in Section 5.1. The EAP
packet bytes are immediately followed by one AUTHU values
concatenated.
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6.13. EAP-Response/UIM/Client-Error
The peer sends EAP-Response/UIM/Client-Error in error cases, as
specified in Section 4.6.1.
The AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE attribute MUST be included.
The AT_MAC, AT_IV, or AT_ENCR_DATA attributes MUST NOT be used with
this packet.
6.14. EAP-Request/UIM/Notification
The usage of this message is specified in Section 4.5.
The AT_NOTIFICATION attribute MUST be included.
The AT_MAC attribute is included in cases discussed in Section 4.5.
No message-specific data is included in the MAC calculation. See
Section 7.2.
Later versions of this protocol MAY make use of the AT_ENCR_DATA and
AT_IV attributes in this message to include encrypted (skippable)
attributes. These attributes MAY be included only if the P bit of
the notification code in AT_NOTIFICATION is set to zero.
6.15. EAP-Response/UIM/Notification
The usage of this message is specified in Section 4.5. Because this
packet is only an acknowledgement of EAP-Request/UIM/Notification,
it does not contain any mandatory attributes.
The AT_MAC attribute is included in cases described in Section 4.5.
No message-specific data is included in the MAC calculation, see
Section 7.2.
Later versions of this protocol MAY make use of the AT_ENCR_DATA and
AT_IV attributes in this message to include encrypted (skippable)
attributes. These attributes MAY be included only if the P bit of
the notification code in the AT_NOTIFICATION attribute of the
server's EAP-Request/UIM/Notification packet is set to zero.
7. Attributes
This section specifies the format of message attributes. The
attribute type numbers are specified in Section 8.
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7.1. Table of Attributes
The following table provides a guide to which attributes may be
found in which kinds of messages, and in what quantity. Messages are
denoted with numbers in parentheses as follows: (1) EAP-
Request/UIM/Start, (2) EAP-Response/UIM/Start, (3) EAP-
Request/UIM/Challenge, (4) EAP-Response/UIM/Challenge, (5) EAP-
Request/UIM/Notification, (6) EAP-Response/UIM/Notification, (7)
EAP-Response/UIM/Client-Error,(8) EAP-Request/UIM/Re-authentication,
(9) EAP-Response/UIM/Re-authentication, (10) EAP-Request/UIM/Update,
(11) EAP-Response/UIM/Update-Server-challenge, (12) EAP-Request/UIM/
Update-Server-Challenge, (13) EAP-Response/UIM/Update-Client-Success
, (14) EAP-Request/UIM/Update-Challenge and (15) EAP-Response/UIM/
Update-Challenge. The column denoted with
"Encr" indicates whether the attribute is a nested attribute that
MUST be included within AT_ENCR_DATA, and the column denoted with
"Skip" indicates whether the attribute is a skippable attribute.
"0" indicates that the attribute MUST NOT be included in the
message, "1" indicates that the attribute MUST be included in the
message, "0-1" indicates that the attribute is sometimes included in
the message, and "0*" indicates that the attribute is not included
in the message in cases specified in this document, but MAY be
included in the future versions of the protocol.
Attribute (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Encr Skip
AT_MAC 0 0 1 1 0-1 0-1 0 1 1 N N
AT_IV 0 0 0 0 0* 0* 0 1 1 N Y
AT_ENCR_DATA 0 0 0 0 0* 0* 0 1 1 N Y
AT_PADDING 0 0 0 0 0* 0* 0 0-1 0-1 Y N
AT_VERSION_LIST 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_SELECTED_VERSION 0 0-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_NONCE_MT 0 0-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ 0-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_ANY_ID_REQ 0-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ 0-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_IDENTITY 0 0-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_RAND 0 0 0-1 0 0 0 0 0-1 0 N N
AT_RANDU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0-1 0 N N
AT_RANDSSD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_RANDBS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_ESN 0 0-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_AUTHR 0 0 0 0-1 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0-1 0 Y Y
AT_NOTIFICATION 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 N N
AT_SSD_UPDATE_SUCCESS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
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Attribute (10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15) Encr Skip
AT_MAC 1 1 1 1 1 1 N N
AT_IV 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_ENCR_DATA 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_PADDING 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_VERSION_LIST 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_SELECTED_VERSION 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_NONCE_MT 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_ANY_ID_REQ 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_IDENTITY 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_RAND 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_RANDU 0 0 0 0 1 0 N N
AT_RANDSSD 1 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_RANDBS 0 1 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_ESN 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_AUTHR 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_SSD_UPDATE_SUCCESS 0 0 0 1 0 0 N N
AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_NOTIFICATION 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N
It should be noted that attributes AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ,
AT_ANY_ID_REQ and AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ are mutually exclusive, so that
only one of them can be included at the same time. In
re-authentication and full authentication, the attributes AT_RAND
and AT_RANDU are mutually exclusive, only one of them can be
included at the same time. If one of the attributes AT_IV and
AT_ENCR_DATA is included, then both of the attributes MUST be
included.
7.2. AT_MAC
The AT_MAC attribute is used for EAP/CAVE message authentication.
Section 6 specifies which messages AT_MAC MUST be included.
The value field of the AT_MAC attribute contains two reserved bytes
followed by a keyed message authentication code (MAC). The MAC is
calculated over the whole EAP packet concatenated with optional
message-specific data, with the exception that the value field of
the MAC attribute is set to zero when calculating the MAC. The EAP
packet includes the EAP header that begins with the Code field, the
EAP/CAVE header that begins with the Subtype field, and all the
attributes, as specified in Section 5.1. The reserved bytes in
AT_MAC are set to zero when sending and ignored on reception. The
contents of the message-specific data that may be included in the
MAC calculation are specified separately for each EAP/CAVE message in
Section 6.
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The format of the AT_MAC attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_MAC | Length = 5 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| MAC |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The MAC algorithm is HMAC-SHA1-128 [RFC 2104] keyed hash value. (The
HMAC-SHA1-128 value is obtained from the 20-byte HMAC-SHA1 value by
truncating the output to 16 bytes. Hence, the length of the MAC is
16 bytes.) The derivation of the authentication key (K_aut) used in
the calculation of the MAC is specified in Section 4.7.
When the AT_MAC attribute is included in an EAP/CAVE message, the
recipient MUST process the AT_MAC attribute before looking at any
other attributes. If the message authentication code is invalid,
then the recipient MUST ignore all other attributes in the message
and operate as specified in Section 4.6.
7.3. AT_IV, AT_ENCR_DATA and AT_PADDING
AT_IV and AT_ENCR_DATA attributes can be used to transmit encrypted
information between the EAP/CAVE peer and server.
The value field of AT_IV contains two reserved bytes followed by a
16-byte initialization vector required by the AT_ENCR_DATA
attribute. The reserved bytes are set to zero when sending and
ignored on reception. The AT_IV attribute MUST be included if and
only if the AT_ENCR_DATA is included. Section 4.6 specifies the
operation if a packet that does not meet this condition is
encountered.
The sender of the AT_IV attribute chooses the initialization vector
by random. The sender MUST NOT reuse the initialization vector value
from previous EAP CAVE packets and the sender MUST choose it freshly
for each AT_IV attribute. The sender SHOULD use a good source of
randomness to generate the initialization vector. Please see [RFC
1750] for more information about generating random numbers for
security applications. The format of AT_IV is shown below.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_IV | Length = 5 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Initialization Vector |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute consists of two
reserved bytes followed by cipher text bytes encrypted using the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [AES] in the Cipher Block
Chaining (CBC) mode of operation using the initialization vector
from the AT_IV attribute. The reserved bytes are set to zero when
sending and ignored on reception. Please see [CBC] for a description
of the CBC mode. The format of the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute is shown
below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_ENCR_DATA | Length | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Encrypted Data .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The derivation of the encryption key (K_encr) is specified in
Section 4.7.
The plaintext consists of nested EAP/CAVE attributes.
The encryption algorithm requires the length of the plaintext to be
a multiple of 16 bytes. The sender may need to include the
AT_PADDING attribute as the last attribute within AT_ENCR_DATA. The
AT_PADDING attribute is not included if the total length of other
nested attributes within the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute is a multiple of
16 bytes. As usual, the Length of the Padding attribute includes the
Attribute Type and Attribute Length fields. The length of the
Padding attribute is 4, 8 or 12 bytes. It is chosen so that the
length of the value field of the AT_ENCR_DATA attribute becomes a
multiple of 16 bytes. The actual pad bytes in the value field are
set to zero (0x00) on sending. The recipient of the message MUST
verify that the pad bytes are set to zero. If this verification
fails on the peer, then it MUST send the EAP-Response/UIM/Client-
Error packet with the error code "unable to process packet" to
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terminate the authentication exchange. If this verification fails on
the server, then the server sends EAP Failure to terminate the
authentication exchange. The format of the AT_PADDING attribute is
shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_PADDING | Length | Padding... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
7.4. AT_VERSION_LIST
The format of the AT_VERSION_LIST attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_VERSION_L..| Length | Actual Version List Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Supported Version 1 | Supported Version 2 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
. .
. .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Supported Version N | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
This attribute is used in version negotiation, as specified in
Section 4.1. The attribute contains the version numbers supported by
the EAP/CAVE server. The server MUST only include versions that it
implements and that are allowed in its security policy. The server
SHOULD list the versions in the order of preference, most preferred
versions first. At least one version number MUST be included. The
version number for the protocol described in this document is one
(0x0001).
The value field of this attribute begins with 2-byte Actual Version
List Length, which specifies the length of the Version List in
bytes, not including the Actual Version List Length attribute
length. This field is followed by the list of the versions supported
by the server, which each have a length of 2 bytes. For example, if
there is only one supported version, then the Actual Version List
Length is 2. Because the length of the attribute must be a multiple
of 4 bytes, the sender pads the value field with zero bytes when
necessary.
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7.5. AT_SELECTED_VERSION
The format of the AT_SELECTED_VERSION attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_SELECTED...| Length = 1 | Selected Version |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
This attribute is used in version negotiation, as specified in
Section 4.1. The value field of this attribute contains a two-byte
version number, which indicates the EAP/CAVE version that the peer
wants to use.
7.6. AT_NONCE_MT
The format of the AT_NONCE_MT attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|AT_NONCE_MT | Length = 5 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| NONCE_MT |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of the NONCE_MT attribute contains two reserved
bytes followed by a random number generated by the peer (16 bytes
long) freshly for this EAP/CAVE authentication exchange. The random
number is used as a seed value for the new keying material. The
reserved bytes are set to zero upon sending and ignored upon
reception.
The peer MUST choose the NONCE_MT value freshly for each EAP/CAVE
authentication exchange. If an EAP/CAVE exchange includes several
EAP/UIM/Start rounds, then the peer MAY use the same NONCE_MT value
in all EAP-Response/UIM/Start packets. The peer SHOULD use a good
source of randomness to generate NONCE_MT. Please see [RFC 1750] for
more information about generating random numbers for security
applications.
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7.7. AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ
The format of the AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|AT_PERM..._REQ | Length = 1 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The use of the AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ is defined in Section 4.2. The
value field only contains two reserved bytes, which are set to zero
on sending and ignored on reception.
7.8. AT_ANY_ID_REQ
The format of the AT_ANY_ID_REQ attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|AT_ANY_ID_REQ | Length = 1 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The use of the AT_ANY_ID_REQ is defined in Section 4.2. The value
field only contains two reserved bytes, which are set to zero on
sending and ignored on reception.
7.9. AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ
The format of the AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|AT_ANY_ID_REQ | Length = 1 | Reserved |
+---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
The use of the AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ is defined in Section 4.2. The
value field only contains two reserved bytes, which are set to zero
on sending and ignored on reception.
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7.10. AT_IDENTITY
The format of the AT_IDENTITY attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_IDENTITY | Length | Actual Identity Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Identity (optional) .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The use of the AT_IDENTITY is defined in Section 4.2. The value
field of this attribute begins with 2-byte actual identity length,
which specifies the length of the identity in bytes. This field is
followed by the subscriber identity of the indicated actual length.
The identity is the permanent identity, a pseudonym identity or a
re-authentication identity. The identity format is specified in
Section 4.2.1. The same identity format is used in the AT_IDENTITY
attribute and the EAP-Response/Identity packet, with the exception
that the peer MUST NOT decorate the identity it includes in
AT_IDENTITY. The identity does not include any terminating null
characters. Because the length of the attribute must be a multiple
of 4 bytes, the sender pads the identity with zero bytes when
necessary.
7.11. AT_RAND
The format of the AT_RAND attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_RAND | Length =2 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| RAND |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of this attribute contains two reserved bytes
followed by the RAND (4 bytes). The reserved bytes are
set to zero upon sending and ignored upon reception.
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7.12. AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID
The format of the AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_NEXT_REAU..| Length | Actual Re-Auth Identity Length|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. Next Re-authentication Username .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of this attribute begins with 2-byte actual re-
authentication identity length which specifies the length of the
following re-authentication identity in bytes. This field is
followed by a re-authentication identity that the peer can use in
the next re-authentication, as described in Section 4.3. In
environments where a realm portion is required, the re-
authentication identity includes both a username portion and a realm
name portion. The re-authentication identity does not include any
terminating null characters. Because the length of the attribute
must be a multiple of 4 bytes, the sender pads the re-authentication
identity with zero bytes when necessary. The identity encoding MUST
follow the UTF-8 transformation format [RFC2279].
7.13. AT_RANDU
The format of the AT_RANDU attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_RANDU | Length=2 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | RANDU |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of this attribute contains three reserved bytes
followed by the RANDU (3 bytes). The reserved bytes are
set to zero upon sending and ignored upon reception.
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7.14. AT_RANDBS
The format of the AT_RANDBS attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_RANDBS | Length=2 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| RANDBS |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of this attribute contains three reserved bytes
followed by the RANDBS (4 bytes). The reserved bytes are
set to zero upon sending and ignored upon reception.
7.15. AT_RANDSSD
The format of the AT_RANDSSD attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_RANDSSD | Length = 3 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| RANDSSD |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of the AT_RANDSSD attribute contains three reserved
bytes followed by a random number generated by the AC (7 bytes)
freshly for this EAP/CAVE SSD Update. The random number is
used as a seed for the new SSD. The reserved bytes are set to zero
upon sending and ignored upon reception.
7.16. AT_NOTIFICATION
The format of the AT_NOTIFICATION attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|AT_NOTIFICATION| Length = 1 |F|P| Notification Code |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of this attribute contains a two-byte notification
code. The first and second bit (F and P) of the notification code
are interpreted as described in Section 4.5.
The notification code values listed below have been reserved. The
descriptions below illustrate the semantics of the notifications.
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The peer implementation MAY use different wordings when presenting
the notifications to the user. The "requested service" depends on
the environment where EAP/CAVE is applied.
1026 - User has been temporarily denied access to the requested
service. (Implies failure, used after the challenge round)
1031 - User has not subscribed to the requested service (implies
failure, used after the challenge round)
7.17. AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE
The format of the AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|AT_CLIENT_ERR..| Length = 1 | Client Error Code |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of this attribute contains a two-byte client error
code. The following error code values have been reserved.
0 "unable to process packet": a general error code
1 "unsupported version": the peer does not support any of
the versions listed in AT_VERSION_LIST
2 "insufficient number of challenges": the peer's policy
requires more triplets than the server included in AT_RAND
3 "RAND are not fresh": the peer believes that the RAND
challenges included in AT_RAND were not fresh
7.18. AT_SSD_UPDATE_SUCCESS
The format of the AT_SSD_UPDATE_SUCCESS attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|AT_SSD_UP_SUC | Length = 1 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The use of the AT_SSD_UPDATE_SUCCESS is defined in Section 4.4. The
value field only contains two reserved bytes, which are set to zero
on sending and ignored on reception.
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The format of the AT_ESN attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_ESN | Length=2 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ESN |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of this attribute contains two reserved bytes
followed by the ESN (4 bytes). The reserved bytes are
set to zero upon sending and ignored upon reception.
7.20. AT_AUTHR
The format of the AT_AUTHR attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_AUTHR | Length=2 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | AUTHR |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value field of this attribute contains three reserved bytes
followed by the AUTHR (3 bytes). The reserved bytes are
set to zero upon sending and ignored upon reception.
8. IANA Considerations
The realm name "owlan.org" has been reserved for NAI realm names
generated from the IMSI.
EAP/CAVE messages include a Subtype field. The following Subtypes are
temporarily specified:
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Start..........................................10
Challenge......................................11
Notification...................................12
Re-authentication..............................13
Client-Error...................................14
Update.........................................15
Update_server_challenge........................16
Update_Client_success..........................17
Update_Challenge...............................18
The Subtype-specific data is composed of attributes, which have
attribute type numbers. The following attribute types are
temporarily specified:
AT_RAND.........................................1
AT_PADDING......................................6
AT_NONCE_MT.....................................7
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ............................10
AT_MAC.........................................11
AT_NOTIFICATION................................12
AT_ANY_ID_REQ..................................13
AT_IDENTITY....................................14
AT_VERSION_LIST................................15
AT_SELECTED_VERSION............................16
AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ.............................17
AT_RANDU.......................................19
AT_RANDSSD.....................................20
AT_RANDBS......................................22
AT_ESN.........................................24
AT_AUTHR.......................................26
AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE...........................28
AT_IV.........................................129
AT_ENCR_DATA..................................130
AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID.............................133
The AT_NOTIFICATION attribute contains a notification code value.
Values 1024, 1026 and 1031 have been specified in Section 7.16 of
this document.
The AT_VERSION_LIST and AT_SELECTED_VERSION attributes contain
version numbers. Version 1 has been specified in Section 7.4 of this
document.
The AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE attribute contains a client error code.
Values 0, 1, 2 and 3 have been specified in Section 7.17 of this
document.
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All requests for value assignment from the various number spaces
described in this document require proper documentation, according
to the "Specification Required" policy described in [RFC 2434].
Requests must be specified in sufficient detail so that
interoperability between independent implementations is possible.
Possible forms of documentation include, but are not limited to,
RFCs, the products of another standards body (e.g. 3GPP2), or
permanently and readily available vendor design notes.
9. Security Considerations
The EAP base protocol [EAP] highlights several attacks that are
possible against the EAP protocol as there is no inherent security
mechanisms provided. This section discusses the claimed security
properties of EAP CAVE as well as vulnerabilities and security
recommendations.
9.1. Identity Protection
EAP/CAVE includes optional identity privacy support that protects the
privacy of the subscriber identity against passive eavesdropping.
The mechanism cannot be used on the first EAP exchange with a given
server, because the permanent identity will have to be sent in the
clear. The terminal SHOULD store the pseudonym in a non-volatile
memory so that it can be maintained across reboots. An active
attacker that impersonates the network may use the
AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ attribute to attempt to learn the subscriber's
permanent identity. However, as discussed in Section 4.2.2, the
terminal can refuse to send the cleartext permanent identity if it
believes that the network should be able to recognize the pseudonym.
If the peer and server cannot guarantee that the pseudonym will be
maintained reliably and identity privacy is required then additional
protection from an external security mechanism such as Protected
Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP) [PEAP] may be used. If an
external security mechanism is in use the identity privacy features
of EAP-CAVE may not be useful. The security considerations of using
an external security mechanism with EAP-CAVE are beyond the scope of
this document.
9.2. Mutual Authentication
EAP/CAVE provides mutual authentication. The peer believes that the
network is authentic because the network can calculate a correct
AT_MAC value in the EAP-Request/UIM/Challenge packet.
Since the security of EAP/CAVE is based on the secrecy of CMEA key.
care should be taken not to expose these values to attackers when
they are transmitted between entities, stored or handled. Steps
should be taken to limit the transport, storage and handling of
this values outside a protected environment. These considerations
are important at both the peer and EAP server implementations.
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9.3. Key Derivation
EAP/CAVE supports key derivation. The key hierarchy is specified in
Section 4.7. The actual strength of the resulting keys depends,
among other things, on some operator specific parameters including
authentication algorithms, the strength of the A-key, and the
quality of the RAND or RANDU challenges. Because the strength of
the CMEA key is 64 bits, the ultimate strength of any derived secret
key material is never more than 64 bits.
The EAP Transient Keys used to protect EAP CAVE
packets (K_encr, K_aut) and the Master Session Key are
cryptographically separate. An attacker cannot derive any non-
trivial information from K_encr or K_aut based on the Master Session
Key or vice versa. An attacker also cannot calculate the pre-shared
secret from the cdma CMEA key used, EAP CAVE K_encr, EAP CAVE K_aut, or
from the Master Session Key.
Each EAP/CAVE exchange generates fresh keying material. The EAP CAVE
peer contributes to the keying material with the NONCE_MT parameter,
which must be chosen freshly for each exchange.
9.4. Dictionary Attacks
Because EAP/CAVE is not a password protocol, it is not vulnerable to
dictionary attacks. (The pre-shared symmetric secret stored on the
UIM card shall not be a weak password.)
9.5. Credentials Reuse
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9.6. Integrity and Replay Protection, and Confidentiality
AT_MAC, AT_IV and AT_ENCR_DATA attributes are used to provide
integrity, replay and confidentiality protection for EAP/CAVE
requests and responses. Integrity protection includes the EAP
header. These attributes cannot be used during the EAP/UIM/Start
roundtrip. However, the protocol values (identity, NONCE_MT and
version negotiation parameters) are protected by later EAP/CAVE
messages.
Integrity protection (AT_MAC) is based on a keyed message
authentication code. Confidentiality (AT_ENCR_DATA and AT_IV) is
based on a block cipher.
On full authentication, replay protection is provided by the RAND
or RANDU values from the underlying cdma authentication scheme and
the use of the NONCE_MT value. On re-authentication, a similar way
is used to provide replay protection.
Contents of the EAP-Response/Identity packet are implicitly
integrity protected by including them in key derivation.
Because EAP/CAVE is not a tunneling method, EAP Notification, EAP
Success or EAP Failure packets are not confidential, integrity
protected or replay protected in EAP/CAVE. On physically insecure
networks, this may enable an attacker to send false notifications to
the peer and to mount denial of service attacks by spoofing these
packets.
An eavesdropper will see the EAP Notification, EAP Success and EAP
Failure packets sent in the clear. With EAP CAVE, confidential
information MUST NOT be transmitted in EAP Notification packets.
9.7. Negotiation Attacks
EAP/CAVE does not protect the EAP-Response/Nak packet. Because
EAP/CAVE does not protect the EAP method negotiation, EAP method
downgrading attacks may be possible, especially if the user uses the
same identity with EAP/CAVE and other EAP methods.
EAP/CAVE includes a version negotiation procedure. In EAP/CAVE the
keying material derivation includes the version list and selected
version to ensure that the protocol cannot be downgraded and that
the peer and server use the same version of EAP/CAVE.
As described in Section 5, EAP/CAVE allows the protocol to be
extended by defining new attribute types. When defining such
attributes, it should noted that any extra attributes included in
EAP-Request/UIM/Start or EAP-Response/UIM/Start packets are not
included in the MACs later on, and thus some other precautions must
be taken to avoid modifications to them.
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EAP/CAVE does not support ciphersuite negotiation.
9.8. Fast Reconnect
EAP/CAVE includes an optional re-authentication ("fast reconnect")
procedure, as recommended in [EAP] for EAP types that are intended
for physically insecure networks.
9.9. Acknowledged Result Indications
EAP/CAVE does not provide acknowledged or integrity protected Success
or Failure indications.
If an EAP Success or EAP Failure packet is lost when using EAP/CAVE
over an unreliable medium and if the protocol over which EAP/CAVE is
transported does not address the possible loss of Success or
Failure, then the peer and EAP server may end up having a different
interpretation of the state of the authentication conversation.
On physically insecure networks, an attacker may mount denial of
service attacks by sending false EAP Success or EAP Failure
indications. However, the attacker cannot force the peer or the EAP
server to believe successful authentication has occurred when mutual
authentication failed or has not happened yet.
9.10. Man-in-the-middle Attacks
In order to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks and session hijacking,
user data SHOULD be integrity protected on physically insecure
networks. The EAP/CAVE Master Session Key or keys derived from it MAY
be used as the integrity protection keys, or, if an external
security mechanism such as PEAP is used, then the link integrity
protection keys MAY be derived by the external security mechanism.
There are man-in-the-middle attacks associated with the use of any
EAP method within a tunneled protocol such as PEAP, or within a
sequence of EAP methods followed by each other. This specification
does not address these attacks. If EAP/CAVE is used with a tunneling
protocol or as part of a sequence of methods, there should be
cryptographic binding provided between the protocols and EAP/CAVE to
prevent man-in-the-middle attacks through rogue authenticators being
able to setup one-way authenticated tunnels. The EAP/CAVE Master
Session Key MAY be used to provide the cryptographic binding.
However the mechanism how the binding is provided depends on the
tunneling or sequencing protocol and is beyond the scope of this
document.
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9.11. Generating Random Numbers
An EAP/CAVE implementation SHOULD use a good source of randomness to
generate the random numbers required in the protocol. Please see
[RFC 1750] for more information on generating random numbers for
security applications.
10. Security Claims
This section provides the security claims required by [EAP].
[a] Intended use. EAP CAVE is intended for use over both physically
insecure networks and physically or otherwise secure networks.
Applicable media include but are not limited to PPP, IEEE 802 wired
networks and IEEE 802.11.
[b] Mechanism. EAP CAVE is based on the cama CAVE mechanism, which is a
challenge/response authentication and key agreement mechanism based
on a symmetric 64-bit pre-shared secret. EAP CAVE also makes use of
a peer challenge to provide mutual authentication.
[c] Security claims. The security properties of the method are
discussed in Section 9.
[d] Key strength. EAP CAVE supports key derivation with 64-bit
effective key strength. However, as discussed in Section 9, if the
same credentials are used in cdma and in EAP/CAVE, then the key
strength may be reduced considerably, basically to the same level as
in cdma, by mounting attacks over cdma. For example an active
attack using a false cdma base station reduces the effective key
strength to almost zero.
[e] Description of key hierarchy. Please see Section 4.7.
[f] Indication of vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities are discussed in
Section 9.
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11. Acknowledgements and Contributions
11.1. Contributors
In addition to the editors, Nora Dabbous, JunHyuk Song, and
Jian Wang were significant contributors to this document.
11.2. Acknowledgements
This protocol has been partly developed based on the EAP SIM
[EAP SIM], and hence this specification incorporates many ideas from
Jari Arkko.
Normative References
[3GPP2 S.S0053] 3GPP2 Technical Specification 3GPP2 S.S0053 V1.0:
"Common Cryptographic Algorithms",
3rd Generation Partnership Project 2, Jan 2002.
[3GPP2 N.S0005] 3GPP2 Technical Specification 3GPP2 N.S0005 V1.0:
"Cellular Radiotelecommunications Intersystem Operations",
3rd Generation Partnership Project 2, June 2001.
[RFC 2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.
[3GPP2 N.S0009] 3GPP2 Technical Specification 3GPP2 N.S0009 V1.0:
"IMSI", 3rd Generation Partnership Project 2, June 2001.
[RFC 2486] Aboba, B. and M. Beadles, "The Network Access
Identifier", RFC 2486, January 1999.
[RFC 2104] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing
for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997.
[AES] Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication
197, "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", National Institute of
Standards and Technology, November 26, 2001.
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
[CBC] NIST Special Publication 800-38A, "Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation - Methods and Techniques", National
Institute of Standards and Technology, December 2001.
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
[SHA-1] Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication
180-1, "Secure Hash Standard," National Institute of Standards and
Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, October 17, 1995.
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[PRF] Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication
186-2 (with change notice), "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)",
National Institute of Standards and Technology, January 27, 2000.
Available on-line at:
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips186-2/fips186-2-
change1.pdf
[RFC 2434] T. Narten, H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 2434, October 1998.
[RFC2279] F. Yergeau, "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", RFC 2279, January 1998.
[EAP] L. Blunk et al., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", draft-ietf-eap-rfc2284bis-05.txt, work-in-progress,
September 2003.
Informative References
[PEAP] H. Andersson, S. Josefsson, G. Zorn, D. Simon, A. Palekar,
"Protected EAP Protocol (PEAP)", draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-
05.txt, work-in-progress, September 2002.
[RFC 1750] D. Eastlake, 3rd, S. Crocker, J. Schiller, "Randomness
Recommendations for Security", RFC 1750 (Informational), December
1994.
[RFC 3344] C. Perkins (editor), "IP Mobility Support", RFC 3344,
August 2002.
[EAP SIM] H. Haverinen, J. Salowey, "EAP SIM Authentication", draft-
arkko-pppext-eap-sim-12.txt, Oct 2003 (work in progress).
[RFC 2548] G. Zorn, "Microsoft Vendor-specific RADIUS Attributes",
RFC 2548, March 1999
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Editors' and Contributors' Contact Information
Zhiming Li
Huawei Technologies Co., LTD
Pudong Lujiazui Software Park
No 98, Lane 91, Eshan Road, Pudong, Shanghai,China, 200127
E-mail: lizhiming@huawei.com
Phone: +86 21 68644808-24039
Nora Dabbous
Gemplus
34 rue Guynemer
92447 Issy les Moulineaux France
E-mail: nora.dabbous@gemplus.com
Phone: +33 1 4648 2000
JunHyuk Song
Samsung Electronics
NTP Lab1
Email: junhyuk.song@samsung.com
Phone: +82 31 279-3639
Jian Wang
Datang Mirco elctronics Technology
No 40, Xueyuan Road, Haidian District, Beijing, China,100083
E-mail:wangj@dmt.com.cn
Phoneú¦+86-10-62302680
Annex A. Pseudo-Random Number Generator
The "|" character denotes concatenation, and "^" denotes involution.
Step 1: Choose a new, secret value for the seed-key, XKEY
Step 2: In hexadecimal notation let
t = 67452301 EFCDAB89 98BADCFE 10325476 C3D2E1F0
This is the initial value for H0|H1|H2|H3|H4
in the FIPS SHS [SHA-1]
Step 3: For j = 0 to m - 1 do
3.1 XSEED_j = 0 /* no optional user input */
3.2 For i = 0 to 1 do
a. XVAL = (XKEY + XSEED_j) mod 2^b
b. w_i = G(t, XVAL)
c. XKEY = (1 + XKEY + w_i) mod 2^b
3.3 x_j = w_0|w_1
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