Network Working Group C. Lonvick
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Expires: February 17, 2004 August 19, 2003
RADIUS Attributes for soBGP Support
draft-lonvick-sobgp-radius-03.txt
Status of this Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document defines a set of RADIUS attributes designed to support
the provisioning of the soBGP protocol. A router will encapsulate
the components of an AuthCert or PolicyCert into TLVs and transport
them to a centralized server capable of verifying the associated
signature.
This draft goes along with other IDs submitted for Secure Origin BGP
(soBGP) both of which are edited by James Ng and Russ White.
draft-white-sobgp-bgp-deployment-00.txt [1],
draft-ng-sobgp-bgp-extensions-00.txt [2] Mostly this work relates to
"Extensions to BGP to Support Secure Origin BGP (soBGP)" and is
explained in additional detail in "Deployment Considerations for
Secure Origin BGP (soBGP)". The purpose of this draft is to explain
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the concept of offloading the Authcert validation steps, and the
Entitycert storage, from the router. RADIUS may not be the best way
to do this but it's the best that I know of at this moment. Once the
concepts of soBGP are discussed, the transport to support offload
should be reviewed and a proper mechanism should be chosen.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Stored-Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1 Stored-Policy-Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.2 Stored-Policy-End . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.1 IPv4-Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.2 IPv6-Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Authcert Validation Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3.1 Authcert-Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3.2 Authcert-URL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.3 Authcert-Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4 Authcert Validation Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4.1 Authcert-Accept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4.2 Authcert-Reject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Table of Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Useage Notes and Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1 Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2 Usernames and Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3 Stored Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.4 Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.5 Authcert Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.6 Redundancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. Changes from Prior Drafts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 19
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1. Introduction
A router participating in soBGP will need to validate received
Authcerts. The best way to do this is by having their associated
Entitycerts contained on the router and using the information stored
in them to perform the necessary validation steps. Unfortunately,
this would entail the storage and consistent maintenance of
Entitycerts on all participating routers in the AS. One way to
centralize this would be for a device to store all of the Entitycerts
and then have each of the participating routers submit the pertinent
information from each received Authcert to it for the computationally
intensive validation steps. This centralized device, henceforth to
be known as the sob-server in this document, could then transmit a
pass/fail message back to the router. This would reduce the amount
of administration of the Entitycert database to one device - with
appropriate backup. This document defines a set of RADIUS attributes
designed to support the provision of the soBGP protocol. The
participating routers are expected to form and transmit a RADIUS RFC
2865 [4] Access-Request message with the appropriate pieces of
information from a received Authcert. This Access-Request will go to
the sob-server which will perform the steps necessary to validate the
Authcert information. It will then form and transmit an
Access-Accept or Access-Reject response to the router.
This draft is still rather drafty. It does not discuss validation of
Policycerts yet, but that's still a subject of discussion anyway.
Discussion of this draft may be directed to the author, or to the
mailing list discussing soBGP. sobgp@external.cisco.com
More information about soBGP may be found on the web page. ftp://
ftp-eng.cisco.com/sobgp/index.html
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2. Attributes
The Attributes are listed in this section. In all cases, each RADIUS
message may only include Attributes pertaining to a single AS. There
are useage notes later in this document which should answer any
questions outstanding from the Attribute section.
2.1 Stored-Policy
This set of Attributes requests any policy information stored on the
sob-server in an Access-Request message, and delivers the policies
through Access-Challenge messages using the Prefix set of of
Attributes described below. Each Access-Challenge message will
describe a policy associated with a single AS. The router will
continue requesting more policies through additional Access-Requests.
When there are no additional policies stored on the sob-server, or if
there were no policies stored there to begin with, then an
Access-Accept message with an appropriate attribute will be sent to
the router.
2.1.1 Stored-Policy-Request
A summary of the Stored-Policy-Request Attribute format is shown
below. This format will only be used in the Access-Request message
The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value Continued |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type - [SPR] for Stored-Policy-Request
Length - The length of the Attribute; 6 octets.
Value - The Value field is four octets. In an Access-Request
message, it contains the request number for the available policies
stored on the sob-server. The first value will be 0x00000001. If the
sob-server responds with a policy (described next), then the router
will send a request with a value of 0x00000002. This will continue
until the sob-server has no more policies to send. At that point, the
sob-server will respond with an Access-Accept message described
below.
This Attribute is also used in Access-Challenge messages. In that
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case, the Value is the AS number of the Authorized Originator. This
is the autonomous system number of an entity authorized to advertise
the associated IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes.
2.1.2 Stored-Policy-End
A summary of the Stored-Policy-End Attribute format is shown below.
This format will only be used in the Access-Accept message. The
fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Count |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Time |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type - [SPE] for Stored-Policy-End
Length - The length of the Attribute; 8 octets.
Count - The Count field is two octets and contains the number of
policies that have been transmitted to the router. The router should
verify that the value returned in this message is the same value that
was most recently transmitted in the associated request message.
Time - The Time field is the number of seconds for which the
downloaded policies should be considered valid. The receiver is not
obligated to honor this timer. A value of 0 is not valid and MUST
NOT be used.
2.2 Prefixes
Multiple instances of each of the attributes defined in this section
may be included in a single RADIUS packet. In all cases, each RADIUS
message may only include these Attributes pertaining to a single AS.
2.2.1 IPv4-Prefix
A summary of the IPv4-Prefix Attribute format is shown below. The
fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | IPv4 Prefix ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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Type - [IP4] for IPv4-Prefix
Length - The entire length of this message in octets; >=3 octets.
IPv4 Prefix - The non-zero octets of the IPv4 Prefix. A special
value of 0x00 is reserved when the Length is 0x03. When that value
is used in an Access-Accept message in response to a
Stored-Policy-Request message, this will denote that no IPv4 address
bock announcements should be received from that originating AS.
2.2.2 IPv6-Prefix
A summary of the IPv6-Prefix Attribute is shown below. The fields
are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | IPv6 Prefix..
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type - [IP6] for IPv6-Prefix
Length - The entire length of this message in octets; >=3
IPv6 Prefix - The IPv6 Address Block represented as a prefix. A
special value of 0x00 is reserved when the Prefix Length is 0x01.
This will denote that no IPv6 address bock announcements should be
received from that originating AS.
2.3 Authcert Validation Request
This Attribute validates an Authcert received by a router through
soBGP. This will first be requested in an Access-Request message
with the pertinent information. The sob-server will respond with
either an Access-Accept or an Access-Reject message with specific
information as described below.
2.3.1 Authcert-Header
A summary of the Authcert-Header Attribute format is given below.
The fields are transmitted left to right.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Authorizing Autonomous System
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
..Continued | Options |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Authorized Originator |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Serial Number
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
..Continued |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type - [HDR] for Authcert-Header
Length - The entire length of this message in octets; 20.
Authorizing Autonomous System - The autonomous system authorizing
other entities to advertise prefixes within this block.
Options - The Options associated with this Authcert.
Authorized Originator - The autonomous system number of an entity
authorized to advertise the associated IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes.
Serial Number - A eight octet unsigned integer indicating the serial
number of this Authorization certificate.
2.3.2 Authcert-URL
A summary of the Authcert-URL Attribute format is given below. The
fields are transmitted left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | URL ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type - [URL] for Authcert-URL
Length - The entire length of this message in octets.
URL - A uniform resource locater indicating a location where the
public key of the entity which signed this certificate can be found
along with any certificate revocation information.
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2.3.3 Authcert-Signature
A summary of the Authcert-Signature Attribute format is given below.
The fields are transmitted left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Signature Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Signature ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type - [Sig] for Authcert-Signature
Length - The entire length of this message in octets.
Signature Type - A two byte unsigned integer denoting the type of
signature (the algorithm used to build this signature). Each
possible signing algorithm is assigned an integer from this field.
Signature - The signature will be as taken from
draft-ng-sobgp-extensions-01.txt [2]
2.4 Authcert Validation Responses
The following Attributes will be sent in response to a group of
Authcert Validation Request Attributes. The Authcert-Accept
Attribute will be sent in an Access-Accept message while the
Authcert-Reject Attribute will be sent in an Access-Reject message.
2.4.1 Authcert-Accept
A summary of the Authcert-Accept Attribute format is shown below.
This format will only be used in the Access-Accept message. The
fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Authorized Originator
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Continued.. | Time
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Continued.. |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type - [ACA] for Authcert-Accept
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Length - The length of the attribute; 10 octets.
Authorized Originator - The autonomous system number of an entity
authorized to advertise the associated IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes.
Time - The Time field is the number of seconds for which the
downloaded policies should be considered valid. The receiver is not
obligated to honor this timer. A value of 0 is not valid and MUST
NOT be used.
2.4.2 Authcert-Reject
A summary of the Authcert-Reject Attribute format is shown below.
This format will only be used in the Access-Reject message. The
fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Authorized Originator |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Continued.. | Reason Code
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type - [ACR] for Authcert-Reject
Length - The length of the attribute; >=7 octets.
Authorized Originator - The autonomous system number of an entity
authorized to advertise the associated IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes.
Reason Code - The reason for the rejection. It may be a local policy
decision on the router to accept the information contained in the
received Authcert even if it is rejected by the sob-server. As an
example of that, if the URL is not found but the Authcert is
validated otherwise, the router may choose to accept the information
in the Authcert but at a lower trust level than if the signature is
valid and the URL is found and properly processed. The table below
gives the Reason Codes and their explanations.
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Reason Code Explanation
0-filled Invalid Code - This value MUST NOT be used.
0b10000000 No Entitycert found matching this Authorized Originator.
0b01000000 Entitycert found for this Authorized Originator but the
Serial Number in the Authcert is out of range.
0b00100000 The Signature in the Authcert doesn't match the
calculated signature.
0b000100000 The Entitycert found on the sob-server has expired.
0b000010000 The URL could not be found.
0b00000nnnn Reserved for future use.
0x00nn and beyond are also reserved for future use.
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3. Table of Attributes
The following table provides a guide to which of the above
attributes may be found in which kinds of packets, and in what
quantity.
Request Accept Reject Challenge Acct-Request # Attribute
0-1 0 0 0-1 0 SPR Stored-Policy-Request
0 0-1 0 0 0 SPE Stored-Policy-End
0+ 0+ 0 0 0 IP4 IPv4-Prefix
0+ 0+ 0 0 0 IP6 IPv6-Prefix
0-1 0 0 0 0 HDR AC-Header
0-1 0 0 0 0 URL
0-1 0 0 0 0 SIG AC-Signature
0-1 0 0 0 0 ACA AC-Accept
0 0 0-1 0 0 ACR AC-Reject
The following table defines the meaning of the above table entries.
0 This attribute MUST NOT be present in packet.
0+ Zero or more instances of this attribute MAY be present in packet.
0-1 Zero or one instance of this attribute MAY be present in packet.
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4. Useage Notes and Examples
This section describes the expected implementation of the ideas
presented in this document.
4.1 Certificate Validation
Any device receiving an Entitycert can verify it by separating its
components into appropriate segments and sending them to the
sob-server. The sob-server will return either an accept or reject
message.
Likewise a router may submit a signed AuthCert or PolicyCert so an
sob-server for validation.
Note: I need to review Brian's work to ensure that the components of
each of these certificates or signed information has an associated
RADIUS attribute in this document.
4.2 Usernames and Passwords
Some latitude is given in this area so that different policies may be
enforced on different routers. In the most expected case, all
routers will be configured with identical Usernames and Passwords
which will be sent in the Access-Request Attributes as described in
[1].
While it is not currently expected to be needed, a differentiated
policy may be applied through the use of different Usernames on
different routers when they initiate the policy download in the
Access-Request Attribute. For example, southern-facing routers could
be configured with a Username of "South" and northern-facing routers
could be given a Username of "North". When the sob-server receives a
policy download request from a router using a Username of "North", it
will deliver a policy for the northern-facing routers. Similarly for
"South" and southern-facing routers.
4.3 Stored Policy
A router SHOULD attempt to gather the stored policy from the
sob-server when it first awakes. It should be a local policy
decision of how to proceed if the router cannot obtain the stored
policy.
If the router can gather policies, then these MAY be enforced above
information received in the Authcerts since this will be locally
defined and administered policy. If the sob-server replies that it
has no policies to deliver then the router should accept routing
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updates in the manner described in
draft-white-sobgp-bgp-deployment-01.txt [1].
4.4 Time
Policies - The router should associate a countdown timer with a
received policy. Before the timer has reached 0, the router should
request a new set of policies. (Note: It may be a problem to
associate all of the downloaded policies with a single timer.)
Authcert - The router should associate a countdown timer with a
validated Authcert. Before that timer reches 0, the router should
reaffirm the validity of the Authcert but only if the associated AS
is still advertising routes.
4.5 Authcert Verification
An Authcert will contain all of the policies which must be sent to
the sob-server in the order they are placed within the Authcert. It
is very important that the elements be kept in order as the signature
is calculated over them in that order. (Note: Perhaps XML signing
would be better?)
4.6 Redundancy
As with all RADIUS solutions, it is usually important that the client
devices be able to access an authoritative RADIUS server at all
times. For this reason, it should be stressed that soBGP devices
utilizing the procedure described in this document should have
redundant sob-servers in their network with consistent databases of
stored policies and certificates.
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5. Security Considerations
The security concerns of the mechanisms described in this document
may be separated into two parts: concerns with the transport, and
concerns with the content.
The security concerns dealing with the transport of this mechanism
are described in RFCs 2865 [4] and 2865 [6]. No further discussion
is warranted in this document.
The security concerns with the contents are identical to the security
concerns of the contens of the Authcerts, Entitycerts and Policycerts
in the other soBGP IDs.
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6. IANA Considerations
Need stuff here.
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7. Acknowledgments
Glen Zorn suggested using Access-Challenge to convey Stored Policy.
This seems to be much better than trying to use a stream of
Access-Requests and a finale of an Access-Reject.
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8. Changes from Prior Drafts
-00 : Contained the basics but had poor formatting.
-01 : The content was transferred to XML to be used with RFC 2629
formatting using "xml2rfc". (Thanks Marshall Rose.)
-02 : Restructured the Stored Policy section to utilize
Access-Challenges. Added things to the tail-end sections.
-03 : tried to harmonize with draft-weis-sobgp-certificates-00.txt
This includes a change to the length of the Serial Number. And I
fixed some spelling errors. Not many of course.
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References
[1] White, R., "Deployment Considerations for Secure Origin BGP
(soBGP)", draft-white-sobgp-bgp-extensions-01.txt (work in
progress), October 2002.
[2] Ng, J., "Extensions to BGP to Support Secure Origin BGP
(soBGP)", draft-ng-sobgp-bgp-extensions-01.txt (work in
progress), October 2002.
[3] Weis, J., "Extensions to BGP to Support Secure Origin BGP
(soBGP)", draft-weis-sobgp-certificates-00.txt (work in
progress), June 2003.
[4] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A. and W. Simpson, "Remote
Authentication Dial in User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, June
2000.
[5] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", RFC 2119, STD 14, March 1997.
[6] Rigney, C., Willats, W. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS Extensions", RFC
2869, June 2000.
[7] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for writing an IANA
Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 2869, BCP 26, October 1998.
[8] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 2373, July 1998.
Author's Address
Chris Lonvick
Cisco Systems
12515 Research Blvd.
Austin, TX 78759
US
Phone: +1 512 378 1182
EMail: clonvick@cisco.com
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