Network Working Group M. Jethanandani
Internet-Draft Independent
Intended status: Standards Track B. Weis
Expires: September 9, 2012 K. Patel
Cisco Systems
D. Zhang
Huawei
S. Hartman
Painless Security
March 08, 2012
Key Management for Pairwise Routing Protocol
draft-mahesh-karp-rkmp-01
Abstract
When running routing protocols such as BGP or RSVP-TE, two routers
need to exchange routing messages in a unicast (one-to-one) fashion.
In order to authenticate these messages using symmetric cryptography,
a secret key needs to be established. This document defines a Router
Key Management Protocol for establishing and managing such keys for
routing protocols.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 9, 2012.
Copyright Notice
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Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Types of Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Protocol Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. IKE_SA_INIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. IKE_AUTH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. CREATE_CHILD_SA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4. INFORMATIONAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Header and Payload Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Security Association Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.1. Transforms Substructures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1.1.1. TCP-AO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1.1.2. LDP Discovery Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2. Traffic Selector Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Operation Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2. Initial Key Specific Data Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.3. Key Selection, Rollover and Protocol Interaction . . . . . 13
6. Key Management Database (KMDB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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1. Introduction
Existing routing protocols using unicast communication model (e.g.,
BGP, LDP, RSVP-TE) have cryptographic authentication mechanisms that
use a key shared between the routers on the both sides of the model
to protect routing message exchanges between the routers. Unicast
key management today is limited to statically configuring master keys
in individual routers. This document defines a Router Key Management
Protocol (RKMP) that largely makes use of currently defined IKEv2
[RFC5996] protocol and extends it to allow network devices to
automatically exchange key material related information between the
network devices.
RKMP assumes that routers need to be provisioned with some
credentials for a one-to-one authentication protocol. Pre-shared
keys or asymmetric keys and an authorization list are expected to be
common deployments.
If two routers running a routing protocol have not authenticated each
other yet, and before sending out any routing protocol packets the
two routers need to perform mutual authentication using their
provisioned credentials. If successful, two routers negotiate the
key material to secure the routing protocol execution.
1.1. Terminology
Here are some terms that we will be using throughout the document.
SKEYSEED: When a TCP-AO transform is chosen, keying material for the
TCP-AO master key is generated as follows, where Ni and Nr are unique
to this exchange. The value SK_d is defined in Section 1.2 of IKEv2
[RFC5996], and refers to the value derived from SKEYSEED (defined in
Section 2.14 of IKEv2 [RFC5996]). SK_d is used to derive new keys
(e.g., for TCP-AO) as follows:
<TCP-AO master key> = prf+(SK_d, Ni | Nr)
1.2. Acronyms and Abbreviations
The following acronyms and abbreviations are used throughout this
document.
IKE Internet Key Exchange Protocol
IKEv2 Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
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RP Routing Protocol
SA Security Association
2. Overview
-----------------------
=======> | Not Authenticated |==========
|| | No RP Keys | ||
|| ----------------------- IKE_SA_INIT
|| ||
|| ||
|| ||
INFORMATIONAL VV
|| --------------------------
|| | Privacy Keys Exchanged |
|| | No RP Keys |
|| --------------------------
|| ||
|| |-------------------- IKE_AUTH
=========| Authenticated | <============
| RP Keys Derived | ====
-------------------- ||
^^ ||
|| CREATE_CHILD_SA
|| ||
===============
Figure 1: State Diagram
2.1. Types of Keys
The keys adopted in RKMP are listed as follows:
o PSK (Pre-Shared Key) : PSKs are pair-wise unique keys used for
authenticating one router to the other one during the initial
exchange. These keys are configured by some mechanism such as
manual configuration or a management application outside of the
scope of RKMP.
o Seed key: Refers to value derived from SKEYSEED that is used to
derive new keys (e.g., for TCP-AO).
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o Protocol master key: A protocol master key is the key exported by
RKMP for use by a routing protocol such as BGP. This is the key
that is shared in the key table between the routing protocol and
RKMP.
o Transport key: A transport key is the key used to integrity
protect routing messages in a protocol such as BGP. In today's
routing protocol cryptographic authentication mechanisms the
transport key can be the same as the protocol master key.
3. Protocol Exchanges
The exchange of private keying material between two network devices
using a dedicated key management protocol is a requirement as
articulated in [I-D.ietf-karp-routing-tcp-analysis]. There is no
need to define an entirely new protocol for this purpose, when
existing mature protocol exchanges and methods have been vetted.
This draft makes use of the IKEv2 protocol exchanges, state machine,
and policy definitions to define a dedicated key management protocol.
In the following figures, the notations contained in the message are
defined as follows.
+----------+------------------------------+
| Notation | Payload |
+----------+------------------------------+
| AUTH | Authentication |
| CERT | Certificate |
| CERTREQ | Certificate Request |
| D | Delete |
| HDR | IKEv2 Header (not a payload) |
| IDi | Identification - Initiator |
| IDr | Identification - Responder |
| KE | Key Exchange |
| Ni, Nr | Nonce |
| N | Notify |
| SA | Security Association |
| SK | Encrypted and Authenticated |
| TSi | Traffic Selector - Initiator |
| TSr | Traffic Selector - Responder |
+----------+------------------------------+
Acronyms Used in Protocol Exchange
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3.1. IKE_SA_INIT
The IKE_SA_INIT exchange defined in Internet Key Exchange Protocol
Version 2 [RFC5996] is used in RKMP. The IKE_SA_INIT exchange is a
two-message exchange that allows the network devices to negotiate
cryptographic algorithms, exchange nonces, and do a Diffe-Hellman
(DH) [DH] exchange, for their routing protocols, after which
protocols on these network devices can communicate privately. Note
that at this point the network devices have not identified their
peer. For the details of this exchange, refer to IKE_SA_INIT in
Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 [RFC5996].
Peer (Initiator) Peer (Responder)
-------------------- ------------------
HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni -->
<-- HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ,]
IKE_SA_INIT
3.2. IKE_AUTH
Next, the network devices perform an IKE_AUTH exchange defined in RFC
5996. However, the SA payloads contain the routing protocol specific
security policies rather than IPsec policies (SAi2, SAr2 defined in
RFC 5996), and the TS payloads contains routing protocol specific
traffic selectors. Policy definitions for routing protocols is
described in Section 3; for the details of the rest of the exchange
please refer to IKE_AUTH in RFC 5996.
Peer (Initiator) Peer (Responder)
-------------------- ------------------
HDR, SK {IDi, [CERT,] [CERTREQ,]
[IDr,] AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr} -->
<-- HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] AUTH,
SAr2, TSi, TSr}
IKE_AUTH
In the IKE_AUTH exchange, the Initiator proposes one or more sets of
policies for one routing protocol in the SAi2. The Responder returns
the one policy contained in SAr2 that it accepts. Based on this
policy, appropriate keying material is derived from the existing
shared keying material. At the successful conclusion of the IKE_AUTH
exchange, the initiator and responder have agreed upon a single set
of policy and keying material for a particular routing protocol.
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3.3. CREATE_CHILD_SA
The network devices may then destroy the state associated with the
IKEv2 SA, continuing to use the RP policy and keying material, or
they may choose to retain them for the further use. Note that this
policy differs from IKEv2/IPsec, where the deletion of the IKEv2 SA
necessitates the deletion of the IPsec SAs. If both the network
devices choose to retain them, they may use the IKEv2 SA to
subsequently agree upon replacement policy for the same RP, or agree
upon policy and keying material for another routing protocol. Either
case will require the use of the IKEv2 CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange as
defined in RFC 5996.
A CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange therefore can be triggered in order to
1. Rekey an antique RP master key and establish a new equivalent one
2. Generate needed key material for a newly executed routing
protocol based on an existing SA
3. Rekey an IKEv2 SA and establish a new equivalent IKEv2 SA.
Peer (Initiator) Peer (Responder)
-------------------- ------------------
HDR, SK {[N], SA, Ni, [KEi],
[TSi, TSr]} -->
<-- HDR, SK {SA, Nr, [KEr],
[TSi, TSr]}
CREATE_CHILD_SA
A CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange MAY be initiated by either end of the SA
after the initial exchanges are completed. All messages in a
CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange are cryptographically protected using the
cryptographic algorithms and keys negotiated in the initial exchange.
For details on the exchange, refer to the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange as
defined in RFC 5996.
3.4. INFORMATIONAL
The IKEv2 INFORMATIONAL exchange is also useful for deleting specific
IKEv2 SAs or sending status information. The Notify (N) and Delete
(D) payloads are as those defined by IKEv2 [IKEV2-PARAMS]. For
example, if the Responder refused to accept one of Proposals sent by
the Initiator, it would return an INFORMATIONAL exchange of type
NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN instead of the response to CREATE_CHILD_SA.
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Peer (Initiator) Peer (Responder)
------------------- ------------------
HDR, SK {[N,] [D,] ... } -->
<-- HDR, SK {[N,] [D,] ... }
INFORMATIONAL
4. Header and Payload Formats
The protocol defined in this memo uses IKEv2 payload definitions.
However, new security policy definitions are described to support
security transforms and policy defined by routing protocol documents.
4.1. Security Association Payload
The Security Association (SA) payload contains a list of Proposals,
which describe one or more sets of policy that a router is willing to
use to protect a routing protocol. In the Initiator's message, the
SAi2 payload contains a list of Proposal payloads (as defined in the
next section), each of which contains a single set of policy that can
b applied to the packets described in the Traffic Selector (TS)
payloads in the same exchange. Each set of policy is given a
particular "Proposal Number" uniquely identifying this set of policy.
The responder includes a single Proposal payload in it's SA policy,
which denotes the choice it has made amongst the initiator's list of
Proposals. Any attributes of a selected transform MUST be returned
unmodified as explained in IKEv2 [RFC5996] section 3.3.6. The
initiator of an exchange MUST check that the accepted offer is
consistent with one of its proposals, and if not MUST terminate the
exchange.
This memo defines new Proposal substructure definitions, which allow
protocol participants to exchange proposals for routing protocol
policy. Figure 2 defines new Protocol IDs that can be negotiated
within an IKEv2 SA payload.
Protocol Protocol ID Reference
----------------------------------------------
TCP-AO TBD-1 RFC 5925
LDP Discovery Key TBD-2
Figure 2: Protocol IDs
The following section describes the SA Payload Transforms
Substructures that are to be used with these Protocol IDs.
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4.1.1. Transforms Substructures
Each Proposal has a list of Transform (T) substructures, each of
which describe a particular set of cryptographic policy choices.
This is useful for an initiator to propose multiple cryptographic
choices for the same policy described in its associated Proposal
payload.
4.1.1.1. TCP-AO
The TCP-AO [RFC5925] transform payload is specified to negotiate the
TCP-AO policies and contains the following fields.
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 0 (last) or 3 | RESERVED | Transform Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SendID |Auth Alg | KDF | Flags |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3: TCP-AO Transforms
o 0 (last) or 3 (more) (1 octet) - Specifies whether this is the last
Transform Substructure in the Proposal.
o RESERVED (1 octet) - MUST be sent as zero; MUST be ignored on
receipt.
o Transform Length (2 octets) - The length (in octets) of the
Transform Substructure including Header and Attributes.
o SendID (1 octet) - The TCP-AO KeyID that the sender will use to
represent this Transform. The KeyID will be used to generate the
keys independently on each network device at the end of the exchange.
o Auth Alg (1 octet) - The Authentication algorithm defined as a part
of this Transform. Initial values are defined in Cryptographic
Algorithms for the TCP Authentication Option [RFC5926].
Parenthetical names in Figure 4 refer to the values assigned in the
Cryptographic Algorithms for TCP-AO Registration [TCP-AO-REG].
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Auth Alg ID
------------------------------
Reserved 0
HMAC-SHA-1-96 (SHA1) 1
AES-128-CMAC-96 (AES128) 2
Standards Action 3-140
Private Use 241-255
Figure 4: TCP-AO Authentication Algorithm
o KDF (1 octet) - The KDF defined as a part of this Transform.
Values are defined in Cryptographic Algorithms for the TCP
Authentication Option [RFC5926].
KDF ID
------------------------------
Reserved 0
KDF_HMAC_SHA1 1
KDF_AES_128_CMAC 2
Standards Action 3-240
Private Use 241-255
Figure 5: TCP-AO Key Derivation Functions
o Flags (1 octet) - Indicates specific options for TCP-AO. The bits
are as follows:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|O|X|X|X|X|X|X|X|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
In the description below, a bit being 'set' means its value is '1',
while 'cleared' means its value is '0'. 'X' bits MUST be cleared
when sending and MUST be ignored on receipt.
o O (Options) - This bit indicates whether or not TCP Options are to
be included in the bytes protected by the authentication
calculation. This bit is set to indicate that TCP Options are to
be ignored and cleared to indicate that TCP Options are protected.
When a TCP-AO transform is chosen, keying material for the TCP-AO
master key is generated as follows, where Ni and Nr are unique to
this exchange. The value SK_D is defined in RFC 5996, and refers to
the value derived from SKEYSEED that is used to derive new keys
(e.g., for TCP-AO).
<TCP-AO master key> = prf+(SK_d, Ni | Nr)
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4.1.1.2. LDP Discovery Key
TBD
4.2. Traffic Selector Payload
The Traffic Selector (TS) payload allows an RP peer to identify
packet flows that are to be protected with the policy in the SA
payload. Unlike IPsec, routing protocols have well-defined flows,
and there is no need to specify them to the specificity of IPsec
policy. The document defines a new TS type for routing protocols as
shown in Figure 6. The TS payload defined in this document includes
only the routing protocol identifier that is to be protected.
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| TS Type | Rtg. Prot. ID | Selector Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 6
o TS Type (1 octet) - TBD-3 for all routing protocols
o Rtg. Prot. ID (1 octet) - Specifies the routing protocol
identifier for the current negotiation.
Routing (RT) Protocol Protocol ID Reference
-----------------------------------------------
Reserved 0
BGP 1 RFC 4271
LDP 2 RFC 5036
MSDP 3 RFC 3618
PIM PORT 4
PCEP 5 RFC 5440
Unassigned 6-240
Private Use 240-255
Figure 7: Routing Protocol IDs
Exchanges including traffic selectors (i.e., IKE_AUTH,
CREATE_CHILD_SA) include two TS payloads, one for the initiator
policy and one for the responder policy. In the case of RPs the
policy is symmetric and both payloads contain the same routing
protocol ID value.
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5. Operation Details
5.1. General
RKMP is used to dynamically derive key material information between
the two network devices trying to establish or maintain a routing
protocol neighbor adjacency. Typically network devices running the
routing protocols establish neighbor adjacencies at the routing
protocol level. These routing protocols may run different security
algorithms that provide transport level security for the protocol
neighbor adjacencies. Depending on the security algorithm used, the
routing protocols are configured with security algorithm specific
keys that are either long term keys or short term session keys.
These keys are specific to the security algorithms used to enforce
transport level security for the routing protocols.
A routing protocol causes RKMP to execute when it needs key material
to establish neighbor adjacency. This can be as a result of the
routing protocol neighbor being configured, neighbor changed or
updated, a local rekey policy decision, or some other event dictated
by the implementation. The key material would allow the network
devices to then independently generate the same key and establish a
RKMP neighbor adjacency between them. This is typically done by the
Initiator (RKMP speaker) initiating a RKMP RP_INIT exchange mentioned
in the section 2.1 towards its RKMP peer. As part of RP_INIT
exchange, RKMP will send a message to the RKMP peer's IKEv2 port.
The format of the message is explained in section 3. The procedure
to exchange key information is explained in section 3. Once the key
material information is successfully exchanged by both the RKMP
speaker, the RKMP neighbor adjacency may be torn down or kept around
as explained in section 3.
The master key data received from RKMP peers are stored in the
separate Key Management Database known as KMDB. KMDB follows the
guidelines inDatabase of Long Lived Symmetric Cryptographic Keys
[I-D.ietf-karp-crypto-key-table], and each entry consists of Key
specific information, Security algorithm to which the Key is
applicable to, Routing Protocol Clients of interest, and the
announcing RKMP Peer. KMDB is also used to notify the routing
protocols about the key updates. Typically key material information
is exchanged whenever a routing protocol is about to create a new
neighbor adjacency. This is considered as an Initial Key exchange
mode. Key material information is also exchanged to refresh existing
key data on an already existing neighbor adjacency. This is
considered as Key rollover exchange mode. The following sections
describes their detail behavior.
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5.2. Initial Key Specific Data Exchange
Routing protocols informs RKMP of its new neighbor adjacency. It
does so by creating a local entry in KMDB which consists of a
Security algorithm, Key specific information, routing protocol client
and the routing protocol neighbor. Upon a successful creation of
such an entry RKMP initiates RKMP peering with the neighbor and
starts initial RKMP RP_INIT exchange explained in section 2.1
followed by the RP_AUTH exchanged explained in section 2.2. Once the
key related information is successfully exchanged, KMDB may invoke
the routing protocol client to provide key specific information
updates if any.
5.3. Key Selection, Rollover and Protocol Interaction
The procedure for key selection and rollover exchange has been
described in Section 3 of Database of Long-Lived Symmetric
Cryptographic Keys [I-D.ietf-karp-crypto-key-table]. Details of how
RP interact with KMDB and deals with multiple keys during rollover
are also described in that section.
6. Key Management Database (KMDB)
Protocol interaction between RKMP and its client routing protocols is
typically done using KMDB. Routing protocols update KMDB by
installing a new Key related information or purging an existing Key
specific information. As part of the KMDB update, RKMP initiates
peering connections with its appropriate RKMP peers to announce the
updated key related information. RKMP may also receive an updated
key related information from its peers which gets installed in KMDB.
Whenever RKMP updates KMDB with updated key information from its
peers, it notifies client routing protocols of its updates.
7. IANA Considerations
New Protocol-IDs (as described in Figure 2) are to be allocated in
the IKEv2 Security Protocol Identifiers registry.
A new Traffic Selector Type (as described in Figure 7) is to be
allocated in the IKEv2 Traffic Selector Types registry.
Several new registries are to be defined as part of a new RKMP
Protocol Registry. These are described in Figure 4, Figure 5, and
Figure 7.
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8. Security Considerations
TBD
9. Acknowledgements
During the development of TCP-AO, Gregory Lebovitz noted that a
protocol based on an IKEv2 exchange would be a good automated key
management method for deriving a TCP-AO master key.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008.
[RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010.
[RFC5926] Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms
for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926,
June 2010.
[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
RFC 5996, September 2010.
10.2. Informative References
[DH] Diffie, W. and M. Hellman, "New Directions in
Cryptography", IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, V.IT-22 n. 6, June 1977.
[I-D.ietf-karp-crypto-key-table]
Housley, R. and T. Polk, "Database of Long-Lived Symmetric
Cryptographic Keys", draft-ietf-karp-crypto-key-table-02
(work in progress), October 2011.
[I-D.ietf-karp-routing-tcp-analysis]
Jethanandani, M., Patel, K., and L. Zheng, "Analysis of
BGP, LDP, PCEP, and MSDP Security According to KARP Design
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Guide", draft-ietf-karp-routing-tcp-analysis-00 (work in
progress), June 2011.
[IKEV2-PARAMS]
"Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Parameters", <htt
p://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/
ikev2-parameters.xml>.
[TCP-AO-REG]
"Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Parameters", <htt
p://www.iana.org/assignments/tcp-parameters/
tcp-parameters.xml>.
Authors' Addresses
Mahesh Jethanandani
Independent
Phone:
Fax:
Email: mjethanandani@gmail.com
URI:
Brian Weis
Cisco Systems
170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, California 95134
USA
Phone: +1 (408) 526-4796
Fax:
Email: bew@cisco.com
URI:
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Keyur Patel
Cisco Systems
170 Tasman Drive
San Jose, California 95134
USA
Phone: +1 (408) 526-7183
Fax:
Email: keyupate@cisco.com
URI:
Dacheng Zhang
Huawei
Beijing,
China
Phone:
Fax:
Email: zhangdacheng@huawei.com
URI:
Sam Hartman
Painless Security
Phone:
Fax:
Email: hartmans@painless-security.com
URI:
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