Secure Inter-Domain Routing T. Manderson
Internet-Draft ICANN
Intended status: Informational K. Sriram
Expires: April 29, 2010 NIST
R. White
Cisco
October 26, 2009
Use Cases and interpretation of RPKI objects for issuers and relying
parties
draft-manderson-sidr-usecases-01
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Abstract
This document provides use cases directions, and interpretations for
organisations and relying parties when creating or encountering RPKI
object scenarios in the public RPKI in relation to the Internet
routing system.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1. General interpretation of RPKI object semantics . . . . . 6
3. Origination use cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Single announcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Aggregate with a more specific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. Aggregate with more specific from different ASN . . . . . 7
3.4. Sub-allocation to multi-homed customer . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.5. Restriction of new allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.6. Restriction of new ASN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.7. Restriction of part of allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.8. Restriction of prefix length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.9. Restriction of sub-allocation prefix length . . . . . . . 10
3.10. Permitted Aggregation and origination by an upstream . . . 11
3.11. Rogue Aggregation and origination by an upstream . . . . . 12
4. Adjacency use cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. Multi-homed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2. Restricting peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Partial Deployment use cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1. Parent does not do RPKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2. Only some children participate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.3. Grandchild allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. Transfer use cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.1. Transfer of in-use prefix and autonomous system number . . 16
6.2. Transfer of in-use prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.3. Transfer of un-used prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Relying Party use cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.1. Use Cases Related to ROA Expiry or receipt of a CRL
covering a ROA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.1.1. ROA of Parent Prefix is Revoked . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.1.2. ROA of Prefix Revoked . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1.3. ROA of Grandparent Prefix Revoked while that of
Parent Prefix Prevails . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1.4. ROA of Prefix Revoked while that of Parent Prefix
Prevails . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1.5. Expiry of ROA of Parent Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.1.6. Expiry of ROA of Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.1.7. Expiry of ROA of Grandparent Prefix while ROA of
Parent Prefix Prevails . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.1.8. Expiry of ROA of Prefix while ROA of Parent Prefix
Prevails . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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1. Introduction
This document provides suggested use cases, direction and
interpretations for organisations and relying parties when creating
or encountering RPKI object scenarios in the public RPKI in relation
to the Internet routing system.
1.1. Terminology
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280], "A Profile
for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates" [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs]
"X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "A
Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)"
[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format], "A Profile for Bogon Origin
Authorizations (BOAs)" [I-D.ietf-sidr-bogons], "Validation of Route
Origination in BGP using the Resource Certificate PKI"
[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-validation],
1.2. Definitions
The following definitions are in use in this document.
Autonomous System (AS) Number (ASN) - An officially registered number
reprsenting a common, clearly defined routing policy for use in
Internet routing systems.
Prefix - A network address and the prefix length.
Route - A tuple of prefix and Autonomous System Number announced to
Internet routing systems.
Origin AS - The Autonomous System, designated by number, which
originates a route.
Aggregate - The result of where multiple specific prefixes are
aggregated into one covering route.
More specific - A route that has a longer prefix than a covering
aggregate.
Multi-homed - An Autonomous System that has active connections to
more than one other Autonomous System
Resource - An Internet (IP) addresses or Autonomous System Number.
Sub-allocation - Where a holder of a resource further allocates a
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portion of the resource to another entity or organisation.
Allocation - The set of resources allocated to an entity or
organisation.
Transit Provider - An Autonomous System that provides access to other
networks through itself.
Upstream - See "Transit Provider".
Grandchild - A Sub-allocation that has resulted from one or more
previous Sub-allocations.
Parent - An allocation from which the subject prefix was sub-
allocated.
Grandparent - The allocation from which the prefix is a grandchild.
1.3. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
2. Overview
2.1. General interpretation of RPKI object semantics
It is important that the interpretation of relying parties, or
relying party routing software, that implements a level of routing
decision, when a routing update ("route") is received in light of the
existence or non-existence of a corresponding RPKI object a 'make
before break' stance is taken. This means that the relying party
should do all possible steps to ensure a route is valid, before
attempting to declare it otherwise. For all of the cases in this
document it is assumed that RPKI objects validate (or otherwise) in
accordance with [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs], [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch],
[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-validation], and [I-D.ietf-sidr-bogons] unless
otherwise stated.
While many of the examples provided here demonstrate organisations
with their own autonomous system numbers, it should be recognised
that a prefix holder not necessarily be the holder of an autonomous
system number, but simply use the autonomous system number for the
purposes of origination.
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3. Origination use cases
3.1. Single announcement
An organisation (Org A with ASN 64496) has been allocated the prefix
192.168.2.0/24, it wishes to announce the /24 prefix from ASN 64496
to the Internet routing system such that relying parties interpret
the route as valid.
The resulting valid announcement (and organisation) would be:
+----------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS | Organisation |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 192.168.2.0/24 | AS64496 | Org A |
+----------------------------------------------+
The issuing party would create the following RPKI objects: TBC
3.2. Aggregate with a more specific
An organisation (Org A with ASN 64496) has been allocated the prefix
10.1.0.0/16, it wishes to announce the more specific prefix
10.1.0.0/20 from ASN 64496 as well as the aggregate route to the
Internet routing system such that relying parties interpret the
routes as valid.
The resulting valid announcements (and organisation) would be:
+----------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS | Organisation |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS64496 | Org A |
| 10.1.0.0/20 | AS64496 | Org A |
+----------------------------------------------+
The issuing party would create the following RPKI objects: TBC
3.3. Aggregate with more specific from different ASN
An organisation (Org A with ASN 64496 and ASN 64499) has been
allocated the prefix 10.1.0.0/16, it wishes to announce the more
specific prefix 10.1.0.0/20 from ASN 64499 as well as the aggregate
route from ASN 64496 to the Internet routing system such that relying
parties interpret the routes as valid.
The resulting valid announcements (and organisation) would be:
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+---------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organisation |
+---------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS64496 | Org A |
| 10.1.0.0/20 | AS64499 | Org A |
+---------------------------------------------+
The issuing party would create the following RPKI objects: TBC
3.4. Sub-allocation to multi-homed customer
An organisation (Org A with ASN 64496) has been allocated the prefix
10.1.0.0/16, it wishes to announce the more specific prefix
10.1.0.0/20 from ASN 64496. It has further delegated 10.1.16.0/20 to
a customer (Org B with ASN 64511) who is multi-homed and will
originate the route prefix route from ASN 64511. ASN 64496 will also
announce the aggregate route to the Internet routing system such that
relying parties interpret the routes as valid.
The resulting valid announcements (and organisation) would be:
+---------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organisation |
+---------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS64496 | Org A |
| 10.1.0.0/20 | AS64496 | Org A |
| 10.1.16.0/20 | AS64511 | Org B |
+---------------------------------------------+
The issuing parties would create the following RPKI objects: TBC
3.5. Restriction of new allocation
An organisation has recently been allocated the prefix 10.1.0.0/16.
Its network deployment is not yet ready to announce the prefix and
wishes to restrict all possible announcements of 10.1.0.0/16 and more
specifics in routing using RPKI.
The following announcements would be considered invalid:
+---------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organisation |
+---------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/16 | ANY AS | ANY |
| 10.1.0.0/20 | ANY AS | ANY |
| 10.1.17.0/24 | ANY AS | ANY |
+---------------------------------------------+
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The issuing party would create the following RPKI objects: TBC
3.6. Restriction of new ASN
An organisation has recently been allocated an additional 4 byte ASN
65551. Its network deployment is not yet ready to use this ASN and
wishes to restrict all possible uses of ASN 65551 using RPKI.
The following announcements would be considered invalid:
+---------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organisation |
+---------------------------------------------+
| ANY | AS65551 | ANY |
+---------------------------------------------+
The issuing party would create the following RPKI objects: TBC
3.7. Restriction of part of allocation
An organisation (Org A with ASN 64496) has been allocated the prefix
10.1.0.0/16. Its network topology permits the announcement of
10.1.0.0/17 and the /16 aggregate however it wishes to restrict any
possible announcement of 10.1.128.0/17 or more specifics of that /17
using RPKI.
The resulting valid announcements would be:
+---------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organisation |
+---------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS64496 | Org A |
| 10.1.0.0/17 | AS64496 | Org A |
+---------------------------------------------+
The following announcements would be considered invalid:
+---------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organisation |
+---------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.128.0/17 | ANY AS | ANY |
| 10.1.128.0/24 | ANY AS | ANY |
+---------------------------------------------+
The issuing party would create the following RPKI objects: TBC
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3.8. Restriction of prefix length
An organization (Org A with ASN 64496) has been allocated the prefix
10.1.0.0/16, it wishes to announce the aggregate and any or all more
specific prefixes up to and including a maximum length of /20, but
never any more specific than a /20.
Examples of the resulting valid announcements (and organisation)
would be:
+---------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organisation |
+---------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS64496 | Org A |
| 10.1.0.0/17 | AS64496 | Org A |
| ... | AS64496 | Org A |
| 10.1.128.0/20 | AS64496 | Org A |
+---------------------------------------------+
The following announcements would be considered invalid:
+---------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organisation |
+---------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/21 | ANY AS | ANY |
| 10.1.0.0/22 | ANY AS | ANY |
| ... | ANY AS | ANY |
| 10.1.128.0/24 | ANY AS | ANY |
+---------------------------------------------+
The issuing party would create the following RPKI objects: TBC
3.9. Restriction of sub-allocation prefix length
An organization (Org A with ASN 64496) has been allocated the prefix
10.1.0.0/16, it sub-allocates several /20 prefixes to its multi-homed
customers Org B with ASN 65551, and Org C with ASN 64499. It wishes
to restrict those customers from advertising any corresponding routes
more specific than a /22.
The resulting valid announcements would be:
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+---------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organisation |
+---------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS64496 | Org A |
| 10.1.0.0/20 | AS65551 | Org B |
| 10.1.128.0/20 | AS64499 | Org C |
| 10.1.4.0/22 | AS65551 | Org B
+---------------------------------------------+
The following example announcements (and organisation) would be
considered invalid:
+---------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organisation |
+---------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/24 | AS65551 | Org B |
| 10.1.128.0/24 | AS64499 | Org C |
| ..... | ... | ... |
| 10.1.0.0/23 | ANY AS | ANY |
+---------------------------------------------+
The issuing party would create the following RPKI objects: TBC
3.10. Permitted Aggregation and origination by an upstream
Consider four organisations with the following resources which were
acquired independently from any transit provider.
+-------------------------------------------------+
| Organisation | ASN | Prefix |
+-------------------------------------------------+
| Org A | AS64496 | 10.1.0.0/24 |
| Org B | AS65551 | 10.1.3.0/24 |
| Org C | AS64499 | 10.1.1.0/24 |
| Org D | AS64512 | 10.1.2.0/24 |
+-------------------------------------------------+
Thes organisations share a common upstream provider Transit A (ASN
64497) that originates an aggregate of these prefixes with the
permission of all four organisations.
The resulting valid announcements (and organisation) would be:
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+----------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS | Organisation |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/24 | AS64496 | Org A |
| 10.1.3.0/24 | AS65551 | Org B |
| 10.1.1.0/24 | AS64499 | Org C |
| 10.1.2.0/24 | AS64512 | Org D |
| 10.1.0.0/22 | AS64497 | Transit A |
+----------------------------------------------+
The issuing parties would create the following RPKI objects: TBC
3.11. Rogue Aggregation and origination by an upstream
Consider four organisations with the following resources which were
acquired independently from any transit provider.
+-------------------------------------------------+
| Organisation | ASN | Prefix |
+-------------------------------------------------+
| Org A | AS64496 | 10.1.0.0/24 |
| Org B | AS65551 | 10.1.3.0/24 |
| Org C | AS64499 | 10.1.1.0/24 |
| Org D | AS64512 | 10.1.2.0/24 |
+-------------------------------------------------+
These organisations share a common upstream provider Transit A (ASN
64497) that originates an aggregate of these prefixes where possible.
Org B (ASN 65551, 10.1.3.0/24) does not wish for its prefix to be
aggregated by any upstream
The resulting valid announcements (and organisation) would be:
+----------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS | Organisation |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/24 | AS64496 | Org A |
| 10.1.3.0/24 | AS65551 | Org B |
| 10.1.1.0/24 | AS64499 | Org C |
| 10.1.2.0/24 | AS64512 | Org D |
| 10.1.0.0/23 | AS64497 | Transit A |
+----------------------------------------------+
The following announcement would be invalid:
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+----------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS | Organisation |
+----------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/22 | AS64497 | Transit A |
+----------------------------------------------+
The issuing parties would create the following RPKI objects: TBC
4. Adjacency use cases
Issues regarding validation of adjacency, or path validation, are
currently out of scope of the SIDR-WG charter. The use cases is this
section are listed here as a reminder that the work goes beyond
origination and at the stage when origination has been addressed by
the WG, a re-charter to encompass adjacency will allow consideration
of these use cases.
4.1. Multi-homed
An organisation (Org A with ASN 64496) has been allocated the prefix
10.1.0.0/16. Its upstreams transit providers are Transit A with ASN
65551 and Transit B ASN 64499. The organisation announces the /16
aggregate. It permits that ASN 65551 and ASN 64499 may further pass
on the aggregate route to their peers or upstreams.
The following announcements and paths would be considered valid:
+---------------------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS | Path |
+---------------------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS64496 | AS64499 AS64496 |
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS64496 | AS65551 AS64496 |
+---------------------------------------------------------+
The issuing parties would create the following RPKI objects: TBC
4.2. Restricting peers
An organisation (Org A with ASN 64496) has been allocated the prefix
10.1.0.0/16. Its two upstreams are Transit A with ASN 65551 and
Transit B with ASN 64499. The organisation (ASN 64496) peers with a
third AS, Peer A with ASN 64511. Org A announces the more specific
10.1.0.0/24 and the /16 aggregate. It wishes that only ASNs 65551
and 64499 may announce the aggregate and more specifics to their
upstreams. ASN 64511, the peer, may not further announce (pass on,
or leak) any routes for 10.1.0.0/16 and 10.1.0.0/24.
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The following announcements and paths would be considered valid:
+---------------------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS | Path |
+---------------------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS64496 | AS64499 AS64496 |
| 10.1.0.0/24 | AS64496 | AS64499 AS64496 |
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS64496 | AS65551 AS64496 |
| 10.1.0.0/24 | AS64496 | AS65551 AS64496 |
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS64496 | Any_AS AS64499 AS64496 |
| 10.1.0.0/24 | AS64496 | Any_AS AS64499 AS64496 |
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS64496 | Any_AS AS65551 AS64496 |
| 10.1.0.0/24 | AS64496 | Any_AS AS65551 AS64496 |
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS64496 | AS64511 AS64496 |
| 10.1.0.0/24 | AS64496 | AS64511 AS64496 |
+---------------------------------------------------------+
The following announcements and paths would be considered invalid:
+---------------------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS | Path |
+---------------------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS64496 | Any_AS AS64511 AS64496 |
| 10.1.0.0/24 | AS64496 | Any_AS AS64511 AS64496 |
+---------------------------------------------------------+
The issuing parties would create the following RPKI objects: TBC
5. Partial Deployment use cases
5.1. Parent does not do RPKI
An organisation (Org A with ASN 64511) is multi-homed has been
assigned the prefix 10.1.0.0/20 from its upstream (Transit A with ASN
64496) Org A wishes to announce the prefix 10.1.0.0/20 from ASN 64511
to its other upstream(s). Org A also wishes to create RPKI
statements about the resource, however Transit A (ASN 64496) which
announces the aggregate 10.1.0.0/16 has not yet adopted RPKI.
The resulting valid announcements (and organisation with RPKI
adoption) would be:
+----------------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organisation | RPKI |
+----------------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/20 | AS64511 | Org A | Yes |
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS64496 | Transit A | No |
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+----------------------------------------------------+
The issuing parties would create the following RPKI objects: TBC
5.2. Only some children participate
An organisation (Org A with ASN 64496) has been allocated the prefix
10.1.0.0/16 and participates in RPKI, it wishes to announce the more
specific prefix 10.1.0.0/20 from ASN 64496. It has further delegated
10.1.16.0/20 and 10.1.32.0/20 to customers Org B with ASN 64511 and
and Org C with ASN 65551 (respectively) who are multi-homed. Org B
(ASN 64511) does not participate in RPKI. Org C (ASN 65551)
participates in RPKI.
The resulting valid announcements (and organisation with RPKI
adoption) would be:
+----------------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organisation | RPKI |
+----------------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS64496 | Org A | Yes |
| 10.1.0.0/20 | AS64496 | Org A | Yes |
| 10.1.16.0/20 | AS64511 | Org B | No |
| 10.1.32.0/20 | AS65551 | Org C | YES |
+----------------------------------------------------+
The issuing parties would create the following RPKI objects: TBC
5.3. Grandchild allocations
Consider the previous example with an extension by where Org B, who
does not participate in RPKI, further allocates 10.1.17.0/24 to Org X
with ASN 64512.
The resulting valid announcements (and organisation with RPKI
adoption) would be:
+----------------------------------------------------+
| Prefix | Origin AS |Organisation | RPKI |
+----------------------------------------------------+
| 10.1.0.0/16 | AS64496 | Org A | Yes |
| 10.1.0.0/20 | AS64496 | Org A | Yes |
| 10.1.16.0/20 | AS64511 | Org B | No |
| 10.1.32.0/20 | AS65551 | Org C | YES |
| 10.1.17.0/24 | AS64512 | Org X | No |
+----------------------------------------------------+
The issuing parties would create the following RPKI objects: TBC
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6. Transfer use cases
6.1. Transfer of in-use prefix and autonomous system number
Organisation A holds the resource 10.1.0.0/20 and is currently is use
and originated from AS64496 with valid RPKI objects in place.
Organisation B has acquired these resources and desires an RPKI
transfer on a particular date and time without adversely affecting
the operational use of the resource.
The following RPKI objects would be created/revoked: TBC
6.2. Transfer of in-use prefix
Organisation A holds the resource 10.1.0.0/8 and it is currently is
use and originated from AS64496 with valid RPKI objects in place.
Organisation B has acquired this resource and desires an RPKI
transfer on a particular date and time with the additional change of
originating the prefix from AS65551.
The following RPKI objects would be created/revoked: TBC
6.3. Transfer of un-used prefix
Organisation A holds the resource 10.1.0.0/8 (with RPKI objects).
Organisation B has acquired an unused portion of the resource
(10.1.4.0/24) and desires an RPKI transfer on a particular date and
time.
The following RPKI objects would be created/revoked: TBC
7. Relying Party use cases
7.1. Use Cases Related to ROA Expiry or receipt of a CRL covering a ROA
Note: In the cases which follow the terms "expired ROA" or "revoked
ROA" are shorthand, and describe the appropriate revocation or expiry
of EE or Resource Certificates which result in the RPKI invalidation
of a ROA.
7.1.1. ROA of Parent Prefix is Revoked
A revocation certificate list (CRL) is received which reveals that
the ROA containing the prefix 10.1.0.0/16; maxLength 24 with ASN64496
is revoked. Further, a prefix route exists in the Internet routing
system for 10.1.4.0/24 originated from ASN64496.
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Note: Parent prefix here simply means a less specific prefix.
The Relying Party interpretation would be: TBC
7.1.2. ROA of Prefix Revoked
A CRL is received which reveals that the ROA containing the prefix
10.1.4.0/24; maxLength 24 with ASN64496 is revoked. Further, a
prefix route exists in the Internet routing system for 10.1.4.0/24
originated from ASN64496.
The Relying Party interpretation would be: TBC
A Counter Example: If there was a valid ROA containing the (less
specific) prefix 10.1.0.0/20; maxLength 24 with ASN64496.
The Relying Party interpretation would be: TBC
7.1.3. ROA of Grandparent Prefix Revoked while that of Parent Prefix
Prevails
A CRL is received which reveals that the ROA containing the prefix
10.1.0.0/16; maxLength 24 with ASN64496 is revoked. Further, a
prefix route exists in the Internet routing system for 10.1.4.0/24
originated from ASN64496. Additionally, the current ROA list has a
valid ROA containing the prefix 10.1.0.0/20; maxLength 24 with
ASN64496.
The Relying Party interpretation would be: TBC
(Clarification: ROA for less specific grandparent prefix 10.1.0.0/16
was withdrawn)
The Relying Party interpretation would be: TBC
7.1.4. ROA of Prefix Revoked while that of Parent Prefix Prevails
A CRL is received which reveals that the ROA containing the prefix
10.1.4.0/24; maxLength 24 with ASN64496 is revoked. Further, a
prefix route exists in the Internet routing system for 10.1.4.0/24
originated from ASN64496. Additionally, the current ROA list has a
valid ROA containing the prefix 10.1.0.0/20; maxLength 24 with
ASN64496.
The Relying Party interpretation would be: TBC
(Clarification: Perhaps the revocation of ROA for prefix 10.1.4.0/24
was initiated just to eliminate redundancy)
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7.1.5. Expiry of ROA of Parent Prefix
A scan of the ROA list reveals that the ROA containing the prefix
10.1.0.0/16; maxLength 24 with ASN64496 has expired. Further, a
prefix route exists in the Internet routing system for 10.1.4.0/24
originated from ASN64496.
The Relying Party interpretation would be: TBC
7.1.6. Expiry of ROA of Prefix
A scan of the ROA list reveals that the ROA containing the prefix
10.1.4.0/24; maxLength 24 with ASN64496 has expired. Further, a
prefix route exists in the Internet routing system for 10.1.4.0/24
originated from ASN64496.
The Relying Party interpretation would be: TBC
7.1.7. Expiry of ROA of Grandparent Prefix while ROA of Parent Prefix
Prevails
A scan of the ROA list reveals that the ROA containing the prefix
10.1.0.0/16; maxLength 24 with ASN64496 has expired. Further, a
prefix route exists in the Internet routing system for 10.1.4.0/24
originated from ASN64496. Additionally, the current ROA list has a
valid ROA containing the prefix 10.1.0.0/20; maxLength 24 with
ASN64496.
The Relying Party interpretation would be: TBC
(Clarification: ROA for less specific grandparent prefix 10.1.0.0/16
expired.)
7.1.8. Expiry of ROA of Prefix while ROA of Parent Prefix Prevails
A scan of the ROA list reveals that the ROA containing the prefix
10.1.4.0/24; maxLength 24 with ASN64496 has expired. Further, a
prefix route exists in the Internet routing system for 10.1.4.0/24
originated from ASN64496. Additionally, the current ROA list has a
valid ROA containing the prefix 10.1.0.0/20; maxLength 24 with
ASN64496.
The Relying Party interpretation would be: TBC
(Clarification: Perhaps the expiry of the ROA for prefix 10.1.4.0/24
was meant to eliminate redundancy.)
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8. Acknowledgements
The authors are indebted to both Sandy Murphy and Sam Weiler for
their guidance. Further, the authors would like to thank Curtis
Villamizar and Danny McPherson for technical insight.
9. IANA Considerations
This memo includes no request to IANA.
10. Security Considerations
This memo requires no security considerations
11. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-08 (work in
progress), July 2009.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bogons]
Manderson, T., "A Profile for Bogon Origin Attestations
(BOAs)", draft-ietf-sidr-bogons-03 (work in progress),
May 2009.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs]
Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates",
draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-17 (work in progress),
September 2009.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]
Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)",
draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-05 (work in progress),
July 2009.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-validation]
Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, "Validation of Route
Origination in BGP using the Resource Certificate PKI and
ROAs", draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-03 (work in
progress), August 2009.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Manderson, et al. Expires April 29, 2010 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft RPKI Use Case and interpretations October 2009
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC3852] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
RFC 3852, July 2004.
[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
June 2005.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[RFC4893] Vohra, Q. and E. Chen, "BGP Support for Four-octet AS
Number Space", RFC 4893, May 2007.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
Authors' Addresses
Terry Manderson
ICANN
Email: terry.manderson@icann.org
Kotikalapudi Sriram
NIST
Email: ksriram@nist.gov
Russ White
Cisco
Email: russ@cisco.com
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