pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Email Formats and Protocols
draft-marques-pep-email-02

Versions: 00 01 02                                                      
Network Working Group                                         H. Marques
Internet-Draft                                            pEp Foundation
Intended status: Standards Track                           July 02, 2018
Expires: January 3, 2019


         pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Email Formats and Protocols
                       draft-marques-pep-email-00

Abstract

   The pretty Easy privacy (pEp) propositions for email are based upon
   already existing email and encryption formats (i.e., PGP/MIME) and
   designed to allow for easy implementable and interoperable
   opportunistic encryption: this ranging from key distribution to
   mechanisms of subject encryption.

   The goal of pEp for email is to automatize operations in order to
   make email encryption usuable by a wider range of Internet users,
   such that practices for confidentiality and privacy can be achieved
   in reality.

   In this document, basic operations of pEp's approach towards email
   and two PGP/MIME formats (pEp Email Format 1 and 2) providing certain
   security guarantees are described.

   The proposed operations and and formats are targeted to Opportunistic
   Security scenarios and are already implemented in several
   applications of pretty Easy privacy (pEp).

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 3, 2019.





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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Opportunistic Security with pEp for email . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Automatic keypair generation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Key Distribution  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Encryption of email header fields and interoperability  . . .   5
   5.  pEp message formats for email . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.1.  Unencrypted plain text message with public key attached .   5
       5.1.1.  Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.2.  pEp email format version 1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       5.2.1.  Example 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       5.2.2.  Example 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.3.  pEp email format version 2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.3.1.  Example (Outer and Inner Envelope)  . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Rendering Incoming Messages and Message Rating  . . . . . . .  12
   7.  Encryption to Bcc recipients  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     7.1.  Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       7.1.1.  Split To and Cc recpients from Bcc recipients . . . .  14
       7.1.2.  Split Bcc recipients in two groups  . . . . . . . . .  14
       7.1.3.  Send one email with only To/Cc recipients . . . . . .  14
       7.1.4.  Send one Bcc email for the first Bcc group  . . . . .  14
       7.1.5.  Send individual Bcc emails for the second group . . .  14
   8.  Saving messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   10. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     10.1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     10.2.  Current software implementing pEp  . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   11. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17



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   Appendix A.  Document Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Appendix B.  Open Issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

1.  Introduction

   This document contains specific propositions to those parts of pretty
   Easy privacy (pEp) [I-D.birk-pep] which are specific to email.
   [RFC5322]

   All changes required for the pEp propositions on email to work just
   affect implementers of Mail User Agents (MUAs).

   pretty Easy privacy (pEp) for email is a proposition to both,
   implementers and Internet users, to make end-to-end encryption of
   emails straigtforward.

   With Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) and OpenPGP [RFC4880] we do not miss
   the very basis to have good encryption.  However, we miss
   implementatons which make it usabable for ordinary Internet users.

   Two users using pEp-enabled mail clients basically don't need to do
   anything else than just writing emails, this working like the
   following

   1.  User Alice, knowing nothing of Bob, just writes him an email:
       this mail goes out unencrypted.  However, the Alice's public key
       is already attached.

   2.  User Bob can just reply to Alice and is now already able to
       encrypt a message.  Through a color-rating (cf.
       [I-D.marques-pep-rating] Bob becomes aware of his message now
       going out in a secure fashion (as secure as the encryption chosen
       is).

   3.  User Alice now receives Bob's key in signed and encrypted form
       and as of now is also able to write secure messages to Bob.

   4.  If Alice and Bob want to make sure they can exclude a man-in-the-
       middle attack (MITM), they can engage in a Handshake
       [I-D.marques-pep-handshake], comparing their so-called Trustwords
       [I-D.birk-pep-trustwords] an confirm this process if they match.
       After doing so their identity rating changes to encrypted and
       authenticated, which (UX-wise) can be done, e.g., using a green
       color rating.  This color rating is also applied to messages (in-
       and outgoing).





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   This basic functionality can since longer been shown on different
   platforms, cf. Section 10).

   No propositions are made at this point in time that would require
   implementers to change the behaviour or feature set of email servers.
   Another Internet-Draft may propose changes to the Simple Mail
   Transfer Protocol (SMTP) [RFC5321] as to allow for onion routing of
   email messages in a way metadata can furtherly be protected for
   communication peers - achievable by message encapsulation. pEp's
   email message format 2 described below is already prepared for this
   scenario.

2.  Terms

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   o  Handshake: The process when Alice - e.g. in-person or via phone -
      contacts Bob to verify Trustwords (or by fallback: fingerprints)
      is called handshake.  [I-D.marques-pep-handshake]

   o  Trustwords: A scalar-to-word representation of 16-bit numbers (0
      to 65535) to natural language words.  When doing a handshake,
      peers are shown combined Trustwords of both public keys involved
      to ease the comparison.  [I-D.birk-pep-trustwords]

   o  Trust on First Use (TOFU): cf. [RFC7435]

   o  Man-in-the-middle attack (MITM): cf. [RFC4949]

3.  Opportunistic Security with pEp for email

   TBD

3.1.  Automatic keypair generation

   For every email account a user has in a pEp-enabled Mail User Agent
   (MUA), a different keypair SHOULD be used by default.  If there are
   no keys whatsoever, RSA-4096 keypairs for OpenPGP encryption
   [RFC4880] SHOULD be generated automatically for each email account.
   At the very least RSA-2048 keypairs MUST be generated.

   If for an identity there's an RSA keypair with less than 2048 bits,
   new keys are generated.






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3.2.  Key Distribution

   By default, public keys MUST always be attached to any outgoing
   message.

4.  Encryption of email header fields and interoperability

   In pEp, implementers MUST put privacy first: email metadata (i.e.,
   headers) MUST either be omitted or encrypted whenever possible.

   In case of email header encryption: implementers of pEp SHOULD be
   liberal in accepting other approaches to encrypt email headers, but
   use the strict and interopable pEp formats for any outgoing
   communication.

5.  pEp message formats for email

   With pEp message formats 1 and 2 email security formats are described
   which are sent signed and encrypted, whenever public key(s) for the
   recipient(s) exist.

5.1.  Unencrypted plain text message with public key attached

   If for a recipient there's no public key, a pEp message MUST be sent
   out in plain text as MIME message version 1, with "Content-Type:
   multipart/mixed" and the OpenPGP public key attached in ASCII armored
   format, named "pEpkey.asc".

   For a MUA implementer this fullfills two functions:

   1.  It can easily be detected a pEp user is the sender.

   2.  The MUA (if at least OpenPGP-enabled) can enable the receiving
       user to import the public key to engage in end-to-end encryption
       with the sender; a MUA implementer can also decide to
       automatically import the key such that the user can immediately
       engage in opportunistic encryption.

   The plain text messages SHOULD be sent out with the UTF-8 charset
   Content-Type set.

5.1.1.  Example

   Please note that the "pEpkey.asc" example attachment encoded in
   base64 format are only shown in its first and last line (and
   otherwise shortened by three points).





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    From: John Doe <jdoe@machine.example>
    To: Mary Smith <mary@example.net>
    Subject: Test
    MIME-Version: 1.0
    Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
                  boundary="----3YNFBU8B6LV244ZJNQZL12LVUAPGG6"
    Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

    ------3YNFBU8B6LV244ZJNQZL12LVUAPGG6
    Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
    Content-Type: text/plain;
    charset=UTF-8

    Test

    ------3YNFBU8B6LV244ZJNQZL12LVUAPGG6
    Content-Type: application/pgp-keys;
     name="pEpkey.asc"
    Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
    Content-Disposition: attachment;
     filename="pEpkey.asc";
     size=3813

    LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBQR1AgUFVCTElDIEtFWSBCTE9DSy0tLS0tCgptUUlOQkZxNWlkd0JF
    ...
    cHhSUXFhQT09Cj1adlFnCi0tLS0tRU5EIFBHUCBQVUJMSUMgS0VZIEJMT0NLLS0tLS0K

    ------3YNFBU8B6LV244ZJNQZL12LVUAPGG6--

5.2.  pEp email format version 1

   pEp email format 1 is an encrypted and signed PGP/MIME format, which
   by default ensures

   o  correctly signed messages

   o  delivery of public keys (at least and automatically: the sender's
      public key)

   By default, when a public key for a peer is available, pEp-capable
   MUAs are REQUIRED to send out email messages according to [RFC5322]
   and in PGP/MIME format [RFC3156] with the informational "Subject:"
   header field set to "pEp", as follows:

      Subject: pEp

   In turn, the intended human-readable subject (in pEp called short
   message) MUST be moved to the body of the message (in pEp called long



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   message) and appear as the first line there. pEp implementers are
   REQUIRED to display the intended "Subject:" field as the real subject
   line in the respective MUAs to help users to easily grasp the real
   subject.

   The "Subject:" header field can also be set to its UTF-8 variant with
   "pEp" written with the equivalence symbol instead of an "E":

      Subject: =?utf-8?Q?p=E2=89=A1p?=

   Additionally, a header field "X-Pep-Version: 1.0" is to be added as
   to make clear a user is using a pEp-enabled MUA with pEp email format
   1.

5.2.1.  Example 1

   Example.  Using the well-known example of [RFC5322], an email message
   sent out with pEp in message format 1 looks like this:

































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      From: John Doe <jdoe@machine.example>
      Sender: Michael Jones <mjones@machine.example>
      To: Mary Smith <mary@example.net>
      Subject: pEp
      Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2018 09:55:06 +0200
      Message-ID: <1234@local.machine.example>
      MIME-Version: 1.0
      Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
                    boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0016_01D0E64A.33EC31B0"
      Content-Language: en-us
      X-Pep-Version: 1.0

      This is a multipart message in MIME format.

      ------=_NextPart_000_0016_01D0E64A.33EC31B0
      Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
      Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

      -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
      hQIMAwusnBHN80H+AQ//cJLQLOl+6hOofKEkQJeu0wedmwt+TkzPx/sCUQ80dzLv
      ...
      j/ES8ndDBftM5mZLzFQ2VatqB9G9cqCgiOVFs6jfTI13nPfLit9IPWRavcVIMdwt
      Xd9bdvHx/ReenAk/
      =7WaL
      -----END PGP MESSAGE-----

      ------=_NextPart_000_0060_01D0EAEF.2D54F450
      Content-Type: application/pgp-keys; name="pEp_key.asc"
      Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
      Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="pEp_key.asc"

      -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
      mQINBFQRqIcBEACpsz3mK1zqPdqDlxU6Yws/Xz14LJpszDLlKJckpa7hSc9jfZ4Q
      ...
      Ag7IIk/Gj628hYTdCpNCUc9b1vS6xMAkxJWYgNVwLFS2goikEHCiyzDe
      =MicJ
      -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

      ------=_NextPart_000_0060_01D0EAEF.2D54F450--


5.2.2.  Example 2

   Using the UTF-8 variant of writing "pEp" with the equivalence symbol,
   and an additional document attached (an example PDF attachment), an
   OpenPGP-signed and -encrypted pEp email would look like the
   following:




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      From: John Doe <jdoe@machine.example>
      Sender: Michael Jones <mjones@machine.example>
      To: Mary Smith <mary@example.net>
      Subject: =?utf-8?Q?p=E2=89=A1p?=
      Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2018 09:55:06 +0200
      Message-ID: <1234@local.machine.example>
      MIME-Version: 1.0
      Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
                    boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0016_01D0E64A.33EC31B0"
      Content-Language: en-us
      X-Pep-Version: 1.0

      This is a multipart message in MIME format.

      ------=_NextPart_000_0016_01D0E64A.33EC31B0
      Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
      Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

      -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
      hQIMAwusnBHN80H+AQ//cJLQLOl+6hOofKEkQJeu0wedmwt+TkzPx/sCUQ80dzLv
      ...
      j/ES8ndDBftM5mZLzFQ2VatqB9G9cqCgiOVFs6jfTI13nPfLit9IPWRavcVIMdwt
      Xd9bdvHx/ReenAk/
      =7WaL
      -----END PGP MESSAGE-----

      ------=_NextPart_000_003A_01D10CF6.2DA15150
      Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name="example.pdf.pgp"
      Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
      Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="example.pdf.pgp"

      -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
      hQIMA/bohV/mG7k7ARAAyy+sdpZYZBhUH/p0gJ+wIlEGTTG2rjLpLuixBrm5Cuj3
      ...
      oAXrQJJgD0F3Ung24Kkundua2gSa9cyeYvUXtA2mbXT7YyN7RdxrMFNfdVFqXZEc
      pXqIjL2uKBbyjpS44fc3GmOZNih3bI6q8nl/
      =Mvna

      ------=_NextPart_000_0060_01D0EAEF.2D54F450
      Content-Type: application/pgp-keys; name="pEp_key.asc"
      Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
      Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="pEp_key.asc"

      -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
      mQINBFQRqIcBEACpsz3mK1zqPdqDlxU6Yws/Xz14LJpszDLlKJckpa7hSc9jfZ4Q
      ...
      Ag7IIk/Gj628hYTdCpNCUc9b1vS6xMAkxJWYgNVwLFS2goikEHCiyzDe
      =MicJ



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      -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

      ------=_NextPart_000_0060_01D0EAEF.2D54F450--

5.3.  pEp email format version 2

   pEp email format 2 is a strict PGP/MIME format, which by default
   ensures

   o  correctly signed messages

   o  delivery of public keys (at least: the sender's public key)

   In pEp email format 2 the actual email is encapsulated by an outside
   multipartd/encrypted envelope email (i.e., the actual email is sent
   like a forwarded message).

   Headers of messages (received, to be forwarded etc.) can thus be
   preserved in the inner message, which is OpenPGP-signed and
   -encrypted by the application/pgp-encrypted "Content-Type:".

   In the outer envelope, unnecessary email headers MUST be ommitted to
   the fullest extent.

   In contrast to pEp email format 1, the public key and other files
   attached cannot be seen in the MIME tree.  The only part which can be
   seen is an application/octet-sream "Content-Type" with name
   "msg.asc".

   or the sender's public key is considered as modification and shown as
   attack.

5.3.1.  Example (Outer and Inner Envelope)

   A pEp email format 2 message, with the "Subject:" header field set to
   "pEp" looks like the following; please note that the inner envelope
   is fully contained in the OpenPGP-signed and -encrypted file named
   "msg.asc", including possible attachments and with the sender's
   public key as "pEpkey.asc" attached at the very end:












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       From: John Doe <jdoe@machine.example>
       Sender: Michael Jones <mjones@machine.example>
       To: Mary Smith <mary@example.net>
       Subject: =?utf-8?Q?p=E2=89=A1p?=
       Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2018 09:55:06 +0200
       Message-ID: <1234@local.machine.example>
       MIME-Version: 1.0
       Subject: pEp
       X-Pep-Version: 2.0
       Content-Type: multipart/encrypted;
                     boundary="261a304d18692673570d913f7e24b8cb";
                     protocol="application/pgp-encrypted"

       --261a304d18692673570d913f7e24b8cb
       Content-Type: application/pgp-encrypted

       Version: 1
       --261a304d18692673570d913f7e24b8cb
       Content-Type: application/octet-stream
       Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
       Content-Disposition: inline; filename="msg.asc"

       -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----

       hQGMAzDKu5MiiyCzAQv9Edg8ulxgxyQfiZRxOpThL0aMFkK7JZH7AJfgdxunLAJk
       ...
       a2jDdzNxotItZk8tWW2h/REdKtRMyXg633DyFLbsIx+cCMnMR1NDChCzvyzUjAw6
       XeCGXnY3LB1K
       =sdgE
       -----END PGP MESSAGE-----

       --261a304d18692673570d913f7e24b8cb--

   The inner envelope in a simple form without further nestings might
   look like the following, when decrypted:
















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    MIME-Version: 1.0
    Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="17d3c87b380049a821c764604aaf9272"

    --17d3c87b380049a821c764604aaf9272
    Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
    Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
    Content-Disposition: inline; filename="msg.txt"

    Subject: The real encrypted subject

    Hello, there!

    --17d3c87b380049a821c764604aaf9272
    Content-Type: application/pgp-keys
    Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="pEpkey.asc"

    -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
    mQGNBFmwE70BDACyR/yQ48QSaQAZyvyUgp7f/4WXxiX1OS9vC/UuewdGLosvl3G+
    ...
    A0KQ6HDwLFuLzneg6Nse4pX0hNWGbLNCouYKdL3vfUHokqp/MTzxyPQlOadDHrDV
    H9RC4kMrB/ONGe5yn+u4zjrgq9gWCbdJ43fMoiU3lfMIKy5sZ2NPzh9l
    =p5bZ
    -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

   It does not only carry the encrypted subject, which pEp implementers
   are supposed to map (UX-wise) such as to replace the "pEp" subject in
   the outer envelope, but also the actual message (as inline file named
   "msg.txt" in case of plain text) as well as the the sender's public
   key.

6.  Rendering Incoming Messages and Message Rating

   pEp-enabled clients MUST NOT blindly render messages.  Special care
   MUST be taken when rendering the pEp email formats, which provide
   certain guarantees:
















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   +--------------+----------------+--------+--------------------------+
   | Message      | Error State    | Render |              Status Code |
   | Format       |                |        |                          |
   +--------------+----------------+--------+--------------------------+
   | PGP/MIME     | Unsigned       | Yes    |   DECRYPTED_BUT_UNSIGNED |
   |              |                |        |                          |
   |              | Signed, no key | Yes    |        NO_KEY_FOR_SIGNER |
   |              |                |        |                          |
   |              | Bad signature  | No     | SIGNATURE_DOES_NOT_MATCH |
   |              |                |        |                          |
   | pEp Email    | Unsigned       | No     |   DECRYPTED_BUT_UNSIGNED |
   | 1.0          |                |        |                          |
   |              |                |        |                          |
   |              | Signed, no key | No     |        NO_KEY_FOR_SIGNER |
   |              |                |        |                          |
   |              | Bad signature  | No     | SIGNATURE_DOES_NOT_MATCH |
   |              |                |        |                          |
   | pEp Email    | Unsigned       | No     |    MODIFICATION_DETECTED |
   | 2.0          |                |        |                          |
   |              |                |        |                          |
   |              | Signed, no key | No     |    MODIFICATION_DETECTED |
   |              |                |        |                          |
   |              | Bad signature  | No     | SIGNATURE_DOES_NOT_MATCH |
   +--------------+----------------+--------+--------------------------+

   For cases where messages appear unsigned, signed without a key or
   with a bad signature, pEp's privacy rating can be employed to signal
   issues to a user in an easily understandable manner, cf.
   [I-D.marques-pep-rating].

   [[TODO: This needs more work to be understandable. ]]

7.  Encryption to Bcc recipients

7.1.  Algorithm

   For email encryption including Bcc recpients, which MUST receive
   encrypted messages if public keys are available for any of the
   involved email addresses, this simple algoritm MAY be used.

   Recipients MUST be partitioned into three lists, one for each of
   three possible outgoing messages:

   1.  To and Cc recipients without Bcc recpients.

   2.  Bcc recipients unable to encrypt.

   3.  Bcc recipients able to encrypt.



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   It's RECOMMENDED that if the original message the user drafted is
   saved in the user's sent folder, that all recipient fields ("To:",
   "Cc:", "Bcc:") be preserved.

7.1.1.  Split To and Cc recpients from Bcc recipients

   To and Cc recipients MUST be split from the Bcc recipients.

7.1.2.  Split Bcc recipients in two groups

   Bcc recipients MUST be split in two groups:

   o  First group of Bcc recipients who will receive clear text emails.

   o  Second group of Bcc recipients who are able to receive encrypted
      emails.

7.1.3.  Send one email with only To/Cc recipients

   The original email the user drafted SHOULD be sent out with the
   "Bcc:" field removed.

7.1.4.  Send one Bcc email for the first Bcc group

   For the first Bcc group, a regular email message with only Bcc
   recipients is sent.

7.1.5.  Send individual Bcc emails for the second group

   For the second group, individual Bcc email messages are sent.

8.  Saving messages

   In accordance to the Privacy by Default principle, messages sent or
   received in encrypted form SHALL be saved with the peer's respective
   public key.

   Messages sent or received in unencrypted form, SHOULD NOT be saved in
   encrypted form on the mail server: this reflects the Privacy Status
   the user encountered when sending or receiving the email and thus
   meets the user's expectations.

   Instead, message drafts MUST always be saved with the user's public
   key.

   Other messages sent and received MUST be saved encrypted by default:
   for most end-user scenarios, the servers users work with, are
   considered untrusted.



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   For trusted environments (e.g., in organizations) and to conform to
   legally binding regulations, pEp implementations MUST provide a
   "Trusted Server" option.  With the user's explicit consent (opt-in),
   unencrypted copies of the messages SHALL be held on the mail servers
   controlled by the organization.  This can also help end-users to
   archive their emails without needing access to any key material.

9.  Security Considerations

   [[ TODO ]]

10.  Implementation Status

10.1.  Introduction

   This section records the status of known implementations of the
   protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
   Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
   The description of implementations in this section is intended to
   assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
   RFCs.  Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
   here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.  Furthermore, no effort
   has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
   supplied by IETF contributors.  This is not intended as, and must not
   be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
   features.  Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
   exist.

   According to [RFC7942], "[...] this will allow reviewers and working
   groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit
   of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable
   experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols
   more mature.  It is up to the individual working groups to use this
   information as they see fit."

10.2.  Current software implementing pEp

   The following software implementing the pEp protocols (to varying
   degrees) already exists:

   o  pEp for Outlook as add-on for Microsoft Outlook, release
      [SRC.pepforoutlook]

   o  pEp for Android (based on a fork of the K9 MUA), release
      [SRC.pepforandroid]

   o  Enigmail/pEp as add-on for Mozilla Thunderbird, release
      [SRC.enigmailpep]



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   o  pEp for iOS (implemented in a new MUA), beta [SRC.pepforios]

   pEp for Android, iOS and Outlook are provided by pEp Security, a
   commercial entity specializing in end-user software implementing pEp
   while Enigmail/pEp is pursued as community project, supported by the
   pEp Foundation.

   All software is available as Free Software and published also in
   source form.

11.  Acknowledgements

   Special thanks go to Krista Bennet and Volker Birk for the reference
   implementation on pEp and the ideas leading to this draft.

   This work was initially created by pEp Foundation, and will be
   reviewed and extended with funding by the Internet Society's Beyond
   the Net Programme on standardizing pEp.  [ISOC.bnet]

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.birk-pep]
              Birk, V., Marques, H., and S. Shelburn, "pretty Easy
              privacy (pEp): Privacy by Default", draft-birk-pep-02
              (work in progress), June 2018.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3156]  Elkins, M., Del Torto, D., Levien, R., and T. Roessler,
              "MIME Security with OpenPGP", RFC 3156,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3156, August 2001,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3156>.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.

   [RFC5322]  Resnick, P., Ed., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5322, October 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5322>.






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   [RFC7435]  Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection
              Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435,
              December 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435>.

12.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.birk-pep-trustwords]
              Birk, V., Marques, H., and B. Hoeneisen, "IANA
              Registration of Trustword Lists: Guide, Template and IANA
              Considerations", draft-birk-pep-trustwords-02 (work in
              progress), June 2018.

   [I-D.marques-pep-handshake]
              Marques, H. and B. Hoeneisen, "pretty Easy privacy (pEp):
              Contact and Channel Authentication through Handshake",
              draft-marques-pep-handshake-00 (work in progress), June
              2018.

   [I-D.marques-pep-rating]
              Marques, H. and B. Hoeneisen, "pretty Easy privacy (pEp):
              Mapping of Privacy Rating", draft-marques-pep-rating-00
              (work in progress), July 2018.

   [ISOC.bnet]
              Simao, I., "Beyond the Net. 12 Innovative Projects
              Selected for Beyond the Net Funding. Implementing Privacy
              via Mass Encryption: Standardizing pretty Easy privacy's
              protocols", June 2017, <https://www.internetsociety.org/
              blog/2017/06/12-innovative-projects-selected-for-beyond-
              the-net-funding/>.

   [RFC4880]  Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Shaw, D., and R.
              Thayer, "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 4880,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4880, November 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4880>.

   [RFC5321]  Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5321>.

   [RFC7258]  Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
              Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.

   [RFC7942]  Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
              Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
              RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.



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   [SRC.enigmailpep]
              "Source code for Enigmail/pEp", July 2018,
              <https://enigmail.net/index.php/en/download/source-code>.

   [SRC.pepforandroid]
              "Source code for pEp for Android", July 2018,
              <https://pep-security.lu/gitlab/android/pep>.

   [SRC.pepforios]
              "Source code for pEp for iOS", July 2018,
              <https://pep-security.ch/dev/repos/pEp_for_iOS/>.

   [SRC.pepforoutlook]
              "Source code for pEp for Outlook", July 2018,
              <https://pep-security.lu/dev/repos/pEp_for_Outlook/>.

Appendix A.  Document Changelog

   [[ RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication ]]

   o  draft-marques-pep-email-00:

      *  Initial version

Appendix B.  Open Issues

   [[ RFC Editor: This section should be empty and is to be removed
   before publication ]]

   o  Ship better example of pEp Message Format 2

   o  Elaborate on omitting headers and better explain pEp Message
      Format 2

   o  Add notes on EFAIL

   o  Describe KeyImport to induce the import from secret keys from
      other devices

   o  Describe / Reference KeySync (and other sync, through IMAP)

   o  Add keypair revocation strategy

   o  Better describe required MIME fields and parameters to set for the
      pEp email formats

   o  Create clearer relations to the pEp rating draft (draft-marques-
      pep-rating), as this plays an important role in how messages are



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      rendered and how they need to be presented (after rating) for a
      user to have awareness about his privacy status in any given
      situation.

   o  Make document more coherent: check with pEp's general draft pieces
      to fill on both sides and how to reference them vice-versa.

Author's Address

   Hernani Marques
   pEp Foundation
   Oberer Graben 4
   CH-8400 Winterthur
   Switzerland

   Email: hernani.marques@pep.foundation
   URI:   https://pep.foundation/


































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