Internet Engineering Task Force                              N. McCallum
Internet-Draft                                             Red Hat, Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                          April 24, 2015
Expires: October 26, 2015


                        SPAKE Pre-Authentication
               draft-mccallum-kitten-krb-spake-preauth-00

Abstract

   This document defines a new password authenticated key exchange based
   pre-authentication mechanism for performing Kerberos authentication.
   This mechanism has three goals.  First, it makes Kerberos pre-
   authentication more resilient against time synchronization errors by
   removing the need to transfer an encrypted timestamp.  Second, it
   increases the security of the Kerberos pre-authentication exchange by
   making offline brute-force attacks impossible.  Third, it enables the
   use of secure second factor authentication without FAST by utilizing
   the existing trust relationship established by the shared first
   factor.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 26, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents



McCallum                Expires October 26, 2015                [Page 1]


Internet-Draft          SPAKE Pre-Authentication              April 2015


   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Properties of PAKE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  PAKE and 2FA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.3.  Which PAKE? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Document Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Prerequisites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  PA-ETYPE-INFO2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Cookie Support  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  More Pre-Authentication Data Required . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  SPAKE Pre-Authentication Message Protocol . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  First Pass  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  Second Pass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.3.  Third Pass  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.4.  Subsequent Passes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.5.  Optimizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Key Derivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.1.  Session Key Derivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.2.  Encryption Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Second Factor Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Recommended Groups  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   10. Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

   Existing Kerberos pre-authentication methods generally involve
   encrypting a well-known value, often a timestamp, in the client
   principal's long-term secret.  This approach has two signficant
   drawbacks.  First, where a timestamp is used, time synchronization
   between the client and KDC becomes a point of fragility.  Second, a
   passive attacker can perform offline brute-force attack against the
   transferred packet.








McCallum                Expires October 26, 2015                [Page 2]


Internet-Draft          SPAKE Pre-Authentication              April 2015


1.1.  Properties of PAKE

   Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DHKE) is a mechanism by which two
   parties can derive a shared session key over an insecure network
   which cannot be derived by a passive attacker.  DHKE could replace
   the above approaches without their drawback.  Unfortunately, DHKE can
   be easily compromised by an active attacker by using a man-in-the-
   middle attack.

   Password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) is a technique which
   extends DHKE by using a shared secret - in the case of Kerberos, the
   client principal's long-term secret - in order to protect the
   underlying DHKE from an active attacker.  This property of PAKE makes
   it ideal for use as a Kerberos pre-authentication mechanism.

1.2.  PAKE and 2FA

   Using PAKE in a pre-authentication mechanism also has another benefit
   when coupled with two-factor authentication (2FA). 2FA methods often
   require the secure transfer of plaintext material to the KDC for
   verification.  This includes one-time passwords, challenge/response
   signatures and biometric data.  Attempting to encrypt this data using
   the long-term password results in packets that are vulnerable to
   offline brute-force attack; a problem we are already trying to solve.

   In the past, this problem has been mitigated by FAST which uses a
   secondary trust relationship to create a secure encryption channel
   within which pre-authentication data can be sent.  However, the
   requirement for a secondary trust relationship has proven to be
   cumbersome to deploy and often introduces third parties into the
   trust chain (such as certificate authorities).  By using PAKE, the
   calculated session key can be leveraged into an encryption key for
   2FA data without the need for a secondary trust relationship.

1.3.  Which PAKE?

   The most common technique in PAKE is to modify a DHKE by encrypting
   one or more of the public keys exchanged using the shared secret.
   This ensures that only the party which knows the shared secret can
   decrypt the public key and complete the DHKE.  The earliest widely
   deployed PAKE, which also used this model, was the Diffie-Hellman
   Encrypted Key Exchange (DH-EKE).  Unfortunately, DH-EKE depends on
   the property that the public key is indistinguishable from random.
   This unfortunately means that DH-EKE cannot be used with elliptic
   curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH).

   SPAKE [I-D.irtf-cfrg-spake2] is a variant of the technique used by
   DH-EKE which ensures that all public key encryption and decryption



McCallum                Expires October 26, 2015                [Page 3]


Internet-Draft          SPAKE Pre-Authentication              April 2015


   operations result in a member of the underlying group.  This property
   allows SPAKE to be used with ECDH, permitting the pre-authentication
   packets to use markedly smaller key sizes with equivalent security.
   Additionally, unlike some other PAKE methods, SPAKE can complete the
   key exchange in just a single round-trip.  These properties make
   SPAKE an ideal PAKE to use for Kerberos pre-authentication.

2.  Document Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3.  Prerequisites

3.1.  PA-ETYPE-INFO2

   KDCs which implement SPAKE pre-authentication MUST return a PA-ETYPE-
   INFO2.  This PA-ETYPE-INFO2 MUST contain only one ETYPE-INFO2-ENTRY.
   This ETYPE-INFO2-ENTRY will be the etype used for all cryptographic
   operations and to select the long-term key for the SPAKE operation.

3.2.  Cookie Support

   KDCs which implement SPAKE pre-authentication MUST have some secure
   mechanism for retaining state between AS-REQs.  This method will most
   commonly be an encrypted PA-FX-COOKIE.  If PA-FX-COOKIE is used, then
   clients MUST also support PA-FX-COOKIE.

3.3.  More Pre-Authentication Data Required

   Both KDCs and clients which implement SPAKE pre-authentication MUST
   support the use of KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED.

4.  SPAKE Pre-Authentication Message Protocol

   This section will describe the flow of messages when performing SPAKE
   pre-authentication.  We will begin by explaining the most verbose
   version of the protocol which all implementations MUST support.  Then
   we will describe several optional optimizations to reduce round-
   trips.

   All messages will use the following pre-authentication type:

   PA-SPAKE  TBD






McCallum                Expires October 26, 2015                [Page 4]


Internet-Draft          SPAKE Pre-Authentication              April 2015


4.1.  First Pass

   The SPAKE pre-authentication exchange begins when the client sends an
   initial authentication service request (AS-REQ) without pre-
   authentication data.  Upon receipt of this AS-REQ, a KDC which
   requires pre-authentication and supports SPAKE SHOULD reply with
   KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED containing an empty PA-SPAKE pre-
   authentication data.  This indicates to the client that the KDC
   supports SPAKE pre-authentication.

4.2.  Second Pass

   Once the client knows that the KDC supports SPAKE pre-authentication
   and the client desires to use it, the client will generate a new AS-
   REQ which includes a SPAKESupport message.  This message indicates to
   the KDC which groups the client prefers for the SPAKE operation.  The
   groups sequence is ordered from the most preferred group to the least
   preferred group.

   SPAKESupport ::= SEQUENCE {
       groups   SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
       ...
   }

   Upon receipt of the SPAKESupport message, the KDC will select a
   group.  The KDC SHOULD choose a group from the groups provided by the
   SPAKESupport message.  However, if the SPAKESupport message does not
   contain any group that is supported by the KDC, the KDC MAY select
   another group in hopes that the client might support it.

   Once the KDC has selected a group, the KDC will reply to the client
   with KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED containing a SPAKEChallenge
   message.

   SPAKEChallenge ::= SEQUENCE {
       group   OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
       pubkey  OCTET STRING,
       factors SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF SPAKESecondFactor,
       ...
   }

   The group field indicates the KDC-selected group used for all SPAKE
   calculations.

   The pubkey field indicates the KDC's public key generated using the M
   constant in the SPAKE algorithm.  The format of this field's contents
   and the value of the M constant will depend upon the group chosen.




McCallum                Expires October 26, 2015                [Page 5]


Internet-Draft          SPAKE Pre-Authentication              April 2015


   The factors field contains an unordered list of second factors which
   can be used to complete the authentication.  Each second factor is
   represented by a SPAKESecondFactor.

   SPAKESecondFactor ::= SEQUENCE {
       type Int32,
       data OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
   }

   The type field is a unique integer which identifies the second factor
   type.  The factors field of SPAKEChallenge MUST NOT contain more than
   one SPAKESecondFactor with the same type value.

   The data field contains optional challenge data.  The contents in
   this field will depend upon the second factor type chosen.

4.3.  Third Pass

   Upon receipt of the SPAKEChallenge message, the client will complete
   its part of of the SPAKE process resulting in a public key and a
   SPAKE key.  Then, the client derives the session key from the SPAKE
   key.

   Next, the client chooses one of the second factor types listed in the
   challenge field of the SPAKEChallenge message and gathers whatever
   data is required for this second factor type; possibly using the
   challenge data for this second factor type.  Finally, the client
   sends an AS-REQ with a SPAKEResponse message.

   SPAKEResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
       pubkey OCTET STRING,
       factor EncryptedData, -- SPAKESecondFactor
       ...
   }

   The pubkey field indicates the client's public key generated using
   the N constant in the SPAKE algorithm.  The format of this field's
   contents and the value of the N constant will depend upon the group
   chosen by the KDC.

   The factor field indicates the client's chosen second factor data.
   This data is encrypted using a derivation of the PAKE key.  The plain
   text inside the EncryptedData is an encoding of SPAKESecondFactor.
   Once decoded, the SPAKESecondFactor contains the type of the second
   factor and any optional data used.  The contents of the data field
   will depend on the second factor type chosen.  The client MUST NOT
   send a response containing a second factor type which was not listed
   in the factors field of the SPAKEChallenge message.



McCallum                Expires October 26, 2015                [Page 6]


Internet-Draft          SPAKE Pre-Authentication              April 2015


   When the KDC receives the SPAKEResponse message from the client, it
   will use the pubkey to complete the SPAKE process resulting in the
   SPAKE key.  The KDC will then derive the session key from the SPAKE
   key.  If the SPAKE process is successful, the client and the KDC will
   have the same SPAKE key and session key.

   The KDC will then use the same derivation of the PAKE key as the
   client to decrypt the factors field.  If decryption is successful,
   the first factor is successfully validated.  Upon decoding the
   SPAKESecondFactor, the KDC then validates the second factor.  If both
   factors successfully validate, the KDC responds by issuing a TGT
   encrypted in the session key.  If either factor fails to validate, an
   appropriate KRB-ERROR is returned.  If validation of the second
   factor requires further round-trips, the KDC MUST reply to the client
   with KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED and include an encoded
   EncryptedData message containing an encoded, encrypted
   SPAKESecondFactor message.  As before, the type field of this message
   will contain the second factor type and the data field will
   optionally contain second factor type specific data.

4.4.  Subsequent Passes

   Any number of EncryptedData message roundtrips may occur.  The
   precise details of this are second factor type specific.  The only
   constraint is that if a client receives EncryptedData from the KDC it
   MUST reply with a subsequent AS-REQ with EncryptedData.  These
   exchanges conclude when the KDC indicates that either authentication
   has failed (via an appropriate KRB-ERROR) or a TGT has been issued
   (via an AS-REP).

4.5.  Optimizations

   The full protocol has two possible optimizations.

   First, the KDC MAY reply to the initial AS-REQ containing no pre-
   authentication data with KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED and a
   SPAKEChallenge message.  In this case the KDC optimistically selects
   a group which the client may not support.  If the group chosen by the
   SPAKEChallenge message is supported by the client, the client MUST
   skip to the Third Pass by issuing an AS-REQ with a SPAKEResponse
   message.  If the KDC's chosen group is not supported by the client,
   the client MUST continue to the Second Pass as if it had received an
   empty PA-SPAKE.  Clients MUST support this optimization.

   Second, clients which are somehow aware that they should use SPAKE
   pre-authentication with a KDC MAY skip the First Pass entirely.  KDCs
   MUST support this optimization.




McCallum                Expires October 26, 2015                [Page 7]


Internet-Draft          SPAKE Pre-Authentication              April 2015


5.  Key Derivation

5.1.  Session Key Derivation

   Implementations MUST NOT use the SPAKE key (denoted by K in Section 2
   of SPAKE [I-D.irtf-cfrg-spake2]) directly for any cryptographic
   operation.  Instead, the SPAKE key MUST be used to derive a session
   key as defined in this section.  This method differs slightly from
   the method used to generate K' in Section 3 of SPAKE
   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-spake2] in order to provide message integrity.

   Whenever a SPAKESupport or SPAKEChallenge message is sent or
   received, its encoded representation MUST be checksummed according to
   the mandatory checksum for the negotiated etype.  Similarly, whenever
   a SPAKEResponse message is sent or received, its pubkey attribute
   MUST be encoded separately and checksummed.  Each checksum MUST be
   concatenated to the end of a buffer containing the checksums of all
   previous messages in the order they were sent or received.  This
   buffer is called the transcript hash.

   In order to generate the session key, we concatenate the following
   values and pass the resulting buffer, along with the client
   principal's key, as input to the pseudo-random function defined for
   the etype: the uncanonicalized client principal, the uncanonicalized
   server principal, the SPAKE key and the transcript hash.  During
   concatenation, each value must be prepended by the value's length as
   defined in Section 2 of SPAKE [I-D.irtf-cfrg-spake2].  The output
   from the pseudo-random function is the session key.

5.2.  Encryption Key Derivation

   Each EncryptedData message sent MUST use a distinct key, including
   the factor field in the SPAKEResponse message.  This key is derived
   by using a method identical to the Session Key Derivation except for
   an additional input value appended to the end of the pseudo-random
   function input: an eight-byte big-endian count of the number of
   EncryptedData messages sent or received.

6.  Second Factor Types

   This document defines one second factor type:

   SF-NONE  1

   This second factor type indicates that no second factor is used.
   Whenever a SPAKESecondFactor is used with SF-NONE, the data field
   MUST be omitted.  The SF-NONE second factor always successfully
   validates.



McCallum                Expires October 26, 2015                [Page 8]


Internet-Draft          SPAKE Pre-Authentication              April 2015


7.  Recommended Groups

   In the interest of broad compatibility, the following groups are
   recommended for implementation:

   o  P256

   o  P384

   o  P521

   All of these groups encode their public keys in SEC1 compressed
   format.

8.  Security Considerations

   All of the security considerations from SPAKE [I-D.irtf-cfrg-spake2]
   apply here as well.

   Message integrity is provided by the transcript hash being integrated
   into the final session key and encryption keys.  This prevents
   downgrade attacks on SPAKESupport and SPAKEChallenge.  However,
   please note that message integrity confirmation does not occur until
   after SPAKEResponse is sent.  This means that data in SPAKEChallenge
   should be treated as untrusted before this point.  The most obvious
   implication is that SPAKEChallenge should not contain information to
   prompt the users with as it may be modified to lie or try to do other
   nasty things.

   However, since the response is encrypted, it is not possible to
   exploit the untrustworthiness of SPAKEChallenge into an encryption or
   signing oracle.  Any attempt to do this will result in data that
   cannot be decrypted.

   Given that each EncryptedData will begin a new encryption context, a
   failure to properly derive the encryption keys will result in a
   situation where the risk of compromise is non-negligible.

   Weak checksums present a risk to the transcript hash.  Any etype with
   a checksum based on one of the following algorithms MUST NOT be used:

   o  CRC32

   o  MD4

   o  MD4

   o  MAC



McCallum                Expires October 26, 2015                [Page 9]


Internet-Draft          SPAKE Pre-Authentication              April 2015


   If more than one round-trip is required to authenticate a second
   factor, this reveals to an online brute-force attacker that his first
   factor guess was correct.  This should be avoided if at all possible.

   Both the size of the EncryptedData and the number of EncryptedData
   messages may reveal information about the second factor used in an
   authentication.  Care should be taken to keep second factor messages
   as small and as few as possible.

9.  IANA Considerations

   One registry for numeric values has been created: Kerberos Second
   Factor Type Numbers.  These are signed values ranging from
   -2147483648 to 2147483647.  Positive values should be assigned only
   for algorithms specified in accordance with this specification for
   use with Kerberos or related protocols.  Negative values are for
   private use; local and experimental algorithms should use these
   values.  Zero is reserved and may not be assigned.

10.  Normative References

   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-spake2]
              Ladd, W., "SPAKE2, a PAKE", draft-irtf-cfrg-spake2-01
              (work in progress), February 2015.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4120]  Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
              Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
              July 2005.

   [RFC6113]  Hartman, S. and L. Zhu, "A Generalized Framework for
              Kerberos Pre-Authentication", RFC 6113, April 2011.

















McCallum                Expires October 26, 2015               [Page 10]


Internet-Draft          SPAKE Pre-Authentication              April 2015


Appendix A.  Acknowledgements

     Simo Sorce (Red Hat)
     Nico Williams (Oracle)
     Greg Hudson (MIT)
     Tom Yu (MIT)

Author's Address

   Nathaniel McCallum
   Red Hat, Inc.
   100 East Davie Street
   Raleigh, NC  27601
   USA

   EMail: npmccallum@redhat.com



































McCallum                Expires October 26, 2015               [Page 11]