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Versions: 00 01 02 03                                                   
Network Working Group                                          D. McGrew
Internet-Draft                                       Cisco Systems, Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                            July 4, 2011
Expires: January 5, 2012


  Generation of Deterministic Initialization Vectors (IVs) and Nonces
                       draft-mcgrew-iv-gen-00.txt

Abstract

   Many cryptographic algorithms use deterministic IVs, including CTR,
   GCM, CCM, GMAC.  This type of IV is also called a (deterministic)
   nonce.  Deterministic IVs must be distinct, for each fixed key, to
   guarantee the security of the algorithm.  This note describes best
   practices for the generation of such IVs, and summarizes how they are
   generated and used in different protocols.  Some problem areas are
   highlighted, and test considerations are outlined.  This note will be
   useful to implementers of algorithms using deterministic IVs, and to
   protocol or system designers using them.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 5, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Conventions Used In This Document  . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Deterministic IVs in Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Deterministic IVs in Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  Deterministic IVs in Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.1.  Recommended IV/Nonce Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.2.  Partially Implicit IV/Nonce Format . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.3.  Unpredictable IV/Nonce Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.4.  ESP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.5.  IKE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.6.  TLS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.7.  SSH  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.8.  SRTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.9.  Summary  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   5.  Imlementation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     5.1.  IV Verification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   6.  Testing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     6.1.  Internal IV Generator  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   7.  Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     7.1.  Choice of Fixed-Distinct Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     7.2.  Size of the Fixed-Distinct Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     7.3.  Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
     9.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
     9.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
















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1.  Introduction

   This note describes deterministic IVs and nonces and how they are
   used in cryptographic algorithms (Section 2), then describes their
   use in protocols (Section 3), and then their use in standards
   (Section 4).  Considerations for implementation (Section 5) and
   testing (Section 6) are presented.  Issues and potential problems are
   discussed (Section 7).  The focus is on network security protocols,
   rather than on the security of data at rest, though many of the same
   considerations apply in both areas.

1.1.  Conventions Used In This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].



































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2.  Deterministic IVs in Algorithms

   Many cryptographic algorithms use Initialization Vectors, or IVs.  An
   IV is provided to an algorithm along with a message to be processed;
   the IV initializes the algorithm to process the message.  Typically,
   there will be many IVs that are used with a single key.  Some
   algorithms, such as the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) encryption mode,
   require that the IVs that it uses are completely unpredictable.  Such
   IVs are typically called random IVs, and they must be generated by a
   cryptographically strong random or pseudorandom process [RFC4086].

   Another type of IVs are deterministic IVs.  These IVs are generated
   by a deterministic process.  The classic example of an algorithm that
   uses a deterministic IV is counter (CTR) mode encryption [CTR].  An
   algorithm that uses deterministic IVs requires that each IV provided
   as input to the algorithm be distinct, for a fixed key.

   A deterministic IV is sometimes called a nonce, or a deterministic
   nonce.  In cryptography, a nonce is a value that is used only once.
   Many cryptographic protocols include a nonce in a message to enable
   its receiver to recognize whether or not the message has been
   previously received and processed.  From the point of view of a
   cryptographic algorithm that uses deterministic IVs, calling the IV a
   nonce emphasizes the role of the IV in the overall system.  Calling
   that value a deterministic IV emphasizes its role in initializing the
   algorithm to process a new message.  Nonetheless, these are different
   monikers for the same thing.

   Authenticated Encryption is a symmetric encryption method that
   provides for the authenticity and integrity of the data that it
   protects, as well as its confidentiality [BN00] [R02].  An
   authenticated encryption method that uses deterministic IVs will need
   to make sure that the IVs used for encryption are distinct.  However,
   when performing the decryption operation, there is no need to ensure
   that the IVs are distinct; the authenticated decryption operation
   does not impose that requirement.  The Authenticated Encryption
   methods used in standards include Galois Counter Mode [GCM] and
   Counter and CBC MAC mode [CCM].

   Some Message Authentication Code (MACs) use deterministic IVs,
   including GMAC [GCM] and UMAC [RFC4118].  The considerations for
   Authenticated Encryption also apply to these MAC algorithms: the IVs
   used in the generation of an authentication tag must be distinct, but
   there is no need to verify the distinctness of an IV prior to
   inputting that IV to a tag verification algorithm.






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3.  Deterministic IVs in Protocols

   The simplest way to implement a deterministic IV or nonce is to use a
   counter: initialize an integer variable to zero, then each time that
   an IV is needed, output the integer value, then store the incremented
   value after checking to make sure that no integer overflow occurred,
   so that no counter value is used twice.  The simplicity of this
   method has made it popular in practice, and recommended by standards.

   The straightforward method of using a counter is not sufficient when
   there are multiple encryption engines that are using the same
   encryption key.  This can be the case when encryption is distributed
   across multiple processors, or across multiple software threads,
   processes, or virtual machines.  It can also happen in cases where a
   protocol allows group keys.  In these cases, some mechanism is needed
   that ensures that IVs are distinct across all encryption engines that
   use the same key.  This is easily accomplished by including a fixed
   field in the IV that is distinct for each distinct encrypter.  (This
   is detailed in Section 4.1.)

   When a deterministic IV is used to encrypt and/or authenticate a
   message, the receiver(s) of that message needs to know that IV in
   order to decrypt it and/or verify its authenticity.  A deterministic
   IV can be sent along with a message, which makes it plain to the
   receiver(s), or it can be left out of a message if the receiver(s)
   have enough information to reconstruct it.  Leaving the IV out of the
   message reduces the amount of data that must be communicated, which
   is advantageous.  On the other hand, if the IV is included in the
   message, the receiver(s) need not be aware of the method by which the
   sender has chosen the IVs.

   In practice, some protocols have split the difference between the
   implicit method (in which the IV is absent and a receiver infers its
   value) and the explicit method (in which the entire IV is included
   with the message).  The IV is constructed out of two fields: an
   explicit field, which is conveyed along with the message, and an
   implicit field, which is coordinated between the encrypter and the
   decrypter using an "out of band" method.  (This is detailed in
   Section 4.2.)  In most cases, the key management protocol that
   establishes the encryption key can also establish the implicit field.

   In a block cipher mode of operation that use deterministic IVs, the
   inputs to each of the block cipher invocations during the encryption
   process are determined by the IV provided to that process.  It is
   desirable to make the inputs to the block cipher unpredictable to an
   attacker, to the extent that is possible, to make cryptanalytic
   attacks more difficult and costly to attackers.  This is true for
   several types of attacks, including time-memory tradeoff attacks and



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   key collision attacks [MF00], which are generic attacks that can
   reduce the cost of attacking any cipher, and cipher-specific attacks
   such as integral cryptanalysis [KW02].  (It is worth noting that
   counter mode gives an attacker exactly what they want for integral
   cryptanalysis: a complete set of block cipher inputs that differ only
   in some bit positions.)  The cost of these attacks can be
   significantly increased by making the deterministic IV unpredictable
   to potential attackers.  This security benefit is one motivation for
   why the implicit field of the deterministic IV is kept secret in some
   protocols.

   It is not hard to adapt the simple methods for constructing
   deterministic IVs so that they produce IVs that are unpredictable.
   An easy way to do that is to have a secret value that is bitwise
   exclusive-ored into the IV after all of the other processing is done.
   (This is detailed in Section 4.3.)  This secret value must be known
   to all encrypters and decrypters, and be established via some "out of
   band" mechanism.  In practice, it is typically established by the key
   management system.
































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4.  Deterministic IVs in Standards

   Many different protocols use deterministic IVs, including ESP
   [RFC4106], TLS [RFC5288], SSH [RFC5647], and SRTP .  The way that
   these protocols define their IVs is outlined in this section and is
   summarized in Table 1.

4.1.  Recommended IV/Nonce Format

   RFC 5116 defines the interface for Authenticated Encryption, which is
   the most common use of deterministic IVs at present.  That RFC
   recommends an IV format, which is used by ESP, IKE, TLS, and SSH.
   The recommended format has a total length of 12 octets, and consists
   of a Fixed Field and a Counter field, and is structured as in
   Figure 1.  (See Section 3.2 of [RFC5116] for the precise normative
   description.)

      +-------------------------------+------------------------+
      |             Fixed             |         Counter        |
      +-------------------------------+------------------------+

                  Figure 1: Recommended IV/Nonce format.


                        Fixed      Counter
                       <------><-------------->
             1st       5DAD87F80000000000000001
             2nd       5DAD87F80000000000000002
             3rd       5DAD87F80000000000000003
             4th       5DAD87F80000000000000004
             5th       5DAD87F80000000000000005
             ...                  ...

    Figure 2: An example output of recommended IV/nonce format, showing
             successive IVs where the Fixed field is 5DAD87F8.

   The Fixed field remains constant for all nonces that are generated
   for a given encryption device.  If different devices are performing
   encryption with a single key, then each distinct device MUST use a
   distinct Fixed field, to ensure the uniqueness of the nonces.

   This format is suggested, but not required, by [CTR].

4.2.  Partially Implicit IV/Nonce Format

   The case in which the recommended format is used with Partially
   Implicit Nonces is further detailed.  In that case, the IV is
   structured as in Figure 3.



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      +--------------+----------------+------------------------+
      | Fixed-Common | Fixed-Distinct |         Counter        |
      +--------------+----------------+------------------------+
       <- implicit -> <--------------- explicit -------------->

               Figure 3: Partially implicit IV/Nonce format


                      Fixed  Fixed
                      Common Distinct  Counter
                      <------><--><---------->
            1st       5DAD87F81E0E000000000001
            2nd       5DAD87F81E0E000000000002
            3rd       5DAD87F81E0E000000000003
            4th       5DAD87F81E0E000000000004
            5th       5DAD87F81E0E000000000005
            ...                 ...

    Figure 4: An example output of Partially Implicit IV/Nonce format,
    showing successive IVs where the Fixed-Common field is 5DAD87F8 and
                     the Fixed-Distinct field is 1E0E.

   The portion of the IV that is stored or sent with the ciphertext is
   the explicit part.  The portion of the IV that is not sent with the
   ciphertext is the implicit part.

   The Fixed field is divided into two sub-fields: a Fixed-Common field
   and a Fixed-Distinct field.

   If different devices are performing encryption with a single key,
   then each distinct device MUST use a distinct Fixed-Distinct field.
   The Fixed-Common field is common to all IVs.  The Fixed-Distinct
   field and the Counter field MUST be in the explicit part of the IV.
   The Fixed-Common field MAY be in the implicit part of the IV.

   ESP, IKE, TLS, and SSH conform to the RFC 5116 Partially Implicit
   Nonces format, though they do not require that the "Counter" field
   actually be an integer counter (instead, "anything that guarantees
   uniqueness can be used").

4.3.  Unpredictable IV/Nonce Format

   This method is shown in Figure 5, in which the symbol (+) denotes the
   bitwise exclusive-or operation.  (Here the Fixed field consists of
   the Fixed-Common field followed by the Fixed-Distinct field.)  This
   format uses a Randomizer, which is an octet string that is combined
   with the other fields to make the IVs unpredictable.  The length of
   the Randomizer must be no greater than the sum of the lengths of the



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   Fixed and Counter fields.

   The next IV in sequence is computed as follows.  The Fixed field and
   the Counter field are concatenated.  If the length of the Randomizer
   is less than the combined length of the Fixed and Counter fields,
   then the Randomizer is padded on the right with enough zeros so that
   the padded value has a length that exactly matches that of the Fixed
   and Counter fields together.  The concatenated Fixed and Counter
   field is bitwise exclusive-ored with the padded Randomizer, and the
   resulting value is the IV.  The Counter is incremented, treating it
   as an unsigned integer with the most significant byte on the left,
   and the stored Counter field is set to the incremented value.  Then
   the IV is returned.  This is the method used by SRTP [RFC3711],
   wherein the Randomizer field is called "Salt".  (We do not use the
   term Salt in this note because some other specifications use that
   term differently, such as [RFC4309].)

                 +-----------------+-----------------+
                 |     Fixed       |      Counter    |---+
                 +-----------------+-----------------+   |
                                                         |
                 +-----------------------------------+   v
                 |             Randomizer                |->(+)
                 +-----------------------------------+   |
                                                         |
                 +-----------------------------------+   |
                 |       Initialization Vector       |<--+
                 +-----------------------------------+


                 Figure 5: Unpredictable IV/Nonce Format.


                Fixed  Fixed
                Common Distinct   Counter            IV
                 <--><------><---------->  <---------------------->
       1st       000097B4AE8F000000000001  0C81C77A5DDB678EE16FA2D0
       2nd       000097B4AE8F000000000002  0C81C77A5DDB678EE16FA2D3
       3rd       000097B4AE8F000000000003  0C81C77A5DDB678EE16FA2D2
       4th       000097B4AE8F000000000004  0C81C77A5DDB678EE16FA2D5
       5th       000097B4AE8F000000000005  0C81C77A5DDB678EE16FA2D4
       ...                     ...

     Figure 6: An example output of the Unpredictable IV/nonce format,
    showing successive IVs where the Fixed-Distinct field has the value
         97B4AE8F and the Salt has value 0C8150CEF354678EE16FA2D1.





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4.4.  ESP

   In the IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
   [RFC3686][RFC4106][RFC4309] the implicit and explicit parts are four
   and eight bytes long, respectively.  The exception is [RFC4309], for
   which the implicit part is three bytes in length.  The Fixed-Common
   field is four bytes, and its value is set by the Internet Key
   Exchange (IKE).  (This field is named inconsistently, being called
   Nonce in [RFC3686], and Salt in [RFC4106] and [RFC4309].)  When ESP
   is used with IKE, there is exactly one entity performing encryption,
   and the Fixed-Distinct part is usually not present (or equivalently,
   is has a length of zero bytes).  When ESP is used with a group key
   management protocol such as GDOI, the Fixed-Distinct field may be two
   or four bytes in length, and the value of the Fixed-Distinct field to
   be used by an encrypter is established by the group key management
   protocol [RFC6054].  The case in which IKE is used with ESP and there
   are multiple encryption engines is not specifically addressed by the
   standards, but it can be handled by the use of a nonzero Fixed-
   Distinct field.

4.5.  IKE

   The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [RFC5282] uses the recommended IV/
   nonce format.  The Fixed-Common field is four bytes in length, and
   its value is set from the IKE Keying Material.  The Fixed-Distinct
   part is usually zero bytes, but it may be any number of bytes if
   there are multiple encrypters in use.

4.6.  TLS

   In Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5288], the Fixed-Common field
   is four bytes in length, and the Fixed-Distinct part is usually zero
   bytes, but it may be any number of bytes when there are multiple
   encrypters in use.  Section 6.2 of [RFC5288] gives an example of TLS
   deterministic IV formation.

4.7.  SSH

   In the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol [RFC5647] the Fixed-Common field
   is not present, the Fixed-Distinct field is four bytes long, and the
   Counter field is eight bytes in length.  The implicit part is not
   present, and the explicit part contains the entire 12 byte IV.

4.8.  SRTP

   In the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) [RFC3711] and
   draft-ietf-avt-srtp-aes-gcm-01 the IV formation is a bit more complex
   than RFC 5116.  It is essentially RFC 5116 format with the additional



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   step of performing a bitwise exclusive-or operation with a Randomizer
   value.  (This step provides additional strength against cryptographic
   attacks that rely on predicting all or most of the IV.)
   draft-ietf-avt-srtp-aes-gcm-01 uses a 12-byte IV, though RFC 3711
   uses a 14-byte IV.

4.9.  Summary

   The following table gives a synopsis of how standard protocols use
   deterministic IVs.









































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   +-----------+---------+--------------+----------------+-------------+
   |  Protocol |    IV   | Fixed-Common | Fixed-Distinct |   Counter   |
   |           | (bytes) |    (bytes)   |     (bytes)    |   (bytes)   |
   +-----------+---------+--------------+----------------+-------------+
   |    ESP    |    12   |       4      |    0,1,2,[4]   |  8,7,6,[4]  |
   |           |         |              |                |             |
   |           |         |  Not on wire |     On wire    |   On wire   |
   |           |         |              |                |             |
   |           |         |  Set by IKE  |                |             |
   |           |         |              |                |             |
   |    ESP    |    11   |       3      |    0,1,2,[4]   |  8,7,6,[4]  |
   |           |         |              |                |             |
   | [RFC4309] |         |  Not on wire |     On wire    |   On wire   |
   |           |         |              |                |             |
   |           |         |  Set by IKE  |                |             |
   |           |         |              |                |             |
   |    IKE    |    12   |       4      |   Unspecified  | Unspecified |
   |           |         |              |                |             |
   |           |         |  Not on wire |     On wire    |   On wire   |
   |           |         |              |                |             |
   |           |         |  Set from KM |                |             |
   |           |         |              |                |             |
   |    TLS    |    12   |       4      |       0-8      |     8-0     |
   |           |         |              |                |             |
   |           |         |  Not on wire |     On wire    |   On wire   |
   |           |         |              |                |             |
   |           |         |  Set by TLS  |                |             |
   |           |         |              |                |             |
   |    SSH    |    12   |       0      |        4       |      8      |
   |           |         |              |                |             |
   |           |         |              |     On wire    |   On wire   |
   |           |         |              |                |             |
   |           |         |              |   Unspecified  |             |
   |           |         |              |                |             |
   |  SRTP-CTR |    14   |       4      |        4       |      6      |
   |           |         |              |                |             |
   |           |         |  Not on wire |   Not on wire  | Not on wire |
   |           |         |              |                |             |
   |           |         |   Set by KM  |                |             |
   |           |         |              |                |             |
   |  SRTP-GCM |    12   |       2      |        4       |      6      |
   |           |         |              |                |             |
   |           |         |  Not on wire |   Not on wire  | Not on wire |
   |           |         |              |                |             |
   |           |         |   Set by KM  |                |             |
   +-----------+---------+--------------+----------------+-------------+

            Table 1: Fields in Deterministic IVs, by Protocol.



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5.  Imlementation

   A cryptographic implementation typically consists of a self-contained
   and testable module that implements all of the essential
   functionality that it needs.  This functionality should include the
   generation of deterministic IVs.

   Because of the variety of ways in which IVs are formed in different
   protocols, implementers may be tempted to put the generation of the
   IV under the control of the protocol implementation.  That is, from
   the point of view of the application making use of the encryption
   algorithm, the IV is an input to that algorithm, as shown in
   Figure 7.  Regardless, it is not good for security to have the IV be
   generated outside the crypto module.  It is possible to implement an
   IV Generator that can be used with all of the protocols outlined
   above and use it inside of a cryptographic module.  In the following
   we outline how that can be done.

           +----------------------+
           |  +--------------+    |      IV       +-------------+
           |  |              |<-------------------|             |
           |  |  Encryption  |    |   Plaintext   |             |
           |  |  Algorithm   |<-------------------| Application |
           |  |              |    |   Ciphertext  |             |
           |  |              |------------------->|             |
           |  +--------------+    |               +-------------+
           |                      |
           | Cryptographic Module |
           +----------------------+

         Figure 7: Architecture with IV generation outside of the
       cryptographic module, showing how the IV is entered into the
           cryptographic module during an encryption operation.

   The internal IV generator architecture is illustrated in Figure 8.
   The cryptographic module contains an IV Generator sub-module that
   understands the IV formats outlined in Section 3.  To initialize the
   IV generator, the application inputs the parameter values to be used.
   Once initialized, the IV generator will produce successive IVs on
   request, and send these values to the algorithm and to the calling
   application.  The encryption algorithm will need the entire IV, but
   if the partially implicit IV format is in use, only the explicit part
   of the IV needs to be provided to the application.  The IV generator
   is responsible for ensuring the distinctness of all of the IVs that
   it generates.






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           +----------------------+
           |  +--------------+    |
           |  | IV Generator |-----------+
           |  +--------------+    |      | IV (explicit part)
           |         | IV         |      |
           |         v            |      |
           |  +--------------+    |      |        +-------------+
           |  |              |           +------->|             |
           |  |  Encryption  |    |   Plaintext   |             |
           |  |  Algorithm   |<-------------------| Application |
           |  |              |    |   Ciphertext  |             |
           |  |              |------------------->|             |
           |  +--------------+    |               +-------------+
           |                      |
           | Cryptographic Module |
           +----------------------+

   Figure 8: Architecture with IV generation inside of the cryptographic
       module, showing how the IV is generated internally during an
                           encryption operation.

   More formally, an IV generator supports the operations of Initialize
   and Output Next IV.  The Initialize operation prepares an IV
   Generator for use with a particular set of parameters.  It takes the
   following inputs:

      A nonnegative integer indicating the number of bytes in the IV to
      be generated.  All of the IVs output from the Generator will have
      the same length.

      An octet string indicating the Fixed part of the IV; this value
      will be used as the initial part in each IV that is generated.

      A nonnegative integer indicating the number of bytes in the Fixed
      part of the IV.  This value must be no greater than the number of
      bytes in the IV.

      An octet string indicating the salt value to be exclusive-ored
      with the other fields of the IV.  If no salt is to be used when
      Generating IVs, then this parameter must not be present.

      A nonnegative integer indicating the number of bytes in the salt
      value.  If no salt value is used, this parameter must be zero.  If
      a salt value is used, this parameter must be no greater than the
      number of bytes in the IV.

   The Fixed field consists of the Fixed-Common field, followed by the
   Fixed-Distinct field.  The Fixed field and Salt field are stored when



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   the IV generator is initialized; at that time, the Counter field is
   initialized to zero.  The length of the Counter field is equal to the
   length of the IV less the length of the Fixed field.  If the Salt
   field is shorter than the IV, then it is padded on the right with
   zeroes.  If no Salt is to be used, this is conceptually equivalent to
   having a Salt value that is the all-zero value.

   The Output Next IV operation returns the next IV in sequence, or it
   returns an indication that there are no more IVs that are available.
   During that operation, the IV is computed as follows.  First, the
   Fixed field and the Counter field are concatenated, then they are
   bitwise exclusive-ored with the Salt field, and the resulting value
   is the IV.  The Counter is incremented, treating it as an unsigned
   integer with the most significant byte on the left, and the stored
   Counter field is set to the incremented value.  Then the IV is
   returned.

   The IV generator should also be able to output the length of the
   explicit field, so that an algorithm can output only the explicit
   part, when that is appropriate.

5.1.  IV Verification

   In some protocols, the IV is constructed out of fields in the
   protocol in such a way that it is difficult to have the IVs generated
   inside of the cryptographic module, without requiring that module to
   contain protocol-specific logic.  In this case, assurance of the
   uniqueness of IVs can be provided by having the IVs be generated by
   the protocol, but checked by the cryptographic module.

   This approach is taken by many implementations of Secure RTP
   [RFC3711].  The IV in that protocol is constructued in a way that
   incorporates a sender identifier (the SSRC field) and the protocol's
   sequence number.  To check the sequence number for uniqueness, an
   implementation can make use of the anti-replay checking that the
   protocol uses to check inbound packet.  An encrypter can use this
   approach as well, to make sure that the sequence number used to
   construct the IV is unique.  (Of course, it is necessary to have an
   IV construction method such that the uniqueness of the sequence
   number ensures the uniqueness of the IV.)  Since many cryptographic
   protocols contain a function to perform anti-replay check based on a
   sequence number, this is a convenient strategy.









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6.  Testing

   The testing of a cryptographic module is an important step in
   assessing the assurance of that module.  The IV Generator defined in
   Section 5 can be tested by an external system to verify that it is
   operating correctly.

   The recommended IV format can be tested by verifying that all of the
   IVs are distinct.  There are many ways that this can be done; for
   instance, the command "sort | uniq -d" on POSIX systems can be used
   to detect repeated lines in a file.

   An important aspect of an IV generator is that, when it has an N byte
   Counter field, it should not generate more than (256)^N IVs.  This
   property should be tested for small values of N (at least 1, 2, and
   3), by calling the Output Next IV operation M times, for some M >
   (256)^N. Note that some implementations may produce fewer than
   (256)^N IVs, e.g. due to their handling of the all-zero IV.  That
   would not affect security.

6.1.  Internal IV Generator

   When a cryptographic module uses an internal IV generator, only the
   explicit part of the IV needs to be output from the module.  It is
   possible to test this use of the IV generator by interacting with an
   encryption algorithm that uses it (or an Authenticated Encryption
   algorithm, or a MAC).

   The encryption operation takes as input a plaintext, and returns a
   ciphertext and the explicit part of the IV.  To test that the IV
   generator is working properly, call the encryption operation
   repeatedly, each time with the same plaintext value, and verify that
   1) all of the ciphertexts returned are distinct, and 2) all of the
   explicit parts that are returned are distinct.  The plaintext must be
   at least 32 bytes long, in order to avoid false positives.
















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7.  Issues

7.1.  Choice of Fixed-Distinct Field

   When considering what data should go into a Fixed-Distinct field, it
   is tempting to use system values such as network addresses because
   they appear to meet the criteria of uniqueness.  However, there are
   several significant problems with this idea.  System values that are
   taken from outside the cryptographic module may not actually be
   distinct, especially if an attacker can influence the system.  System
   values can also change over time; even if they are actually distinct,
   they may not be fixed.  Lastly, the cryptographic system should have
   the freedom to put distinct data into the Fixed-Distinct fields, so
   that it can accommodate multiple encryption engines when they occur.

   Internet Protocol (IP) version four addresses are four bytes in
   length, and thus can fit into the Fixed-Distinct field of a 12-byte
   IV.  However, an IP address is highly unsuitable for this purpose.
   Most networked devices use dynamically assigned IP addresses, with
   address assignment via an automatic configuration protocol such as
   the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP).  The addresses are
   determined by an external system and are communicated over an
   insecure protocol; furthermore, a DHCP address is only valid for a
   particular period of time, and may change after that lease has
   expired.  Even when an automatic configuration protocol is not in
   use, IP addresses are determined by the networking subsystem, and are
   not under the control of the cryptographic module.  Network Address
   Translation (NAT, [RFC1361]) is commonly used to modify the IP
   addresses of packets as they traverse a network boundary, for
   instance between a private address space [RFC1918] and the Internet.
   Because of NAT, the IP address associated with a particular device
   will not be consistent throughout the network.  Multiple devices can
   use the same addresses; this technique is utilized in order to
   provide redundancy or load sharing (see the Virtual Router Redundancy
   Protocol [RFC3768] for instance).  Lastly, IPv4 is currently being
   replaced by version six of that protocol.  IPv6 addresses are sixteen
   bytes long; this is too long for inclusion in an IV, and the
   coexistence of both versions on the Internet is likely to increase
   the use of NAT for protocol translation [RFC6146].  In summary, IP
   addresses are neither fixed nor distinct, and should not be used in a
   Fixed-Distinct field.

   Similar considerations hold for link layer addresses, Domain Name
   System (DNS) names, and TCP, UDP, and SCTP ports.

   A much better solution is to have the Fixed-Distinct field be
   assigned by the security system.  For instance, if a cryptographic
   module has multiple encrypters, it can assign that field



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   appropriately for each encrypter.

7.2.  Size of the Fixed-Distinct Field

   Deterministic IVs typically have an explicit part that is eight bytes
   in length.  (This size is natural to use with a block cipher that has
   a 16 byte block width, because no more than (256)^8 packets can be
   encrypted under a single key without encountering security
   degradation due to the birthday paradox.)  Because the Fixed-Distinct
   field must appear in the explicit part, larger Fixed-Distinct fields
   will reduce the number of IVs that can be generated.  This can be
   problematic, especially for high throughput situations.  For
   instance, the ESP protocol allows for up to 2^64 packets to be
   encrypted under a single key, so it is desirable to use a Counter
   field that is close to eight bytes in length; this is why [RFC6054]
   encourages the use of short values in the Fixed-Distinct field.
   Table 2 presents the lifetimes of a single key that can encrypt 2^32
   packets, i.e. a key being used with a four-byte Counter field.  At
   high data rates, keys must be replaced quickly.

   +----------+-------------------+------------------+-----------------+
   |          |     Best Case     |   Typical Case   |    Worst Case   |
   +----------+-------------------+------------------+-----------------+
   |          | 9000 byte packets | 850 byte packets | 64 byte packets |
   |          |                   |                  |                 |
   |  1 Gbps  |       3 days      |     8.6 hours    |    66 minutes   |
   |          |                   |                  |                 |
   |  10 Gbps |     8.6 hours     |    52 minutes    |   6.6 minutes   |
   |          |                   |                  |                 |
   |  40 Gbps |     22 minutes    |    13 minutes    |   1.6 minutes   |
   |          |                   |                  |                 |
   | 100 Gbps |    8.9 minutes    |    5.2 minutes   |   0.7 minutes   |
   +----------+-------------------+------------------+-----------------+

           Table 2: Key Lifetimes with a four-byte Counter field

7.3.  Security

   As long as each deterministic IV is distinct, for each key, then
   security is assured.  However, when deterministic IVs are not
   distinct, security suffers.

   The number of deterministic IVs is limited, regardless of how those
   IVs are generated.  What does an encrypter do when no more IVs are
   available?  It should retire the key that it is currently using, and
   establish another one.  This is the reason that the IETF Guidelines
   for Cryptographic Key Management [RFC4107] require that automated key
   management be used for algorithms with deterministic IVs.  For



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   network security protocols, this has proven to be an effective
   strategy.

   Particular care must be taken in Virtual Machine (VM) environments,
   because the VM cloning and rollback processes can cause inadvertent
   re-use of deterministic IVs.  This is just one of many security
   problems that can result from uncritical application of VM mechanisms
   when cryptography is in use [GR05].











































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8.  Security Considerations

   Cryptographic algorithms that rely on deterministic IVs or nonces
   must ensure the uniqueness of those values.  The recommendations in
   this note aim to help implementers achieve that goal.

   Implementations should use the nonce formats described in Section 3.
   The way in which these formats are used in standards is summarized in
   Table 1.

   Implementations should use the internal IV generator described in
   Section 5.







































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9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [CCM]      Dworkin, M., "NIST Special Publication 800-38C: The CCM
              Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality", U.S.
              National Institute of Standards and Technology http://
              csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38C/SP800-38C.pdf.

   [GCM]      Dworkin, M., "NIST Special Publication 800-38D:
              Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
              Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC.", U.S. National
              Institute of Standards and Technology http://
              csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP800-38D.pdf.

   [MF00]     McGrew, D. and S. Fluhrer, "Attacks on Additive Encryption
              of Redundant Plaintext and Implications on Internet
              Security", Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Workshop on
              Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC 2000) Spinger-Verlag.

   [RFC1361]  Mills, D., "Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP)",
              RFC 1361, August 1992.

   [RFC1918]  Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and
              E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
              BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3768]  Hinden, R., "Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol (VRRP)",
              RFC 3768, April 2004.

9.2.  Informative References

   [BN00]     Bellare, M. and C. Namprempre, "Authenticated encryption:
              Relations among notions and analysis of the generic
              composition paradigm", Proceedings of ASIACRYPT 2000,
              Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1976, pp. 531-545 http://
              www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/mihir/papers/oem.html.

   [CTR]      Dworkin, M., "NIST Special Publication 800-38:
              Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation", U.S.
              National Institute of Standards and Technology http://
              csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf.

   [GR05]     Garfinkel, T. and M. Rosenblum, "When Virtual is Harder
              than Real: Security Challenges in Virtual Machine Based



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              Computing Environments", Proceedings of the 10th Workshop
              on Hot Topics in Operating Systems http://
              www.stanford.edu/~talg/papers/HOTOS05/
              virtual-harder-hotos05.pdf.

   [KW02]     Knudsen, L. and D. Wagner, "Integral Cryptanalysis", 9th
              International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption (FSE
              '02) http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/193, December 2001.

   [R02]      Rogaway, P., "Authenticated encryption with Associated-
              Data", ACM Conference on Computer and Communication
              Security (CCS'02), pp. 98-107, ACM Press,
              2002. http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/ad.html.

   [RFC3686]  Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
              Counter Mode With IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload
              (ESP)", RFC 3686, January 2004.

   [RFC3711]  Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
              Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
              RFC 3711, March 2004.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
              Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.

   [RFC4106]  Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode
              (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4106, June 2005.

   [RFC4107]  Bellovin, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for Cryptographic
              Key Management", BCP 107, RFC 4107, June 2005.

   [RFC4118]  Yang, L., Zerfos, P., and E. Sadot, "Architecture Taxonomy
              for Control and Provisioning of Wireless Access Points
              (CAPWAP)", RFC 4118, June 2005.

   [RFC4309]  Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) CCM
              Mode with IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4309, December 2005.

   [RFC5116]  McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
              Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008.

   [RFC5282]  Black, D. and D. McGrew, "Using Authenticated Encryption
              Algorithms with the Encrypted Payload of the Internet Key
              Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) Protocol", RFC 5282,
              August 2008.




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   [RFC5288]  Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois
              Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288,
              August 2008.

   [RFC5647]  Igoe, K. and J. Solinas, "AES Galois Counter Mode for the
              Secure Shell Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 5647,
              August 2009.

   [RFC6054]  McGrew, D. and B. Weis, "Using Counter Modes with
              Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication
              Header (AH) to Protect Group Traffic", RFC 6054,
              November 2010.

   [RFC6146]  Bagnulo, M., Matthews, P., and I. van Beijnum, "Stateful
              NAT64: Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6
              Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6146, April 2011.



































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Author's Address

   David A. McGrew
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   510 McCarthy Blvd.
   Milpitas, CA  95035
   US

   Phone: (408) 525 8651
   Email: mcgrew@cisco.com
   URI:   http://www.mindspring.com/~dmcgrew/dam.htm








































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