Network Working Group D. McGrew
Internet Draft Cisco Systems, Inc.
Intended Status: Informational October 27, 2008
Expires: April 30, 2009
AES-GCM and AES-CCM Authenticated Encryption in Secure RTP (SRTP)
draft-mcgrew-srtp-aes-gcm-00.txt
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Abstract
This document defines how AES GCM, AES CCM, and other Authenticated
Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms, can be used to
provide confidentiality and data authentication mechanisms in the
SRTP protocol.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction.....................................................2
1.1. Conventions Used In This Document..............................3
1.2. AEAD processing for SRTP.......................................3
1.2.1. Terminology..................................................4
1.2.2. Initialization Vectors for SRTP..............................4
1.2.3. Initialization Vectors for SRTCP.............................5
1.2.4. AEAD Authentication versus SRTP Authentication...............5
2. AEAD parameters for SRTP and SRTCP...............................8
2.1. Generic AEAD Parameter Constraints.............................8
2.2. AES-GCM for SRTP/SRTCP.........................................9
2.3. AES-CCM for SRTP/SRTCP.........................................9
3. Security Considerations.........................................10
4. IANA Considerations.............................................11
5. Acknowledgements................................................12
6. References......................................................12
6.1. Normative References..........................................12
6.2. Informative References........................................12
1. Introduction
The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) is a profile of the
Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP), which can provide
confidentiality, message authentication, and replay protection to the
RTP traffic and to the control traffic for RTP, the Real-time
Transport Control Protocol (RTCP).
SRTP/SRTCP assumes that both the sender and recipient have a shared
secret master key and a shared secret master salt. As described in
sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.3 of [RFC3711], a Key Derivation Function is
applied to these secret values to obtain separate encryption keys,
authentication keys and salting keys for STRP and for SRTCP. (Note:
As will be explained below, AEAD SRTP/SRTCP does not make use of
these authentication keys.)
Authenticated encryption [BN00] is a form of encryption that, in
addition to providing confidentiality for the plaintext that is
encrypted, provides a way to check its integrity and authenticity.
Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data, or AEAD [R02], adds
the ability to check the integrity and authenticity of some
Associated Data (AD), also called "additional authenticated data",
that is not encrypted. This specification makes use of the interface
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to a generic AEAD algorithm as defined in [RFC5116].
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a block cipher that
provides a high level of security, and can accept different key
sizes. Two families of AEAD algorithm families, AES Galois/Counter
Mode (AES GCM) and AES Cipher Block Chaining/Counter Mode (AES/CCM),
are based upon AES. This specification makes use of the AES versions
that use 128-bit and 256-bit keys, which we call AES-128 and AES-256,
respectively.
The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of operation and the Counter with CBC
MAC (CCM) mode are AEAD modes of operation for block ciphers. Both
use counter mode to encrypt the data, an operation that can be
efficiently pipelined, making them especially appealing for
high-speed implementations, or for implementations in an efficient
and compact circuit. Further GCM authentication uses operations
which are particularly well suited to efficient implementation in
hardware. This specification uses GCM and CCM with both AES-128 and
AES-256.
In summary, this document defines how to use AEAD algorithms,
particularly AES GCM and AES CCM, to provide confidentiality and
message authentication within SRTP and SRTCP packets.
1.1. Conventions Used In This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
1.2. AEAD processing for SRTP
We first define how to use a generic AEAD algorithm in SRTP, then we
describe the specific use of the AES-128-GCM and AES-256-GCM
algorithms.
The use of an AEAD algorithm is defined by expressing the AEAD
encryption algorithm inputs in terms of SRTP fields and data
structures. The AEAD encryption inputs are as follows:
Key. This input is the SRTP encryption key (SRTP_encr_key)
produced from the shared secret master key using the key
derivation process. (Note that the SRTP_auth_key is not used).
Associated Data. This is data that is to be authenticated but not
encrypted. In SRTP, the associated data consists of the entire
RTP header, including the list of CSRC identifiers (if present)
and the RTP header extension (if present), as shown in Figure 2.
Plaintext. This is data that is to be both authenticated and
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encrypted. In SRTP this consists of the RTP payload, and the RTP
padding and RTP pad count fields (if the latter two fields are
present), as shown in Figure 2. The padding service provided by
RTP is not needed by the AEAD encryption algorithm, so the RTP
padding and RTP pad count fields SHOULD be omitted.
Initialization Vector (IV). Each STRP/SRTCP packet has its own
12-octet initialization vector. Construction of this IV is
covered in more detail below.
The AEAD encryption algorithm accepts these four inputs and returns a
Ciphertext field.
1.2.1. Terminology
The following terms have very specific meanings in the context of
this RFC:
Security Association. For the purposes of this document a
security association is the outcome of any process which results
in mutual authentication between client and server and their
possession of a shared secret master key and a shared secret
master salt. Details of how the security association is
established are outside the scope of this document.
Instantiation. Once keys have been established, an instance of
the AEAD algorithm is created using the appropriate key. In
SRTP/SRTCP there will be four instantiations of the AEAD
algorithm; one for SRTP traffic from the client to the server, one
for SRTP traffic from the server to the client, one for SRTCP
traffic from the client to the server, and one for SRTCP traffic
from the server to the client. Each of these instantiations has
its own encryption key derived from its shared secret master key
and encryption salt derived from its shared secret master salt.
Invocation. SRTP/SRTCP data streams are broken into packets.
Each packet is processed by a single invocation of the appropriate
instantiation of the AEAD algorithm.
Each AEAD instantiation has its own invocation counter which is
incremented each time that particular instantiation is invoked. As
we shall see below, the invocation counter is used to insure each
invocation gets a unique initialization vector.
1.2.2. Initialization Vectors for SRTP
The initialization vector for an SRTP packet is formed from the
4-octet Synchronization Source identifier (SSRC), 4-octet Rollover
Counter (ROC), the 2-octet RTP Sequence Number (SEQ), and a 12-octet
SRTP session encryption salt produced by the SRTP Key Derivation
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Function (KDF) as described in [RFC 3711]. (The concatenation of the
ROC and SEQ serves as a 6-octet invocation counter.) First, a 2-octet
string consisting of zeroes is prepended to the 4-octet SSRC, then
the 4-octet ROC appended and 2-octet SEQ is appended to that octet
string. The resulting 12-octet string is bitwise exclusive-ored into
salt; the output of that process is the IV. The process is
illustrated in Figure 1. The IV is always exactly 12 octets in
length.
1.2.3. Initialization Vectors for SRTCP
The initialization vector for an SRTCP packet is formed from the
4-octet Synchronization Source identifier (SSRC), 31-bit SRTCP Index
(packed zero-filled, right justified into a 4-octet field), and a
12-octet SRTP session encryption salt produced by the SRTP Key
Derivation Function (KDF) as described in [RFC 3711]. (The 31-bit
SRTCP index serves as the invocation counter.) First a 12-octet
string is formed by starting with a 2-octet string consisting of
zeroes, and post-pending the 4-octet SSRC, the 4-octet ROC, and
2-octet SEQ. The resulting 12-octet string is bitwise exclusive-ored
into salt; the output of that process is the IV. The process is
illustrated in Figure 3. The IV is always exactly 12 octets in
length.
1.2.4. AEAD Authentication versus SRTP Authentication
The reader is reminded that in addition to providing confidentiality
for the plaintext that is encrypted, an AEAD algorithm also provides
a way to check the data integrity and authenticity of the plaintext
and associated data. The AEAD integrity check is incorporated into
the ciphertext field by RFC 5116, thus AEAD does not make use of the
optional SRTP Authentication Tag field. (Note that this means that
the cipher text will be longer than the plain text by precisely the
length of the AEAD authentication tag.)
The AEAD message authentication mechanism MUST be the primary message
authentication mechanism for AEAD SRTP. Additional SRTP
authentication mechanisms SHOULD NOT be used with any AEAD algorithm
and the optional SRTP Authentication Tag SHOULD NOT be present.
Rationale. Some applications use the Authentication Tag as a
means of conveying additional information, notably [RFC4771].
This document retains the Authentication Tag field primarily to
preserve compatibility with these applications.
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|00|00| SSRC | ROC | SEQ |---+
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ |
|
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ |
| Encryption Salt |->(+)
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ |
|
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ |
| Initialization Vector |<--+
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
Figure 1: SRTP Initialization Vector formation.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
A |V=2|P|X| CC |M| Packet Type | sequence number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
A | timestamp |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
A | synchronization source (SSRC) identifier |
+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
A | contributing source (CSRC) identifiers (optional) |
A | .... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
A | RTP extension (OPTIONAL) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
P | payload ... |
P | +-------------------------------+
P | | RTP padding | RTP pad count |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
X : authentication tag (NOT RECOMMENDED) :
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
P = Plaintext (to be encrypted and authenticated)
A = Associated Data (to be authenticated only)
X = neither encrypted nor authenticated
Figure 2: Constructing AEAD inputs from an RTP packet.
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|00|00| SSRC |00|00|SRTCP Index|---+
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ |
|
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ |
| Encryption Salt |->(+)
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ |
|
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ |
| Initialization Vector |<--+
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
Figure 3: SRTCP Initialization Vector formation.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
A |V=2|P|X| RC |M| Packet Type | length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
A | synchronization source (SSRC) of Sender |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
P | sender info |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
P | report block 1 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
P | report block 2 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
P | ... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
P |V=2|P|X| SC |M| Packet Type | length |
+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
P | SSRC/CSRC_1 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
P | SDES items |
+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
P | ... |
+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
A |E| SRTCP index |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
X | SRTCP MKI (optional)index |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
X : authentication tag (NOT RECOMMENDED) :
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
P = Plaintext (to be encrypted and authenticated)
A = Associated Data (to be authenticated only)
X = neither encrypted nor authenticated
Figure 4: Constructing AEAD inputs from an RTCP packet.
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2. AEAD parameters for SRTP and SRTCP
In general, any AEAD algorithm can accept inputs with varying
lengths, but each algorithm can accept only a limited range of
lengths for a specific parameter. In this section, we describe the
constraints on the parameter lengths that any AEAD algorithm must
support to be used in AEAD-SRTP. Additionally we specify a complete
parameter set for a specific AEAD algorithm, namely AES-GCM
2.1. Generic AEAD Parameter Constraints
All AEAD algorithms used with SRTP/SRTCP MUST satisfy the three
constraints listed below:
PARAMETER Meaning Value
A_MAX maximum additional MUST be at least 12 octets
authenticated data
length
N_MIN minimum nonce (IV) MUST be 12 octets
length
N_MAX maximum nonce (IV) MUST be 12 octets
length
C_MAX maximum ciphertext MUST be at most 2^16-40 octets
length per invocation SHOULD be at least 2232
The upper bound on C_MAX is obtained by subtracting away a 20-octet
IP header, an 8-octet UDP header, and a 12-octet RTP header out of
the largest possible IP packet, the total length of which is 2^16
octets.
Similarly the lower bound on C_MAX is based on the maximum
transmission unit (MTU) of 2272 octets in IEEE 802.11. Because many
RTP applications use very short payloads (for example, the G.729
codec used in VoIP can be as short as 20 octets), implementations
that only support a maximum ciphertext lengths smaller than 2232
octets are permitted under this RFC. However, in the interest of
maximizing interoperability between various AEAD implementations, the
use of C_MAX values less than 2232 is discouraged.
For sake of clarity we specify two additional parameters:
Authentication Tag Length MUST be either 8, 12, or 16
octets
Maximum number of invocations MUST be at most 2^48 for SRTP
for a given instantiation MUST be at most 2^31 for SRTCP
The reader is reminded that the plaintext is shorter than the
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ciphertext by exactly the length of the AEAD authentication tag.
2.2. AES-GCM for SRTP/SRTCP
AES GCM is a family of AEAD algorithm built around the AES block
cipher algorithm. AES GCM uses AES counter mode for encryption and
Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) for authentication. A
detailed description of the AES GCM family can be found in
[RFC5116]. The following members of the AES GCM family may be used
with SRTP/SRTCP:
Table: AES GCM algorithms for SRTP/SRTCP
Name Key Size Auth. Tag Size Reference
================================================================
AEAD_AES_128_GCM 16 octets 16 octets [RFC5116]
AEAD_AES_256_GCM 32 octets 16 octets [RFC5116]
AEAD_AES_128_GCM_8 16 octets 8 octets [RFC5282]
AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8 32 octets 8 octets [RFC5282]
AEAD_AES_128_GCM_12 16 octets 12 octets [RFC5282]
AEAD_AES_256_GCM_12 32 octets 12 octets [RFC5282]
Any implementation of AES GCM SRTP MUST support both
AEAD-AES-128-GCM-8 and AEAD-AES-256-GCM-8.
In addition to the invocation counter used in the formation of IVs,
each instantiation of AES GCM has a block counter which is
incremented each time AES is called to produce a 16-octet output
block. The block counter is reset to "1" each time AES GCM is
invoked.
1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| | salt | | salt xor | block |
| salt | xor | salt | invocation | counter |
| | ssrc | | counter | |
----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Figure 5: AES Inputs for Counter Mode Encryption in GCM
2.3. AES-CCM for SRTP/SRTCP
AES CCM is another family of AEAD algorithm built around the AES
block cipher algorithm. AES GCM uses AES counter mode for encryption
and AES Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC MAC)
for authentication. A detailed description of the AES CCM family can
be found in [RFC5116]. The following members of the AES CCM family
may be used with SRTP/SRTCP:
Table: AES CCM algorithms for SRTP/SRTCP
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Name Key Size Auth. Tag Size Reference
================================================================
AEAD_AES_128_CCM 16 octets 16 octets [RFC5116]
AEAD_AES_256_CCM 32 octets 16 octets [RFC5116]
Any implementation of AES CCM SRTP/SRTCP MUST support both
AEAD-AES-128-CCM and AEAD-AES-256-CCM.
In addition to the invocation counter used in the formation of
IVs, each instantiation of AES CCM has a block counter which is
incremented each time AES is called to produce a 16-octet output
block. The block counter is reset to "0" each time AES CCM is
invoked.
AES CCM uses a flag octet that conveys information about the length
of the authentication tag, length of the block counter, and presence
of additional authenticated data. For AES CCM in SRTP/SRTCP, the
flag octet has the hex value 5A if an 8-octet authentication tag is
used, 6A if a 12-octet authentication tag is used, and 7A if a
16-octet authentication tag is used. The flag octet is one of the
inputs to AES during the counter mode encryption of the plaintext
(see Figure 6)
1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| | | salt | | salt xor | block |
|Flag| salt | xor | salt | invocation | counter |
| | | ssrc | | counter | |
----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Figure 6: AES Inputs for Counter Mode Encryption in CCM
3. Security Considerations
We require that the AEAD authentication tag must be at least 8
octets, significantly reducing the probability of an adversary
successfully introducing fraudulent data. The goal of an
authentication tag is to minimize the probability of a successful
forgery occurring anywhere in the network we are attempting to
defend. There are three relevant factors: how low we wish the
probability of successful forgery to be (prob_success), how many
attempts the adversary can make (N_tries) and the size of the
authentication tag in bits (N_tag_bits). Then
prob_success < expected number of successes
= N_tries * 2^-N_tag_bits.
The table below summarizes the relationship between the
authentication tag size, the probability of success, and the maximum
numbers of forgery attempts that can be permitted on our network.
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|==================+========================================|
| Authentication | Probability any Successful Forgeries |
| Tag Size |-------------+-------------+------------|
| (octets) | 2^-10 | 2^-20 | 2^-30 |
|==================+=============+=============+============|
| 4 | 2^22 tries | 2^12 tries | 2^2 tries |
|==================+=============+=============+============|
| 8 | 2^54 tries | 2^44 tries | 2^34 tries |
|==================+=============+=============+============|
| 12 | 2^86 tries | 2^76 tries | 2^66 tries |
|==================+=============+=============+============|
| 16 | 2^118 tries | 2^108 tries | 2^98 tries |
|==================+=============+=============+============|
Table 1: Maximum allowable number of forgery attempts for
a given tag size and probability of success.
4. IANA Considerations
RFC 4568 defines SRTP "crypto suites"; a crypto suite corresponds to
a particular AEAD algorithm in SRTP. In order to allow SDP to signal
the use of the algorithms defined in this document, IANA will
register the following crypto suites into the subregistry for SRTP
crypto suites under the SRTP transport of the SDP Security
Descriptions:
srtp-crypto-suite-ext = "AEAD_AES_128_GCM" /
"AEAD_AES_256_GCM" /
"AEAD_AES_128_GCM_8" /
"AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8" /
"AEAD_AES_128_GCM_12" /
"AEAD_AES_256_GCM_12" /
"AEAD_AES_128_CCM" /
"AEAD_AES_256_CCM" /
srtp-crypto-suite-ext
draft-ietf-avt-dtls-srtp-05 defines a DTLS-SRTP "SRTP Protection
Profile"; it also corresponds to the use of an AEAD algorithm in
SRTP. In order to allow the use of the algorithms defined in this
document in DTLS-SRTP, IANA will also register the following SRTP
Protection Profiles:
SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM
SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM
SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM_8
SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8
SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM_12
SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM_12
SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_CCM
SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_CCM
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5. Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Kevin Igoe and many other reviewers
provided valuable comments on earlier drafts of this document.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[CCM] Dworkin, M., "NIST Special Publication 800-38C: The CCM
Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality", U.S.
National Institute of Standards and Technology http://
csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38C/SP800-38C.pdf.
[GCM] Dworkin, M., "NIST Special Publication 800-38D:
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC.", U.S. National
Institute of Standards and Technology http://
csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP800-38D.pdf.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for
Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data", RFC 5116,
January 2008.
6.2. Informative References
[BN00] Bellare, M. and C. Namprempre, "Authenticated encryption:
Relations among notions and analysis of the generic
composition paradigm", Proceedings of ASIACRYPT 2000,
Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1976, pp. 531-545 http://
www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/mihir/papers/oem.html.
[BOYD] Boyd, C. and A. Mathuria, "Protocols for Authentication
and Key Establishment", Springer, 2003 .
[CMAC] "NIST Special Publication 800-38B", http://csrc.nist.gov/
CryptoToolkit/modes/800-38_Series_Publications/
SP800-38B.pdf.
[EEM04] Bellare, M., Namprempre, C., and T. Kohno, "Breaking and
provably repairing the SSH authenticated encryption
scheme: A case study of the Encode-then-Encrypt-and-MAC
paradigm", ACM Transactions on Information and System Secu
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rity, http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/tkohno/papers/
TISSEC04/.
[GR05] Garfinkel, T. and M. Rosenblum, "When Virtual is Harder
than Real: Security Challenges in Virtual Machine Based
Computing Environments", Proceedings of the 10th Workshop
on Hot Topics in Operating Systems http://
www.stanford.edu/~talg/papers/HOTOS05/
virtual-harder-hotos05.pdf.
[J02] Jonsson, J., "On the Security of CTR + CBC-MAC",
Proceedings of the 9th Annual Workshop on Selected Areas
on Cryptography, http://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/modes/
proposedmodes/ccm/ccm-ad1.pdf, 2002.
[MODES] Dworkin, M., "NIST Special Publication 800-38:
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation", U.S.
National Institute of Standards and Technology http://
csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf.
[MV04] McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "The Security and Performance of
the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)", Proceedings of INDOCRYPT
'04, http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/193, December 2004.
[R02] Rogaway, P., "Authenticated encryption with Associated-
Data", ACM Conference on Computer and Communication
Security (CCS'02), pp. 98-107, ACM Press,
2002. http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/ad.html.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997.
[RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
October 1998.
[RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
[RFC4106] Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4106, June 2005.
[RFC4107] Bellovin, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for Cryptographic
Key Management", BCP 107, RFC 4107, June 2005.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, December 2005.
[RFC4309] Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) CCM
Mode with IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
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RFC 4309, December 2005.
[RFC4771] Lehtovirta, V., Naslund, M., and K. Norrman, "Integrity
Transform Carrying Roll-Over Counter for the Secure Real-
time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 4771, January 2007.
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Author's Address
David A. McGrew
Cisco Systems, Inc.
510 McCarthy Blvd.
Milpitas, CA 95035
US
Phone: (408) 525 8651
Email: mcgrew@cisco.com
URI: http://www.mindspring.com/~dmcgrew/dam.htm
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this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
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