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Versions: 00 01                                                         
Domain Name System Operations                                 W. Mekking
Internet-Draft                                                NLnet Labs
Intended status: Standards Track                       December 21, 2010
Expires: June 24, 2011


    Automated (DNSSEC) Child Parent Synchronization using DNS UPDATE
                   draft-mekking-dnsop-auto-cpsync-01

Abstract

   This document proposes a way to synchronise existing trust anchors
   automatically between a child zone and its parent.  The protocol can
   be used for other Resource Records that are required to delegate from
   a parent to a child such as NS and glue records.  The synchronization
   allows for a third party to be involved, thus the protocol is
   suitable for both cases, whether you have to communicate to the
   registry or to the registrar.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 24, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal



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   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

1.  Introduction

   This memo defines a way to synchronise existing trust anchors
   automatically between a child zone and its parent.  The protocol can
   be used for other Resource Records that are required to delegate from
   a parent to a child such as NS and glue records.  The synchronization
   allows for a third party to be involved, thus the protocol is
   suitable for both cases, whether you have to communicate to the
   registry or to the registrar.

   To create a DNSSEC RFC 4035 [RFC4035] chain of trust, child zones
   must submit their DNSKEYs, or hashes of their DNSKEYs, to their
   parent zone.  The parent zone publishes the hashes of the DNSKEYs in
   the form of a DS record.  The DNSKEY RRset at the child may change
   over time.  In order to keep the chain of trust intact, the DS
   records at the parent zone also needs to be updated.  The rolling of
   the keys with the SEP bit on is one of the few tasks in DNSSEC that
   yet has to be fully automated.

   The DNS UPDATE mechanism RFC 2136 [RFC2136] can be used to push zone
   changes to the parent.

   To bootstrap the communication channel, information must be exchanged
   in order to detect service location and granting update privileges.
   A new or existing child zone is in need of a communication channel
   with the parent.  This can be a direct channel or a channel through a
   third party:

      If the parent allows for direct communication channel with child
      zones, the parent can share the required data to set up the
      channel to the child zone.  Once the child has the required
      credentials, it can use the direct communication channel with the
      parent to request zone changes related to its delegation.

      If a third party is involved, the third party acts on behalf of
      the parent.  In this case, the third party will give out the
      required credentials to set up the communication channel.

   Allowing for a third party in the communication channel ensures



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   flexibility of the service location.

   Please note that the document only describes the front end of the
   synchronization service.  The first reason for that is that it is not
   necessary to write down how the DNS UPDATE is processed after it is
   accepted.  It is merely a goal to provide a way for the child zone to
   automatically update the records at the zone cut.  The second reason
   is that flexibility is needed in order to fit the protocol into the
   multifarious policies that exist among the great number of
   registrars.

   Thus, it is not required that the DNS UPDATE immediately updates the
   name server.  Thus, it would still be possible to monitor the
   incoming updates with the tools of your choice.  It is not a
   replacement of your RR provisioning system.  The records in the DNS
   UPDATE can be converted into any kind of format.

2.  Service Discovery

   The service location is handed out during bootstrap.  If this
   information is missing or incorrect, the normal guidelines for
   sending DNS UPDATE messages SHOULD be followed.

3.  Access and Update Control

   The DNS UPDATE normally is used for granting update permissions to a
   machine that is within the boundary of the same organization.  This
   document proposes to grant child zones the same permissions.
   However, it MUST NOT be possible that a child zone updates
   information in the parent zone that falls outside the administrative
   domain of the corresponding delegation.  For example, it MUST NOT be
   possible for a child zone to update the data that the parent is
   authoritative for, or update a delegation that is pointed to a
   different child zone.  It MUST only be able to update records that
   match one of the following:

   Or:   The owner name is equal the child zone name and RRtype is
      delegation specific.  Currently those are records with RRtype NS
      or DS.

   Or:   The owner name exists in the right side of the NS RRset
      belonging to the child zone and RRtype is is glue specific.
      Currently those are records with RRtype A or AAAA.

   We can make a distinction here between narrow and wide glue records.
   Narrow glue records are said to be glue specific records with an
   owner name that is a subdomain of the child zone.  Wide glue records
   are glue specific records with an owner name that is outside of the



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   delegated child domain.

   These updates MAY be refused if it conflicts with the local policy.
   This list may be expanded, if there is need for more delegation
   related zone content.

   In case of adding or deleting delegation specific records, the DNSSEC
   related RRs in the parent zone might need to be updated.

4.  Update Mechanism

4.1.  Update Request

   Updating the NS RRset or corresponding glue at the parent, an update
   can be sent at any time.  Updating the DS RRset is part of key
   rollover, as described in RFC 4641 [RFC4641].  When performing a key
   rollover that involves updating the RRset at the parent, the child
   introduces a new DNSKEY in its zone that represents the security
   entry point for determining the chain of trust.  After a while, it
   will revoke and/or remove the previous security entry point.  The
   timings when to update the DS RRset at the parent are described in
   draft-dnsop-morris-dnssec-key-timing [keytiming].  When updating the
   DS RRset at the parent automatically, these timing specifications
   SHOULD be followed.  To determine the propagation delays described in
   this document, the child should poll the parent zone for a short
   time, until the DS is visible at all parent name servers.

   [Author's note] To discuss: A child zone might be unable to reach all
   parent name servers.

   The child notifies the parent of the requested changes by sending a
   DNS UPDATE message.  If it receives a NOERROR reply in return, the
   update is acknowledged by the parent zone.  Otherwise, the child MAY
   retry transmitting the update.  In order to prevent duplicate
   updates, it SHOULD follow the guidelines described in RFC 2136
   [RFC2136].

4.2.  Processing the Update

   An incoming DNS UPDATE message is processed as follows:

   Step 1:  Check the TSIG/SIG0 credentials.  In case of TSIG, the
      parent should follow the TSIG processing described in section 3.2
      of RFC 2845.  In case of SIG0, the parent should follow the SIG0
      processing described in section 3.2 of RFC 2931.






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   Step 2:  Verify that the updates matches the update policy for child
      zones.

   Step 3:  If verified, send back DNS UPDATE OK.  Otherwise, send back
      DNS UPDATE REFUSED.

   Step 4:  If verified, apply changes.  How that is done is a matter of
      policy.

5.  Examples

5.1.  Example BIND9 Configuration

   This is how a parent zone can configure a policy to enable a child
   zone synchronize delegation specific records.  The first rule of the
   update policy grants children to update their DS and NS records in
   the parent zone, in this case example.com.  The second rule of the
   update policy grants children to update the corresponding glue
   records.

   key cs.example.com. {
   algorithm HMAC-MD5;
   secret "secretforcs";
   }

   key math.example.com. {
   algorithm HMAC-MD5;
   secret "secretformath";
   }

   ...

   zone "example.com" {
   type master;
   file "example.com";
   update-policy { grant *.example.com. self *.example.com.  DS NS; };
   update-policy { grant *.example.com. selfsub *.example.com.  A AAAA;
   };
   };

6.  Security Considerations

   Automating the synchronization of (DNSSEC) records between the parent
   and child creates a new communication channel.  It is up to the
   policy of the parent, or the third party acting on behalf of the
   parent, who is allowed such privileges.  A policy would usually
   include a form of access control.  It is recommended that it involves
   transaction authentication, for example TSIG [RFC2845] or SIG0



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   [RFC2931].

   In the jungle of the DNS, many stakeholders exist.  The registrant of
   a zone might not be the one that maintains the zone.  That can
   possibly mean that many stakeholders need to possess the security
   credentials in order to use this synchronization channel.  However,
   this problem exist with any kind of transaction authentication.

   The disadvantage of adding a new communication channel is that you
   create a new attack window onto your DNS and DNSSEC records.  When
   using this synchronization method for your DNSSEC records, a
   cryptographically equally strong, or stronger private key SHOULD be
   used, compared to the strength of your DNSSEC keys.

   The advantage is that if somehow your DNSSEC keys are compromised,
   you can still use this channel to perform an emergency key rollover.

7.  IANA Considerations

   None.

8.  Acknowledgments

   Mark Andrews, Rickard Bellgrim, Wolfgang Nagele, Wouter Wijngaards.

9.  Changelog

   01:

      - Make it clear that the solution is flexible and it can fit into
      many and diverse environments of registrars.

      - Short section about service discovery.

      - Add text about narrow glue records.

      - Add text about transaction authentication concerns with respect
      to many stakeholders involved.

   00:

      - Initial document

10.  References







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10.1.  Informative References

   [RFC2136]    Vixie, P., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound,
                "Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS
                UPDATE)", RFC 2136, April 1997.

   [RFC4641]    Kolkman, O. and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC Operational
                Practices", RFC 4641, September 2006.

   [keytiming]  Morris, S., Ihren, J., and J. Dickinson, "DNSSEC Key
                Timing Considerations", March 2010.

10.2.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]    Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
                Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2845]    Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake, D., and B.
                Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for
                DNS (TSIG)", RFC 2845, May 2000.

   [RFC2931]    Eastlake, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures (
                SIG(0)s)", RFC 2931, September 2000.

   [RFC4035]    Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
                Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
                Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.

Author's Address

   Matthijs Mekking
   NLnet Labs
   Science Park 140
   Amsterdam  1098 XG
   The Netherlands

   EMail: matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl














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