HTTPAUTH A. Melnikov
Internet-Draft Isode Ltd
Intended status: Standards Track November 12, 2014
Expires: May 16, 2015
Salted Challenge Response (SCRAM) HTTP Authentication Mechanism
draft-melnikov-httpbis-scram-auth-01.txt
Abstract
The secure authentication mechanism most widely deployed and used by
Internet application protocols is the transmission of clear-text
passwords over a channel protected by Transport Layer Security (TLS).
There are some significant security concerns with that mechanism,
which could be addressed by the use of a challenge response
authentication mechanism protected by TLS. Unfortunately, the HTTP
Digest challenge response mechanism presently on the standards track
failed widespread deployment, and have had success only in limited
use.
This specification describes a family of HTTP authentication
mechanisms called the Salted Challenge Response Authentication
Mechanism (SCRAM), which addresses security concerns with HTTP Digest
and meets the deployability requirements. When used in combination
with TLS or an equivalent security layer, a mechanism from this
family could improve the status-quo for HTTP authentication.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 16, 2015.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. SCRAM Algorithm Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. SCRAM Mechanism Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. SCRAM Authentication Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. One round trip reauthentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Formal Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10. Design Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Formal syntax is defined by [RFC5234] including the core rules
defined in Appendix B of [RFC5234].
Example lines prefaced by "C:" are sent by the client and ones
prefaced by "S:" by the server. If a single "C:" or "S:" label
applies to multiple lines, then the line breaks between those lines
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are for editorial clarity only, and are not part of the actual
protocol exchange.
1.1. Terminology
This document uses several terms defined in [RFC4949] ("Internet
Security Glossary") including the following: authentication,
authentication exchange, authentication information, brute force,
challenge-response, cryptographic hash function, dictionary attack,
eavesdropping, hash result, keyed hash, man-in-the-middle, nonce,
one-way encryption function, password, replay attack and salt.
Readers not familiar with these terms should use that glossary as a
reference.
Some clarifications and additional definitions follow:
o Authentication information: Information used to verify an identity
claimed by a SCRAM client. The authentication information for a
SCRAM identity consists of salt, iteration count, the "StoredKey"
and "ServerKey" (as defined in the algorithm overview) for each
supported cryptographic hash function.
o Authentication database: The database used to look up the
authentication information associated with a particular identity.
For application protocols, LDAPv3 (see [RFC4510]) is frequently
used as the authentication database. For network-level protocols
such as PPP or 802.11x, the use of RADIUS [RFC2865] is more
common.
o Base64: An encoding mechanism defined in [RFC4648] which converts
an octet string input to a textual output string which can be
easily displayed to a human. The use of base64 in SCRAM is
restricted to the canonical form with no whitespace.
o Octet: An 8-bit byte.
o Octet string: A sequence of 8-bit bytes.
o Salt: A random octet string that is combined with a password
before applying a one-way encryption function. This value is used
to protect passwords that are stored in an authentication
database.
1.2. Notation
The pseudocode description of the algorithm uses the following
notations:
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o ":=": The variable on the left hand side represents the octet
string resulting from the expression on the right hand side.
o "+": Octet string concatenation.
o "[ ]": A portion of an expression enclosed in "[" and "]" may not
be included in the result under some circumstances. See the
associated text for a description of those circumstances.
o Normalize(str): Apply the SASLPrep profile [RFC4013] of the
"stringprep" algorithm [RFC3454] as the normalization algorithm to
a UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoded "str". The resulting string is also in
UTF-8. When applying SASLPrep, "str" is treated as a "stored
strings", which means that unassigned Unicode codepoints are
prohibited (see Section 7 of [RFC3454]). Note that
implementations MUST either implement SASLPrep, or disallow use of
non US-ASCII Unicode codepoints in "str".
o HMAC(key, str): Apply the HMAC keyed hash algorithm (defined in
[RFC2104]) using the octet string represented by "key" as the key
and the octet string "str" as the input string. The size of the
result is the hash result size for the hash function in use. For
example, it is 20 octets for SHA-1 (see [RFC3174]).
o H(str): Apply the cryptographic hash function to the octet string
"str", producing an octet string as a result. The size of the
result depends on the hash result size for the hash function in
use.
o XOR: Apply the exclusive-or operation to combine the octet string
on the left of this operator with the octet string on the right of
this operator. The length of the output and each of the two
inputs will be the same for this use.
o Hi(str, salt, i):
U1 := HMAC(str, salt + INT(1))
U2 := HMAC(str, U1)
...
Ui-1 := HMAC(str, Ui-2)
Ui := HMAC(str, Ui-1)
Hi := U1 XOR U2 XOR ... XOR Ui
where "i" is the iteration count, "+" is the string concatenation
operator and INT(g) is a four-octet encoding of the integer g,
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most significant octet first.
Hi() is, essentially, PBKDF2 [RFC2898] with HMAC() as the PRF and
with dkLen == output length of HMAC() == output length of H().
2. Introduction
This specification describes a family of authentication mechanisms
called the Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism (SCRAM)
which addresses the requirements necessary to deploy a challenge-
response mechanism more widely than past attempts (see [RFC5802]).
When used in combination with Transport Layer Security (TLS, see
[RFC5246]) or an equivalent security layer, a mechanism from this
family could improve the status-quo for HTTP authentication.
HTTP SCRAM is adoptation of [RFC5802] for use in HTTP. (SCRAM data
exchanged is identical to what is defined in [RFC5802].) It also
adds 1 round trip reauthentication mode.
HTTP SCRAM provides the following protocol features:
o The authentication information stored in the authentication
database is not sufficient by itself (without a dictionary attack)
to impersonate the client. The information is salted to prevent a
pre-stored dictionary attack if the database is stolen.
o The server does not gain the ability to impersonate the client to
other servers (with an exception for server-authorized proxies).
o The mechanism permits the use of a server-authorized proxy without
requiring that proxy to have super-user rights with the back-end
server.
o Mutual authentication is supported, but only the client is named
(i.e., the server has no name).
3. SCRAM Algorithm Overview
The following is a description of a full HTTP SCRAM authentication
exchange. Note that this section omits some details, such as client
and server nonces. See Section 5 for more details.
To begin with, the SCRAM client is in possession of a username and
password (*) (or a ClientKey/ServerKey, or SaltedPassword). It sends
the username to the server, which retrieves the corresponding
authentication information, i.e. a salt, StoredKey, ServerKey and the
iteration count i. (Note that a server implementation may choose to
use the same iteration count for all accounts.) The server sends the
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salt and the iteration count to the client, which then computes the
following values and sends a ClientProof to the server:
(*) - Note that both the username and the password MUST be encoded in
UTF-8 [RFC3629].
Informative Note: Implementors are encouraged to create test cases
that use both username passwords with non-ASCII codepoints. In
particular, it's useful to test codepoints whose "Unicode
Normalization Form C" and "Unicode Normalization Form KC" are
different. Some examples of such codepoints include Vulgar Fraction
One Half (U+00BD) and Acute Accent (U+00B4).
SaltedPassword := Hi(Normalize(password), salt, i)
ClientKey := HMAC(SaltedPassword, "Client Key")
StoredKey := H(ClientKey)
AuthMessage := client-first-message-bare + "," +
server-first-message + "," +
client-final-message-without-proof
ClientSignature := HMAC(StoredKey, AuthMessage)
ClientProof := ClientKey XOR ClientSignature
ServerKey := HMAC(SaltedPassword, "Server Key")
ServerSignature := HMAC(ServerKey, AuthMessage)
The server authenticates the client by computing the ClientSignature,
exclusive-ORing that with the ClientProof to recover the ClientKey
and verifying the correctness of the ClientKey by applying the hash
function and comparing the result to the StoredKey. If the ClientKey
is correct, this proves that the client has access to the user's
password.
Similarly, the client authenticates the server by computing the
ServerSignature and comparing it to the value sent by the server. If
the two are equal, it proves that the server had access to the user's
ServerKey.
For initial authentication the AuthMessage is computed by
concatenating decoded "data" attribute values from the authentication
exchange. The format of these messages is defined in [RFC5802].
4. SCRAM Mechanism Names
A SCRAM mechanism name (authentication scheme) is a string "SCRAM-"
followed by the uppercased name of the underlying hash function taken
from the IANA "Hash Function Textual Names" registry (see
http://www.iana.org) .
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For interoperability, all HTTP clients and servers supporting SCRAM
MUST implement the SCRAM-SHA-1 authentication mechanism, [[CREF1:
OPEN ISSUE: Possibly switch to SHA-256 as the mandatory-to-
implement.]] i.e. an authentication mechanism from the SCRAM family
that uses the SHA-1 hash function as defined in [RFC3174].
5. SCRAM Authentication Exchange
HTTP SCRAM is a HTTP Authentication mechanism whose client response
(<credentials-scram>) and server challenge (<challenge-scram>)
messages are text-based messages containing one or more attribute-
value pairs separated by commas. The messages and their attributes
are described below and defined in Section 6.
challenge-scram = scram-name [1*SP 1#auth-param]
; Complies with <challenge> ABNF from RFC 7235.
; Included in the WWW-Authenticate header field.
credentials-scram = scram-name [1*SP 1#auth-param]
; Complies with <credentials> from RFC 7235.
; Included in the Authorization header field.
scram-name = "SCRAM-SHA-1" / other-scram-name
; SCRAM-SHA-1 is registered by this RFC
other-scram-name = "SCRAM-" hash-name
; hash-name is a capitalized form of names from IANA
; "Hash Function Textual Names" registry.
; Additional SCRAM names must be registered in both
; the IANA "SASL mechanisms" registry
; and the IANA "authentication scheme" registry.
This is a simple example of a SCRAM-SHA-1 authentication exchange
when the client doesn't support channel bindings (username 'user' and
password 'pencil' are used):
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C: GET /resource HTTP/1.1
C: Host: server.example.com
C: [...]
S: HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
S: WWW-Authenticate: Digest realm="realm1@host.com",
Digest realm="realm2@host.com",
Digest realm="realm3@host.com",
SCRAM-SHA-1 realm="realm3@host.com",
SCRAM-SHA-1 realm="testrealm@host.com"
S: [...]
C: GET /resource HTTP/1.1
C: Host: server.example.com
C: Authorization: SCRAM-SHA-1 realm="testrealm@host.com",
data=base64(n,,n=user,r=fyko+d2lbbFgONRv9qkxdawL)
C: [...]
S: HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
S: WWW-Authenticate: SCRAM-SHA-1
sid=AAAABBBBCCCCDDDD,
data=base64(r=fyko+d2lbbFgONRv9qkxdawL3rfcNHYJY1ZVvWVs7j,
s=QSXCR+Q6sek8bf92,i=4096)
S: [...]
C: GET /resource HTTP/1.1
C: Host: server.example.com
C: Authorization: SCRAM-SHA-1 sid=AAAABBBBCCCCDDDD,
data=base64(c=biws,r=fyko+d2lbbFgONRv9qkxdawL3rfcNHYJY1ZVvWVs7j,
p=v0X8v3Bz2T0CJGbJQyF0X+HI4Ts=)
C: [...]
S: HTTP/1.1 200 Ok
S: Authentication-Info: SCRAM-SHA-1
sid=AAAABBBBCCCCDDDD,
data=base64(v=rmF9pqV8S7suAoZWja4dJRkFsKQ=)
S: [...Other header fields and resource body...]
Note that in the example above the client can also initiate SCRAM
authentication without first being prompted by the server.
Initial "SCRAM-SHA-1" authentication starts with sending the
"Authorization" request header field defined by HTTP/1.1, Part 7
[RFC7235] containing "SCRAM-SHA-1" authentication scheme and the
following attributes:
o A "realm" attribute MAY be included to indicate the scope of
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protection in the manner described in HTTP/1.1, Part 7 [RFC7235].
As specified in [RFC7235], the "realm" attribute MUST NOT appear
more than once. The realm attribute only appears in the first
SCRAM message to the server and in the first SCRAM response from
the server.
o The client also includes the data attribute that contains base64
encoded "client-first-message" [RFC5802] containing:
* a header consisting of a flag indicating whether channel
binding is supported-but-not-used, not supported, or used .
Note that the header always starts with "n", "y" or "p",
otherwise the message is invalid and authentication MUST fail.
* SCRAM username and a random, unique nonce attributes.
In HTTP response, the server sends WWW-Authenticate header field
containing: a unique session identifier (the "sid" attribute) plus
the "data" attribute containing base64-encoded "server-first-message"
[RFC5802]. The "server-first-message" contains the user's iteration
count i, the user's salt, and the nonce with a concatenation of the
client-specified one with a server nonce. [[CREF2: OPEN ISSUE:
Alternatively, the "sid" attribute can be another header field.]]
The client then responds with another HTTP request with the
Authorization header field, which includes the "sid" attribute
received in the previous server response, together with the "data"
attribute containing base64-encoded "client-final-message" data. The
latter has the same nonce and a ClientProof computed using the
selected hash function (e.g. SHA-1) as explained earlier.
The server verifies the nonce and the proof, and, finally, it
responds with a 200 HTTP response with the Authentication-Info header
field containing the "data" attribute containing base64-encoded
"server-final-message", concluding the authentication exchange.
The client then authenticates the server by computing the
ServerSignature and comparing it to the value sent by the server. If
the two are different, the client MUST consider the authentication
exchange to be unsuccessful and it might have to drop the connection.
5.1. One round trip reauthentication
If the server supports SCRAM reauthentication, the server sends in
its initial HTTP response a WWW-Authenticate header field containing:
the "realm" attribute (as defined earlier), the "sr" attribute that
contains the server part of the "r" attribute (see [RFC5802] and
optional "ttl" attribute (which contains the "sr" value validity in
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seconds).
If the client has authenticated to the same realm before (i.e. it
remembers "i" and "s" attributes for the user from earlies
authentication exchanges with the server), it can respond to that
with "client-final-message".
If the server considers the server part of the nonce (the "r"
attribute) to be still valid, it will provide access to the requested
resource (assuming the client hash verifies correctly, of course).
However if the server considers that the server part of the nonce is
stale (for example if the "sr" value is used after the "ttl"
seconds), the server returns "401 Unauthorized" containing the SCRAM
mechanism name with a new "sr" and optional "ttl" attributes.
When constructing AuthMessage Section 3 to be used for calculating
client and server proofs, "client-first-message-bare" and "server-
first-message" are reconstructed from data known to the client and
the server.
Reauthentication can look like this:
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C: GET /resource HTTP/1.1
C: Host: server.example.com
C: [...]
S: HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
S: WWW-Authenticate: Digest realm="realm1@host.com",
Digest realm="realm2@host.com",
Digest realm="realm3@host.com",
SCRAM-SHA-1 realm="realm3@host.com",
SCRAM-SHA-1 realm="testrealm@host.com", sr=3rfcNHYJY1ZVvWVs7j
SCRAM-SHA-1 realm="testrealm2@host.com", sr=AAABBBCCCDDD, ttl=120
S: [...]
[Client authenticates as usual to realm "testrealm@host.com"]
[Some time later client decides to reauthenticate.
It will use the cached "i" and "s" from earlies exchanges.
It will use the server advertised "sr" value as the server part of the "r".
Should some counter be added to make "sr" unique for each reauth???]
C: GET /resource HTTP/1.1
C: Host: server.example.com
C: Authorization: SCRAM-SHA-1 realm="testrealm@host.com",
data=base64(c=biws,r=fyko+d2lbbFgONRv9qkxdawL3rfcNHYJY1ZVvWVs7j,
p=v0X8v3Bz2T0CJGbJQyF0X+HI4Ts=)
C: [...]
S: HTTP/1.1 200 Ok
S: Authentication-Info: SCRAM-SHA-1
sid=AAAABBBBCCCCDDDD,
data=base64(v=rmF9pqV8S7suAoZWja4dJRkFsKQ=)
S: [...Other header fields and resource body...]
6. Formal Syntax
The following syntax specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur
Form (ABNF) notation as specified in [RFC5234]. "UTF8-2", "UTF8-3"
and "UTF8-4" non-terminal are defined in [RFC3629].
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ALPHA = <as defined in RFC 5234 appendix B.1>
DIGIT = <as defined in RFC 5234 appendix B.1>
base64-char = ALPHA / DIGIT / "/" / "+"
base64-4 = 4base64-char
base64-3 = 3base64-char "="
base64-2 = 2base64-char "=="
base64 = *base64-4 [base64-3 / base64-2]
sr = "sr=" s-nonce
;; s-nonce is defined in RFC 5802.
data = "data=" base64
;; The data attribute value is base-64 encoded
;; SCRAM challenge or response defined in
;; RFC 5802.
ttl = "ttl" = 1*DIGIT
;; "sr" value validity in seconds.
;; No leading 0s.
sid = "sid=" <...>
realm = "realm=" <...as defined in HTTP Authentication...>
7. Security Considerations
If the authentication exchange is performed without a strong security
layer (such as TLS with data confidentiality), then a passive
eavesdropper can gain sufficient information to mount an offline
dictionary or brute-force attack which can be used to recover the
user's password. The amount of time necessary for this attack
depends on the cryptographic hash function selected, the strength of
the password and the iteration count supplied by the server. An
external security layer with strong encryption will prevent this
attack.
If the external security layer used to protect the SCRAM exchange
uses an anonymous key exchange, then the SCRAM channel binding
mechanism can be used to detect a man-in-the-middle attack on the
security layer and cause the authentication to fail as a result.
However, the man-in-the-middle attacker will have gained sufficient
information to mount an offline dictionary or brute-force attack.
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For this reason, SCRAM allows to increase the iteration count over
time. (Note that a server that is only in posession of "StoredKey"
and "ServerKey" can't automatic increase the iteration count upon
successful authentication. Such increase would require resetting
user's password.)
If the authentication information is stolen from the authentication
database, then an offline dictionary or brute-force attack can be
used to recover the user's password. The use of salt mitigates this
attack somewhat by requiring a separate attack on each password.
Authentication mechanisms which protect against this attack are
available (e.g., the EKE class of mechanisms). RFC 2945 [RFC2945] is
an example of such technology.
If an attacker obtains the authentication information from the
authentication repository and either eavesdrops on one authentication
exchange or impersonates a server, the attacker gains the ability to
impersonate that user to all servers providing SCRAM access using the
same hash function, password, iteration count and salt. For this
reason, it is important to use randomly-generated salt values.
SCRAM does not negotiate a hash function to use. Hash function
negotiation is left to the HTTP authentication mechanism negotiation.
It is important that clients be able to sort a locally available list
of mechanisms by preference so that the client may pick the most
preferred of a server's advertised mechanism list. This preference
order is not specified here as it is a local matter. The preference
order should include objective and subjective notions of mechanism
cryptographic strength (e.g., SCRAM with a successor to SHA-1 may be
preferred over SCRAM with SHA-1).
SCRAM does not protect against downgrade attacks of channel binding
types. The complexities of negotiation a channel binding type, and
handling down-grade attacks in that negotiation, was intentionally
left out of scope for this document.
A hostile server can perform a computational denial-of-service attack
on clients by sending a big iteration count value.
See [RFC4086] for more information about generating randomness.
8. IANA Considerations
New mechanisms in the SCRAM- family are registered according to the
IANA procedure specified in [RFC5802].
Note to future SCRAM- mechanism designers: each new SCRAM- HTTP
authentication mechanism MUST be explicitly registered with IANA and
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MUST comply with SCRAM- mechanism naming convention defined in
Section 4 of this document.
IANA is requested to add the following entry to the Authentication
Scheme Registry defined in HTTP/1.1, Part 7 [RFC7235]:
Authentication Scheme Name: SCRAM-SHA-1
Pointer to specification text: [[ this document ]]
Notes (optional): (none)
9. Acknowledgements
This document benefited from discussions on the HTTPAuth, SASL and
Kitten WG mailing lists. The authors would like to specially thank
co-authors of [RFC5802] from which lots of text was copied.
Thank you to Martin Thomson for the idea of adding "ttl" attribute.
Special thank you to Tony Hansen for doing an early implementation
and providing extensive comments on the draft.
10. Design Motivations
The following design goals shaped this document. Note that some of
the goals have changed since the initial version of the document.
o The HTTP authentication mechanism has all modern features: support
for internationalized usernames and passwords, support for channel
bindings.
o The protocol supports mutual authentication.
o The authentication information stored in the authentication
database is not sufficient by itself to impersonate the client.
o The server does not gain the ability to impersonate the client to
other servers (with an exception for server-authorized proxies),
unless such other servers allow SCRAM authentication and use the
same salt and iteration count for the user.
o The mechanism is extensible, but [hopefully] not overengineered in
this respect.
o Easier to implement than HTTP Digest in both clients and servers.
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11. Open Issues
Mandatory to implement SCRAM mechanism? Probably will switch to
SHA-256
Should "sid" directive be an attribute or a new HTTP header field
shared with other HTTP authentication mechanisms?
Username/password normalization algorithm needs to be picked.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February
1997.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3174] Eastlake, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1
(SHA1)", RFC 3174, September 2001.
[RFC3454] Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of
Internationalized Strings ("stringprep")", RFC 3454,
December 2002.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
[RFC4013] Zeilenga, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep Profile for User Names
and Passwords", RFC 4013, February 2005.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.
[RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
Channels", RFC 5056, November 2007.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
[RFC5802] Newman, C., Menon-Sen, A., Melnikov, A., and N. Williams,
"Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism
(SCRAM) SASL and GSS-API Mechanisms", RFC 5802, July 2010.
Melnikov Expires May 16, 2015 [Page 15]
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[RFC5929] Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings
for TLS", RFC 5929, July 2010.
[RFC7235] Fielding, R. and J. Reschke, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235, June 2014.
12.2. Informative References
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC
2865, June 2000.
[RFC2898] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography
Specification Version 2.0", RFC 2898, September 2000.
[RFC2945] Wu, T., "The SRP Authentication and Key Exchange System",
RFC 2945, September 2000.
[RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
[RFC4510] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): Technical Specification Road Map", RFC 4510, June
2006.
[RFC4616] Zeilenga, K., "The PLAIN Simple Authentication and
Security Layer (SASL) Mechanism", RFC 4616, August 2006.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC
4949, August 2007.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[tls-server-end-point]
Zhu, L., , "Registration of TLS server end-point channel
bindings", IANA http://www.iana.org/assignments/
channel-binding-types/tls-server-end-point, July 2008.
Author's Address
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Alexey Melnikov
Isode Ltd
Email: Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com
Melnikov Expires May 16, 2015 [Page 17]
