Extended Incident Handling Working Group            Kathleen M. Moriarty
draft-moriarty-post-inch-rid-soap-00.txt          MIT Lincoln Laboratory
                                                       Brian H. Trammell
                                      CERT Network Situational Awareness
Expires: May 14, 2007                                  November 14, 2006


                           IODEF/RID over SOAP

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
   months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
   at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
   reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
        http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
        http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.


Abstract

    Documents intended to be shared among multiple constituencies must
    share a common format and transport mechanism.  The Incident Object
    Description Exchange Format (IODEF) defines a common XML format for
    document exchange.  This draft outlines the SOAP wrapper for all
    IODEF documents and extensions to facilitate an interoperable and
    secure communication of documents.  The SOAP wrapper allows for
    flexibility in the selection of a transport protocol.  The
    transport protocols will be provided through existing standards and
    SOAP binding, such as SOAP over HTTP/TLS and SOAP over BEEP.














Internet-Draft                                         November 14, 2006



                           TABLE OF CONTENTS


Status of this Memo ................................................   1

Abstract ...........................................................   1

1. Introduction ....................................................   3

2. SOAP Wrapper ....................................................   3

3. Transport Protocol Bindings .....................................   4
    3.1 SOAP over HTTP/TLS .........................................   4
    3.2 SOAP over BEEP .............................................   5

4. Examples ........................................................   6
        4.1. Example TraceRequest message ..........................   6
    4.2 RequestAuthorization Message Example .......................   9
    4.3 Result Message Example .....................................  10
    4.4 Example InvestigationRequest Message .......................  12
    4.5 Example Report .............................................  14
    4.6 Example IncidentQuery ......................................  16

5. Security Considerations .........................................  16
    5.1 Privacy and Confidentiality ................................  16
    5.2 Authentication and Identification ..........................  17

6. IANA Considerations .............................................  17

7. Summary .........................................................  17

8. References ......................................................  17

    6.1 Acknowledgments ............................................  19
    6.2 Author Information .........................................  19


















Moriarty & Trammell      Expires: May 14, 2007                  [Page 2]


Internet-Draft                                         November 14, 2006


1. Introduction

    The Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) [RFCXXX]
    describes an XML document format for the purpose of exchanging data
    between CSIRTS or those responsible for security incident handling
    for network providers (NPs).  The defined document format provides
    an easy way for CSIRTS to exchange data in a way which can be easily
    parsed.  In order for the IODEF documents to be shared between
    entities, a uniform method for transport is necessary. SOAP will
    provide a layer of abstraction and enable the use of multiple
    transport protocol bindings.  IODEF documents and extensions will
    be contained in an XML Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)
    [RFCXXXX] envelope inside the body of a SOAP message.  For some
    message types, the IODEF document or RID document may stand alone
    in the body of a SOAP message.  The RIDPolicy class of RID (e.g.,
    policy information that may affect message routing) will appear in
    the SOAP message header.

    HTTP/TLS has been selected as the REQUIRED SOAP binding for
    exchanging IODEF/RID messages.  The primary reason for selecting
    HTTP/TLS is due to the existence of multiple successful
    implementations of SOAP over HTTP/TLS, and to its being widely
    understood, despite the additional overhead associated with this
    combination.  Excellent tool support exists to ease the development
    of applications using SOAP over HTTP.  BEEP may actually be better
    suited as a transport for RID messages containing IODEF documents,
    but does not yet have wide adoption.  Standards exist for the HTTPS
    or HTTP/TLS binding for SOAP.  A standard is in development for
    SOAP over BEEP, [RFC****].  Standards MUST be followed when
    implementing transport bindings for RID communications.

    The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
    "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in
    this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119.

2. SOAP Wrapper

    IODEF/RID documents, including all supported extensions, intended
    to be shared between CSIRTS or NPs MUST use a SOAP wrapper, along
    with a supported transport protocol binding, for transport.  The
    transport is independent of the wrapper.  SOAP will be used to
    provide the messaging framework and can make distinctions as to how
    messages should be handled by each participating system.  SOAP has
    been selected because of the flexibility it provides for binding
    with transport protocols, which can be independent of the IODEF/RID
    messaging system.

    As defined by the SOAP messaging specifications [18], the
    appropriate message contents for the RID message type, as defined
    in RID, will be in the SOAP body of the message.  The SOAP header
    contains information pertinent to all participating systems that
    receive the message, including the ultimate destination, any


Moriarty & Trammell      Expires: May 14, 2007                  [Page 3]


Internet-Draft                                         November 14, 2006


    intermediate hosts, and message processing policy information and
    is provided through RIDPolicy in the RID schema.  Depending on the
    message or document being transported, there may be a case, such as
    with RID messages, in which a host may only need to view the SOAP
    header and not the SOAP body and is, therefore, acting as a SOAP
    intermediary node.  An example of this would be if one RID system
    was sending a communication to a RID system for which there was no
    direct trust relationship, an intermediate RID system may be used
    to provide the trusted path between the communicating systems.
    This intermediate system may not need to see the contents of the
    SOAP body.  Therefore, the elements or classes needed by all
    participating systems MUST be in the SOAP header, specifically the
    RIDPolicy class.  Each participating system receiving an incident
    handling IODEF/RID document is an ultimate destination and has to
    parse and view the entire IODEF/RID document to make necessary
    decisions.

    The SOAP specifications for intermediate and ultimate nodes MUST be
    Followed; for example, a message destined for an intermediate node
    would contain the attribute env:role with the value
    http://www.w3c.org/2003/05/soap-envelope/role/next.  Also in
    accordance with the SOAP specifications, the attribute of
    env:mustUnderstand has a value of "true" to ensure each node
    processes the header blocks consistent with the specifications for
    IODEF/RID.

    SOAP messages are typically a one-way conversation. Transmittal of
    incident information to another RID host in the form of a Report
    message is the single case within RID where a one way communication
    is specified.  The arrival of an IODEF Report document in a RID
    message is simply an assertion that a described incident occurred.
    In the case of other RID message types, two or more SOAP messages
    may be exchanged to enable bi-directional communication.
    Request/response pairs defined by RID include:
        TraceRequest/TraceAuthorization/Result,
        Investigation/Result, and
        IncidentQuery/Report.

3. Transport Protocol Bindings

    The SOAP binding will be used for message transport.  One agreed-
    upon protocol, HTTP/TLS, MUST be implemented by all RID systems and
    other protocols are optional.  The use of a single transport
    binding supported by all systems sending and receiving RID messages
    and will enable interoperability between participating CSIRTS and
    NPs.  Other protocol bindings may be defined in separate documents.

3.1 SOAP over HTTP/TLS

    SOAP over HTTP/TLS is widely supported, as are ancillary tools such
    as the Web Services Description Language (WSDL), hence the
    selection of SOAP over HTTP/1.1 over TLS as Mandatory for transport


Moriarty & Trammell      Expires: May 14, 2007                  [Page 4]


Internet-Draft                                         November 14, 2006


    of RID communications.  Security is provided through the RID
    specification and all REQUIRED RID security MUST be implemented.
    TLS offers additional security at the transport layer to ensure the
    integrity of the session.

    BCP 56 contains a number of important considerations when using
    HTTP for application protocols.  These include the size of the
    payload for the application, whether the application will use a web
    browser, whether the protocol should be defined on a port other
    than 80, and if the security provided through HTTP/TLS suits the
    needs of the new application.

    It is acknowledged within the scope of these concerns that HTTP/TLS
    is not ideally suited for IODEF/RID transport, as the former is a
    client-server protocol and the latter a message-exchange protocol;
    however, the ease of implementation for services based on SOAP over
    HTTP outweighs these concerns. Consistent with BCP 56, IODEF/RID
    over SOAP over HTTP/TLS will require its own TCP port assignment
    from IANA.

    Every RID system participating in a consortium MUST listen for
    HTTP/TLS connections on the assigned port, as the requests and
    responses in a RID message exchange transaction may be
    significantly separated in time. If a RID message is answered
    immediately, or within a generally accepted HTTP client timeout
    (about thirty seconds), the listening system SHOULD return the
    reply message in the HTTP response body; otherwise, it must
    initiate a connection to the requesting system and send its reply
    in an HTTP request.

    If the HTTP response body sent in reply to a RID message does not
    contain a RID message itself, the response body SHOULD be empty,
    and RID clients MUST ignore any response body that is not an
    expected RID message. This provision applies ONLY to HTTP response
    bodies; unsolicited HTTP requests (such as Reports not preceded by
    an IncidentQuery) are handled according to the message exchange
    pattern described in RID.

    RID systems SHOULD use HTTP/1.1 persistent connections as described
    in RFC 2616 to minimize TCP connection setup overhead. RID systems
    SHOULD support chunked transfer encoding on the HTTP server side to
    allow the implementation of clients that do not need to
    precalculate message sizes before constructing HTTP headers.

3.2 SOAP over BEEP

    SOAP over BEEP is an optional transport binding for IODEF/RID. A
    RID system supporting BEEP MAY attempt to use SOAP over BEEP on
    first connection with a peer; if the peer does not support SOAP
    over BEEP, the initiating peer MUST fall back to SOAP over HTTPS,
    and SHOULD note that the peer does not support BEEP, to avoid
    attempting to use BEEP in future communications.


Moriarty & Trammell      Expires: May 14, 2007                  [Page 5]


Internet-Draft                                         November 14, 2006


    BEEP has certain implementation advantages over HTTP/TLS for this
    application; however, the protocol has not been widely implemented.
    Communication between participating RID systems is on a server-to-
    server basis, for which BEEP is better suited than HTTP.   Incident
    handling may at times require immediate action; thus, a protocol
    with low overhead and minimum bandwidth requirements is desirable.

    To provide equivalent transport-layer security to HTTP/TLS, the
    BEEP TLS profile MUST be supported if BEEP is implemented and
    SHOULD be used.

4. Examples

    The examples below, parallel to the examples in section 4.5 of RID,
    demonstrate how the structure of RID messages fit into SOAP
    containers as outlined in this document for each message type. Of
    particular note in each is the use of the RID policy information in
    the SOAP header.  The RID schema was designed to enable the use of
    RIDPolicy to stand alone in the SOAP header and to enable the use of
    the RID class, RequestStatus to stand alone in the SOAP body
    without the need for an IODEF document.  When the RID class called
    IncidentSource is used, it is combined with an associated IODEF
    document in the SOAP body to provide all of the necessary
    information in response to an incident handling request.  The first
    example includes the full IODEF/RID message and associated
    IODEF-Document; following examples omit the IODEF-Document and
    Refer to it in a comment. Where indicated, the IODEF-Document must
    be present, following the requirements listed in the IODEF and RID
    specifications.

4.1. Example TraceRequest message

   This TraceRequest is identical to the TraceRequest example in
   Section 4.5.1.1 of RID and would be sent from a CSIRT
   reporting a denial-of-service attack in progress to its upstream
   NP. This request asks the upstream to continue the trace and to
   rate-limit traffic closer to the source.

<SOAP-ENV:Envelope
 xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope">
 <SOAP-ENV:Header>
  <iodef-rid:RID xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
                   xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
      <iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="TraceRequest"
                           MsgDestination="RIDSystem">
        <iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="IntraConsortium"/>
        <iodef:Node>
          <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">172.20.1.2</iodef:Address>
        </iodef:Node>
        <iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
        <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
          CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1


Moriarty & Trammell      Expires: May 14, 2007                  [Page 6]


Internet-Draft                                         November 14, 2006


        </iodef:IncidentID>
      </iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
    </iodef-rid:RID>
  </SOAP-ENV:Header>
  <SOAP-ENV:Body>
    <iodef:IODEF-Document version="1.00"
                          xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
      <iodef:Incident restriction="need-to-know" purpose="traceback">
        <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
          CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
        </iodef:IncidentID>
        <iodef:DetectTime>2004-02-02T22:49:24+00:00</iodef:DetectTime>
        <iodef:StartTime>2004-02-02T22:19:24+00:00</iodef:StartTime>
        <iodef:ReportTime>2004-02-02T23:20:24+00:00</iodef:ReportTime>
        <iodef:Description>Host involved in DOS attack</iodef:Description>
        <iodef:Assessment>
          <iodef:Impact severity="low" completion="failed" type="dos"/>
        </iodef:Assessment>
        <iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
          <iodef:ContactName>Constituency-contact for 10.1.1.2
       </iodef:ContactName>
          <iodef:Email>Constituency-contact@10.1.1.2</iodef:Email>
        </iodef:Contact>
        <iodef:EventData>
          <iodef:Flow>
            <iodef:System category="source">
              <iodef:Node>
                <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">10.1.1.2</iodef:Address>
              </iodef:Node>
              <iodef:Service>
                <iodef:port>38765</iodef:port>
              </iodef:Service>
            </iodef:System>
            <iodef:System category="target">
              <iodef:Node>
                <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.168.1.2</iodef:Address>
              </iodef:Node>
              <iodef:Service>
                <iodef:port>80</iodef:port>
              </iodef:Service>
            </iodef:System>
          </iodef:Flow>
          <iodef:Expectation severity="high" action="rate-limit-host">
            <iodef:Description>
              Rate limit traffic close to source
            </iodef:Description>
          </iodef:Expectation>
          <iodef:Record>
            <iodef:RecordData>
              <iodef:Description>
                The IPv4 packet included was used in the described attack
              </iodef:Description>


Moriarty & Trammell      Expires: May 14, 2007                  [Page 7]


Internet-Draft                                         November 14, 2006


              <iodef:RecordItem dtype="ipv4-packet">450000522ad9
                0000ff06c41fc0a801020a010102976d0050103e020810d9
                4a1350021000ad6700005468616e6b20796f7520666f7220
                6361726566756c6c792072656164696e6720746869732052
                46432e0a
              </iodef:RecordItem>
            </iodef:RecordData>
          </iodef:Record>
        </iodef:EventData>
        <iodef:History>
          <iodef:HistoryItem>
            <iodef:DateTime>2001-09-14T08:19:01+00:00</iodef:DateTime>
            <iodef:IncidentID name="CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
              CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
            </iodef:IncidentID>
            <iodef:Description>
              Notification sent to next upstream NP closer to 10.1.1.2
            </iodef:Description>
          </iodef:HistoryItem>
        </iodef:History>
      </iodef:Incident>
    </iodef:IODEF-Document>
  </SOAP-ENV:Body>
</SOAP-ENV:Envelope>
<!-- Digital signature accompanied by above RID and IODEF -->
<Envelope xmlns="urn:envelope"
          xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
          xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0">
  <iodef:IODEF-Document>
    <iodef:Incident>
      <iodef:EventData>
        <iodef:Record>
          <iodef:RecordData>
            <iodef:RecordItem type="ipv4-packet">450000522ad9
             0000ff06c41fc0a801020a010102976d0050103e020810d9
             4a1350021000ad6700005468616e6b20796f7520666f7220
             6361726566756c6c792072656164696e6720746869732052
             46432e0a
            </iodef:RecordItem>
          </iodef:RecordData>
        </iodef:Record>
      </iodef:EventData>
    </iodef:Incident>
  </iodef:IODEF-Document>
  <Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
    <SignedInfo>
      <CanonicalizationMethod
       Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-
                 20010315#WithComments"/>
      <SignatureMethod
       Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#dsa-sha1"/>
      <Reference URI="">


Moriarty & Trammell      Expires: May 14, 2007                  [Page 8]


Internet-Draft                                         November 14, 2006


        <Transforms>
          <Transform Algorithm=
           "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/>
        </Transforms>
        <DigestMethod
         Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
        <DigestValue>KiI5+6SnFAs429VNwsoJjHPplmo=</DigestValue>
      </Reference>
    </SignedInfo>
    <SignatureValue>
      VvyXqCzjoW0m2NdxNeToXQcqcSM80W+JMW+Kn01cS3z3KQwCPeswzg==
    </SignatureValue>
    <KeyInfo>
      <KeyValue>
        <DSAKeyValue>
          <P>/KaCzo4Syrom78z3EQ5SbbB4sF7ey80etKII864WF64B81uRpH5t9j
             QTxeEu0ImbzRMqzVDZkVG9xD7nN1kuFw==</P>
          <Q>li7dzDacuo67Jg7mtqEm2TRuOMU=</Q>
          <G>Z4Rxsnqc9E7pGknFFH2xqaryRPBaQ01khpMdLRQnG541Awtx/XPaF5
             Bpsy4pNWMOHCBiNU0NogpsQW5QvnlMpA==</G>
          <Y>VFWTD4I/aKni4YhDyYxAJozmj1iAzPLw9Wwd5B+Z9J5E7lHjcAJ+bs
             HifTyYdnj+roGzy4o09YntYD8zneQ7lw==</Y>
        </DSAKeyValue>
      </KeyValue>
    </KeyInfo>
  </Signature>
</Envelope>

4.2 RequestAuthorization Message Example

    This RequestAuthorization is identical to the RequestAuthorization
    example in section 4.5.1.2 of the RID specification and Is
    sent in response to the TraceRequest to approve the request.

<SOAP-ENV:Envelope
   xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope">
 <SOAP-ENV:Header>
  <iodef-rid:RID xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
                   xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
     <iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="RequestAuthorization"
                           MsgDestination="RIDSystem">
        <iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="IntraConsortium"/>
        <iodef:Node>
          <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.168.1.2</iodef:Address>
        </iodef:Node>
        <iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
        <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
          CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
        </iodef:IncidentID>
      </iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
      <iodef-rid:RequestStatus AuthorizationStatus="Approved"/>
    </iodef-rid:RID>


Moriarty & Trammell      Expires: May 14, 2007                  [Page 9]


Internet-Draft                                         November 14, 2006


  </SOAP-ENV:Header>
</SOAP-ENV:Envelope>

4.3 Result Message Example

    This Result message is identical to the Result example in section
    4.5.1.3 of the RID.  This message is the final response from the
    TraceRequest that has completed to notify the requestor of the
    results and actions taken from the request.

<SOAP-ENV:Envelope
   xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope">
 <SOAP-ENV:Header>
  <iodef-rid:RID xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
                   xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
      <iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="Result"
                           MsgDestination="RIDSystem">
        <iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="IntraConsortium"/>
        <iodef:Node>
          <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.168.1.2</iodef:Address>
        </iodef:Node>
        <iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
        <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
          CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
        </iodef:IncidentID>
      </iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
      <iodef-rid:IncidentSource>
        <iodef-rid:SourceFound>true</iodef-rid:SourceFound>
        <iodef:Node>
          <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">10.1.1.15</iodef:Address>
        </iodef:Node>
      </iodef-rid:IncidentSource>
    </iodef-rid:RID>
  </SOAP-ENV:Header>
  <SOAP-ENV:Body>
    <iodef:IODEF-Document version="1.00"
                          xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
      <iodef:Incident restriction="need-to-know" purpose="traceback">
        <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
          CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
        </iodef:IncidentID>
        <iodef:DetectTime>2004-02-02T22:49:24+00:00</iodef:DetectTime>
        <iodef:StartTime>2004-02-02T22:19:24+00:00</iodef:StartTime>
        <iodef:ReportTime>2004-02-02T23:20:24+00:00</iodef:ReportTime>
        <iodef:Description>Host involved in DOS attack</iodef:Description>
        <iodef:Assessment>
          <iodef:Impact severity="low" completion="failed" type="dos"/>
        </iodef:Assessment>
        <iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
          <iodef:ContactName>Constituency-contact for 10.1.1.2
       </iodef:ContactName>
          <iodef:Email>Constituency-contact@10.1.1.2</iodef:Email>


Moriarty & Trammell      Expires: May 14, 2007                 [Page 10]


Internet-Draft                                         November 14, 2006


        </iodef:Contact>
        <iodef:EventData>
          <iodef:Contact role="admin" type="organization">
            <iodef:ContactName>Admin-contact for 10.1.1.2
            </iodef:ContactName>
            <iodef:Email>Admin-contact@10.1.1.2</iodef:Email>
          </iodef:Contact>
          <iodef:Flow>
            <iodef:System category="intermediate">
              <iodef:Node>
                <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">10.1.1.2
          </iodef:Address>
              </iodef:Node>
            </iodef:System>
          </iodef:Flow>
          <iodef:EventData>
            <iodef:Contact role="admin" type="organization">
              <iodef:ContactName>Admin-contact for 172.20.1.2
              </iodef:ContactName>
              <iodef:Email>Admin-contact@172.20.1.2</iodef:Email>
            </iodef:Contact>
            <iodef:Flow>
              <iodef:System category="intermediate">
                <iodef:Node>
                  <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">172.20.1.2</iodef:Address>
                </iodef:Node>
              </iodef:System>
            </iodef:Flow>
          </iodef:EventData>
        </iodef:EventData>
        <iodef:EventData>
          <iodef:Flow>
            <iodef:System category="source">
              <iodef:Node>
                <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">10.1.1.2</iodef:Address>
              </iodef:Node>
              <iodef:Service>
                <iodef:port>38765</iodef:port>
              </iodef:Service>
            </iodef:System>
            <iodef:System category="target">
              <iodef:Node>
                <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.168.1.2</iodef:Address>
              </iodef:Node>
              <iodef:Service>
                <iodef:port>80</iodef:port>
              </iodef:Service>
            </iodef:System>
          </iodef:Flow>
          <iodef:Expectation severity="high" action="rate-limit-host">
            <iodef:Description>
              Rate limit traffic close to source


Moriarty & Trammell      Expires: May 14, 2007                 [Page 11]


Internet-Draft                                         November 14, 2006


            </iodef:Description>
          </iodef:Expectation>
          <iodef:Record>
            <iodef:RecordData>
              <iodef:Description>
                The IPv4 packet included was used in the described attack
              </iodef:Description>
              <iodef:RecordItem dtype="ipv4-packet">450000522ad9
                0000ff06c41fc0a801020a010102976d0050103e020810d9
                4a1350021000ad6700005468616e6b20796f7520666f7220
                6361726566756c6c792072656164696e6720746869732052
                46432e0a
              </iodef:RecordItem>
            </iodef:RecordData>
          </iodef:Record>
        </iodef:EventData>
        <iodef:History>
          <iodef:HistoryItem>
            <iodef:DateTime>2004-02-02T22:53:01+00:00</iodef:DateTime>
            <iodef:IncidentID name="CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
              CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
            </iodef:IncidentID>
            <iodef:Description>
              Notification sent to next upstream NP closer to 10.1.1.2
            </iodef:Description>
          </iodef:HistoryItem>
          <iodef:HistoryItem action="rate-limit-host">
            <iodef:DateTime>2004-02-02T23:07:21+00:00</iodef:DateTime>
            <iodef:IncidentID name="CSIRT-FOR-NP3">
              CSIRT-FOR-NP3#3291-1
            </iodef:IncidentID>
            <iodef:Description>
              Host rate limited for 24 hours
            </iodef:Description>
          </iodef:HistoryItem>
        </iodef:History>
      </iodef:Incident>
    </iodef:IODEF-Document>
  </SOAP-ENV:Body>
</SOAP-ENV:Envelope>

4.4 Example InvestigationRequest Message

    This InvestigationRequest is identical to the InvestigationRequest
    example in section 4.5.2.1 of the RID specification and would be
    sent in a situation similar to that of example 4.1, when the source
    of the attack is known.

<SOAP-ENV:Envelope
   xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope">
 <SOAP-ENV:Header>
  <iodef-rid:RID xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"


Moriarty & Trammell      Expires: May 14, 2007                 [Page 12]


Internet-Draft                                         November 14, 2006


                   xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
      <iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="Investigation"
                           MsgDestination="SourceOfIncident">
        <iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="PeerToPeer"/>
        <iodef:Node>
          <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">172.25.1.33</iodef:Address>
        </iodef:Node>
        <iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
        <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
          CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#208-1
        </iodef:IncidentID>
      </iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
    </iodef-rid:RID>
  </SOAP-ENV:Header>
  <SOAP-ENV:Body>
    <iodef:IODEF-Document version="1.00"
                          xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
      <iodef:Incident restriction="need-to-know" purpose="other">
        <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
          CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#208-1
        </iodef:IncidentID>
        <iodef:DetectTime>2004-02-05T08:13:33+00:00</iodef:DetectTime>
        <iodef:StartTime>2004-02-05T08:13:31+00:00</iodef:StartTime>
        <iodef:EndTime>2004-02-05T08:13:33+00:00</iodef:EndTime>
        <iodef:ReportTime>2004-02-05T08:13:35+00:00</iodef:ReportTime>
        <iodef:Description>Host involved in DOS attack</iodef:Description>
        <iodef:Assessment>
          <iodef:Impact severity="low" completion="failed" type="recon"/>
        </iodef:Assessment>
        <iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
          <iodef:ContactName>Constituency-contact for 10.1.1.2
       </iodef:ContactName>
          <iodef:Email>Constituency-contact@10.1.1.2</iodef:Email>
        </iodef:Contact>
        <iodef:EventData>
          <iodef:Flow>
            <iodef:System category="source">
              <iodef:Node>
                <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">10.1.1.2</iodef:Address>
              </iodef:Node>
              <iodef:Service>
                <iodef:port>41421</iodef:port>
              </iodef:Service>
            </iodef:System>
            <iodef:System category="target">
              <iodef:Node>
                <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.168.1.2</iodef:Address>
              </iodef:Node>
              <iodef:Service>
                <iodef:port>80</iodef:port>
              </iodef:Service>
            </iodef:System>


Moriarty & Trammell      Expires: May 14, 2007                 [Page 13]


Internet-Draft                                         November 14, 2006


          </iodef:Flow>
          <iodef:Expectation severity="high" action="investigate">
            <iodef:Description>
              Investigate whether source has been compromised
            </iodef:Description>
          </iodef:Expectation>
        </iodef:EventData>
        <iodef:History>
          <iodef:HistoryItem>
            <iodef:DateTime>2004-02-05T08:19:01+00:00</iodef:DateTime>
            <iodef:IncidentID name="CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
              CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#208-1
            </iodef:IncidentID>
            <iodef:Description>
              Investigation request sent to NP for 10.1.1.2
            </iodef:Description>
          </iodef:HistoryItem>
        </iodef:History>
      </iodef:Incident>
    </iodef:IODEF-Document>
  </SOAP-ENV:Body>
</SOAP-ENV:Envelope>

4.5 Example Report

    This Report is identical to the Report example in section 4.5.3.1
    of the RID specification.

<SOAP-ENV:Envelope
   xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope">
 <SOAP-ENV:Header>
  <iodef-rid:RID xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
                   xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
      <iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="Report" MsgDestination="RIDSystem">
        <iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="PeerToPeer"/>
        <iodef:Node>
          <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">172.17.1.2</iodef:Address>
        </iodef:Node>
        <iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
        <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
          CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#209-1
        </iodef:IncidentID>
      </iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
    </iodef-rid:RID>
  </SOAP-ENV:Header>
  <SOAP-ENV:Body>
    <iodef:IODEF-Document version="1.00"
                          xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
      <iodef:Incident restriction="need-to-know" purpose="reporting">
        <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
          CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#209-1
        </iodef:IncidentID>


Moriarty & Trammell      Expires: May 14, 2007                 [Page 14]


Internet-Draft                                         November 14, 2006


        <iodef:DetectTime>2004-02-05T10:21:08+00:00</iodef:DetectTime>
        <iodef:StartTime>2004-02-05T10:21:05+00:00</iodef:StartTime>
        <iodef:EndTime>2004-02-05T10:35:00+00:00</iodef:EndTime>
        <iodef:ReportTime>2004-02-05T10:27:38+00:00</iodef:ReportTime>
        <iodef:Description>Host illicitly accessed admin account
        </iodef:Description>
        <iodef:Assessment>
          <iodef:Impact severity="high" completion="succeeded" type="admin"/>
          <iodef:Confidence rating="high"/>
        </iodef:Assessment>
        <iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
          <iodef:ContactName>Constituency-contact for 10.1.1.2
       </iodef:ContactName>
          <iodef:Email>Constituency-contact@10.1.1.2</iodef:Email>
        </iodef:Contact>
        <iodef:EventData>
          <iodef:Flow>
            <iodef:System category="source">
              <iodef:Node>
                <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">10.1.1.2</iodef:Address>
              </iodef:Node>
              <iodef:Service>
                <iodef:port>32821</iodef:port>
              </iodef:Service>
            </iodef:System>
            <iodef:System category="target">
              <iodef:Node>
                <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.168.1.2</iodef:Address>
              </iodef:Node>
              <iodef:Service>
                <iodef:port>22</iodef:port>
              </iodef:Service>
            </iodef:System>
          </iodef:Flow>
        </iodef:EventData>
        <iodef:History>
          <iodef:HistoryItem>
            <iodef:DateTime>2004-02-05T10:28:00+00:00</iodef:DateTime>
            <iodef:IncidentID name="CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
              CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#209-1
            </iodef:IncidentID>
            <iodef:Description>
              Incident report sent to NP for 10.1.1.2
            </iodef:Description>
          </iodef:HistoryItem>
        </iodef:History>
      </iodef:Incident>
    </iodef:IODEF-Document>
  </SOAP-ENV:Body>
</SOAP-ENV:Envelope>




Moriarty & Trammell      Expires: May 14, 2007                 [Page 15]


Internet-Draft                                         November 14, 2006


4.6 Example IncidentQuery

    This IncidentQuery is identical to the IncidentQuery example in
    Section 4.5.4.1 of the RID specification.

<SOAP-ENV:Envelope
   xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope">
 <SOAP-ENV:Header>
  <iodef-rid:RID xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
                   xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
      <iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="IncidentQuery"
                           MsgDestination="RIDSystem">
        <iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="PeerToPeer"/>
        <iodef:Node>
          <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">172.20.1.2</iodef:Address>
        </iodef:Node>
        <iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
        <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
          CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#210-1
        </iodef:IncidentID>
      </iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
    </iodef-rid:RID>
 </SOAP-ENV:Header>
</SOAP-ENV:Envelope>


5. Security Considerations

    All security considerations of related documents MUST be
    considered, including those in the following documents:
    Requirements for the Format for INcident information Exchange
    (FINE) [RFCXXXX], the Incident Object Description Exchange (IODEF),
    [RFCXXXX], and Real-time Inter-network
    Defense (RID) [RFCXXXX].  The SOAP wrappers described herein are
    built upon the foundation of these documents; the security
    considerations contained therein are incorporated by reference.

5.1 Privacy and Confidentiality

    For transport confidentiality, TLS (whether HTTP/TLS or the BEEP
    TLS profile) MUST be supported and SHOULD be used.

    Since multiple bindings for transport may be implemented, RID
    implementations MUST support XML encryption [4] to encrypt the SOAP
    body. Since XML encryption is performed at the IODEF document
    level, not only is the transport encrypted when a document is
    sensitive or contains sensitive elements, but the stored document
    is also encrypted.  Note that this encryption applies only to the
    SOAP body; policy information in the SOAP header should remain
    unencrypted if it is necessary for the intermediate node to
    dispatch the message.   XML encryption protects the IODEF/RID
    document in the SOAP body from being viewed by any involved SOAP


Moriarty & Trammell      Expires: May 14, 2007                 [Page 16]


Internet-Draft                                         November 14, 2006


    intermediary node.

5.2 Authentication and Identification

    For transport authentication and identification, TLS (whether
    HTTP/TLS or the BEEP TLS profile) MUST be supported and SHOULD be
    used. Each RID consortium SHOULD use a trusted public key
    infrastructure (PKI) to manage identities for TLS connections.
    The public/private key pairs used for XML encryption and digital
    signatures provide authentication for the RID message.  The session
    encryption keys are also used to identify the communicating hosts
    and provide integrity for the session.

    Since multiple bindings for transport may be implemented, RID
    implementations MUST support XML digital signatures [5] to
    sign the SOAP body; the rationale and implementation here is
    parallel to that for XML encryption discussed in section 5.1.

6. IANA Considerations

    The IANA is requested to assign TCP ports for RID over SOAP over
    HTTPS and for RID over SOAP over BEEP.

7. Summary

    SOAP provides the wrapper to facilitate the exchange of RID
    messages.  The IETF and W3C standards provide detailed
    implementation details for SOAP and SOAP protocol bindings.  The
    use of existing standards assists with development and
    interoperability between RID systems exchanging IODEF documents for
    incident handling purposes.  HTTP/TLS is the mandatory transport
    binding for SOAP to be implemented and BEEP with a TLS profile is
    optional.

8. References

    [RFC2119] "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
    Levels," S. Bradner, March 1997.

    [RFC2246] "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0," T. Dierks, C. Allen, W.
    Treese, P. Karlton, A. Freier, P. Kocher, January 1999.

    [RFC2256] "A Summary of the X.500(96) User Schema for use with
    LDAPv3," M. Wahl, December 1997.

    [RFC2459] "Internet Public Key Infrastructure: Part I: X.509
    Certificate and CRL Profile," R. Housley, W. Ford, W. Polk, and
    D. Solo, January 1999.

    [RFC2527] "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate
    Policy and Certification Practices Framework," S. Chokhani, W.
    Ford, March 1999.


Moriarty & Trammell      Expires: May 14, 2007                 [Page 17]


Internet-Draft                                         November 14, 2006


    [RFC2616] "Hypertext Transfer Protocol - HTTP/1.1," R. Fielding, J.
    Gettys, J. Mogul, H. Masinter, P. Leach, and T. Berners-Lee, June
    1999.

    [RFC3080] "The Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol Core," M. Rose.
    March 2001.

    [RFC3205] "On the Use of HTTP as a Substrate," K. Moore, February
    2002. (BCP56)

    [RFC3688] "The IETF XML Registry," M. Mealling, January 2004.

    [RFCXXXX] "The Incident Object Data Exchange Format Data Model and
    XML Implementation," J. Meijer, R. Danyliw, and Y. Demchenko,
    August 2006.
    http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-inch-iodef-08.txt

    [RFCXXXX] "Requirements for the Format for INcident information
    Exchange," Y. Demchenko, R. Danyliw, and G. Keeni, June 2006.
    http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-inch-requirements-
    08.txt

    [RFCXXXX] "Incident Handling: Real-time Inter-network Defense,"
    K. Moriarty, August 2006.
    http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-inch-rid-08.txt

    [RFCXXXX] "Using the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) Over
    the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)," T. Goddard,  March 2006.
    http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-netconf-soap-08.txt

    [RFCXXXX] "Using the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) in Blocks
    Extensible Exchange Protocol (BEEP)," E. O'Tuathail, and M. Rose,
    May 13, 2005.
    http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mrose-rfc3288bis-02.txt

    [1] "Security in a Web Services World: A Proposed Architecture
    and Roadmap". IBM and Microsoft, April 2002.
    http://www-106.ibm.com/developerworks/webservices/library/ws-secmap

    [2] SOAP Version 1.2 Part 0: Primer,  W3C Recommendation,
    http://www.w3c.org/TR/REC-soap12-part0-20030624/, 24 June 2004.

    [3] SOAP Version 1.2 Part 1:Messaging Framework.  W3C
    Recommendation, 24 June 2004.
    http://www.w3c.org/TR/REC-soap12-part1-20030624/

    [4] XML Encryption Syntax and Processing, W3C Recommendation.
    T. Imamura, B. Dillaway, and E. Simon, December 2002.

    [5] XML-Signature Syntax and Processing, W3C Recommendation,
    M. Bartel, J. Boyer, B. Fox, B. LaMacchia, and E. Simon, February
    2002. http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/#sec-Design


Moriarty & Trammell      Expires: May 14, 2007                 [Page 18]


Internet-Draft                                         November 14, 2006


6.1 Acknowledgments

    Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
    Internet Society.

6.2 Author Information

    Kathleen M. Moriarty
    MIT Lincoln Laboratory
    244 Wood Street
    Lexington, MA 02420
    Email: Moriarty@ll.mit.edu

    Brian H. Trammell
    CERT Network Situational Awareness
    4500 Fifth Avenue
    Pittsburgh, PA 15213
    Email: bht@cert.org

    Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).  This document is
    subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP
    78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their
    rights.

    This document and the information contained herein
    are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE
    ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE
    INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM
    ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
    ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT
    INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
    OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

    This work was sponsored by the Air Force under Air Force
    Contract FA8721-05-C-0002.

    "Opinions, interpretations, conclusions, and recommendations
     are those of the author and are not necessarily endorsed
     by the United States Government."















Moriarty & Trammell      Expires: May 14, 2007                 [Page 19]