DRIP                                                        R. Moskowitz
Internet-Draft                                            HTT Consulting
Intended status: Standards Track                                 S. Card
Expires: 23 October 2022                                 A. Wiethuechter
                                                           AX Enterprize
                                                               A. Gurtov
                                                    Linköping University
                                                           21 April 2022


                Secure UAS Network RID and C2 Transport
                 draft-moskowitz-drip-secure-nrid-c2-05

Abstract

   This document defines a transport mechanism for Unmanned Aircraft
   System (UAS) Network Remote ID (N-RID).  CoAP/CBOR is used for the
   N-RID messaging.  This is secured via either HIP/ESP or DTLS.  HIP/
   ESP or DTLS secure messaging Command-and-Control (C2) for is also
   described.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 October 2022.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components



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   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Requirements Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Secure Transports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  HIP for Secure Transport  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  DTLS for Secure Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  Ciphers for Secure Transport  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.4.  HIP and DTLS contrasted and compared  . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Network Remote ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Network RID Endpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       4.1.1.  N-RID from the UA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       4.1.2.  N-RID from the GCS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       4.1.3.  N-RID from the Operator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.2.  Network RID Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.2.1.  Secure Link Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.2.2.  Static Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       4.2.3.  Vector/Location Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.3.  CoAP N-RID messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.1.  Securing MAVLink  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   This document defines a set of messages for Unmanned Aircraft System
   (UAS) Network Remote ID (N-RID) derived from the ASTM Remote ID
   [F3411-19] broadcast messages and common data dictionary.  These
   messages are transported from the UAS to its USS Network Service
   Provider (Net-RID SP) over CoAP/CBOR ([RFC7252]/[RFC8949]).









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   CoAP/CBOR were selected for their low communication "cost".  This may
   not be an issue if N-RID originates from the Ground Control Station
   (GCS, Section 4.1.2), but it may be an important determinant when
   originating from the UA (Section 4.1.1).  Particularly, very small
   messages may open N-RID transmissions over a variety of wireless
   technologies.

   To further reduce the communication cost, SCHC [RFC8724] is defined
   for the CoAP layer ([RFC8824]) and security "compression" (ESP
   Implicit IV, [RFC8750]) for ESP.  SCHC for the IP/UDP layer is
   currently defined by IP carrier (e.g.  LoRaWAN, [RFC9011]) and will
   be covered in any specific implementation.

   This document defines mechanisms to provide secure transport for
   these N-RID messages and Command and Control (C2) messaging.

   A secure end-to-end transport for C2 is critical for UAS especially
   for Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) operations.  It needs to provide data
   Confidentiality, Integrity, and Authenticity (CIA).  Depending on the
   underlying network technology, this secure transport may need to
   manage IP address changes (IP mobility) for both the UA and GCS.

   A secure end-to-end transport for N-RID (UAS to Network RID Service
   Provider (Net-RID SP)) also should provide full CIA.  It may seem
   that confidentiality is optional, as most of the information in N-RID
   is sent in the clear in Broadcast Remote ID (B-RID), but this is a
   potentially flawed analysis.  N-RID has evesdropping risks not in
   B-RID and may contain more sensitive information than B-RID.  The
   secure transport for N-RID should only need to manage IP address
   changes (IP mobility) for the UAS.

   Two options for secure transport are provided: HIPv2 [RFC7401] and
   DTLS 1.3 [DTLS-1.3-draft].  These options are generally defined and
   their applicability is compared and contrasted.  It is up to N-RID
   and C2 to select which is preferred for their situation.

2.  Terms and Definitions

2.1.  Requirements Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.






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2.2.  Definitions

   See Section 2.2 of [RFC9153] for common DRIP terms.  The following
   new terms are used in the document:

   B-RID
      Broadcast Remote ID.  A method of sending RID messages as 1-way
      transmissions from the UA to any Observers within radio range.

   N-RID
      Network Remote ID.  A method of sending RID messages via the
      Internet connection of the UAS directly to the UTM.

   RID
      Remote ID.  A unique identifier found on all UA to be used in
      communication and in regulation of UA operation.

3.  Secure Transports

   Secure UDP-based protocols are preferred for both Network Remote ID
   (N-RID) and C2.  Both HIPv2 and DTLS can be used.  It will be shown
   below that HIPv2 is better suited in most cases.

   For IPv6 and CoAP over both WiFi and Bluetooth (or any other radio
   link), SCHC [RFC8724] is defined to significantly reduce the per
   packet transmission cost.  SCHC is used both within the secure
   envelope and before the secure envelope as shown in Section 5.2.10 of
   [lpwan-architecture].  For Bluetooth, there is also IPv6 over
   Bluetooth LE [RFC7668] for more guidance.

   Local link (direct radio) C2 security is possible with the link's MAC
   layer security.  SCHC SHOULD still be used as above.  Both WiFi and
   Bluetooth link security can provide appropriate security, but this
   would not provide trustworthy multi-homed security.

3.1.  HIP for Secure Transport

   HIP has already been used for C2 mobility, managing the ongoing
   connectivity over WiFi at start of an operation, switching to LTE
   once out of WiFi range, and returning to WiFi connectivity at the end
   of the operation.  This functionality is especially important for
   BLOS.  HHITs are already defined for RID, and need only be added to
   the GCS via a GCS Registration as part of the UAS to USS registration
   to be usedfor C2 HIP.

   When the UA is the UAS endpoint for N-RID (Section 4.1.1), and
   particularly when HIP is used for C2, HIP for N-RID simplifies
   protocol use on the UA.  The Net-RID SP endpoint may already support



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   HIP if it is also the HHIT Registrar.  If the UA lacks any IP ability
   and the RID HHIT registration was done via the GCS or Operator
   device, then they may also be set for using HIP for N-RID.

   Further, double jump and multi-homing support is mandatory for C2
   mobility.  This is inherent in the HIP design.  The HIP address
   update can be improved with [hip-fast-mobility].

3.2.  DTLS for Secure Transport

   DTLS is a good fit for N-RID for any of the possible UAS endpoints.
   There are challenges in using it for C2.  To use DTLS for C2, the GCS
   will need to be the DTLS server.  How does it 'push' commands to the
   UA?  How does it reestablish DTLS security if state is lost?  And
   finally, how is the double jump scenario handled?

   All the above DTLS for C2 probably have solutions.  None of them are
   inherent in the DTLS design.

3.3.  Ciphers for Secure Transport

   The cipher choice for either HIP or DTLS depends, in large measure,
   on the UAS endpoint.  If the endpoint is computationally constrained,
   the cipher computations become important.  If any of the links are
   constrained or expensive, then the over-the-wire cost needs to be
   minimized.  AES-CCM and AES-GCM are the preferred, modern, AEAD
   ciphers.

   For ESP with HIP [RFC7402], an additional 4 - 8 bytes can be trimmed
   by using the Implicit IV for ESP option [RFC8750].

   NIST is working on selecting a new lightweight cipher that may be the
   best choice for use on a UA.  The Keccak Xoodyak cipher in
   [new-hip-crypto] is a good "Green Cipher".

3.4.  HIP and DTLS contrasted and compared

   This document specifies the use of DTLS 1.3 for its 0-RTT mobility
   feature and improved (over 1.2) handshake.  DTLS 1.3 is still an IETF
   draft, so there is little data available to properly contrast it with
   HIPv2.  This section will be based on the current DTLS 1.2.  The
   basic client-server model is unchanged.

   The use of DTLS vs HIPv2 (both over UDP, HIP in IPsec ESP BEET mode)
   has pros and cons.  DTLS is currently at version 1.2 and based on TLS
   1.2.  It is a more common protocol than HIP, with many different
   implementations available for various platforms and languages.




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   DTLS implements a client-server model, where the client initiates the
   communication.  In HIP, two parties are equal and either can be an
   Initiator or Responder of the Base Exchange.  HIP provides separation
   between key management (base exchange) and secure transport (for
   example IPsec ESP BEET) while both parts are tightly coupled in DTLS.

   DTLS 1.2 still has quite chatty connection establishment taking 3-5
   RTTs and 15 packets.  HIP connection establishment requires 4 packets
   (I1,R1,I2,R2) over 2 RTTs.  This is beneficial for constrained
   environments of UAs.  HIPv2 supports cryptoagility with possibility
   to negotiate cryptography mechanisms during the Base Exchange.

   Both DTLS and HIP support mobility with a change of IP address.
   However, in DTLS only client mobility is well supported, while in HIP
   either party can be mobile.  The double-jump problem (simultaneous
   mobility) is supported in HIP with a help of Rendezvous Server (RVS)
   [RFC8004].  HIP can implement secure mobility with IP source address
   validation in 2 RTTs, and in 1 RTT with fast mobility extension.

   One study comparing DTLS and IPsec-ESP performance concluded that
   DTLS is recommended for memory-constrained applications while IPSec-
   ESP for battery power-constrained [Vignesh].

4.  Network Remote ID

   In UAS Traffic Management (UTM), the purpose of N-RID is to provide
   situational awareness of UA (in the form of flight tracking) in a
   user specified 3D volume.  The data needed for this is already
   defined in [F3411-19], but a standard message format, protocol, and
   secure communications methodology are missing.  F3411, and other UTM
   based standards going through ASTM, provide JSON objects and some of
   the messages for passing information between various UTM entities
   (e.g., Net-RID SP to Net-RID SP and Net-RID SP to Net-RID DP) but
   does not specify how the data gets into UTM to begin with.  This
   document will provide such an open standard.

   The Broadcast Remote ID (B-RID) messages in [F3411-19] are sufficient
   to meet the needs of N-RID.  These messages can be sent to the Net-
   RID SP when their contents change.  Further, a UAS supporting B-RID
   will have minimal development to add N-RID support.

   This approach has the added advantage of being very compact,
   minimizing the N-RID communications cost.








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4.1.  Network RID Endpoints

   The FAA defines the Network Remote ID endpoints as a USS Network
   Service Provider (Net-RID SP) and the UAS.  Both of these are rather
   nebulous items and what they actually are will impact how
   communications flow between them.

   The Net-RID SP may be provided by the same entity serving as the UAS
   Service Provider (USS).  This simplifies a number of aspects of the
   N-RID communication flow.  An Operator is expected to register an
   operation with the USS.  If this is done via the GCS and the GCS is
   the source (directly acting as a gateway), this could set up the
   secure connection for N-RID.  The Net-RID SP is likely to be stable
   in the network, that is its IP address will not change during a
   mission.  This simplifies maintaining the N-RID communications.

   The UAS component in N-RID may be either the UA, GCS, or the
   Operator's Internet connected device (e.g. smartphone or tablet).  In
   all cases, mobility MUST be assumed.  That is the IP address of this
   end of the N-RID communication will change during an operation.  The
   N-RID mechanism MUST support this.  The UAS Identity for the secure
   connection may vary based on the UAS endpoint.

4.1.1.  N-RID from the UA

   Some UA will be equipped with direct Internet access.  These UA will
   also tend to have multiple radios for their Internet access (e.g.
   Cellular and WiFi).  Thus multi-homing with "make before break"
   behavior is needed.  This is on top of any IP address changes on any
   of the interfaces while in use.

4.1.2.  N-RID from the GCS

   Many UA will lack direct Internet access, but their GCS are
   connected.  There are two sources for the GCS for the RID messages,
   both from the UA.  These are UA B-RID messages, or content from C2
   messages that the GCS converts to RID message format.  In either
   case, the GCS may be mobile with changing IP addresses.  The GCS may
   be in a fast moving ground device (e.g. delivery van), so it can have
   as mobility demanding connection needs as the UA.

4.1.3.  N-RID from the Operator

   Many UAS will have no Internet connectivity, but the UA is sending
   B-RID messages and the Operator, when within RF range, can receive
   these B-RID messages on an Internet Connected device that can act as
   the proxy for these messages, turning them into N-RID messages.




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4.2.  Network RID Messaging

   N-RID messaging is tied to a UA operation (generally called a flight
   or mission).  This consists of an initial secure link setup, followed
   by a set of mostly static information related to the operation.
   During the operation, continuous location information is sent by the
   UA with any needed updates to the mostly static operation
   information.

   The Net-RID SP SHOULD send regular "heartbeats" to the UAS.  If the
   UAS does not receive these heartbeats for some policy set time, the
   UA MUST take the policy set response to loss of Net-RID SP
   connectivity.  For example, this could be a mandated immediate
   landing.  There may be other messages from the Net-RID SP to the UAS
   (e.g., call the USS operator at this number NOW!).  The UAS MUST
   acknowledge these messages.

   If the Net-RID SP stops receiving messages from the UAS
   (Section 4.2.3), it should notify the UTM of a non-communicating UA
   while still in operation.

4.2.1.  Secure Link Setup

   The secure link setup MUST be done before the operation begins, thus
   it can use a high capacity connection like WiFi.  It MAY use the UA
   RID for this setup, including other data elements provided in the
   B-RID Basic ID (Msg Type 0x0) Message.  If the Basic ID information
   is NOT included via the secure setup (including the Net-RID SP
   querying the USS for this information), it MUST be sent as part of
   the Static Messages (Section 4.2.2)

4.2.1.1.  UAS Identity

   The UAS MAY use its RID if it is a HHIT [drip-uas-rid].  It may use
   some other Identity, based on the Net-RID SP policy.

   The GCS or Operator smart device may have a copy of the UA
   credentials and use them in the connection to the Net-RID SP.  In
   this case, they are indistinguishable from the UA as seen from the
   Net-RID SP.  Alternatively, they may use their own credentials with
   the Net-RID SP which would need some internal mechanism to tie that
   to the UA.









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4.2.2.  Static Messages

   For simplicity, a class of UAS information is called here "Static",
   though in practice any of it can change during the operation, but
   will change infrequently.  This information is the contents of the
   B-RID Self-ID (Msg Type 0x3), Operator ID (Msg Type 0x5), and System
   Messages (Msg Type 0x4).  This information can simply be sent in the
   same format as the B-RID messages.  Alternatively the individual data
   elements may be send as separate CBOR objects.

   The Basic ID (Msg Type 0x0) Message may be included as a static
   message if this information was not used for the secure setup.  There
   may be more than one Basic ID Message needed if as in the case where
   the Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB) has mandated that the CAA
   assigned ID (UA ID type 2) and Serial Number (UA ID type 1) be
   broadcasted.

   The information in the System Message is most likely to change during
   an operation.  Noteably the Operator Location data elements are
   subject to change if the GCS is physically moving (e.g.  hand-held
   and the operator is walking or driving in a car).  The whole System
   Message may be sent, or only the changing data elements as CBOR
   objects.

   These static message elements may be sent before the operation
   begins, thus their transmission can use a high capacity connection
   like WiFi.  Once the operation is underway, any updates will have to
   traverse the operational link which may be very constrained and this
   will impact data element formatting.

   The Net-RID SP MUST acknowledge these messages.  The UAS MUST receive
   these ACKs.  If no ACK is received, the UAS MUST resent the
   message(s).  This send/ACK sequence continues either until ACK is
   received, or some policy number of tries.  If this fails, the UAS
   MUST act that the Net-RID SP connection is lost and MUST take the
   policy set response to loss of Net-RID SP connectivity.  If the
   information changes during this cycle, the latest information MUST
   always be sent.

4.2.3.  Vector/Location Message

   Many CAAs mandate that the UA Vector/Location information be updated
   at least once per second.  Without careful message design, this
   messaging volume would overwhelm many wireless technologies.  Thus to
   enable the widest deployment choices, a highly compressed format is
   recommended.





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   The B-RID Vector/Location Message (Msg Type 0x1) is the simplest
   small object (24 bytes) for sending this information as a single CBOR
   object.  It may be possible to send only those data elements that
   changed in the last time interval.  This may result in smaller
   individual transmissions, but should not be used if the resulting
   message is larger than the Vector/Location Message.

4.3.  CoAP N-RID messages

   TBD

5.  Command and Control

   The Command and Control (C2) connection is between the UA and GCS.
   This is often this over a direct link radio.  Some times,
   particularly for BLOS, it is via Internet connections.  In either
   case C2 SHOULD be secure from eavesdropping and tampering.  For
   design and implementation consistency it is best to treat the direct
   link as a local link Internet connection and use constrained
   networking compression standards.

   Both the UA and GCS need to be treated as fully mobile in the IP
   networking sense.  Either one can have its IP address change and both
   could change at the same time (the double jump problem).  It is
   preferable to use a peer-to-peer (P2P) secure technology like HIPv2
   [RFC7401].

   Finally UA may also tend to have multiple radios for their C2
   communications.  Thus multi-homing with "make before break" behavior
   is needed.  This is on top of any IP address changes on any of the
   interfaces while in use.

5.1.  Securing MAVLink

   MAVLink [MAVLINK] is a commonly used protocol for C2.  Message
   authenticity was added in MAVLink 2 in the form of a SHA-256 (secret
   + message hash) left-truncated to 6 byte.  This does not follow HMAC
   [RFC2104] security recommendations, nor provides confidentiality.

   By following the security approach here, UAS C2 is superior to that
   currently provided within MAVlink.

6.  IANA Considerations

   TBD






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7.  Security Considerations

   Designing secure transports is challenging.  Where possible, existing
   technologies SHOULD be used.  Both ESP and DTLS have stood "the test
   of time" against many attack scenarios.  Their use here for N-RID and
   C2 do not represent new uses, but rather variants on existing
   depoyments.

   The same can be said for both key establishment, using HIPv2 and
   DTLS, and the actual cipher choice for per packet encryption and
   authentication.  N-RID and C2 do not present new challenges, rather
   new opportunities to provide communications security using well
   researched technologies.

8.  Acknowledgments

   Stuart Card and Adam Wiethuechter provivded information on their use
   of HIP for C2 at the Syracuse NY UAS test corridor.  This, in large
   measure, was the impetus to develop this document.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8949]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [drip-uas-rid]
              Moskowitz, R., Card, S. W., Wiethuechter, A., and A.
              Gurtov, "DRIP Entity Tag (DET) for Unmanned Aircraft



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              System Remote ID (UAS RID)", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-ietf-drip-rid-22, 13 April 2022,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-drip-
              rid-22>.

   [DTLS-1.3-draft]
              Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
              Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
              1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-
              dtls13-43, 30 April 2021,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
              dtls13-43>.

   [F3411-19] ASTM International, "Standard Specification for Remote ID
              and Tracking", February 2020,
              <http://www.astm.org/cgi-bin/resolver.cgi?F3411>.

   [hip-fast-mobility]
              Moskowitz, R., Card, S. W., and A. Wiethuechter, "Fast HIP
              Host Mobility", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              moskowitz-hip-fast-mobility-03, 3 April 2020,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-moskowitz-
              hip-fast-mobility-03>.

   [lpwan-architecture]
              Pelov, A., Thubert, P., and A. Minaburo, "LPWAN Static
              Context Header Compression (SCHC) Architecture", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lpwan-architecture-
              01, 26 November 2021,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lpwan-
              architecture-01>.

   [MAVLINK]  "Micro Air Vehicle Communication Protocol", 2021,
              <http://mavlink.io/>.

   [new-hip-crypto]
              Moskowitz, R., Card, S. W., and A. Wiethuechter, "New
              Cryptographic Algorithms for HIP", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-new-crypto-10, 2
              August 2021, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
              moskowitz-hip-new-crypto-10>.

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.





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Internet-Draft            Secure UAS Transport                April 2022


   [RFC7401]  Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T.
              Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)",
              RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>.

   [RFC7402]  Jokela, P., Moskowitz, R., and J. Melen, "Using the
              Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Transport Format with
              the Host Identity Protocol (HIP)", RFC 7402,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7402, April 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7402>.

   [RFC7668]  Nieminen, J., Savolainen, T., Isomaki, M., Patil, B.,
              Shelby, Z., and C. Gomez, "IPv6 over BLUETOOTH(R) Low
              Energy", RFC 7668, DOI 10.17487/RFC7668, October 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7668>.

   [RFC8004]  Laganier, J. and L. Eggert, "Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
              Rendezvous Extension", RFC 8004, DOI 10.17487/RFC8004,
              October 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8004>.

   [RFC8724]  Minaburo, A., Toutain, L., Gomez, C., Barthel, D., and JC.
              Zuniga, "SCHC: Generic Framework for Static Context Header
              Compression and Fragmentation", RFC 8724,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8724, April 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8724>.

   [RFC8750]  Migault, D., Guggemos, T., and Y. Nir, "Implicit
              Initialization Vector (IV) for Counter-Based Ciphers in
              Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 8750,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8750, March 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8750>.

   [RFC8824]  Minaburo, A., Toutain, L., and R. Andreasen, "Static
              Context Header Compression (SCHC) for the Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 8824,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8824, June 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8824>.

   [RFC9011]  Gimenez, O., Ed. and I. Petrov, Ed., "Static Context
              Header Compression and Fragmentation (SCHC) over LoRaWAN",
              RFC 9011, DOI 10.17487/RFC9011, April 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9011>.

   [RFC9153]  Card, S., Ed., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., and A.
              Gurtov, "Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP)
              Requirements and Terminology", RFC 9153,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9153, February 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9153>.



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   [Vignesh]  Vignesh, K., "Performance analysis of end-to-end DTLS and
              IPsec-based communication in IoT environments", Thesis
              no. MSEE-2017: 42, 2017, <http://www.diva-
              portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1157047/FULLTEXT02>.

Authors' Addresses

   Robert Moskowitz
   HTT Consulting
   Oak Park, MI 48237
   United States of America
   Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com


   Stuart W. Card
   AX Enterprize
   4947 Commercial Drive
   Yorkville, NY 13495
   United States of America
   Email: stu.card@axenterprize.com


   Adam Wiethuechter
   AX Enterprize
   4947 Commercial Drive
   Yorkville, NY 13495
   United States of America
   Email: adam.wiethuechter@axenterprize.com


   Andrei Gurtov
   Linköping University
   IDA
   SE-58183 Linköping
   Sweden
   Email: gurtov@acm.org















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