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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06                                          
                                                  R. Moskowitz, ICSA.net

Internet Draft

Document: <draft-moskowitz-hip-arch-01.txt>               Feb 2000

                         Host Identity Payload


Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
   months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
   at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
   reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at

Table of Contents

1. Abstract...........................................................2
2. Conventions used in this document..................................2
3. Introduction.......................................................2
4. Background.........................................................3
5. The Host Identity..................................................4
5.1. Host Identity....................................................5
5.2. Host Identity Global Hash (HIGH).................................5
5.2.1. Storing HIGH in DNS............................................6
5.3. Host Assigning Authority (HAA) field.............................6
5.4. Endpoint Selector (ESEL).........................................7
6. Using the Host Identity............................................7
7. Mobility via HIP...................................................8
8. HIP and NATs.......................................................9
8.1. HIP and TCP Checksum.............................................9
9. HIP Policies.......................................................9
10. Security Considerations..........................................10
10.1. HIGHs used in ACLs.............................................11
10.2. Non-security Considerations....................................12
11. IANA Considerations..............................................12

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                  Host Identity Payload Architecture     February 2000

12. ICANN Considerations.............................................12
13. References.......................................................12
14. Acknowledgments..................................................13
15. Author's Address.................................................13
16. Copyright Statement..............................................13

1. Abstract

   This memo describes the reasoning behind proposing a new namespace,
   the Host Identity, and a payload, between the Internetworking and
   Transport layers, to carry this identity.  Herein is presented the
   basics of the current namespaces, strengths and weaknesses, and how
   a new namespace will add completeness to them.  This new namespace's
   roles in the protocols are defined.

2. Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC-2119].

3. Introduction

   The Internet has created two namespaces: Internet Protocol (IP)
   addresses, and Domain Name Services (DNS) names.  These two
   namespaces have a set of features and abstractions that have powered
   the Internet to what it is today.  They also have a number of
   weaknesses. IP addresses define an interface, not a host and not
   every host has one permanently, so they cannot reliably be used for
   host authentication systems.  Further, IP addresses are bound to the
   transport within the hosts (e.g. in the Transport Control Block,
   TCB) so that a change to an IP address will disrupt any existing
   transport flow.

   Few systems on the Internet have DNS names.  DNS names are also only
   indirect references to IP addresses, though this changes in part
   with DNSSEC and KEY records.  Although each namespace can be
   stretched (IP with v6, DNS with KEY records), neither can adequately
   provide for host authentication or act as a separation between
   Internetworking and Transport layers.

   The Host Identity (HI) namespace is assigned to each host, or
   technically its networking kernel.  Each host will have at least one
   HI, which can either be public (published in DNS), or anonymous.
   Client systems will tend to have both public and anonymous HIs.

   Although the HI can be used in many authentication systems, its
   principle design calls out for a new protocol header and exchange
   [HIP] that will support trust between systems, enhance mobility and
   dynamic IP renumbering, and greatly reduce Denial Of Service (DOS)

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                  Host Identity Payload Architecture     February 2000

4. Background

   The Internet is built from three principle components: Computing
   platforms, Packet transport infrastructure, and Services
   (applications).  The Internet exists to service two principle
   components: People and Robotic processes (silicon based people, if
   you will).  All these components need to be named in order to
   interact in a scalable manner.

   There are three principle namespaces in use in the Internet for
   these components: IP numbers, Domain Names, and Email addresses.
   Where Email addresses are really only an extension of Domain Names.

   IP addresses provide naming for the Transport Infrastructure
   interfaces on computing platforms.  More than just naming the
   interface, IP addresses are used directly in the TCB in all TCP
   implementations.  IP addresses assignments are centrally controlled
   and delegated in blocks.  There is little anonymity in IP addresses.
   IPv4 addresses provide a unique (non-singular sometimes), but non-
   global names.  IPv6 addresses MAY provide globally unique (non-
   singular regularly?) names.  Most IP address assignment is
   transient; making IP addresses an unreliable namespace outside of
   packet delivery.

   Domain Names provide hierarchically assigned names for some
   computing platforms and some services.  Each hierarchy is delegated
   from the level above; there is no anonymity in Domain Names.

   Email addresses provide naming for both carbon and silicon based
   people.  Email addresses are extensions of Domain Names, only in so
   far as a named service is responsible for managing a person's mail.
   There is some anonymity in Email addresses.

   There are four critical deficiencies with the current namespaces.
   Computing platforms are not well named with the current namespaces.
   Dynamic readdressing cannot be directly managed.  Anonymity is not
   provided in a consistent, trustable manner.  And authentication for
   systems and datagrams is not provided.

        A namespace for computing platforms can be used in end-to-end
        operations independent of the evolution of the internetworking
        layer and across the many transport layers.  This could support
        rapid readdressing of the internetworking layer either from
        mobility or renumbering.

        If this namespace is cryptographically based, it can also
        provide authentication services for IPsec.  If this namespace
        is locally created without requiring registration, it can
        provide anonymity.

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                  Host Identity Payload Architecture     February 2000

   Such a namespace (for computing platforms) should have the following

        It is applied to the IP 'kernel'.  The IP kernel is the
        'component' between services and the packet transport

        It should fully decouple the Internetworking layer from the
        higher layers.  It should replace all occurrences of IP
        addresses within applications (like in the TCB).  This may
        require API changes.

        It should not mandate any infrastructure.  Deployment must come
        from the bottom up, in a pairwise deployment.

        It should be fixed length, for easy inclusion in datagrams and
        programming interfaces (e.g the TCB).

        It should be affordable when used in protocols.  This is
        primarily a packet size issue.

        It MUST be statistically globally unique.  64 bits is
        inadequate (1% chance of collision in a population of 640M);
        thus approximately 128 bits should be used.

        It should have a localized abstraction so that it can be used
        in existing protocols and APIs.

        It SHOULD be locally created.  This can provide anonymity at
        the cost of making resolvability very difficult.

                Sometimes it MAY contain a delegation component.  This
                is the cost of resolvability.

        It SHOULD provide authentication services.  This is a preferred

        It should be long lived, but replaceable at any time.  This
        impacts access control lists; short lifetimes will tend to
        result in tedious list maintenance or require a namespace
        infrastructure for central control of access lists.

   This new namespace will be called the Host Identity.  It will
   require its own protocol layer (the Host Identity Payload), between
   the Internetworking and Transport layers.  It will be based on
   Public Key Cryptography to supply authentication services.  Properly
   designed, it can deliver all of the above stated requirements.

5. The Host Identity

   The Host Identity represents a statistically globally unique name
   for naming any system with an IP stack.  This identity is normally

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                  Host Identity Payload Architecture     February 2000

   associated with an IP stack. A system can have multiple identities,
   some 'well known', some anonymous.  A system may self assert its
   identity, or may use a third-party authenticator like DNSSEC, PGP,
   or X.509 to 'notarize' the identity assertion.  DNSSEC is the MUST
   implement authenticator for the Host Identity.

   Although the Host Identity can be any name that can claim
   'statistically globally unique', a public key of a 'public key' pair
   makes the best Host Identity.  As documented in the Host Identity
   Payload (HIP) protocol [HIP], a public key based HI can authenticate
   the HIP packets and protect them for man-in-the-middle attacks.  And
   since authenticated datagrams are MANDITORY to provide much of HIP's
   Dos protection, the Diffie-Hellman exchange in HIP has to be
   authenticated.  Thus only public key HI and authenticated datagrams
   SHOULD be supported.  The non-cryptographic forms of HI and HIP are
   presented to complete the theory of HI, but SHOULD NOT be
   implemented as they could produce worst DOS attacks than the
   internet has without HI.

5.1. Host Identity

   Host Identity adds two main features to Internet protocols.  The
   first is a decoupling of the internetworking and transport layers.
   This decoupling will allow for independent evolution of the two
   layers.  Additionally it can provide end-to-end services over
   multiple internetworking realms.  The second feature is host
   authentication.  If the Host Identity is a public key, this key can
   be used to authenticate security protocols like IPsec.

   The preferred structure of the Host Identity is that of a public key
   pair.  DSA is the MUST implement algorithm for any implementation
   supporting public keys for the Host Identity.  Any other Internet
   naming convention MAY be used for the Host Identity.  However, these
   should only be used in situations of high trust - low risk.  That is
   any place where host authentication is not needed (no risk of host
   spoofing) and no use of IPsec.

   The Host Identity is never directly used in any Internet protocol.
   It may be stored in various DNS or LDAP directories as identified in
   the HIP architecture and it is passed in the HIP payload.  If the
   Host Identity is a public key, it SHOULD be stored in a DNS KEY RR
   with the protocol set to HIP.  A Host Identity Global Hash (HIGH) is
   used in protocols to represent the Host Identity.  Another
   representation of the Host Identity, the Endpoint Selector (ESEL)
   can also be used in protocols and APIs.  ESEL's advantage over HIGH
   is its size; its disadvantage is its local scope.

5.2. Host Identity Global Hash (HIGH)

   The Host Identity Global Hash is a 128 bit field.  There are two
   advantages of using a hash over the actual Identity in protocols.

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                  Host Identity Payload Architecture     February 2000

   First its fix length makes for easier protocol coding and also
   better manages the packet size cost of this technology.  Secondly,
   it presents a consistent format to the protocol whatever underlying
   Identity technology is used.

   When the Host Identity is a public key, HIGH functions much like the
   SPI does in IPsec.  However, instead of being an arbitrary 32-bit
   value that, in combination with the destination IP address and
   security protocol (ESP), uniquely identifies the Security
   Association for a datagram, HIGH identifies the public key that can
   validate the packet authentication.  HIGH SHOULD be unique in the
   whole IP universe.  If there is more than one public key for a HIGH,
   the HIGH acts as a hint for the correct public key to use.

   There are two formats for HIGH.  Bit 0 is used to differentiate the
   formats.  If Bit 0 is zero, then the rest of HIGH is a 127 bits of a
   Hash of the key.  For example, if the Identity is DSA, these bits
   are the least significant 127 bits of the SHA-1 [FIPS-180-1] hash of
   the DSA public key Host Identity.

   If Bit 0 is one, then the next 63 bits is the Host Assigning
   Authority field, and only the last 64 bits come from a hash of the
   Host Identity.  This format for HIGH is recommended for 'well known'
   systems.  It is possible to support a resolution mechanism for these
   names in directories like DNS.

   The birthday paradox sets a bound for the expectation of collisions.
   It is based on the square root of the number of values.  A 64-bit
   hash, then, would put the chances of a collision at 50-50 with 2^32
   hosts (4 billion).  A 1% chance of collision would occur in a
   population of 640M and a .001% collision chance in a 20M population.
   A 128 bit hash will have the same .001% collision chance in a
   9x10^16 population.

5.2.1. Storing HIGH in DNS

   The HIGH SHOULD be stored in DNS.  The exception to this is
   anonymous identities.  The HIGH is stored in a new KEY RR.  The HIGH
   KEY RR will have all flags set to ZERO, its protocol set to HIP, and
   algorithm set to HIGH128.  The 'public key' field of the HIGH KEY RR
   will be the 128 bit HIGH.

5.3. Host Assigning Authority (HAA) field

   The 63 bits of HAA supports two levels of delegation.  The first is
   a registered assigning authority (RAA).  The second is a registered
   identity (RI, commonly a company).  The RAA is 23 bits with values
   assign sequentially by ICANN.  The RI is 40 bits, also assigned
   sequentially but by the RAA.  This can be used to create a
   resolution mechanism in the DNS.  For example if FOO is RAA number
   100 and BAR is FOO's 50th registered identity, and if

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                  Host Identity Payload Architecture     February 2000

   1385D17FC63961F5 is the hash of the key for www.foo.com, then by
   using DNS Binary Labels [DNSBIN] there could be a reverse lookup
   record like:

   \[x1385D17FC63961F5/64].\[x32/40].\[x64/23].high.int   IN PTR

5.4. Endpoint Selector (ESEL)

   ESELs (pronounced E-cells) are 32 bit localized representations of a
   Host Identity.  The purpose of an ESEL is to facilitate using Host
   Identities in existing protocols and APIs.  Each host selects its
   own 32 bit representation for a Host Identity.  It MUST be random.
   A different ESEL SHOULD be used for each HIP exchange with a
   particular host; this is to avoid a replay attack with an old ESEL
   that was used as a SPI.  Additionally, when a host rekeys, the ESEL
   MUST change.  One method for ESEL creation that meets these
   criteria, would be to concatenate the HIGH with a 32 bit random
   number, hash this (using SHA1), and then use the high order 32 bits
   as the ESEL.

   The owner of the Host Identity does not set its own ESEL, its
   partner does; the risk of collisions is too great (1% in a
   population of 10,000).  Since the ESEL only has meaning to the host,
   its generation is a local policy issue.

   Examples of how ESELs can be used include: as the SPI in IPsec
   (principle use, even for IPv6), as the address in a FTP command, the
   index to address mapping in address realm gateways, and as the
   address in a socket call.  Thus ESELs act both as a bridge for Host
   Identity into old protocols and APIs and a packet compression
   mechanism for Host Identity in general.

   Since rekeying changes the ESEL, a HIP implementation needs to be
   able to handle the transition between the old and new ESEL.

6. Using the Host Identity

   There are a number of ways that Host Identity can be used in
   Internet Protocols.  The first is to use it in IKE [IKE].  HIGH can
   be used in Main Mode.  For this, the Host Identity MUST be a Public
   Key, and an appropriate Main Mode authentication (e.g. DSA
   signature) used.  The ESEL of the HIGH can replace the usage of IP
   addresses in IKE.  An appropriate ISAKMP [ISAKMP] payload will be
   needed to accommodate the Host Identity and HIGH.  These additions
   to IKE would produce a mode of operation for IKE that could traverse
   a NAT.  This, coupled with ESP transport mode, would produce a NAT
   friendly IPsec mode (note that the NATs can alter none of the data
   within the ESP).

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                  Host Identity Payload Architecture     February 2000

   Another, and perhaps more powerful mode is a new, lightweight,
   protocol that will allow for one host to convey its Host Identity to
   another host.  This Host Identity Protocol will enable two hosts to
   exchange Host Identity and related information and rapidly establish
   an ESP Security Association.  It will lack the fine-grain controls
   of IKE and some of IKE's security features (like identity

7. Mobility via HIP

   As HIP decouples the Transport from the Internetworking layer, and
   binds the Transport to the Host Identity (though actually either the
   HIGH or ESEL), HIP can provide for a high degree of Internetworking
   'mobility' at a very low infrastructure cost.  HIP Internetworking
   Mobility includes IP address changes (via any method) to either the
   initiator or responder.  Thus a system is considered mobile if its
   IP address can change dynamically for any reason like PPP, DHCP, or
   IPv6 TLA reassignments.

   Initiator address changes are rather straightforward.  A responder
   CAN just accept a HIP or an ESP (whose SPI is an ESEL) packet from
   any address and totally ignore the address for anything more than
   packet delivery.  An initiator MAY send a HIP readdress packet to
   inform the responder of the new location of the initiator.  This is
   especially helpful for those situations where the responder is
   sending data periodically to the initiator (that is starting a
   connection after the initial connection).

   Responder mobility is slightly more involved.  The initiator has to
   know where the responder is to start the HIP exchange.  HIP need not
   rely on Dynamic DNS for this function, but will use a rendezvous
   server.  The DNS address for the responder will be the address of
   the rendezvous server.  The responder will keep the rendezvous
   server continuously updated with its IP address.  The rendezvous
   server simply forwards the initial HIP packet from the initiator to
   the responder at its current location.  All further packets are
   between the initiator and responder, and responder mobility is
   handled just like initiator mobility.  There is very little activity
   on the rendezvous server, responder address updates and initial HIP
   packet forwarding, thus one server can support a large number of
   potential responders.  The responders MUST trust the rendezvous
   server to properly maintain its HIGH and IP address mapping.

   The responder keeps its address current on the rendezvous server by
   setting up a HIP based SA with the rendezvous server and sending it
   HIP Readdress packets.  The rendezvous server MUST have the
   responder's Host Identity from a trusted third party (manual,
   DNSSEC, etc.) to avoid attacks against its HIGH and IP address
   mapping on behalf of the responder.  Further, a rendezvous server
   will permit two mobile systems to use HIP without any extraneous
   infrastructure, including DNSSEC if they have a method other than a
   DNS query to get each other's HI and HIGH.

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                  Host Identity Payload Architecture     February 2000

8. HIP and NATs

   With HIP, the Transport is bound to the IP address, thus a
   connection between two hosts can traverse many addressing realm
   boundaries, typically implemented with Network Address Translation
   (NAT) technology.  For a HIP based flow, the NAT needs only track
   the mapping of the HIGH or ESEL to an IP address.  Many HIGHs can
   map to a single IP address on a NAT, simplifying connections on
   address poor NAT interfaces.  The NAT can gain much of its knowledge
   from the HIP packets themselves, however some NAT configuration MAY
   be necessary.

   The NAT systems CANNOT touch the datagrams within the ESP envelope,
   thus application specific address translation MUST be done in the
   end systems.  HIP provides for 'Distributed NAT', and uses the ESEL
   as a place holder for embedded IP addresses.  See the HIP
   Implementation document [HIPIMPL] for details.

8.1. HIP and TCP Checksum

   A HIP implementation CANNOT trust the TCP checksum.  There is no way
   for an host to know if any of the IP addresses in the IP header are
   the addresses used to calculate the TCP Checksum.  Thus ALL HIP
   implementations MUST recalculate the TCP Checksum after removing the
   ESP envelope.

9. HIP Policies

   There are a number of variables that will influence the HIP
   exchanges that each host must support.  All HIP implementations MUST
   support at least 2 HIs, one to publish in DNS and one for anonymous
   usage.  Although anonymous HIs will be rarely used as responder HIs,
   they will be common for initiators.  Support for multiple HIs is

   Many initiators would want to use different a HI for different
   responders.  The implementations SHOULD provide for an ACL of
   initiator HIGH to responder HIGH.  This ACL SHOULD also include
   preferred transform and local lifetimes.  For HIGHs with HAAs,
   wildcarding SHOULD be supported.  Thus if a Community of Interest,
   like Banking gets an RAA, a single ACL could be used. A global
   wildcard would represent the general policy to be used.  Policy
   selection would be from most specific to most general.

   Responders would need a similar ACL, representing which hosts they
   accept HIP exchanges, and the preferred transform and local
   lifetimes.  Wildcarding SHOULD be support supported for this ACL

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                  Host Identity Payload Architecture     February 2000

10. Security Considerations

   HIP takes advantage of the new Host Identity paradigm to provide
   secure authentication of hosts and provide a fast key exchange for
   IPsec ESP.  HIP also attempts to limit the exposure of the host to
   various denial-of-service (DOS) and man-in-the-middle (MITH)
   attacks.  In so doing, HIP itself is subject to its own DOS and MITM
   attacks that potentially could be more damaging to a host's ability
   to conduct business as usual.

   The Security Association for ESP is indexed by the ESEL-SPI, not the
   SPI and IP address.  HIP enabled ESP is IP address independent.
   This might seem to make it easier for an attacker, but ESP with
   replay protection is already as well protected as possible, and the
   removal of the IP address as a check should not increase the
   exposure of ESP to DOS attacks.

   Denial-of-service attacks take advantage of the cost of start of
   state for a protocol on the responder compared to the 'cheapness' on
   the initiator.  HIP makes no attempt to increase the cost of the
   start of state on the initiator, but makes an effort to reduce the
   cost to the responder.  This is done by having the responder start
   the 3-way cookie exchange instead of the initiator, making the HIP
   protocol 4 packets long.  There are more details on this process in
   the HIP protocol document [HIP].

   HIP optionally supports opportunistic negotiation.  That is, if a
   host receives a start of transport without a HIP negotiation, it can
   attempt to force a HIP exchange before accepting the connection.
   This has the potential for DOS attacks against both hosts.  If the
   method to force the start of HIP is expensive on either host, the
   attacker need only spoof a TCP SYN.  This would put both systems
   into the expensive operations.  HIP avoids this attack by having the
   responder send a simple HIP packet that it can build at HI selection
   time.  Since this packet is fixed and easily spoofed the initiator
   only reacts to it if it has just started a connection to the

   Man-in-the-middle attacks are difficult to defend against, without
   third-party authentication.  A skillful MITM could easily handle all
   parts of HIP; but HIP indirectly provides the following protection
   from a MITM attack.  If the responder's HI is retrieved from a
   signed DNS zone by the initiator, the initiator can use this to
   validate the signed HIP packets.

   Likewise, if the initiator's HI is in a secure DNS zone, the
   responder can retrieve it and validate the signed HIP packets.
   However, since an initiator may choose to use an anonymous HI, it
   knowingly risks a MITM attack.  The responder may choose not to
   accept a HIP exchange with an anonymous initiator.

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                  Host Identity Payload Architecture     February 2000

   Since not all hosts will ever support HIP, ICMP 'Destination
   Protocol Unreachable' are to be expected and present a DOS attack.
   Against an initiator, the attack would look like the responder does
   not support HIP, but shortly after receiving the ICMP message, the
   initiator would receive a valid HIP packet.  Thus to protect against
   this attack, an initiator should not react to an ICMP message until
   a reasonable delta time to get the real responder's HIP packet.  A
   similar attack against the responder is more involved.

   Another MITM attack is simulating a responder's rejection of a HIP
   initiation.  This is a simple ICMP Host Unreachable,
   Administratively Prohibited message.  A HIP packet was not used
   because it would either have to have unique content, and thus
   difficult to generate, resulting in yet another DOS attack, or just
   as spoofable as the ICMP message.  The defense against this MITM
   attack is for the responder to wait a reasonable time period to get
   a valid HIP packet.  If one does not come, then the Initiator has to
   assume that the ICMP message is valid.  Since this is the only point
   in the HIP exchange where this ICMP message is appropriate, it can
   be ignored at any other point in the exchange.

10.1. HIGHs used in ACLs

   It is expected that HIGHs will be used in ACLs.  NATs will use HIGHs
   to control egress and ingress to networks, with an assurance
   difficult to achieve today.

   There has been considerable bad experience with distributed ACLs
   that contain public key related material, for example with SSH.  If
   the owner of the key needs to revoke it for any reason, the task of
   finding all locations where the key is held in an ACL may be
   impossible.  If the reason for the revocation is due to private key
   theft, this could be a serious issue.

   A host can keep track of all of its partners that might use its HIGH
   in an ACL by logging all remote HIGHs.  It should only be necessary
   to log responder hosts.  With this information, the host can notify
   the various hosts about the change to the HIGH.  There has been no
   attempt here to develop a secure method (like in CMP and CMC) to
   issue the HIGH revocation notice.

   NATs, however, are transparent to the HIP aware systems by design.
   Thus the host many find it difficult to notify any NAT that is using
   a HIGH in an ACL.  Since most systems will know of the NATs for
   their network, there should be a process by which they can notify
   these NATs of the change of the HIGH.  This is MANDITORY for systems
   that function as responders behind a NAT.  In a similar vein, if a
   host is notified of a change in a HIGH of an initiator, it should
   notify its NAT of the change.  In this manner, NATs will get updated
   with the HIGH change.

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                  Host Identity Payload Architecture     February 2000

10.2. Non-security Considerations

   The definition of the Host Identity states that the HI need not be a
   public key.  That the HI could be any value; for example an FQDN.
   This document does not describe how to support a non-cryptographic
   HI.  Such a HI would still offer the services of the ESEL for NAT
   traversal.  It would carry the ESELs in an ESP that had neither
   privacy nor authentication (ESP EMPTY).  Since this mode of HIP
   would offer so little additional functionality for so much addition
   to the IP kernel, it has not been defined in this document.  Given
   how little public key cryptography HIP requires, HIP SHOULD only be
   implemented using public key Host Identities.

11. IANA Considerations

   The IANA considerations for HIP are covered in the Host Identity
   payload document [HIP].

12. ICANN Considerations

   ICANN will need to set up the high.int zone and accredit the
   registered assigning authorities (RAA) for HAA field.  With 21 bits,
   ICANN can allocate just over 2M registries.

13. References

   [RFC-2119], Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
   Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [HIP], Moskowitz, R., "Host Identity Payload", draft-ietf-moskowitz-
   hip-01.txt, February 2000.

   [ESP], Kent, S., and Atkinson, R.,  "IP Encapsulating Security
   Payload", RFC 2406, November 1998.

   [FIPS-180-1], NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1: Secure Hash Standard, April
   1995.           http://csrc.nist.gov/fips/fip180-1.txt (ascii)
                   http://csrc.nist.gov/fips/fip180-1.ps  (postscript)

   [DNSBIN], Crawford, M., "Binary Labels in the Domain Name System",
   RFC 2673, August 1999.

   [IKE], Harkins, D., and Carrel, D., "The Internet Key Exchange", RFC
   2409, November 1998.

   [ISAKMP], Maughan, D., Schertler, M., Schneider, M., and Turner, J.,
   "Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol", RFC
   2408, November 1998.

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                  Host Identity Payload Architecture     February 2000

   [HIPIMPL], Moskowitz, R., "Host Identity Payload Implementation",
   draft-ietf-moskowitz-hip-impl-00.txt, February 2000.

14. Acknowledgments

   The drive to create HIP came to being after attending the MALLOC
   meeting at IETF 43.  It has matured considerably since the early
   drafts thanks to extensive input from IETFers.  Most importantly,
   its design goals are articulated and are different from other
   efforts in this direction.  Particular mention goes to the members
   of the NameSpace Research Group of the IRTF.  Noel Chiappa provided
   the framework for ESELs and Kieth Moore the impetuous to provide
   resolvability.  Steve Deering provided encouragement to keep
   working, as a solid proposal can act as a proof of ideas for a
   research group.  Many others contributed; extensive security tips
   were provided by Steve Bellovin.  Rob Austein kept the DNS parts on
   track.  Rodney Thayer and Hugh Daniels provide extensive feedback.
   John Gilmore kept me challenged to provide something of value.  I
   hope I have.

15. Author's Address

   Robert Moskowitz
   1200 Walnut Bottom Rd.
   Carlisle, PA  17013
   Email: rgm@icsa.net

16. Copyright Statement

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   This document and the information contained herein is provided on an

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