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Versions: 00 01                                                         
Network Working Group                                          H. Naderi
Internet-Draft                                         B. Carpenter, Ed.
Intended status: Informational                         Univ. of Auckland
Expires: April 24, 2015                                 October 21, 2014


                   Experience with IPv6 path probing
                      draft-naderi-ipv6-probing-00

Abstract

   This document reports on experience and simulations of dynamic
   probing of alternate paths between two IPv6 hosts when network
   failures occur.  Two models for such probing were investigated: the
   Shim6 REAchability Protocol (REAP) and the Multipath Transmission
   Control Protocol (MPTCP).  The motivation for this document is to
   identify some aspects of path probing at large or very large scale
   that may be broadly relevant to future protocol design.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 24, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of



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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Results for Shim6 and REAP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Experiments over the Internet . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Lab Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Large scale simulation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Results for MPTCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Operational issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Implications for future designs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   9.  Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove]  . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   10. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

   A common situation in the Internet today is that a host trying to
   contact another host has a choice of IP addresses for one or both
   ends of the communication.  Multiple addresses are expected to be
   quite common for IPv6 hosts [RFC2460].  Some approaches to this
   situation envisage either switching paths during the course of the
   communication or using multiple paths in parallel.  Examples include
   "Happy Eyeballs" [RFC6555] which tries alternative paths at the
   start, Shim6 [RFC5533] and Stream Control Transmission Protocol
   (SCTP) [RFC4960] which change paths when there is a failure, and
   Multipath TCP (MPTCP) [RFC6824] which shares the paths dynamically.

   Some of these methods involve active path probing to choose the best
   one.  Shim6 probes all available paths using the REAchability
   Protocol (REAP) [RFC5534] when the current path fails, and MPTCP
   effectively probes all paths continuously, and shifts load according
   to the results.  In this document we summarise results and
   observations from Shim6 and MPTCP operated or simulated at large
   scale.  These observations may be of help in designing future path
   probing mechanisms.  In particular, we are interested in minimising
   both the time taken to recover to the maximum possible throughput
   after a path failure, and the amount of overhead traffic caused by
   the probing process.

   In summary, we ran a series of Shim6 experiments, each including 250
   path failures, between Auckland and Dublin, measuring the time and
   overhead traffic for each instance of path probing and recovery.



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   Then we repeated essentially the same experiment in the laboratory in
   Auckland (i.e. with negligible RTT instead of round-the-world RTT).
   Then we built a Stochastic Activity Network (SAN) simulation model of
   the same scenarios, and validated it by comparison with the
   experimental results.  Then we used this model to simulate path
   failure and recovery using REAP at very large scale (10,000
   simultaneous sessions on a single site experiencing path failure).
   Both TCP and DCCP were used for the transport layer, with a simple
   application sending meaningless data in one direction only.

   This was followed by roughly equivalent simulations of recovery from
   path failure for MPTCP sessions.  In this case we validated the SAN
   model by comparison with a completely different MPTCP simulator
   developed elsewhere.

   One advantage of the SAN model is that there are SAN analysis
   software tools which allow very large scale simulations.  Another is
   that it makes it relatively easy to experiment with variations of the
   protocol itself, so we did test the impact of certain protocol
   changes.  However, unlike conventional network simulation tools, the
   user has to program a complete protocol behaviour model.  We used the
   Moebius tool [Moebius].

   Details of the experiments and results have been described in two
   papers [Naderi10] [Naderi14b] and in H.  Naderi's thesis [Naderi14a].
   This document limits itself to describing the results and their
   implications for the design of path probing mechanisms in the
   Internet.

2.  Results for Shim6 and REAP

2.1.  Experiments over the Internet

   We set up a test environment which enabled us to run a set of
   experiments with LinShim6 [Barre08] over the Internet.  We have used
   two SHIM6-enabled multi- addressed hosts, located in the University
   of Auckland (New Zealand) and Waterford Institute of Technology
   (Dublin, Ireland).  Each host was equipped with two network interface
   cards and configured with two prefixes from two different providers.
   The SHIM6 host in Auckland was connected to a router which was a
   Linux machine and was configured as an IPv6 router.  This router
   simulated link failures for the experiments.

   Source Address Dependent Routing (SADR) is necessary for effective
   use of SHIM6.  Hosts decide what source and destination address to
   use when host-centric solutions, like SHIM6, are used.  Without SADR,
   or similar mechanism for routing, packets might be forwarded to the
   wrong address providers and dropped because of ingress filtering



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   according to BCP 38 [RFC2827] [RFC3704].  Unfortunately, we could not
   convince the university network administrators to enable SADR on the
   Auckland University edge router.  To run the experiments, they agreed
   to add static routes to the edge router's routing table, to forward
   packets destined to the host in Dublin through different providers
   according to their destination addresses.  Therefore, only two
   address pairs out of four possible address pairs could work.  To
   resolve this issue, we have changed LinShim6 to shuffle the list of
   address pairs before starting the exploration process in order to put
   the working address pair in a random location in the list.  As a
   result, the working address pair could appear in any location in the
   list and create different recovery cases.

   This configuration enabled us to run experiments with four address
   pairs over the Internet.  For each experiment, we artificially
   created 250 failures and for each case measured the REAP exploration
   time (EP), number of sent (SP) and received probes (RP) and
   application recovery time (ART).

   Comparing results from experiments with TCP and DCCP shows that when
   DCCP is employed, EP, SP and RP are bigger than when TCP is used.
   The main reason for this is that DCCP employs delayed
   acknowledgement.  It sends ACKs every RTT (300 ms) while in case of
   TCP, they are sent faster (less than 100 ms).  Since RTT is long, the
   communications look different from REAP's view point although the
   behaviour of the application is the same in both experiments.  Since
   TCP sends ACKs faster, REAP treats it more like a bi-directional
   communication while DCCP communication is treated more like uni-
   directional.  As a result, in the DCCP experiment, the sender always
   detects the failure first and then reports it to the receiver, while
   in the TCP experiment both sides detect failure and start exploration
   with a small time difference.  In other words, in case of TCP,
   exploration is performed in parallel on both sides and takes less
   time and generates less traffic.  This result also shows that the
   efficiency of the solutions, like SHIM6, which are implemented inside
   the protocol stack may be affected by the behaviour of the other
   layers of the protocol stack as well.

   We also observed some signs of probe loss in the results.  Probe
   losses can affect EP, SP, RP and ART.  When a probe is lost, it might
   cause the exploration process to go to the second run and employing
   exponential backoff algorithm causes the exploration process to take
   longer and generate more traffic.








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2.2.  Lab Experiments

   We repeated similar experiments in the lab.  The main difference was
   RTT which was much smaller (0.3 ms) than in the Internet experiments.
   We setup two SHIM6 hosts in the lab, each equipped with four network
   interfaces.  Thus, in addition to experiments with four address pairs
   (similar to the Internet experiments), we could run experiments with
   9 and 16 address pairs as well.

   In the lab, we got similar results from the TCP and DCCP experiments.
   Since RTT is small, DCCP sends ACKs faster, therefore there is no
   difference from REAP's view point.

   Probe losses are observable in the lab experiments too.  Probe loss
   causes REAP to go to the second round for scanning the list of
   address pairs, which leads to sending more probes and also longer
   exploration time.

   Experiments with 16 address pairs fail when the working address pair
   is located at or close to the end of the list of address pairs.  REAP
   employs exponential backoff after sending initial probes to avoid
   generating large bursts of traffic during exploration.  For 16
   address pairs, this delay causes the connection to time out and stop
   the experiment.  In some cases, SHIM6 removes the context without
   finding the new address pair.  We believe that packet losses cause
   the exploration process to go to the second round of exploration
   which causes much longer delays and makes SHIM6 actually stop
   exploration and remove the context.

2.3.  Large scale simulation

   To study the behaviour of REAP in a very large scale network (e.g. an
   enterprise network), we built a simulation model of REAP and
   conducted some experiments which simulated a link failure event in a
   network with 10,000 simultaneously active SHIM6 monitored
   communications.  The aim of the experiments was to see how REAP
   reacts to path failures in a large SHIM6-enabled multihomed network.
   In our practical tests, nine address pairs seems to be the limit but
   we have included larger numbers in our simulations to obtain a
   clearer view of REAP's behaviour.

   We focused on REAP recovery time and probe traffic as two important
   performance parameters.  REAP recovery time is the time that REAP
   takes to detect the failure and find a new working address pair.
   REAP traffic is the traffic which is generated by REAP itself during
   its exploration process.





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   We measured average and total REAP recovery time for different
   numbers of address pairs for 10,000 instances of REAP.  We define
   total REAP recovery time as the recovery time for the whole site,
   i.e., the time between failure occurrence and recovering the last
   context.  In other words, it shows the recovery time for the last
   context that is recovered.  The average recovery time is calculated
   by dividing the sum of recovery times for REAP instances by the
   number of REAP instances.  It should be noted that recovery time
   includes failure detection and address exploration times.

   A typical average recovery time for 4 address pairs is 10 to 12
   seconds.  The results show that the average and maximum recovery time
   increase when the number of address pairs is increased.  The
   correlation is not linear because REAP uses an exponential backoff
   algorithm for increasing the time interval between probes.  As a
   result, REAP shows poor performance when the number of address pairs
   exceeds 9, for example exceeding 100 seconds to recover with 16
   address pairs.

   We also measured the average and total number of probes sent during
   the address exploration process in the experiments.  The results show
   that there is a linear correlation between number of address pairs
   and number of sent probes.  They also show that a large amount of
   probes are sent at the start of exploration.  For example, in the
   case of four address pairs, 93% of the probes, and in the case of 25
   address pairs 34% of probes, are sent during the first 10 seconds.
   The reason is that all contexts detect failure within 10 seconds and
   start exploration by sending initial probes (first four probes which
   are sent in two seconds).  After that, there are some intervals when
   very few probes were sent.  This can be seen more clearly in the
   experiments with more address pairs, e.g.  16 or 25 address pairs.
   It means that for some SHIM6 contexts the time interval between
   probes is large because of the exponential backoff, so REAP instances
   have to wait for a long time before probing the next address pair.
   Some connections might be dropped by the transport or application
   layer before REAP can recover them.  For example, in case of 25
   address pairs, 50% of contexts need more than five minutes to
   recover.

   Although the peak of the REAP traffic is generated in the first 10
   seconds (before employing the exponential backoff algorithm), our
   results show that this traffic is small compared to normal traffic
   for a large network, and cannot cause a major problem.  For example,
   in the case of 25 address pairs, about 4800 probes per second are
   sent during the first 10 seconds of the exploration process, which is
   the peak of the traffic.  Every probe in the first 10 seconds carries
   at most seven address pairs; four initial address pairs and three
   more after employing exponential backoff.  Thus, the average probe



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   size in the first 10 seconds is 232 bytes; each probe needs 72 bytes
   for the fixed part and 40 bytes for each address pair.  As a result,
   a load of 4800 probes per second does not occupy more than one MB/s
   of the site's available link capacity.  Large sites usually have high
   bandwidth links to the Internet and this amount of traffic does not
   cause a significant problem for them.  In any case this traffic will
   occur at a time when normal traffic from the same sessions has been
   interrupted.

   We also tried two changes to REAP to improve recovery time:
   Increasing the number of initial probes, and sending initial probes
   in parallel.  In both cases, we also measured the probe traffic.  The
   results showed that those modifications improved recovery time while
   their effect on the traffic were not big.  For example, in case of
   nine address pairs, increasing the number of initial probes from four
   to five caused about 6.5% increase in traffic in the first 10 seconds
   of the recovery process, 22% decrease in average recovery time and
   34% decrease in maximum recovery time.  Sending initial probes in
   parallel, in the case of nine address pairs, caused an 11% decrease
   in average recovery time, 4.5% decrease in maximum recovery time, and
   8.2% increase in traffic.  In both cases, these modifications
   increased traffic but not to the level that could not be handled in a
   large network.

3.  Results for MPTCP

   MPTCP does not use any specific mechanism for probing paths.  In
   fact, every subflow runs as a TCP flow and it is the TCP congestion
   control mechanism which monitors the used path.  When congestion is
   detected, the load from the congested path is transferred to other
   available paths, if they present less congestion.  The MPCTP
   congestion control algorithm, known as SEMICOUPLED, reacts to
   congestion reports from subflows and adjust the load on the used
   paths to achieve performance and fairness.  TCP never sets the
   congestion window for a subflow to less than 1.  Therefore, even on a
   highly congested path or a broken path, it performs the equivalent of
   probing by setting the congestion window size to 1, so that any
   improvements in the path can be detected.  Expiration of the TCP
   retransmission timer for the subflow on a broken path triggers
   sending a segment once in a while, acting as a probe, to ensure a
   recovery in the path can be detected.  How fast this mechanism can
   detect an improvement in a broken path depends on the value of the
   time-out for this timer (RTO).  The minimum value is usually set to 1
   second and consequent expirations, the case for a broken path, back
   off the timer value and multiplies RTO by 2.  The traffic generated
   by this mechanism in this case is low and may be handled easily, even
   in a large network.




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   We simulated MPTCP with up to 8 paths and with RTTs between 80 and
   150 ms, observing the expected behaviour with the load in the steady
   state spread across the paths.  When the loss rate of a path is
   higher, the throughput of that path is lower.  For a given loss rate,
   a smaller RTT increases throughput on that path.  However, total
   throughput increases sublinearly with more paths, due to the way
   SEMICOUPLED links the congestion windows of the various subflows.
   For example, we simulated a scenario in which the steady state
   throughput for 8 paths was only about 25% greater than for a single
   path (Figure 5.10 in [Naderi14a]).  This suggests that a scenario
   with as many as 8 paths is of limited value in a reasonably reliable
   network.

   We simulated a permanent failure of a single path in a scenario with
   four paths in operation.  As may be deduced from the previous point,
   the throughput recovered in the steady state to within a small
   percentage of its previous value.  This recovery took about 6 seconds
   (Figure 5.15 in [Naderi14a]), which is significantly faster than
   observed with SHIM6 due to MPTCP's effectively continuous probing.
   Simulations of temporary path failures showed that returning to the
   original steady state using all paths took a similar time.

   Finally we simulated the effect of variable loss rates on MPTCP
   performance with two paths operating.  We observed that for loss
   rates varying randomly in the range up to 1%, MPTCP effectively
   maintains its steady state throughput.

4.  Operational issues

   Many if not most site border firewalls today drop packets containing
   the Shim6 extension header.  In our Internet experiments we had to
   bypass the site firewall at both ends.  This issue is discussed in
   [RFC7045].

   Source Address Dependent Routing (SADR) is necessary for effective
   use of multiple paths.  Without it, packets may be sent to the wrong
   exit router, or to an ISP that will immediately discard them due to
   ingress filtering.  With ingress filtering in place, packets with a
   given source address may only be sent via an ISP that accepts packets
   from that source address.  If this is not taken correctly into
   account by the source host and by the local routing configuration,
   the host will waste resources trying to explore paths that are
   certain to fail.








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5.  Implications for future designs

   We suggest several conclusions from the above results that should be
   relevant to the design of any probing mechanism for exploiting
   alternative paths between two hosts:

   o  The interaction between round-trip time, the transport layer
      acknowledgement mechanism, and the failure detection mechanism
      significantly affects the time taken to start recovery after a
      failure.

   o  When probing is linked to congestion control, packet loss rates
      may also affect recovery times.

   o  Probe traffic is unlikely to cause overload, especially since
      normal traffic stops during recovery from failure.

   o  Exponential backoff leads to significantly slower recovery time,
      and (due to the previous point) is probably unnecessary.

   o  Probing all alternative paths in parallel leads to significantly
      faster recovery times with only a minor increase in the intensity
      of probe traffic, although this does occur on the paths that are
      still carrying normal traffic.  However, full sized probe packets
      (as used by MPTCP, because they are normal data packets) have more
      impact than short probe packets (as used by SHIM6).

   o  The probe packets should resemble normal data packets as much as
      possible, in order to avoid being treated specially or dropped by
      middleboxes such as firewalls or load balancers.

   o  If Source Address Dependent Routing (SADR) is unavailable, it is
      better to avoid probing address pairs that will fail as a result.
      (Probing all paths in parallel would in fact mask this problem.)

   o  There is little to be gained by having more than two or three
      alternative paths.

6.  Security Considerations

   Apart from the need for Shim6 to bypass firewalls, no security issues
   are raised by this work.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document requests no action by IANA.





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8.  Acknowledgements

   This document was produced using the xml2rfc tool [RFC2629].

   Some text was adapted from [Naderi14a].

   John Ronan from the Telecommunications Software and Systems Group,
   Waterford Institute of Technology, and the University of Auckland
   Information Technology Services (ITS) helped to run the SHIM6
   experiments over the Internet between Auckland and Dublin.

9.  Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove]

   draft-naderi-ipv6-probing-00: original version, 2014-10-21.

10.  Informative References

   [Barre08]  Barre, S., "LinShim6 - implementation of the Shim6
              protocol", Technical Report, Universite catholique de
              Louvain , February 2008.

   [Moebius]  Deavours, D., Clark, G., Courtney, T., Daly, D., Derisavi,
              S., Doyle, J., Sanders, W., and P. Webster, "The Moebius
              framework and its implementation", IEEE Transactions on
              Software Engineering 28(10):956-969, October 2002.

   [Naderi10]
              Naderi, H. and B. Carpenter, "A Performance Study on
              REAchability Protocol in Large Scale IPv6 Networks",
              Second International Conference on Computer and Network
              Technology (ICCNT 2010), Bangkok 28-32, April 2010.

   [Naderi14a]
              Naderi, H., "Evaluating and Improving SHIM6 and MPTCP: Two
              Solutions for IPv6 Multihoming", Ph.D. Thesis, The
              University of Auckland , July 2014.

   [Naderi14b]
              Naderi, H. and B. Carpenter, "Putting SHIM6 into
              Practice", Australasian Telecommunication Networks and
              Applications Conference (ATNAC 2014), Melbourne , November
              2014.

   [RFC2460]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
              (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.

   [RFC2629]  Rose, M., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629,
              June 1999.



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   [RFC2827]  Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
              Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
              Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000.

   [RFC3704]  Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed
              Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, March 2004.

   [RFC4960]  Stewart, R., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol", RFC
              4960, September 2007.

   [RFC5533]  Nordmark, E. and M. Bagnulo, "Shim6: Level 3 Multihoming
              Shim Protocol for IPv6", RFC 5533, June 2009.

   [RFC5534]  Arkko, J. and I. van Beijnum, "Failure Detection and
              Locator Pair Exploration Protocol for IPv6 Multihoming",
              RFC 5534, June 2009.

   [RFC6555]  Wing, D. and A. Yourtchenko, "Happy Eyeballs: Success with
              Dual-Stack Hosts", RFC 6555, April 2012.

   [RFC6824]  Ford, A., Raiciu, C., Handley, M., and O. Bonaventure,
              "TCP Extensions for Multipath Operation with Multiple
              Addresses", RFC 6824, January 2013.

   [RFC7045]  Carpenter, B. and S. Jiang, "Transmission and Processing
              of IPv6 Extension Headers", RFC 7045, December 2013.

Authors' Addresses

   Habib Naderi
   Department of Computer Science
   University of Auckland
   PB 92019
   Auckland  1142
   New Zealand

   Email: habib@cs.auckland.ac.nz


   Brian Carpenter (editor)
   Department of Computer Science
   University of Auckland
   PB 92019
   Auckland  1142
   New Zealand

   Email: brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com




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