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Versions: 00                                                            
          Network Working Group                       J. O'Hara
          Expires May 20th, 1997                      New Oak Communications
          Internet Draft                              November 20, 1997
          
                 Configuration of Tunnel Mode Ipsec Endpoint Parameters
                          <draft-ohara-ipsecparam-00.txt>
          
          
          Status of this Memo
          
          This document is an Internet-Draft.  Internet-Drafts are working
          documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its
          areas, and its working groups.  Note that other groups may also
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          Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
          months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
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          To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check
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          Abstract
          
          This document describes the assignment of configuration
          parameters to IPsec tunnel mode client endpoints. Single user
          computers that are connecting into corporations via Internet
          Service Providers, ISP's, using Tunnel mode IPsec may need to
          have configuration information supplied to them, such as inner
          ip address, DNS server addresses, WINS server addresses, etc.
          
          This document describes a method utilized by New Oak
          Communications to pass these parameters between it's Extranet
          Access Switch and it's IPsec client software.
          
          
          TABLE OF CONTENTS
          
          STATUS OF THIS MEMO...........................................1
          
          
          ABSTRACT......................................................1
          
          
          1. INTRODUCTION...............................................2
          
          
          2. IP ADDRESS ASSIGNMENT METHOD...............................2
          
          
          3. DNS AND WINS ADDRESS ASSIGNMENT............................3
          
          O'Hara                                                 [Page 1]


          Internet Draft - Tunneled Ipsec Endpoint Parameters     Page 2
          
          
          4. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS....................................4
          
          
          5. REFERENCES.................................................4
          
          
          6. AUTHOR'S ADDRESS...........................................5
          
          
          1. Introduction
          
          Traditional use of Tunnel Mode IPsec has been focused at
          firewall to firewall connections with state configured at
          each end. This is well suited for branch office routing, but
          is less appropriate for internet remote access, where a
          single user system, such as a home computer or laptop is
          connected to an Internet Service Provider's Point of Presence,
          POP. In this model the end system will have it's IP configuration
          initially configured through IPCP in the dial up case or via
          DHCP in the case of a cable modem or ADSL. It is desirable
          for the IPsec tunnel parameters and policy to be downloaded to
          the end user's system in similar, but secure manner.
          
          Tunnel mode IPsec is well suited to allow traveling or home users
          the opportunity to tunnel directly from their systems into
          corporate sites. In doing so the user would first connect to a
          ISP's POP. Then the user would initiate a connection with a
          access server on the edge of their network that would serve
          as the other end of the IPsec tunnel.
          
          Establishment of a secure tunnel hides the corporation's network
          topology and allows the end users system to operate just as if it
          were an internal system. The end users system will need to
          be assigned a new end node address for use inside the IPsec tunnel
          and other addresses such as those of DNS and WINS servers. In this
          draft the terms "end node" read as a home or traveling user's PC,
          and "access server" as the device that exists between the corporate
          Intranet and the Internet terminates IPsec tunnel connections.
          
          
          This document assumes that the reader is familiar with the related
          documents "The resolution of ISAKMP with Oakley" [Hark97], and
          "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol, RFC 2131" [Drom97], that
          provide important background for this specification.
          
          In this document, the key words "MAY", "MUST", "recommended",
          "required", and "SHOULD", are to be interpreted as described in
          [RFC-2119].
          
          
          
          
          
          
          O'Hara                                              [Page 2]


          Internet Draft - Tunneled IPsec Endpoint Parameters  Page 3
          
          
          
          2. IP ADDRESS ASSIGNMENT
          
          Assignment of a Inner IP address is accomplished by using the access
          server supplied Proxy ID responder, IDur, supplied by the initiator
          (server) as part of the Quick Mode exchange undertaken in
          ISAKMP phase 2. To utilize the proxy ID's in this way requires that
          the phase 2 initiator is the server and that the responder (the end
          node) accepts that address as it's inner, or tunneled address.
          
          ISAKMP usage [Hark97] and [Pip97] describe the 2 stage process
          for establishment of a Security Association, SA. Phase 1 establishes
          a secure connection for SA negotiation. During Phase 2 this
          negotiation is accomplished within the authenticated and protected
          channel constructed in phase 1. Phase 2 is characterized by 1 or more
          Quick mode exchanges.
          
          When the end node initiates the IPsec tunnel it will be the Phase 1
          initiator. During Phase 2 the access server MUST be the initiator, as
          shown below.
          
          Quick Mode is defined as follows from [Hark97]:
          
           Initiator (server)                Responder (end node)
          --------------------              ----------------------
          HDR*, HASH(1), SA, Ni
            [, KE ] [, IDui, IDur ] -->
                                   <--    HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr
                                               [, KE ] [, IDui, IDur ]
          HDR*, HASH(3)             -->
          
          
          Where the contents of IDui are specified as follows:
          
          Identification Type for IDui and IDur will be: ID_IPV4_ADDR    1
          
          The ID_IPV4_ADDR type specifies a single four (4) octet IPv4 address.
          
          Summary:
          
          By reversing the Phase 1 and Phase 2 initiator roles and using the
          supplied IDur as the tunneled source address the problem of how to
          supply a remote user a tunneled, inner address can be resolved. This
          reversal of roles is within the scope of the draft [Hark97] and
          provides secure assigment method protected by the ISAKMP SA.
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          O'Hara                                             [Page 3]


          Internet Draft - Tunneled IPsec Endpoint Parameters Page 4
          
          
          3. DNS and WINS ADDRESS ASSIGNMENT
          
          When the end node has received its tunnelled address and the IPsec
          tunnel has been established, the end node may require the addresses
          for DNS and WINS servers inside the corporate network.  To obtain
          these addresses, the end node uses the Dynamic Host Configuration
          Protocol (DHCP) [Drom97] as follows:
          
          The end node sends a tunnelled unicast DHCPINFORM message under the
          protection of the just-established IPsec SA.  The source address
          inside the tunnel is the IPv4 address received from the server
          in IDur (as described in section 2), while the destination address
          is the server's IPv4 address on the corporate network, as provided
          in IDui.  The "ciaddr" field in the DHCPINFORM message MUST be the
          same as the end node's source address inside the tunnel.  If the
          end node requires DNS server configuration, the end node SHOULD
          provide DHCP option 55 (Parameter Request List) as specified in
          RFC 2132, and include DHCP option 6 (Domain Name Server option)
          in the list.  If the end node requires WINS server configuration,
          it SHOULD provide a parameter request list that includes DHCP option
          44 (NetBIOS over TCP/IP Server option).
          
          The server responds by sending a tunnelled unicast DHCPACK message
          to the end node's tunnelled address.  The DHCPACK MAY include one
          or more DNS servers, provided by DHCP option 6, and MAY include one
          or more WINS servers, provided by DHCP option 44.
          
          
          
          4. Security Considerations
          
          Protection of corporate network topology is of concern and it
          should be observed that tunnel addresses assigned with this
          method are transmitted under the protection of the ISAKMP SA,
          while the DNS and WINS server addresses are protected by the IPsec
          SAs.  Thus, the information is no more (and no less) secure than
          the SAs themselves.
          
          
          5. References
          
          [Alex97] Alexander, S., Droms, R., "DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor
          Extensions", RFC 2132,  March 1997
          
          [Bra97] Bradner, S., "Key Words for use in RFCs to indicate
          Requirement Levels", RFC2119, March 1997.
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          O'Hara                                             [Page 4]


          Internet Draft - Tunneled IPsec Endpoint Parameters Page 5
          Expires May 20th, 1997
          
          
          [Drom97] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC 2131,
          Bucknell University, March 1997.
          
          [Hark97]  Harkins, D., Carrel, D., "The resolution of ISAKMP with
          Oakley", draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-oakley-04.txt.
          
          [MSST96] Maughhan, D., Schertler, M., Schneider, M., and Turner, J.,
          "Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)",
          version 8, draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-08.{ps,txt}.
          
          [Orm96] Orman, H., "The Oakley Key Determination Protocol", version
          1, TR97-92, Department of Computer Science Technical Report,
          University of Arizona.
          
          [Pip97] Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain Of Interpretation
          for ISAKMP", version 5, draft-ietf-ipsec-ipsec-doi-05.txt.
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          6. Author's Address
          
          John O'Hara
          New Oak Communications, Inc.
          125 Nagog Park
          Acton, Massachusetts, 01720
          
          johara@newoak.com
          
          (978) 266 1011 voice
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          O'Hara                                              [Page 5]