Internet Engineering Task Force Y. Oiwa
Internet-Draft H. Watanabe
Intended status: Standards Track H. Takagi
Expires: April 27, 2012 RCIS, AIST
B. Kihara
T. Hayashi
Lepidum
Y. Ioku
Yahoo! Japan
October 25, 2011
HTTP Authentication Extensions for Interactive Clients
draft-oiwa-http-auth-extension-00
Abstract
This document specifies an extension of HTTP authentication framework
for use with interactive clients. Recently, the fundamental features
of HTTP-level authentication is not enough for complex requirements
of various Web-based applications. This makes these applications to
implement their own authentication frameworks using HTML Forms and
other means, which becomes one of the hurdles against introducing
secure authentication mechanisms handled jointly by servers and user-
agent clients. The extended framework fills gaps between Web
application requirements and HTTP authentication provisions to solve
the above problems, while maintaining some upper-compatibility
against existing Web and non-Web uses of HTTP authentications.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 27, 2012.
Copyright Notice
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Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Terms for describing authentication protocol flow . . . . 4
2.2. Syntax Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Optional Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Authentication-Control header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. Auth-style parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Location-when-unauthenticated parameter . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3. No-auth parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4. Location-when-logout parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.5. Logout-timeout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. Usage examples [TBD] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Methods to extend this protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. (Informative) Applicability of features for each
messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix B. (Informative) Draft Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix C. (Informative) Draft Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . 16
C.1. Changes in revision 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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1. Introduction
The document proposes several extensions to the current HTTP
authentication framework, to provide enough functionality comparable
with current widely-used form-based Web authentication. A majority
of the recent Web-sites on the Internet use custom application-layer
authentication implementations using Web forms. The reasons for
these may vary, but many people believe that the current HTTP Basic
(and Digest, too) authentication method does not have enough
functionality (including a good-feeling user interfaces) to support
most of realistic Web-based applications. However, the method is
very weak against phishing attacks, because the whole behavior of the
authentication is controlled from the server side. To overcome this
problem, we need to "modernize" the HTTP authentication framework so
that better client-controlled secure methods can be used with Web
applications. The extensions proposed in this document include:
o non-mandatory, optional authentication on HTTP (Section 3),
o log out from both server and client side (Section 4), and
o finer control for redirection depending on authentication status
(Section 4).
[I-D note: These extensions are initially proposed as a part of
[I-D.oiwa-http-mutualauth]. However, since these might possibly be
useful in combination with other authentication schemes, the
extensions were separated as an independent draft.]
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].
The terms "encouraged" and "advised" are used for suggestions that do
not constitute "SHOULD"-level requirements. People MAY freely choose
not to include the suggested items regarding [RFC2119], but complying
with those suggestions would be a best practice; it will improve the
security, interoperability, and/or operational performance.
This document distinguishes the terms "client" and "user" in the
following way: A "client" is an entity understanding and talking HTTP
and the specified authentication protocol, usually computer software;
a "user" is a (usually natural) person who wants to access data
resources using "a client".
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2. Definitions
2.1. Terms for describing authentication protocol flow
HTTP Authentication defined in [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p7-auth] may involve
with several pairs of HTTP requests/responses. Throughout this
document, the following terms are used to categorize those messages:
for requests,
o A non-authenticating request is a request not attempting any
authentication: a request without any Authorization header.
o An authenticating request is the opposite: a request with an
Authorization header.
For responses,
1) A non-authenticated response: is a response which does not
involve with any HTTP authentication. It may not contain any
WWW-Authenticate or Authentication-Info header.
Servers send this response when the requested resource is not
protected by HTTP authentication mechanisms. In context of this
specification, not-authentication-related negative responses (e.g.
403 and 404) are also considered as non-authenticated responses.
(See note on successfully-authenticated responses below for some
ambiguous cases.)
2) An authentication-initializing response: is a response which
requires or allows clients to start authentication attempts.
Servers send this response when the requested resource is
protected by HTTP authentication mechanism, and the request meets
one of the following cases:
* The request is non-authenticating request, or
* The request contained an authentication trial directed to the
protection space (realm) other than the server's expected one.
The server will specify the protection space for authentication in
this response.
Upon reception, the client's behavior is further divided to two
possible cases.
* If the client may have no prior knowledge on authentication
credentials (e.g. a user-name and a password) related to the
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requested protection space, the protocol flow terminates and
the client will ask the user to provide authentication
credentials,
* On the other hand, if client already have an enough credentials
for authentication to the requested protection space, the
client will automatically send an authenticating request. Such
cases often occur when the client did not know beforehand that
the current request-URL requires an authentication.
3) A successfully-authenticated response: is a response for an
authenticating request meaning that the authentication attempt was
granted. (Note: if the authentication scheme used does not use an
Authentication-Info header, it may be indistinguishable from a
non-authenticated response.)
4) An intermediate authenticating response: is a response for an
authenticating request which requires some more reaction by the
client software without involving users. Such a response is
required when an authentication scheme requires two or more round-
trip messages to perform authentication, or when an authentication
scheme uses some speculative short-cut method (such as uses of
cached shared secrets) and it failed.
5) A negatively-authenticated response: is a response for an
authenticating request which means that the authentication attempt
was declined and can not continue without another authentication
credential. Clients typically erase memory of the currently-using
credentials and ask the user for other ones.
Usually the format of these responses are as same as the one for
authentication-initializing responses. Client can distinguish it
by comparing the protection spaces contained in the request and in
the response.
Figure 1 shows a state diagram of generic HTTP authentication with
the above message categorization. Note that many authentication
schemes uses only a subset of the transitions described on the
diagram. Labels in the figure show the abbreviated names of response
types.
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=========== -----------------
NEW REQUEST ( UNAUTHENTICATED )
=========== -----------------
| ^ non-auth.
v | response
+----------------------+ NO +-------------+
| The requested URI |--------------------------->| send normal |
| known to be auth'ed? | ---------------->| request |
+----------------------+ / +-------------+
YES | / initializing|
v / |
+------------------+ NO / |
| Can auth-req (*1)|--------- |
| be constructed? | |
+------------------+ |
YES | initializing |
| ---------------------------------------. |
| / v v
| | ---------------- NO +-----------+
| | ( AUTH-REQUESTED )<------|credentials|
| | ---------------- | known? |
v | +-----------+
+-----------+ negative ------------- negative |YES
| send |---------->( AUTH-FAILED )<---------, |
/| auth-req | ------------- | |
/ +-----------+\ | v
| \ \ intermediate +-----------+
| \ -------------------------------->| send |
| \ | auth-req |
| non-auth. \successful successful +-----------+
| response (*2) \ / | ^
v \ / | |
----------------- \ -------------- / `----'
( UNAUTHENTICATED ) ----->( AUTH-SUCCEED )<---- intermediate
----------------- --------------
Figure 1: Generic state diagram for HTTP authentication
Note: (*1) For example, "Digest" scheme requires server-provided
nonces to construct client-side challenges.
(*2) In "Basic" and some others, this cannot be distinguished from a
successfully-authenticated response.
2.2. Syntax Notation
This specification uses an extended BNF syntax defined in
[I-D.ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging]. The following syntax definitions
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are quoted from [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging] and
[I-D.ietf-httpbis-p7-auth]: auth-scheme, quoted-string, auth-param,
SP, header-field, and challenge. It also uses the convention of
using header names for specifying syntax of header values.
Additionally, this specification uses the following syntax elements
following syntax definitions as a refinement for token and the
righthand-side of auth-param in [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p7-auth]. Note
that bare-token, extension-token and integer are subset of the
token's syntax, and the extension-param is a subset of auth-param.
(Note: these definitions are consistent with those in
[I-D.oiwa-http-mutualauth].)
bare-token = 1*(%x30-39 / %x41-5A / %x61-7A / "-" / "_")
extension-token = "-" bare-token 1*("." bare-token)
extension-param = (bare-token / extension-token) "=" value
value = bare-token / extension-token / quoted-string
integer = "0" / (%x31-39 *%x30-39) ; no leading zeros
Figure 2: the BNF syntax for common notations
Extensive-tokens are used in this protocol where the set of
acceptable tokens may include private extensions. Any private
extensions of this protocol MUST use the extension-tokens with format
"-<token>.<domain-name>", where <domain-name> is a validly registered
(sub-)domain name on the Internet owned by the party who defines the
extensions.
3. Optional Authentication
The Optional-WWW-Authenticate header enables a non-mandatory
authentication, which is not possible under the current HTTP
authentication mechanism. In several Web applications, users can
access the same contents as both a guest user and an authenticated
user. In most Web applications, it is implemented using HTTP cookies
[RFC6265] and custom form-based authentications. The new
authentication method using this message will provide a replacement
for these authentication systems.
Servers MAY send HTTP successful responses (response code 200, 206
and others) containing the Optional-WWW-Authenticate header as a
replacement of a 401 response when it is an authentication-
initializing response. The Optional-WWW-Authenticate header MUST NOT
be contained in 401 responses.
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Optional-WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="xxxx"
Optional-WWW-Authenticate = challenge
Figure 3: BNF syntax for Optional-WWW-Authenticate header
The challenge contained in the Optional-WWW-Authenticate header are
the same as those for a 401 responses corresponding for a same
request. For authentication-related matters, an optional
authentication request will have the same meaning as a 401 message
with a corresponding WWW-Authenticate header (as an authentication-
initializing response). (The behavior for other matters, such as
caching, MAY be different between the optional authentication and 401
messages.)
A response with an Optional-WWW-Authenticate header SHOULD be
returned from the server only when the request is either non-
authenticated or authenticating to a wrong (not the server's
expected) protection space. If a response is either an intermediate
or a negative response to a client's authentication attempt, the
server MUST respond with a 401 status response with a
WWW-Authenticate header instead. Failure to comply this rule will
make client not able to distinguish authentication successes and
failures.
The server is NOT RECOMMENDED to include an Optional-WWW-Authenticate
header in a positive response when a client's authentication attempt
succeeds.
Whenever an authentication scheme support for servers to send some
parameter which gives a hint of URL space for the corresponding
protection space for the same realm (e.g. "path" or "domain"),
servers requesting non-mandatory authentication SHOULD send such
parameter with the response. Clients supporting non-mandatory
authentication MUST recognize the parameter, and MUST send a request
with an appropriate authentication credential in an Authorization
header for any URI inside the specified paths.
Support of this header is OPTIONAL; Clients MAY also choose any set
of authentication schemes for which optional authentication is
supported (in other words, its support MAY be scheme-dependent).
However, some authentication schemes MAY require mandatory/
recommended support for this header, so that server-side applications
MAY assume that clients supporting such schemes are likely to support
the extension as well.
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4. Authentication-Control header
Authentication-Control = auth-scheme 1*SP 1#Auth-Ctrl-params
Auth-Ctrl-params = auth-style / no-auth / loc-when-unauthed
/ loc-when-logout / logout-timeout
/ extension-param
auth-style = "auth-style" "=" ( "modal" / "non-modal" )
no-auth = "no-auth" "=" "true"
loc-when-unauthed = "location-when-unauthenticated" "=" quoted-string
loc-when-logout = "location-when-logout" "=" quoted-string
logout-timeout = "logout-timeout" "=" integer
Figure 4: the BNF syntax for the Authentication-Control header
The Authentication-Control header provides a more precise control of
the client behavior for Web applications using an HTTP authentication
protocol. This header is supposed to be generated in the application
layer, as opposed to WWW-Authenticate headers which will be generated
by the Web servers.
Support of this header is OPTIONAL, and clients MAY choose any subset
of these parameters to be supported. The set of supported parameters
MAY also be authentication scheme-dependent. However, some
authentication schemes MAY require mandatory/recommended support for
some or all of the features provided in this header.
The "auth-scheme" specified in this header and other authentication-
related headers within the same message MUST be the same. Clients
MUST ignore any unknown parameters contained in this header.
Server-side application SHOULD always be reminded that any parameters
contained in this header MAY be ignored by clients. Also, even when
a client accepts this header, users may always be able to circumvent
semantics of this header. Therefore, if this header is used for
security purposes, its use MUST be limited for providing some non-
fundamental additional security measures valuable for end-users (such
as client-side log-out for protecting against console takeover).
Server-side application MUST NOT rely on the use of this header for
protecting server-side resources.
4.1. Auth-style parameter
Authentication-Control: Digest auth-style=modal
The parameter "auth-style" specifies the server's preferences over
user interface behavior for user authentication. This parameter can
be included in any kind of responses, however, it is only meaningful
for either authentication-initializing or negatively-authenticated
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responses. The value of this parameter MUST be one of the tokens
"modal" or "non-modal". When the Optional-WWW-Authenticate header is
used, the value of this parameter MUST be disregarded and the value
"non-modal" is implied.
The value of "modal" means that the server thinks the content of the
response (body and other content-related headers) is valuable only
for users refusing authentication request. The clients are expected
to ask the user a password before processing the content. This
behavior is common for most of the current implementations of Basic
and Digest authentication schemes.
The value of "non-modal" means that the server thinks the content of
the response (body and other content-related headers) is valuable for
users before processing an authentication request. The clients are
expected to first process the content and then provide users
opportunities to perform authentication.
The default behavior for the clients is implementation-dependent, and
clients MAY choose different defaults for different authentication
schemes. The proposed default behavior is "modal" for all
authentication schemes, but specifications for authentication schemes
MAY propose a different default.
The above two different methods of authentication may introduce a
observable difference of semantics when the response contains state-
changing side effects; for example, it may change whether Cookie
headers [RFC6265] in 401 responses are processed or not. However,
the server applications SHOULD NOT depend on both existence and non-
existence of such side effects.
4.2. Location-when-unauthenticated parameter
Authentication-Control: Mutual
location-when-unauthenticated="http://www.example.com/login.html"
The parameter "location-when-unauthenticated" specifies a location
where any unauthenticated clients should be redirected to. This
header may be used, for example, when there is a central login page
for the entire Web application. The value of this parameter MUST be
a string that contains an absolute URL location. If a given URL is
not absolute, the clients MAY consider it a relative URL from the
current location.
This parameter MAY be used with a 401 response for authentication-
initializing response. It can also be contained, although
NOT RECOMMENDED, in a positive response with an
Optional-WWW-Authenticate header. The clients MUST ignore this
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parameter, when a response is either successfully-authenticated or
intermediately-authenticated. The clients SHOULD ignore this
parameter when a response is a negatively-authenticated one (the case
is unlikely to happen, though).
When a client receives an authentication-initiating response with
this parameter, if the client has to ask users for authentication
credentials, the client will treat the entire response as if it were
a 303 "See Other" response with a Location header that contains the
value of this parameter (i.e., client will be redirected to the
specified location with a GET request). Unlike a normal 303
response, if the client can process authentication without the user's
interaction, this parameter MUST be ignored.
4.3. No-auth parameter
Authentication-Control: Basic no-auth=true
The parameter "no-auth" is a variant of the
location-when-unauthenticated parameter; it specifies that new
authentication attempt is not to be performed on this location for
better user experience, without specifying the redirection on the
HTTP level. This header may be used, for example, when there is a
central login page for the entire Web application, and when a (Web
content's level) explicit interaction of users is desired before
authentications. The value of this parameter MUST be a token "true".
If the value is incorrect, client MAY ignore this parameter.
This parameter MAY be used with authentication-initiating responses.
It can also be contained, although NOT RECOMMENDED, in a positive
response with an Optional-WWW-Authenticate header. The clients MUST
ignore this parameter, when a response is either successfully-
authenticated or intermediately-authenticated. The clients SHOULD
ignore this parameter when a response is a negatively-authenticated
one (the case is unlikely to happen, though).
When a client receives an authentication-initiating response with
this parameter, if the client has to ask users for authentication
credentials, the client will ignore the WWW-Authenticate header
contained in the response and treat the whole response as a normal
negative 4xx-class response instead of giving user an opportunity to
start authentication. If the client can process authentication
without the user's interaction, this parameter MUST ignored.
This parameter SHOULD NOT be used along with the
location-when-unauthenticated parameter. If both were supplied,
clients MAY choose which one is to be honored.
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This parameter SHOULD NOT be used as any security measures to prevent
authentication attempts, as it is easily circumvented by users. This
parameter SHOULD be used solely for improving user experience of web
applications.
4.4. Location-when-logout parameter
Authentication-Control: Digest
location-when-logout="http://www.example.com/byebye.html"
The parameter "location-when-logout" specifies a location where the
client is to be redirected when the user explicitly request a logout.
The value of this parameter MUST be a string that contains an
absolute URL location. If a given URL is not absolute, the clients
MAY consider it a relative URL from the current location.
This parameter MAY be used with successfully-authenticated responses.
If this parameter is contained in other kinds of responses, the
clients MUST ignore this parameter.
When the user requests to terminate an authentication period, and if
the client currently displays a page supplied by a response with this
parameter, the client will be redirected to the specified location by
a new GET request (as if it received a 303 response). The log-out
operation (e.g. erasing memories of user name, authentication
credential and all related one-time credentials such as nonce or
keys) SHOULD occur before processing a redirection.
When the user requests to terminate an authentication period, if the
client supports this parameter but the server response does not
contain this parameter, the client's RECOMMENDED behavior is as
follows: if the request corresponding to the current content was
idempotent (e.g. GET), reload the page without the authentication
credential. If the request was non-idempotent (e.g. POST), keep the
current content as-is and simply forget the authentication status.
The client SHOULD NOT replay a non-idempotent request without the
user's explicit approval.
Web applications are encouraged to send this parameter with an
appropriate value for any responses (except those with redirection
(3XX) statuses) for non-GET requests.
4.5. Logout-timeout
Authentication-Control: Basic logout-timeout=300
The parameter "logout-timeout", when contained in a successfully-
authenticated response, means that any authentication credentials and
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states related to the current protection space are to be discarded if
a time specified in this header (in seconds) has been passed from the
time received. As a special case, the value of logout-timeout=0
means that the client is requested to immediately log-out from the
current authentication space and revert to an unauthenticated status.
This does not, however, mean that the long-term memories for the
passwords (such as the password reminders and auto fill-ins) should
be removed. If a new timeout value is received for the same
authentication space, it cancels the previous timeout and sets a new
timeout.
5. Usage examples [TBD]
[TBD]
6. Methods to extend this protocol
If a non-standard extension to this protocol is implemented, it MUST
use the extension-param to avoid conflicts with this protocol and
other future official extensions.
Extension-tokens MAY be freely used for any non-standard, private,
and/or experimental uses. The extension-tokens MUST be with format
"-<bare-token>.<domain-name>", where <domain-name> is a validly
registered (sub-)domain name on the Internet owned by the party who
defines the extensions.
7. IANA Considerations
Tokens used for the authentication control parameters may be either
extension-tokens or bare-tokens as outlined in Section 2.2. When
bare-tokens are used in this protocol, these MUST be allocated by
IANA. Any tokens used for non-private, non-experimental parameters
are RECOMMENDED to be registered to IANA, regardless of the kind of
tokens used.
To acquire registered tokens, a specification for the use of such
tokens MUST be available as a publicly-accessible documents, as
outlined as "Specification Required" level in [RFC5226].
Note: More formal declarations will be added in the future drafts to
meet the RFC 5226 requirements.
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8. Security Considerations
The purpose of the log-out timeout feature in the Authentication-
control header is to protect users of clients from impersonation
caused by an attacker having access to the same console. Server
application implementors SHOULD be aware that the directive may
always be ignored by either malicious clients or clients not
supporting this extension. If the purpose of introducing a timeout
for an authentication period is to protect server-side resources,
such features MUST be implemented by other means such as HTTP Cookies
[RFC6265].
All parameters in Authentication-Control header SHOULD NOT be used
for any security-enforcement purposes. Server-side applications MUST
be implemented always considering that the header may be either
ignored by clients or even bypassed by users.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging]
Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Nielsen, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., Berners-Lee, T., Reschke, J., and
Y. Lafon, "HTTP/1.1, part 1: URIs, Connections, and
Message Parsing", draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-16 (work
in progress), August 2011.
[I-D.ietf-httpbis-p7-auth]
Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Nielsen, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., Berners-Lee, T., Reschke, J., and
Y. Lafon, "HTTP/1.1, part 7: Authentication",
draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth-16 (work in progress),
August 2011.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008.
9.2. Informative References
[I-D.oiwa-http-mutualauth]
Oiwa, Y., Watanabe, H., Ioku, Y., and T. Hayashi, "Mutual
Authentication Protocol for HTTP",
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draft-oiwa-http-mutualauth-09 (work in progress),
July 2011.
[RFC6265] Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
April 2011.
Appendix A. (Informative) Applicability of features for each messages
This section provides cross-reference table about applicability of
each features provided in this specification for each kinds of
responses described in Section 2.1. The table provided in this
section is for informative purposes only.
+-------------------+-------+----------+-----------+------+
| | init. | success. | intermed. | neg. |
+-------------------+-------+----------+-----------+------+
| Optional auth. | O | n | N | N |
| auth-style | O | - | - | O |
| loc.-when-unauth. | O | I | I | i |
| no-auth | O | I | I | i |
| loc.-when-logout | - | O | - | - |
| logout-timeout | - | O | - | - |
+-------------------+-------+----------+-----------+------+
Legends:
O = MAY contain; n = SHOULD NOT contain; N = MUST NOT contain
i = SHOULD be ignored; I = MUST be ignored;
- = meaningless (to be ignored)
Appendix B. (Informative) Draft Notes
Things which might be considered for future revisions:
o In [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p7-auth], meaning of WWW-Authenticate headers
in non-401 responses are defined as "supplying credentials (or
different credentials) might affect the response". This
clarification change leaves a way for using 200-status responses
along with a WWW-Authenticate header for providing optional
authentication.
Incorporating this possibility, however, needs more detailed
analysis on the behavior of existing clients and intermediate
proxies for such possibly-confusing responses. Optional-WWW-
Authenticate is safer, at least for minimum backward
compatibility, because clients not supporting this extension will
consider this header as an unrecognized entity-header, possibly
providing opportunity for silently falling-back to application-
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level authentications.
Appendix C. (Informative) Draft Change Log
C.1. Changes in revision 00
o Separated from HTTP Mutual authentication proposal (-09).
o Adopting httpbis works as a referencing point to HTTP.
o Generalized, now applicable for all HTTP authentication schemes.
o Added "no-auth" and "auth-style" parameters.
o Loosened standardization requirements for parameter-name tokens
registration.
Authors' Addresses
Yutaka Oiwa
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
Research Center for Information Security
Tsukuba Central 2
1-1-1 Umezono
Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki
JP
Email: mutual-auth-contact@m.aist.go.jp
Hajime Watanabe
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
Hiromitsu Takagi
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
Boku Kihara
Lepidum Co. Ltd.
#602, Village Sasazuka 3
1-30-3 Sasazuka
Shibuya-ku, Tokyo
JP
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Tatsuya Hayashi
Lepidum Co. Ltd.
Yuichi Ioku
Yahoo! Japan, Inc.
Midtown Tower
9-7-1 Akasaka
Minato-ku, Tokyo
JP
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