Internet Engineering Task Force                             J. Livingood
Internet-Draft                                                   N. Mody
Intended status: Informational                              M. O'Reirdan
Expires: December 8, 2010                                        Comcast
                                                            June 6, 2010

      Recommendations for the Remediation of Bots in ISP Networks


   This document contains recommendations on how Internet Service
   Providers can manage the effects of computers used by their
   subscribers, which have been infected with malicious bots, via
   various remediation techniques.  Internet users with infected
   computers are exposed to risks such as loss of personal data, as well
   as increased susceptibility to online fraud and/or phishing.  Such
   computers can also become an inadvertent participant in or component
   of an online crime network, spam network, and/or phishing network, as
   well as be used as a part of a distributed denial of service attack.
   Mitigating the effects of and remediating the installations of
   malicious bots will make it more difficult for botnets to operate and
   could reduce the level of online crime on the Internet in general
   and/or on a particular Internet Service Provider's network.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 8, 2010.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
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Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements Language  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Key Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Introduction and Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.  Important Notice of Limitations and Scope  . . . . . . . . . .  8
   5.  Detection of Bots  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.  Notification to Internet Users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   7.  Remediation of Hosts Infected with a Bot . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   8.  Guided Remediation Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   9.  Professionally-Assisted Remediation Process  . . . . . . . . . 21
   10. Sharing of Data from the User to the ISP . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   11. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   12. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   14. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   Appendix A.  Document Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   Appendix B.  Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

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1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Key Terminology

   This section defines the key terms used in this document.

2.1.  Malicious Bots, or Bots

   A malicious or potentially malicious "bot" (derived from the word
   "robot", hereafter simply referred to as a "bot") refers to a program
   that is installed on a system in order to enable that system to
   automatically (or semi-automatically) perform a task or set of tasks
   typically under the command and control of a remote administrator, or
   "bot master".  Bots are also known as "zombies".  Such bots may have
   been installed surreptitiously, without the user's full understanding
   of what the bot will do once installed, unknowingly as part of
   another software installation, under false pretenses, and/or in a
   variety of other possible ways.

   It is important to note that there are 'good', or benign bots.  Such
   benign bots are often found in such environments such as gaming and
   Internet Relay Chat (IRC) [RFC1459], where a continual, interactive
   presence can be a requirement for participating in the games,
   interacting with a computing resource.  Since such benign bots are
   performing useful, lawful, and non-disruptive functions, there is no
   reason for a provider to monitor for their presence and/or alert
   users to their presence.

   Thus, while there may be benign, or harmless bots, for the purposes
   of this document all mention of bots shall assume that the bots
   involved are malicious or potentially malicious in nature.  Such
   malicious bots shall generally be assumed to have been deployed
   without the permission or conscious understanding of a particular
   Internet user.  Thus, without a user's knowledge, bots may transform
   the user's computing device into a platform from which malicious
   activities can be conducted.  In addition, included explicitly in
   this category are potentially malicious bots, which may initially
   appear neutral but may simply be waiting for remote instructions to
   transform and/or otherwise begin engaging in malicious behavior.  In
   general, installation of a malicious bot without user knowledge and
   consent is considered in most regions to be unlawful, and the
   activities of malicious bots typically involve unlawful or other
   maliciously disruptive activities.

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2.2.  Bot Networks, or Botnets

   These are defined as concerted networks of bots capable of acting on
   instructions generated remotely.  The malicious activities are either
   focused on the information on the local machine or acting to provide
   services for remote machines.  Bots are highly customizable so they
   can be programmed to do many things.  The major malicious activities
   include but are not limited to: identity theft, spam, spim (spam over
   instant messaging), spit (spam over Internet telephony), email
   address harvesting, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks,
   key-logging, fraudulent DNS pharming (redirection), hosting proxy
   services, fast flux hosting, hosting of illegal content, use in man-
   in-the-middle attacks, and click fraud.

   Infection vectors include un-patched operating systems, software
   vulnerabilities (which include so-called zero-day vulnerabilities
   where no patch yet exists), weak/non-existent passwords, malicious
   websites, un-patched browsers, malware, vulnerable helper
   applications and social engineering techniques to gain access to the
   user's computer.  The detection and destruction of bots is an ongoing
   issue and also a constant battle between the internet security
   community, network security engineers and bot developers.

   Initially, some bots used IRC to communicate but were easy to
   shutdown if the command and control server was identified and
   deactivated.  Newer command and control methods have evolved, such
   that those currently employed by bot masters make them much more
   resistant to deactivation.  With the introduction of P2P, HTTP and
   other resilient communication protocols along with the widespread
   adoption of encryption, bots are considerably more difficult to
   identify and isolate from typical network usage.  As a result
   increased reliance is being placed on anomaly detection and
   behavioral analysis, both locally and remotely, to identify bots.

2.3.  Host

   An end user's host, or computer, as used in the context of this
   document, is intended to refer to a computing device that connects to
   the Internet.  This encompasses devices used by Internet users such
   as personal computers, including laptops, desktops, and netbooks, as
   well as mobile phones, smart phones, home gateway devices, and other
   end user computing devices which are connected or can connect to the
   public Internet and/or private IP networks.

   Increasingly, other household systems and devices contain embedded
   hosts which are connected to or can connect to the public Internet
   and/or private IP networks.  However, these devices may not be under
   interactive control of the Internet user, such as may be the case

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   with various smart home and smart grid devices.

2.4.  Malware

   This is short for malicious software.  In this case, malicious bots
   are considered a subset of malware.  Other forms of malware could
   include viruses and other similar types of software.  Internet users
   can sometimes cause their host to be infected with malware, which may
   include a bot or cause a bot to install itself, via inadvertently
   accessing a specific website, downloading a file, or other

   In other cases, Internet-connected hosts may become infected with
   malware through externally initiated malicious activities such as the
   exploitation of vulnerabilities or the brute force guessing of access

2.5.  Fast Flux

   DNS Fast Fluxing occurs when a domain is bound in DNS using A records
   to multiple IP addresses, each of which has a very short Time To Live
   (TTL) value associated with it.  This means that the domain resolves
   to varying IP addresses over a short period of time.

   DNS Fast Flux is typically used in conjunction with proxies which
   then route the web requests to the real host which serves the data
   being sought.  The proxies are normally run on compromised user
   hosts.  The effect of this is to make the detection of the real host
   much more difficult and to ensure that the backend or hidden site
   remains up for as long as possible.

3.  Introduction and Problem Statement

   Hosts used by Internet users, which in this case are customers of an
   Internet Service Provider (ISP), can be infected with malware which
   may contain and/or install one or more bots on a host.  They can
   present a major problem for an ISP for a number of reasons (not to
   mention of course the problems created for users).  First, these bots
   can be used to send spam, in some cases very large volumes of spam
   [Spamalytics: An Empirical Analysis of Spam Marketing Conversion].
   This spam can result in extra cost for the ISPs in terms of wasted
   network, server, and/or personnel resources, among many other
   potential costs and side effects.  Such spam can also negatively
   affect the reputation of the ISP, their customers, and the email
   reputation of the IP address space used by the ISP (often referred to
   simply as 'IP reputation').

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   In addition, these bots can act as platforms for directing,
   participating in, or otherwise conducting attacks on critical
   Internet infrastructure [Emerging Cyber Threats Report for 2009:
   Data, Mobility and Questions of Responsibility will Drive Cyber
   Threats in 2009 and Beyond].  Bots are frequently used as part of
   coordinated Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks for
   criminal, political or other motivations [The Gh0st in the Shell:
   Network Security in the Himalayas] [The snooping dragon:
   social-malware surveillance of the Tibetan movement].  For example,
   bots have been used to attack Internet resources and infrastructure
   ranging from web sites, to email servers and DNS servers, as well as
   the critical Internet infrastructure of entire countries [Battling
   Botnets and Online Mobs: Estonia's Defense Efforts during the
   Internet War] [Cyberspace as a Combat Zone: The Phenomenon of
   Electronic Jihad].  Motivations for such coordinated DDoS attacks can
   range from criminal extortion attempts through to online protesting
   and nationalistic fervor [Case Study: How a Bookmaker and a Whiz Kid
   Took On a DDOS-based Online Extortion Attack].

   While any computing device can be infected with bots, the majority of
   bot infections affect the personal computers used by Internet end
   users.  As a result of the role of ISPs in providing IP connectivity,
   among many other services, to Internet users, these ISPs are in a
   unique position to be able to attempt to detect and observe bot nets
   operating in their networks.  Furthermore, ISPs may also be in a
   unique position to be able to notify their customers of actual,
   potential, or likely infection by bots or other infection.

   From end users perspective, being notified that they may have an
   infected computer on their network is important information.  Once
   they know this, they can take steps to remove the bots, resolve any
   problems which may stem from the bot infection, and protect
   themselves againts future threats.  Given that bots can consume vast
   amounts of local computing and network resources, enable theft of
   personal information (including personal financial information),
   enable the host to be used for criminal activities (that may result
   in the Internet user being legally culpable), destroy or leave the
   host in an unrecoverable state via 'kill switch' bot technologies, it
   is important to notify the user that they may be infected with a bot.

   As a result, the intent of this document is to provide guidance to
   ISPs and other organizations for the remediation of hosts infected
   with bots, so as to reduce the size of bot nets and minimize the
   potential harm that bots can inflict upon Internet infrastructure
   generally, as well as on individual Internet users.  Efforts by ISPs
   and other organizations can, over time, reduce the pool of hosts
   infected with bots on the Internet, which in turn could result in
   smaller bot nets with less capability for disruption.

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   The potential mitigation of bots is accomplished through a process of
   detection, notification to Internet users, and remediation of bot
   infections with a variety of tools, as described later in this

4.  Important Notice of Limitations and Scope

   The techniques described in this document in no way guarantee the
   remediation of all bots.  Bot removal is potentially a task requiring
   specialized knowledge, skills and tools, and may be beyond the
   ability of average users.  Attempts at bot removal may frequently be
   unsuccessful, or only partially successful, leaving the user's system
   in an unstable and unsatisfactory state or even in a state where it
   is still infected.  Attempts at bot removal can result in side
   effects ranging from a loss of data to partial or complete loss of
   system usability.

   In general, the only way a user can be sure they have removed some of
   today's increasingly sophisticated malware is by 'nuking-and-paving'
   the system: reformatting the drive, reinstalling the operating system
   and applications (including all patches) from scratch, and then
   restoring user files from a known clean backup.  However the
   introduction of persistent memory based malware may mean that, in
   some cases, this may not be enough and may prove to be more than any
   end user can be reasonably expected to resolve [Persistent Memory
   Infection].  Experienced users would have to re-flash or re-image
   persistent memory sections or components of their hosts in order to
   remove persistent memory based malware.  However, in some cases, not
   even 'nuking-and-paving' the system will solve the problem, which
   calls for hard drive replacement and/or complete replacement of the

   Devices with embedded operating systems, such as video gaming
   consoles and smart home appliances, will most likely be beyond a
   user's capability to remediate by themselves, and could therefore
   require the aid of vendor-specific advice, updates and tools.
   However, in some cases, such devices will have a function or switch
   to enable the user to reset that device to a factory default
   configuration, which may in some cases enable the user to remediate
   the infection.  Care must be taken when imparting remediation advice
   to Internet users given the increasingly wide array of computing
   devices that can be, or could be, infected by bots in the future.

5.  Detection of Bots

   An ISP must first identify that an Internet user, in this case a user

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   that is assumed to be their customer or otherwise connected to the
   ISP's network, is determined to be infected, or likely to have been
   infected with a bot.  The ISP must attempt to detect the presence of
   bots using methods, processes, and tools which maintain the privacy
   of the personally identifiable information (PII) of their customers.
   The ISP must not block legitimate traffic in the course of bot
   detection, and must instead employ detection methods, tools, and
   processes which seek to be non-disruptive, and transparent to
   Internet users and end-user applications.

   Detection methods, tools, and processes may include analysis of
   specific network and/or application traffic flows (such as traffic to
   an email server), analysis of aggregate network and/or application
   traffic data, data feeds received from other ISPs and organizations
   (such as lists of the ISP's IP addresses which have been reported to
   have sent spam), feedback from the ISP's customers or other Internet
   users, as well as a wide variety of other possibilities.  In
   practice, it has proven effective to validate a bot infect through
   the use of a combination of multiple bot detection data points.  This
   can help to corroborate information of varying dependability or
   consistency, as well as to avoid or minimize the possibility of false
   positive identification of hosts.  Detection should also, where
   possible and feasible, attempt to classify the specific bot infection
   type in order to confirm that it is malicious in nature, estimate the
   variety and severity of threats it may pose (such as spam bot, key-
   logging bot, file distribution bot, etc.), and to determine potential
   methods for eventual remediation.  However, given the dynamic nature
   of botnet management and the criminal incentives to seek quick
   financial rewards, botnets frequently update or change their core
   capabilities.  As a consequence, botnets that are initially detected
   and classified by the ISP as one particular type of bot need to be
   continuously monitored and tracked in order to correctly identify the
   threat the botnet poses at any particular point in time.

   Detection is also time-sensitive.  If complex analysis is required
   and multiple confirmations are needed to verify a bot is indeed
   present, then it is possible that the bot may cause some damage (to
   either the infected host or a remotely targeted system) before it can
   be stopped.  This means that an ISP needs to balance the desire or
   need to definitively classify and/or confirm the presence of a bot,
   which may take an extended period of time, with the ability to
   predict the likelihood of a bot in a very short period of time.  Such
   determinations have a relatively low false positive rate in order to
   maintain the trust of users.  This 'definitive-vs-likely' challenge
   is difficult and, when in doubt, ISPs should err on the side of
   caution by communicating that a bot infection has taken place.  This
   also means that Internet users may benefit from the installation of
   client-based software on their host.  This can enable rapid

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   performance of heuristically-based detection of bot activity, such as
   the detection of a bot as it starts to communicate with other botnets
   and execute commands.  Any bot detection system should also be
   capable of adapting, either via manual intervention or automatically,
   in order to cope with a rapidly evolving threat.

   As noted above, detection methods, tools, and processes should ensure
   that privacy of customers' PII is maintained.  While bot detection
   methods, tools, and processes are similar to spam and virus defenses
   deployed by the ISP for the benefit of their customers (and may be
   directly related to those defenses), attempts to detect bots should
   take into account the need of an ISP to take care to ensure any PII
   collected or incidentally detected is properly protected.  This is
   important, as just as spam defenses may involve scanning the content
   of email messages, which may contain PII, then so to may bot defenses
   similarly come into incidental contact with PII.  The definition of
   PII varies from one jurisdiction to the next so proper care must be
   taken to ensure that any actions taken comply with legislation and
   good practice in the jurisdiction in which the PII is gathered.
   Finally, depending upon the geographic region within which an ISP
   operates, certain methods relating to bot detection may need to be
   included in relevant terms of service documents or other documents
   which are available to the customers of a particular ISP.

   There are several bot detection methods, tools, and processes that an
   ISP may choose to utilize, as noted in the list below.  It is
   important to note that the technical solutions available are
   relatively immature, and are likely to change over time, evolving
   rapidly in the coming years.  While these items are described in
   relation to ISPs, they may also be applicable to organizations
   operating other networks, such as campus networks and enterprise

   a.  Where legally permissible or otherwise an industry accepted
       practice in a particular market region, an ISP may in some manner
       "scan" their IP space in order to detect un-patched or otherwise
       vulnerable hosts, or to detect the signs of infection.  This may
       provide the ISP with the opportunity to easily identify Internet
       users who appear to already be infected or are at great risk of
       being infected with a bot.  ISPs should note that some types of
       port scanning may leave network services in a hung state or
       render them unusable due to common frailties, and that many
       modern firewall and host-based intrusion detection
       implementations may alert the Internet user to the scan.  As a
       result the scan may be interpreted as a malicious attack against
       the host.  Vulnerability scanning has a higher probability of
       leaving accessible network services and applications in a damaged
       state and will often result in a higher probability of detection

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       by the Internet user and subsequent interpretation as a targeted
       attack.  Depending upon the vulnerability for which an ISP may be
       scanning, some automated methods of vulnerability checking may
       result in data being altered or created afresh on the Internet
       user's host which can be a problem in many legal environments.
       It should also be noted that due to the prevalence of Network
       Address Translation devices, Port Address Translation devices,
       and/or firewall devices in user networks, network-based
       vulnerability scanning may be of limited value.  Thus, while we
       note that this is one technique which may be utilized, it is
       unlikely to be particularly effective and it has problematic side
       effects, which leads the authors to recommend against the use of
       this particular method.

   b.  An ISP may also communicate and share selected data, via feedback
       loops or other mechanisms, with various third parties.  Feedback
       loops are consistently formatted feeds of real-time (or nearly
       real-time) abuse reports offered by threat data clearinghouses,
       security alert organizations, other ISPs, and other
       organizations.  The data may include, but is not limited to, IP
       addresses of hosts which have or are likely infected, IP
       addresses, domain names or fully qualified domain names (FQDNs)
       known to host malware and/or be involved in the command and
       control of botnets, recently tested or discovered techniques for
       detecting or remediating bot infections, new threat vectors, and
       other relevant information.  A few good examples of data sharing
       include SNDS from Microsoft, XBL and PBL from Spamhaus, the
       DSHIELD AS tool from the SANS Institute.

   c.  An ISP may use Netflow [RFC3954] or other similar passive network
       monitoring to identify network anomalies that may be indicative
       of botnet attacks or bot communications.  For example, an ISP may
       be able to identify compromised hosts by identifying traffic
       destined to IP addresses associated with the command and control
       of botnets, or destined to the combination of an IP address and
       control port associated with a command and control network
       (sometimes command and control traffic comes from a host which
       has legitimate traffic).  In addition, bots may be identified
       when a remote host is under a DDoS attack, because hosts
       participating in the attack will likely be infected by a bot,
       frequently as observed at network borders (though ISPs should
       beware of source IP address spoofing techniques to avoid or
       confuse detection).

   d.  An ISP may use DNS-based techniques to perform detection.  For
       example, a given classified bot may be known to query a specific
       list of domain names at specific times or on specific dates (in
       the example of the so-called "Conficker" bot), often by matching

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       DNS queries to a well known list of domains associated with
       malware.  In many cases such lists are distributed by or shared
       using third parties, such as threat data clearinghouses.

   e.  User complaints: Because hosts infected by bots are frequently
       used to send spam or participate in DDoS attacks, the ISP
       servicing those hosts will normally receive complaints about the
       malicious network traffic.  Those complaints may be sent to
       RFC2142-specified [RFC2142] role accounts, such as abuse@, or to
       other relevant addresses such as to abuse or security addresses
       specified by the site as part of its WHOIS (or other) contact

   f.  ISPs may also discover likely bot infected hosts located on other
       networks.  Thus, when legally permissible in a particular market
       region, it may be worthwhile for ISPs to share information
       relating to those compromised hosts with the relevant remote
       network operator, with security researchers, and with blocklist

   g.  ISPs may operate or subscribe to services that provide
       'sinkholing' or 'honeynet' capabilities.  This may enable the ISP
       to obtain near-real-time lists of bot infected hosts as they
       attempt to join a larger botnet or propagate to other hosts on a

   h.  ISP industry associations should examine the possibility of
       collating statistics from ISP members in order to provide good
       statistics about bot infections based on real ISP data.

   i.  An Intrusion Detection System(IDS) can be a useful tool to
       actually help identify the malware.  An IDS tool such as SNORT
       (open source IDS platform) can be placed in a Walled Garden and
       used to analyze end user traffic to confirm malware type.  This
       will help with remediation of the infected device.

6.  Notification to Internet Users

   Once an ISP has detected a bot, or the strong likelihood of a bot,
   steps should be undertaken to inform the Internet user that they may
   have a bot-related problem.  Depending upon a range of factors, from
   the technical capabilities of the ISP, to the technical attributes of
   their network, financial considerations, available server resources,
   available organizational resources, the number of likely infected
   hosts detected at any given time, and the severity of any possible
   threats, among other things, an ISP should decide the most
   appropriate method or methods for providing notification to one or

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   more of their customers or Internet users.  Such notification methods
   may include one or more of the following, as well as other possible
   methods not described below.

   It is important to note that none of these methods are guaranteed to
   be one-hundred percent successful, and that each has its own set of
   limitations.  In addition, in some cases, an ISP may determine that a
   combination of two or more methods is most appropriate and effective,
   and reduces the chance that malware may block a notification.  As
   such, the authors recommend the use of multiple notification methods.
   Finally, notification is also considered time sensitive; if the user
   does not receive or view the notification or a timely basis, then a
   particular bot could launch an attack, exploit the user, or cause
   other harm.  If possible, an ISP should establish a preferred means
   of communication when the subscriber first signs up for service.  As
   a part of the notification process, ISPs should maintain a record of
   the allocation of IP addresses to subscribers for such a period as
   allows any commonly used bot detection technology to be able to
   accurately link an infected IP address to a subscriber.  This record
   should only be maintained for a period of time which is necessary, in
   order to maintain the protection of the privacy of an individual

   One important factor to bear in mind is that notification to end
   users needs to be resistant to potential spoofing.  This must be done
   to protect, as reasonably as possible, against the potential of
   legitimate notifications being spoofed and/or used by parties with
   intent to perform additional malicious attacks against victims of
   malware, or even to deliver additional malware.

6.1.  Email Notification

   This is a common form of notification used by ISPs.  One drawback of
   using email is that it is not guaranteed to be viewed within a
   reasonable time frame, if at all.  The user may be using a different
   primary email address than that which they have provided to the ISP.
   In addition, some ISPs do not provide an email account at all, as
   part of a bundle of Internet services, and/or do not have a need for
   or method in which to request or retain the primary email addresses
   of Internet users of their networks.  Another possibility is that the
   user, their email client, and/or their email servers could determine
   or classify such a notification as spam, which could delete the
   message or otherwise file it in an email folder that the user may not
   check on a regular and/or timely basis.  Bot masters have also been
   known to impersonate the ISP or trusted sender and send fraudulent
   emails to the users.  This technique of social engineering often
   leads to new bot infestations.  Finally if the user's email
   credentials are compromised, then a hacker and/or a bot could simply

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   access the user's email account and delete the email before it is
   read by the user.

6.2.  Telephone Call Notification

   A telephone call may be an effective means of communication in
   particularly high-risk situations.  However, telephone calls may not
   be feasible due to the cost of making a large number of calls, as
   measured in either time, money, organizational resources, server
   resources, or some other means.  In addition, there is no guarantee
   that the user will answer their phone.  To the extent that the
   telephone number called by the ISP can be answered by the infected
   computing device, the bot on that host may be able to disconnect,
   divert, or otherwise interfere with an incoming call.  Users may also
   interpret such a telephone notification as a telemarketing call and
   as such not welcome it, or not accept the call at all.  Finally, even
   if a representative of the ISP is able to connect with and speak to a
   user, that user is very likely to lack the necessary technical
   expertise to understand or be able to effectively deal with the

6.3.  Postal Mail Notification

   This form of notification is probably the least popular and effective
   means of communication, due to both preparation time, delivery time,
   the cost of printing and paper, and the cost of postage.

6.4.  Walled Garden Notification

   Placing a user in a walled garden is another approach that ISPs may
   take to notify users.  A walled garden refers to an environment that
   controls the information and services that a subscriber is allowed to
   utilize and what network access permissions are granted.  A walled
   garden implementation can range from strict to leaky.  In a strict
   walled garden environment access to most Internet resources are
   typically limited by the ISP.  In contrast a leaky walled garden
   environment permits access to all Internet resources except those
   deemed malicious or service and resources that can be used to notify
   the users.

   Walled gardens are effective because it is possible to notify the
   user and simultaneously block all communication between the bot and
   the command and control channel.  While in many cases the user is
   almost guaranteed to view the notification message and take any
   appropriate remediation actions, this approach can pose other
   challenges.  For example, it is not always the case that a user is
   actively using a host that uses a web browser or which has a web
   browser actively running on it, or that uses another application

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   which uses ports which are redirected to the walled garden.  In one
   example, a user could be playing a game online, via the use of a
   dedicated, Internet-connected game console.  In another example, the
   user may not be using a host with a web browser when they are placed
   in the walled garden and may instead be in the course of a telephone
   conversation, or may be expecting to receive a call, using a Voice
   Over IP (VoIP) device of some type.  As a result, the ISP may feel
   the need to maintain a potentially lengthy white list of domains
   which are not subject to the typical restrictions of a walled garden,
   which could well prove to be an onerous task, from an operational

   For these reasons the implementation of a leaky walled garden makes
   more sense but a leaky walled garden has different set of drawbacks.
   The ISP has to assume that the user will eventually use a web browser
   to acknowledge the notification other wise the user will remain in
   the walled garden and not know it.  If the intent of the leaky walled
   garden is to solely notify the user about the bot infection then the
   leaky walled garden is not ideal because notification is time
   sensitive and the user may not receive the notification until the
   user invokes a request for the targeted service and/or resource.
   This means the bot can potentially do more damage.  Additionally, the
   ISP has to identify which services and/or resources to restrict for
   the purposes of notification.  This does not have to be resource
   specific and can be time based and or policy based.  For example show
   notification for all HTTP requests every 10 minutes or show the
   notification for one in five HTTP requests.

   The ISP has several options to determine when to let the user out of
   the walled garden.  One approach may be to let the user determine
   when to exit.  This option is suggested when the primary purpose of
   the walled garden is to notify users and provide information on
   remediation only, particularly since notification is not a guarantee
   of successful remediation.  It could also be the case that, for
   whatever reason, the user makes the judgment that they cannot then
   take the time to remediate their host and that other online
   activities which they would like to resume are more important.  Exit
   from the walled garden may also involve a process to verify that it
   is indeed the user who is requesting exit from the walled garden and
   not the bot.

   Once the user acknowledges the notification, they may decide to
   either remediate and exit the walled garden or to exit the walled
   garden without remediating the issue.  Another approach may be to
   enforce a stricter policy and require the user to clean the host
   prior to permitting the user to exit the walled garden, though this
   may not be technically feasible depending upon the type of bot,
   obfuscation techniques employed by a bot, and/or a range of other

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   factors.  Thus, the ISP may also need to support tools to scan the
   infected host (in the style of a virus scan, rather than a port scan)
   and determine whether it is still infected or rely on user judgment
   that the bot has been disabled or removed.  One challenge with this
   approach is that if the user has multiple hosts sharing a single IP
   address, such as via a common home gateway device which performs
   Network Address Translation (NAT).  In such a case, the ISP may need
   to determine from user feedback, or other means, that all affected
   hosts have been remediated, which may or may not be technically

   Finally, when a walled garden is used, a list of well-known addresses
   for both operating system vendors and security vendors should be
   created and maintained in a white list which permits access to these
   sites.  This can be important for allowing access from the walled
   garden by end users in search of operating system and application

6.5.  Instant Message Notification

   Instant messaging provides the ISP with a simple means to communicate
   with the user.  There are several advantages to using Instant
   Messaging (IM) which makes it an attractive option.  If the ISP
   provides IM service and the user subscribes to it, then the user can
   be notified easily.  IM-based notification can be a cost effective
   means to communicate with users automatically from an IM alert system
   or via a manual process, by the ISP's support staff.  Ideally, the
   ISP should allow the user to register their IM identity in an ISP
   account management system and grant permission to be contacted via
   this means.  If the IM service provider supports off-line messaging,
   then the user can be notified regardless of whether they are
   currently logged into the IM system.

   There are several drawbacks with this communications method.  There
   is a high probability that subscriber may interpret the communication
   to be spim, and as such ignore it.  Also, not every user uses IM
   and/or the user may not provide their IM identity to the ISP so some
   alternative means have to be used.  Even in those cases where a user
   does have an IM address, they may not be signed onto that IM system
   when the notification is attempted.  There may be a privacy concern
   on the part of users, when such an IM notification must be
   transmitted over a third-party network and/or IM service.  As such,
   should this method be used, the notification should be discreet and
   not include any PII in the notification itself.

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6.6.  Short Message Service (SMS) Notification

   SMS allows the ISP send a brief description of the problem to notify
   the user of the issue, typically to a mobile device such as a mobile
   phone or smart phone.  Ideally, the ISP should allow the user to
   register their mobile number and/or SMS address in an ISP account
   management system and grant permission to be contacted via this
   means.  The primary advantage of SMS is that users are familiar with
   receiving text messages and are likely to read them.  However, users
   may not act on the notification immediately if they are not in front
   of their host at the time of the SMS notification.

   One disadvantage is that ISPs may have to follow up with an alternate
   means of notification if not all of the necessary information maybe
   conveyed in one message, given constraints on the number of
   characters in an individual message (typically 140 characters).
   Another disadvantage with SMS is the cost associated with it.  The
   ISP has to either build its own SMS gateway to interface with the
   various wireless network service providers or use a third-party SMS
   clearinghouse (relay) to notify users.  In both cases an ISP may
   incur fees related to SMS notifications, depending upon the method
   used to send the notifications.  An additional downside is that SMS
   messages sent to a user may result in a charge to the user by their
   wireless provider, depending upon the plan to which they subscribe.
   Another minor disadvantage is that it is possible to notify the wrong
   user if the intended user changes their mobile number but forgets to
   update it with the ISP.

   There are several other drawbacks with this communications method.
   There is a high probability that subscriber may interpret the
   communication to be spam, and as such ignore it.  Also, not every
   user uses SMS and/or the user may not provide their SMS address or
   mobile number to the ISP.  Even in those cases where a user does have
   an SMS address or mobile number, their device may not be powered on
   or otherwise available on a wireless network when the notification is
   attempted.  There maybe also be a privacy concern on the part of
   users, when such an SMS notification must be transmitted over a
   third-party network and/or SMS clearinghouse.  As such, should this
   method be used, the notification should be discreet and not include
   any PII in the notification itself.

6.7.  Web Browser Notification

   Near real-time notification to the user's web browser is another
   technique that may be utilized for notifying the user, though how
   such a system might operate is outside the scope of this document.
   Such a notification could have a comparative advantage over a walled
   garden notification, in that it does not restrict traffic to a

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   specified list of destinations in the same way that a walled garden
   by definition would.  However, as with a walled garden notification,
   there is no guarantee that a user is at any given time making use of
   a web browser, though such a system could certainly provide a
   notification when such a browser is eventually used.  Compared to a
   walled garden, a web browser notification is probably preferred from
   the perspective of Internet users, as it does not have the risk of
   disrupting non-web sessions, such as online games, VoIP calls, etc.
   (as noted in Section 6.4).

6.8.  Considerations for Notification to Public Network Locations

   Delivering a notification to a location that provides a shared public
   network, such as a train station, public square, coffee shop, or
   similar location may be of low value since the users connecting to
   such networks are typically highly transient and generally not know
   to site or network administrators.  For example, a system may detect
   that a host on such a network has a bot, but by the time a
   notification is generated that user has departed from the network and
   moved elsewhere.

6.9.  Considerations for Notification to Network Locations Using a
      Shared IP Address

   Delivering a notification to a location that Internet access routed
   through one or more shared public IP addresses may be of low value
   since it may be quite difficult to differentiate between users when
   providing a notification.  For example, on a business network of 500
   users, all sharing one public IP address, it may be sub-optimal to
   provide a notification to all 500 users if you only need one specific
   user to be notified and take action.  As a result, such networks may
   find value in establishing a localized bot detection and notification
   system, just as they are likely to also establish other localized
   systems for security, file sharing, email, and so on.

   However, should an ISP implement some form of notification to such
   networks, it may be better to simply send notifications to a
   designated network administrator at the site.  In such a case the
   local network administrator may like to receive additional
   information in such a notification, such as a date and timestamp, the
   source port of the infected system, and malicious sites and ports
   that may have been visited.

7.  Remediation of Hosts Infected with a Bot

   This section covers the different options available to remediate a
   host, which means to remove, disable, or otherwise render a bot

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   harmless.  Prior to this step, an ISP has detected the bot, notified
   the user that one of their hosts is infected with a bot, and now may
   provide some recommended means to clean the host.  The generally
   recommended approach is to provide the necessary tools and education
   to the user so that they may perform bot remediation themselves,
   particularly given the risks and difficulties inherent in attempting
   to remove a bot.

   For example, this may include the creation of a special web site with
   security-oriented content that is dedicated for this purpose.  This
   should be a well-publicized security web site to which a user with a
   bot infection can be directed to for remediation.  This security web
   site should clearly explain why the user was notified and may include
   an explanation of what bots are, and the threats that they pose.
   There should be a clear explanation of the steps that the user should
   take in order to attempt to clean their host and provide information
   on how users can keep the host free of future infections.  The
   security web site should also have a guided process that takes non-
   technical users through the remediation process, on an easily
   understood, step-by-step basis.

   In terms of the text used to explain what bots are and the threats
   that they pose, something simple such as this may suffice:

         "What is a bot?  A bot is a piece of software, generally
         installed on your machine without your knowledge, which either
         sends spam or tries to steal your personal information.  They
         can be very difficult to spot, though you may have noticed that
         your computer is running much more slowly than usual or you
         notice regular disk activity even when you are not doing
         anything.  Ignoring this problem is risky to you and your
         personal information.  Thus, bots need to be removed to protect
         your data and your personal information."

   It is also important to note that it may not be immediately apparent
   to the Internet user precisely which devices have been infected with
   a particular bot.  This may be due to the user's home network
   configuration, which may encompass several hosts, where a home
   gateway which performs Network Address Translation (NAT) to share a
   single public IP address has been used.  Therefore, any of these
   devices can be infected with a bot.  The consequence of this for an
   ISP is that remediation advice may not ultimately be immediately
   actionable by the Internet user, as that user may need to perform
   additional investigation within their own home network.

   An added complication is that the user may have a bot infection on a
   device such as a video console, multimedia system, appliance, or
   other end-user computing device which does not have a typical Windows

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   or Macintosh user interface.  As a result, diligence needs to be
   taken by the ISP where possible such that they can identify and
   communicate the specific nature of the device that has been infected
   with a bot, and further providing appropriate remediation advice.

   There are a number of forums that exist online to provide security
   related support to end users.  These forums are staffed by volunteers
   and often are focussed around the use of a common tool set to help
   end users to remediate hosts infected with malware.  It may be
   advantageous to ISPs to foster a relationship with one or more
   forums, perhaps by offering free hosting or other forms of

8.  Guided Remediation Process

   Minimally the Guided Remediation Process should include options
   and/or recommendations on how a user should:

   1.  Backup personal Documents, for example: "Before you start, make
       sure to back up all of your important data.  (You should do this
       on a regular basis anyway.)  You can back up your files manually
       or using a system back-up software utility, which may be part of
       your Operating System (OS).  You can back your files up to a USB
       Thumb Drive (aka USB Key), a writeable CD/DVD-ROM, an external
       hard drive, or a network file server."

   2.  Download OS patches and Anti-Virus (A/V) software updates.  For
       example, links could be provided to Microsoft Windows updates at
       default.aspx?ln=en-us as well as to Apple MacOS updates at

   3.  Explain how to configure the host to automatically install
       updates for the OS, A/V and other common Web Browsers such as
       Microsoft Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Apple Safari,
       Opera, and Google Chrome.

   4.  The flow should also have the option for users to get
       professional assistance if they are unable to remove the bots
       themselves.  If purchasing professional assistance, then the user
       should be encouraged to pre-determine how much they are willing
       to pay for that help.  If the host that is being remediated is
       old and can easily be replaced with a new, faster, larger and
       more reliable system for three or four hundred dollars, the it
       makes no sense to spend five or six hundred dollars to fix the
       old host, for example.  On the other hand, if the customer has a
       brand new host that cost several thousand dollars, it might make

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       perfect sense to spend the money in attempting to remediate it.

   5.  To continue, regardless of whether the user or a knowledgeable
       technical assistant is working on remediating the host, their
       first task should be to determine which of multiple potentially-
       infected machines may be the one that needs attention (in the
       common case of multiple hosts in a home network).  Sometimes, as
       in cases where there is only a single directly-attached host, or
       the user has been noticing problems with one of their hosts, this
       can be easy.  Other times, it may be more difficult especially if
       there are no clues as to which host is infected.  If the user is
       behind a home gateway/router, then the first task may be to
       ascertain which of the machines is infected.  In some cases the
       user may have to check all machines to identify the infected one.

   6.  User surveys to solicit feedback on whether the notification and
       remediation process is effective and what recommended changes
       could be made in order to improve the ease, understandability,
       and effectiveness the remediation process.

   7.  If the user is interested in reporting his or her host's bot
       infection to an applicable law enforcement authority, then the
       host effectively becomes a cyber "crime scene" and should not be
       mitigated unless or until law enforcement has collected the
       necessary evidence.  For individuals in this situation, the ISP
       should refer them to local, state, federal, or other relevant
       computer crime offices.  (Note: Some "minor" incidents, even if
       highly traumatic to the user, may not be sufficiently serious for
       law enforcement to commit some of their limited resources to an
       investigation.)  In addition, individual regions may have other,
       specialized computer crime organizations to which these incidents
       can be reported.  For example, in the United States, that
       organization is the Internet Crime Complaint Center, at

   8.  Users may also be interested in links to security expert forums,
       where other users can assist them.

9.  Professionally-Assisted Remediation Process

   It should be acknowledged that, based on the current state of
   remediation tools and the technical abilities of end users, that many
   users may be unable to remediate on their own.  As a result, it is
   recommended that users have the option for professional assistance.
   This may entail online or telephone assistance for remediation, as
   well as working face to face with a professional who has training and
   expertise in the removal of malware.

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10.  Sharing of Data from the User to the ISP

   As an additional consideration, it may be useful to create a process
   by which users could choose, at their option and with their express
   consent, to share data regarding their bot infection with their ISP
   and/or another authorized third party.  Such third parties may
   include governmental entities that aggregate threat data, such as the
   Internet Crime Complaint Center referred to earlier in this document,
   to academic institutions, and/or security researchers.  While in many
   cases the information shared with the user's ISP or designated third
   parties will only be used for aggregated statistical analysis, it is
   also possible that certain research needs may be best met with more
   detailed data.  Thus, any such data sharing from a user to the ISP or
   authorized third party may contain some type of personally
   identifiable information, either by design or inadvertently.  As a
   result, any such data sharing must be enabled on an opt-in based,
   where users review and approve of the data being shared and the
   parties with which it is to be shared, unless the ISP is already
   required to share such data in order to comply with local laws and in
   accordance with those laws and applicable regulations.

11.  Security Considerations

   This document describes in detail the numerous security risks and
   concerns relating to bot nets.  As such, it has been appropriate to
   include specific information about security in each section above.
   This document describes the security risks related to malicious bot
   infections themselves, such as enabling identity theft, theft of
   authentication credentials, and the use of a host to unwittingly
   participate in a DDoS attack, among many other risks.  This document
   also describes at a high level the activities that ISPs should be
   sensitive to, where the collection or communication of PII may be
   possible.  Finally, the document also describes security risks which
   may relate to the particular methods of communicating a notification
   to Internet users.  Bot networks and bot infections pose extremely
   serious security risks and any reader should review this document

   In addition, regarding notifications, as described in Section 6, care
   should be taken to assure users that notifications have been provided
   by a trustworthy site and/or party, so that the notification is more
   difficult for phishers and/or malicious parties using social
   engineering tactics to mimic, or that the user has some level of
   trust that the notification is valid, and/or that the user has some
   way to verify via some other mechanism or step that the notification
   is valid.

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   As noted in Section 10, any sharing of data from the user to the ISP
   and/or authorized third parties must be done on an opt-in basis.
   Additionally the ISP and or authorized third parties must clearly
   state what data will be shared and with whom the data will be shared

   Lastly, as noted in some other sections, there my be legal
   requirements in particular legal jurisdictions concerning how long
   any subscriber-related or other data is retained, of which an ISP
   operating in such a jurisdiction must be aware and with which an ISP
   must comply.

12.  IANA Considerations

   There are no IANA considerations in this document.

13.  Acknowledgements

   The authors wish to acknowledge the following individuals for
   performing a detailed review of this document and/or providing
   comments and feedback with had helped to improve and evolve this

   Mark Baugher

   Richard Bennett

   James Butler

   Vint Cerf

   Alissa Cooper

   Jonathan Curtis

   Jeff Chan

   Roland Dobbins

   Dave Farber

   Eliot Gillum

   Joel Halpern

   Joel Jaeggli

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   Scott Keoseyan

   The Messaging Anti-Abuse Working Group (MAAWG)

   Jose Nazario

   Gunter Ollmann

   David Reed

   Roger Safian

   Donald Smith

   Joe Stewart

   Forrest Swick

   Sean Turner

   Robb Topolski

   Eric Ziegast

14.  Informative references

   [Battling Botnets and Online Mobs: Estonia's Defense Efforts during
   the Internet War]
              Evron, G., "Battling Botnets and Online Mobs: Estonia's
              Defense Efforts during the Internet War", May 2005, <http:

   [Case Study: How a Bookmaker and a Whiz Kid Took On a DDOS-based
   Online Extortion Attack]
              Berinato, S., "Case Study: How a Bookmaker and a Whiz Kid
              Took On a DDOS-based Online Extortion Attack", May 2005, <

   [Cyberspace as a Combat Zone: The Phenomenon of Electronic Jihad]
              Alshech, E., "Cyberspace as a Combat Zone: The Phenomenon
              of Electronic Jihad", February 2007, <http://

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   [Distributed Denial of Service Attacks: Explanation, Classification
   and Suggested Solutions]
              Saafan, A., "Distributed Denial of Service Attacks:
              Explanation, Classification and Suggested Solutions",
              March 2009, <https://docs.google.com/

   [Emerging Cyber Threats Report for 2009: Data, Mobility and Questions
   of Responsibility will Drive Cyber Threats in 2009 and Beyond]
              Ahamad, M., Amster, D., Barret, M., Cross, T., Heron, G.,
              Jackson, D., King, J., Lee, W., Naraine, R., Ollman, G.,
              Ramsey, J., Schmidt, H., and P. Traynor, "Emerging Cyber
              Threats Report for 2009: Data, Mobility and Questions of
              Responsibility will Drive Cyber Threats in 2009 and
              Beyond", October 2008, <http://smartech.gatech.edu/

   [Persistent Memory Infection]
              Sacco, A. and A. Ortega, "Persistent BIOS Infection",
              March 2009, <http://www.coresecurity.com/files/

   [RFC1459]  Oikarinen, J. and D. Reed, "Internet Relay Chat Protocol",
              RFC 1459, May 1993.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

              FUNCTIONS", RFC 2142, May 1997.

   [RFC3954]  Claise, B., "Cisco Systems NetFlow Services Export Version
              9", RFC 3954, October 2004.

   [Spamalytics: An Empirical Analysis of Spam Marketing Conversion]
              Kanich, C., Kreibich, C., Levchenko, K., Enright, B.,
              Voelker, G., Paxson, V., and S. Savage, "Spamalytics: An
              Empirical Analysis of Spam Marketing Conversion",
              October 2008, <http://www.icir.org/christian/publications/

   [The Gh0st in the Shell: Network Security in the Himalayas]
              Vallentin, M., Whiteaker, J., and Y. Ben-David, "The Gh0st
              in the Shell: Network Security in the Himalayas",
              February 2010, <http://www.infowar-monitor.net/wp-content/

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   [The snooping dragon: social-malware surveillance of the Tibetan
              Nagaraja, S. and R. Anderson, "The snooping dragon:
              social-malware surveillance of the Tibetan movement",
              March 2009,

Appendix A.  Document Change Log

   [RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication]

   -09 version:

   o  Corrected nits pointed out by Sean

   o  Removed occurrences of double spacing

   o  Grammar and spelling corrections in many sections

   o  Added text for leaky walled garden

   -08 version:

   o  Corrected a reference error in Section 10.

   o  Added a new informative reference

   o  Change to Section 5.a., to note additional port scanning

   o  Per Joel Jaeggli, change computer to host, to conform to IETF
      document norms

   o  Several other changes suggested by Joel Jaeggli and Donald Smith
      on the OPSEC mailing list

   o  Incorp. other feedback received privately

   o  Because Jason is so very dedicated, he worked on this revision
      while on vacation ;-)

   -07 version:

   o  Corrected various spelling and grammatical errors, pointed out by
      additional reviewers.  Also added a section on information flowing
      from the user.  Lastly, updated the reviewer list to include all
      those who either were kind enough to review for us or who provided

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      interesting, insightful, and/or helpful feedback.

   -06 version:

   o  Corrected an error in the version change log, and added some extra
      information on user remediation.  Also added an informational
      reference to BIOS infection.

   -05 version:

   o  Minor tweaks made by Jason - ready for wider review and next
      steps.  Also cleared open issues.  Lastly, added 2nd paragraph to
      security section and added sections on limitations relating to
      public and other shared network sites.  Added a new section on
      professional remediation.

   -04 version:

   o  Updated reference to BIOS based malware, added wording on PII and
      local jurisdictions, added suggestion that industry body produce
      bot stats, added suggestion that ISPs use volunteer forums

   -03 version:

   o  all updates from Jason - now ready for wider external review

   -02 version:

   o  all updates from Jason - still some open issues but we're now at a
      place where we can solicit more external feedback

   -01 version:

   o  -01 version published

Appendix B.  Open Issues

   [RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication]

   per Donald, where SNDS is mentioned: That is a list of good examples
   but there are a lot of other good 3rd party infected client
   notification resources.  Arbor via atlas, ShadowServer, Cymru, SIE,
   Support Intelligence and many others.  It might be worth having a
   seperate section near the end that has a list of 3rd parties that are
   willing to share this kind of information with ISPs and provide
   contact info such as was done for conficker. http://

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   That list is NOT complete in any sense of the word.  Providing
   contact information may help other ISPs get a more complete set of
   third party reports.  I am a bit concerned that some of the 3rd party
   contact information could change later and be outdated but I believe
   most of them will use a role based email account or a link.

   per Sean, There is no RFC 2119 language in the document.  Was this
   intentional?  If it is then we could delete section 1.  If it's not
   then you'll need to figure out which "must", "should", etc. need to
   be capitalized.

   per Donald, in notification method section, consider taking this text
   from the phone method and using as a new section with drawbacks/
   challenges: Finally, even if a representative of the ISP is able to
   connect with and speak to a user, that user is very likely to lack
   the necessary technical expertise to understand or be able to
   effectively deal with the threat.

   per Donald, consider w/r/t the WG method: That is really the
   definition of a quarantine walled garden.  Walled garden's don't have
   to quarantine the user (much) to notify the customer.  They can be
   fairly leaky and still notify the customer of their infection.

   per Donald, consider text re users who continue to fail to mitigate:
   Another good approach is just to keep track of whom was put into the
   walled garden for which infection and if they keep showing up as
   infected via the trusted third party reports then you can assume they
   are unable/unwilling to remediate and take what ever additional
   actions you deem appropriate.

   per Donald, inclusion of PII is a good general stmt to consider for
   an opening section in the notification part of the doc: As such,
   should this method be used, the notification should be discreet and
   not include any PII in the notification itself.

   per Donald, do we want to consider adding a 'leaky' WG?  'Or design a
   leaky walled garden that allows most traffic without interference
   only redirecting the traffic needed to mitigate or notify.'

   Address suggestion from Donald Smith: The risks to users of infected
   systems and others are included/defined in many places within this
   document.  It should probably be defined clearly in one place and
   referenced in all other places.

   per Roger - ponder acct termination

   A question has been raised about whether this should change from
   Informational to BCP.

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   Guided remediation -- these urls while provided for the purpose of
   examples are unlikely to be stable on any kind of long timescale.
   fundamentally updating os software addresses vulnerability not
   remediation (windows malicious software removal tool notwithstanding)

   Guided remediation, bullets 4 - 7 -- It's unclear how these steps are
   even feasible to undertake for organizations nominally characterized
   as ISPs. there's a several thousand fold cost differential between
   automated help and remediation by sending a train professional to lay
   hands on one computer.

Authors' Addresses

   Jason Livingood
   Comcast Cable Communications
   One Comcast Center
   1701 John F. Kennedy Boulevard
   Philadelphia, PA  19103

   Email: jason_livingood@cable.comcast.com
   URI:   http://www.comcast.com

   Nirmal Mody
   Comcast Cable Communications
   One Comcast Center
   1701 John F. Kennedy Boulevard
   Philadelphia, PA  19103

   Email: nirmal_mody@cable.comcast.com
   URI:   http://www.comcast.com

   Mike O'Reirdan
   Comcast Cable Communications
   One Comcast Center
   1701 John F. Kennedy Boulevard
   Philadelphia, PA  19103

   Email: michael_oreirdan@cable.comcast.com
   URI:   http://www.comcast.com

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