dnssd D. Otis
Internet-Draft Trend Micro
Intended status: Informational May 9, 2015
Expires: November 10, 2015
mDNS X-link review
draft-otis-dnssd-mdns-xlink-05
Abstract
Multicast DNS will not normally extend beyond the MAC Bridge. This
limitation is problematic when desired services are beyond the reach
of multicast mDNS. This document explores security considerations
when overcoming this limitation.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 10, 2015.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Multiple Link Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Scope of Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3. Multiple Namespaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.4. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.5. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2. References - Informative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix A. mDNS Example of Device Resolution Information . . . . 14
Appendix B. Uncontrolled Access Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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1. Introduction
On Bridged LANs, as described by [IEEE.802-1D.2004], MAC entities
make their services known via multicast. Multicast forms a basis for
networking and layer 3 protocol initialization where [mDNS] together
with [DNS-SD] provide a higher level of structure based on multicast
announcements made within a LAN environment. Unfortunately, an
increased exchange of structural information does not scale well.
There is an effort to push mDNS into DNS. Just exposure of [mDNS] to
the Internet has proven problematic as noted by [CERTvu550620].
[DNS-SD] can further extend DDoS amplification concerns. [mDNS] may
use Jumbo frames of 9000 bytes that exceeds design limits of Ethernet
CRC, however it recommends an upper limit of 1,300 bytes suitable for
most local networks. DNS started with in an era working within the
minimum MTU established by [RFC0791] and noted by [RFC1191] of 576
bytes which accommodates 512 byte UDP DNS messages. Most Internet
links are able to handle larger MTUs, as per the minimum 1280 byte
MTU specified by [RFC2460] for IPv6.
[DNS-SD] discovery is initialized by querying DNS PTR queries using
Unicast or Multicast DNS at five special zones reserved for this
purpose:
b._dns-sd._udp.<Domain>. Domain list to Browse
db._dns-sd._udp.<Domain>. Default Domain to Browse
r._dns-sd._udp.<Domain>. Domains list to register service
dr._dns-sd._udp.<Domain>. Default Domain to register service
lb._dns-sd._udp.<Domain>. Legacy Browse using special label info
SRV [RFC2782] records are located with the form:
"_<sn>._<Proto>.<Domain>
DNS-SD differs by locating SRV and TXT RR-sets with the forms:
_<sn>._<Proto>.<SrvDOM>.<ParentDOM>.
<Instance>._<sn>._<Proto>.<SrvDOM>.<ParentDOM>.
<sub>._sub._<sn>._<Proto>.<SrvDOM>.<ParentDOM>.
Instance names are not host names and may use Unicode for Network
Interchange [RFC5198] encoding and may include escaped periods "\."
and other punctuation and spaces.
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For DNS-SD, Proto="udp" for all non-TCP transports otherwise it is
"tcp" .
_<sn> = IANA Registered Service Name
At each of these locations SRV and TXT Resource Record Sets offer
instance and service enumerations but resulting RR-sets may be
unsuitable for exposure to the Internet. The RR-sets returned in
response to a wildcard placed at the instance location can approach
839 instances and 64 kBytes. In addition, a browsing operation never
completes until terminated where clients are expected to report
availability state changes. The DNS-SD query to response ratio makes
it potentially unsuitable for access over the Internet.
A Bridge acts as an interconnect mechanism transparent to end
stations on LANs. Bridges designated to forward frames is normally
accomplished by participation in a Spanning Tree Algorithm. Many
expect [mDNS] resource records can be safely and automatically placed
into [DNS] to overcome Bridge to Bridge multicast limitations.
Nevertheless, such a process must operate in conjunction with
requisite controls necessary to retain network security.
A Bridge forwards frames based on prior source MAC associations with
incoming frames on different LAN ports. Source MAC and LAN port
associations are recommended to expire in 300 seconds. Frames
containing source multicast MACs are silently discarded as invalid.
Frames containing a destination MAC on the same LAN port already
associated with the MAC are silently discarded. A valid incoming
frame with a destination not previously associated with a different
LAN port is forwarded (flooded) to all other LAN ports, otherwise
when a MAC destination address is associated with a different LAN
port from which the frame was received, the frame is selectively
forwarded to this port. All broadcast and multicast MACs are flooded
to all other LAN ports because they do not represent a valid source.
Flooding operations may create a storm of replicated frames having an
unknown MAC destination whenever forwarding is enabled on LAN ports
connected in a loop.
In [IEEE.802-11.2012] wireless networks, multicast frames are
transmitted at a low data rate supported by all receivers. Multicast
on wireless networks may thereby lower overall network throughput.
Some network administrators block some multicast traffic or convert
it to a series of link-layer unicast frames.
Wireless links may be orders of magnitude less reliable than their
wired counterparts. To improve transmission reliability,
[IEEE.802-11.2012] requires positive acknowledgement of unicast
frames. It does not, however, support positive acknowledgement of
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multicast frames. As a result, it is common to observe much higher
loss of multicast frames on wireless compared against wired network
technologies.
2. IANA Considerations
This document requires no IANA consideration.
3. Security Considerations
Scalable DNS-SD (SSD) proposes to automatically gather autonomously
named [mDNS] resource records by observing announcement traffic to
then make routable resources visible and accessible from other
networks via unicast [DNS] structured per [DNS-SD]. When doing so,
address translation using Unique Local Addresses, ULAs [RFC4193] can
offer a significant level of protection since typical link-local
addresses are not usable from other networks but either ULA or
[RFC1918] addresses typically indicate site local. Section 3.2 of
[RFC4193] are locally defined and handled as Global addresses
although not intended to be routed beyond the site or beyond those
having explicit routing agreements.
Section 4.1 of [RFC4193] indicates the default behavior of exterior
routing protocol sessions between administrative routing regions must
be to ignore receipt of and not advertise prefixes in the FC00::/7
block. A network operator may specifically configure prefixes longer
than FC00::/7 for inter-site communication. Specifically, these
prefixes are not designed to aggregate. Routers by default do not
block ULA prefixes which makes it important to confirm how ULA
traffic is handled by the access provider.
ULA or [RFC1918] addresses are not normally routed over the Internet
where their use provides a degree of isolation. For either home or
enterprise networks, ULAs as an overlay network avoids network
address translations and permits local routing isolated from direct
Internet access. ULAs also permit local communications to remain
unaffected by Internet related link failures or scope limitations
imposed by use of multicast protocols.
ULAs avoid a need to renumber internal-only private nodes when
changing ISPs, or when ISPs restructure their address allocations.
In these situations, use of ULA offers an effective tool for
protecting internal-only nodes. As such, more than just the security
considerations discussed in [mDNS] and [DNS-SD] are needed. For
example, [DNS-SD] states the following: "Since DNS-SD is just a
specification for how to name and use records in the existing DNS, it
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has no specific additional security requirements over and above those
that already apply to DNS queries and DNS updates." This simply
overlooks that many devices are not automatically published in DNS
nor can it be assumed they are able to handle the access that DNS
might permit.
[DNS-SD] recommends additional DNS records such as the associated PTR
and TXT SHOULD be generated to improve network efficiency for both
Unicast and Multicast DNS-SD responses. This behavior further
increases risks related to query/response ratios and the likelihood
security sensitive information might become exposed.
Current BTMM [RFC6281] only publishes ULAs of hosts in DNS able to
authenticate when setting up an overlay network. Remaining devices,
such as printers, are only accessed as shared elements offered by the
authenticating hosts. DNS resources should never be considered to
offer privacy even in split-horizon configurations. DNS is unable to
authenticate incoming queries nor can it offer application layer
protection. Since many prefixes are expected to be in use within
environments served by [I-D.cheshire-dnssd-hybrid], errors related to
network boundary detections becomes critical. As such, DNS SHOULD
NOT publish addresses of devices unable to authenticate sessions that
traverse the Internet.
[DNS-SD] should not be viewed as only a catalog structure of desired
services. [I-D.cheshire-dnssd-hybrid] is to be used to bridge
adjacent networks, which risks conveying resources of hosts that are
unable to safely facilitate Internet access. Since
[I-D.cheshire-dnssd-hybrid] only expects to disclose routable
addresses while also ignoring use of ULAs, this clearly expects
conveyance of globally routable addresses, GUA. Use of ULAs instead
of GUAs represents a significantly safer strategy that permits
limited devices to remain isolated from the Internet while still
allowing packet routing between local network realms.
[I-D.cheshire-dnssd-hybrid] lacks a process able to limit resources
being gathered, resolved, and propagated to those that can be
administrated. As such, an [I-D.cheshire-dnssd-hybrid] scheme
represents a profound change to network security. The following
sections highlight potential threats posed by deploying [DNS-SD] over
multiple links through the automated collection and publication of
[mDNS] resources into [DNS] as proposed by
[I-D.cheshire-dnssd-hybrid]. This conveyance expands namespaces into
.local., .sitelocal., and [DNS] which may also cache Internet
namespace.
This new routable namespace also lacks the benefit of registrar
involvement and may not afford an administrator an ability to
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mitigate nefarious activity, such as spoofing and phishing, without
requisite controls having been first carefully established. When a
device has access to different realms on multiple interfaces, it is
not even clear how simple conflict resolution avoids threatening
network stability while resolving names conveyed over disparate
technologies.
Managing autonomously named resources becomes especially salient
since visually selected names are not ensured uniquely represented
nor quickly resolved due to latency uncertainties. For example,
[DNS] recommends 5 second timeouts with a doubling on two subsequent
retries for a total of 35 seconds. [mDNS] only requires compliance
with [RFC5198] rather than IDNA2008 [RFC5895]. This less restrictive
use of the name space may impair the defense of critical services
from look-alike attack. [mDNS] does not ensure instances are visually
unique and allows spaces and punctuation not permitted by IDNA2008.
It is imperative for SSD to include requisite filtering necessary to
prevent data ex-filtration or the interception of sensitive services.
Any exchanged data must first ensure locality, limit the resources
gathered, resolved, and propagated to just those elements that can be
effectively administrated. It is critical to ensure normal network
protection is not lost for hosts that depend on link-local addressing
and exclusion of routable traffic. A printer would be one such
example of a host that can not be upgraded.
3.1. Multiple Link Strategies
3.1.1. Selective Forwarding based on IGMP or MLD snooping
Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) [RFC3376] supports
multicast on IPv4 networks. Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD)
[RFC3810] supports multicast management on IPv6 networks using ICMPv6
messaging in contrast to IGMP's bare IP encapsulation. This
management allows routers to announce their multicast membership to
neighboring routers. To optimize which LANs receive forwarded
multicast frames, IGMP or MLD snooping can be used to determine the
presence of listeners as a means to permit selective forwarding of
multicast frames as well.
3.1.2. IPv4 Link-Local
[RFC3927] provides an overview of IPv4 address complexities related
to dealing with multiple segments and interfaces. IPv6 introduces
new paradigms in respect to interface address assignments which offer
scoping as explained in [RFC4291].
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3.1.3. VLAN
Use of VLAN such as [RFC5517] can selectively extend multicast
forwarding beyond Bridge limitations. While not a general solution,
use of VLAN can both isolate and unite specific networks.
3.1.4. DHCP
IP address assignment and host registration might use a single or
forwarded DHCP [RFC2131] or [RFC3315] server for IPv4 and IPv6
respectively that responds to interconnected networks as a means to
register hosts and addresses. DHCP does not ensure against name or
address conflict nor is it intended to configure routers.
3.1.5. Automated placement of mDNS resources into DNS
IP addresses made visible by [DNSSEC] or [DNS] that conform with
[DNS-SD] might be used, but the automated population of information
into [DNS] should be limited to administrative systems.
Automated conversion of [mDNS] into unicast [DNS] can be problematic
from a security standpoint as can the widespread propagation of
multicast frames. [mDNS] only requires compliance with [RFC5198]
rather than IDNA2008 [RFC5895]. This means [mDNS] does not ensure
instances are visually unique and may contain spaces and punctuation
not permitted by IDNA2008. As such, this might allow users into
becoming misled about the scope of a name.
Replacing ASCII punctuation and spaces in the label with the '_'
character, except when located as the leftmost character, may reduce
some handling issues related to end of string parsing, since labels
in [DNS] normally do not contain spaces or punctuation.
Nevertheless, [DNS] is able to handle such labels within sub-domains
of registered domains.
Services outside the ".local." domain may have applications obtaining
domain search lists provided by DHCP ([RFC2131] and [RFC3315] for
IPv4 and IPv6 respectively or RA DNSSL [RFC6106] also for IPv6.
Internet domains need to be published in [DNS] as A-Labels [RFC3492]
because IDNA2008 compliance depends on A-label enforcement by
registrars. Therefore A-Labels and not U-Labels must be published in
DNS for Internet domains at this time.
The SRV scheme used by [mDNS] has also been widely adopted in the
Windows OS since it offered a functional replacement for Windows
Internet Name Service (WINS) as their initial attempt which lacked
sufficient name hierarchy. Such common use may represent security
considerations whenever these records can be automatically published.
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It is unknown whether sufficient filtering of [mDNS] to expose just
those services likely needed will sufficiently protect wireless
networks. The extent of using IGMP or MLD for selective forwarding
to mitigate otherwise spurious traffic is unknown.
ULA or [RFC1918] addresses allow safer automatic publication in DNS
since these addresses are unlikely to be routed beyond the site.
These addresses also provide a simple scheme to ascertain which
addresses should be blocked at a network boundary. The use of other
addresses MUST require specific administrative confirmations. It
should be noted in the Addendum example, the Brother printer
published a globally routable address.
3.2. Scope of Discovery
As [mDNS] is currently restricted to a single link, the scope of the
advertisement is limited, by design, to the shared link between
client and the device offering a service. In a multi-link scenario,
the owner of the advertised service may not have a clear indication
of the scope of its advertisement.
If the advertisement propagates to a larger set of links than
expected, this may result in unauthorized clients (from the
perspective of the owner) connecting to the advertised service. It
also discloses information (about the host and service) to a larger
set of potential attackers.
If the scope of the discovery is not properly setup or constrained,
then information leaks will happen beyond the appropriate network
which may also expose the network to various forms of attack as well.
3.3. Multiple Namespaces
There is a possibility of conflicts between local, multi-realm, and
global [DNS] namespaces. Without adequate feedback, a client may not
know whether the target service is the correct one, which can
therefore enable potential attacks.
A Host unable to recognize when it is in conflict with itself over
multiple realms also represents a potential network stability threat.
3.4. Authorization
[DNSSEC] can assert the validity but not the veracity of records in a
zone file. The trust model of the global [DNS] relies on the fact
that human administrators either a) manually enter resource records
into a zone file, or b) configure the [DNS] server to authenticate a
trusted device (e.g., a DHCP server) that can automatically maintain
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such records.
An imposter may register on the local link and appear as a legitimate
service. Such "rogue" services may then be automatically registered
in wide area [DNS-SD].
3.5. Authentication
Up to now, the "plug-and-play" nature of [mDNS] devices have relied
only on physical connectivity to the local network. If a device is
visible via [mDNS], it had been assumed to be trusted. When multiple
networks are involved, verifying a host is local using [mDNS] is no
longer possible so other verification schemes must be used.
3.6. Privacy Considerations
Mobile devices such as smart phones that can expose the location of
their owners by registering services in arbitrary zones pose a risk
to privacy. Such devices must not register their services in
arbitrary zones without the approval of their operators. However, it
should be possible to configure one or more "safe" zones, e.g., based
on subnet prefix, in which mobile devices may automatically register
their services.
As noted in [CERTvu550620] private security information is leaked in
many cases. This includes hostnames and MACs, networking details,
service related details such as those for Printers and NAS devices.
Many consumer printers can not authenticated users or block addresses
when connected with IPv6. Once this information is leaked,
malefactors are given unlimited access.
4. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to acknowledge valuable contributions from the
following: Dave Rand, Michael Tuexen, Hosnieh Rafiee
5. References
5.1. Normative References
[DNS] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[DNS-SD] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
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Discovery", RFC 6763, February 2013.
[DNSSEC] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, March 2005.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and
E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.
[RFC2782] Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P., and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for
specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782,
February 2000.
[RFC3492] Costello, A., "Punycode: A Bootstring encoding of Unicode
for Internationalized Domain Names in Applications
(IDNA)", RFC 3492, March 2003.
[RFC3587] Hinden, R., Deering, S., and E. Nordmark, "IPv6 Global
Unicast Address Format", RFC 3587, August 2003.
[RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
Addresses", RFC 4193, October 2005.
[RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.
[RFC5198] Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for Network
Interchange", RFC 5198, March 2008.
[RFC5895] Resnick, P. and P. Hoffman, "Mapping Characters for
Internationalized Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)
2008", RFC 5895, September 2010.
[RFC6106] Jeong, J., Park, S., Beloeil, L., and S. Madanapalli,
"IPv6 Router Advertisement Options for DNS Configuration",
RFC 6106, November 2010.
[mDNS] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
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February 2013.
5.2. References - Informative
[CERTvu550620]
Seaman, C., "CERT Vulnerability Note VU#550620",
March 2015.
[I-D.cheshire-dnssd-hybrid]
Cheshire, S., "Hybrid Unicast/Multicast DNS-Based Service
Discovery", draft-cheshire-dnssd-hybrid-01 (work in
progress), January 2014.
[I-D.ietf-dnssd-push]
Pusateri, T. and S. Cheshire, "DNS Push Notifications",
draft-ietf-dnssd-push-00 (work in progress), March 2015.
[I-D.ietf-dnssd-requirements]
Lynn, K., Cheshire, S., Blanchet, M., and D. Migault,
"Requirements for Scalable DNS-SD/mDNS Extensions",
draft-ietf-dnssd-requirements-06 (work in progress),
March 2015.
[IEEE.802-11.2012]
"Information technology - Telecommunications and
information exchange between systems - Local and
metropolitan area networks - Specific requirements - Part
11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical
Layer (PHY) specifications", IEEE Standard 802.11,
February 2012, <http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/
download/802.11-2012.pdf>.
[IEEE.802-1D.2004]
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
"Information technology - Telecommunications and
information exchange between systems - Local area networks
- Media access control (MAC) bridges", IEEE Standard
802.1D, February 2004, <http://standards.ieee.org/
getieee802/download/802.1D-2004.pdf>.
[IEEE.802-3.2012]
"Information technology - Telecommunications and
information exchange between systems - Local and
metropolitan area networks - Specific requirements - Part
3: Carrier sense multiple access with collision detection
(CSMA/CD) access method and physical layer
specifications"", IEEE Standard 802.3, August 2012, <http:
//standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/
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802.3-2012_section1.pdf>.
[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
September 1981.
[RFC1112] Deering, S., "Host extensions for IP multi-casting",
STD 5, RFC 1112, August 1989.
[RFC1191] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
November 1990.
[RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
RFC 2131, March 1997.
[RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C.,
and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.
[RFC3376] Cain, B., Deering, S., Kouvelas, I., Fenner, B., and A.
Thyagarajan, "Internet Group Management Protocol, Version
3", RFC 3376, October 2002.
[RFC3810] Vida, R. and L. Costa, "Multicast Listener Discovery
Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6", RFC 3810, June 2004.
[RFC3927] Cheshire, S., Aboba, B., and E. Guttman, "Dynamic
Configuration of IPv4 Link-Local Addresses", RFC 3927,
May 2005.
[RFC4043] Pinkas, D. and T. Gindin, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Permanent Identifier", RFC 4043, May 2005.
[RFC4510] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): Technical Specification Road Map", RFC 4510,
June 2006.
[RFC4541] Christensen, M., Kimball, K., and F. Solensky,
"Considerations for Internet Group Management Protocol
(IGMP) and Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) Snooping
Switches", RFC 4541, May 2006.
[RFC5517] HomChaudhuri, S. and M. Foschiano, "Cisco Systems' Private
VLANs: Scalable Security in a Multi-Client Environment",
RFC 5517, February 2010.
[RFC6281] Cheshire, S., Zhu, Z., Wakikawa, R., and L. Zhang,
"Understanding Apple's Back to My Mac (BTMM) Service",
RFC 6281, June 2011.
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[RFC7217] Gont, F., "A Method for Generating Semantically Opaque
Interface Identifiers with IPv6 Stateless Address
Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)", RFC 7217, April 2014.
Appendix A. mDNS Example of Device Resolution Information
dns-sd -L "Brother MFC-9560CDW" _printer._tcp local
Lookup Brother MFC-9560CDW._printer._tcp.local
16:00:26.965 Brother\032MFC-9560CDW._printer._tcp.local.
can be reached at BRN30066C239958.local.:515
(interface 4) Flags: 2 txtvers=1 qtotal=1
pdl=application/vnd.hp-PCL,application/vnd.brother-hbp
rp=duerqxesz5090 ty=Brother\ MFC-9560CDW product=\(Brother\ MFC-9560CDW\)
adminurl=http://BRN30066C239958.local./
priority=75 usb_MFG=Brother usb_MDL=MFC-9560CDW
Color=T Copies=T Duplex=F PaperCustom=T Binary=T Transparent=T TBCP=F
Timestamp A/R Flags if Hostname Address TTL
16:14:34.855 Add 3 4 BRN30066C239958.local.
192.168.99.99 245
16:14:34.856 Add 2 4 BRN30066C239958.local.
2699:9999:7300:1510:3205:5CFF:FE23:9958%<0> 245
dns-sd -L "Canon MX920 series" _printer._tcp local.
Lookup Canon MX920 series._printer._tcp.local.
16:47:09.676 Canon\032MX920\032series._printer._tcp.local.
can be reached at 9299990000.local.:515 (interface 4) Flags: 2
txtvers=1 rp=auto note= qtotal=1 priority=60 ty=Canon\ MX920
\ series product=\(Canon\ MX920\ series\)
pdl=application/octet-stream adminurl=http://929999000000.local.
usb_MFG=Canon usb_MDL=MX920\ series
usb_CMD= UUID=00000000-0000-1000-8000-F4813999999
Color=T Duplex=T Scan=T Fax=F mac=F4:81:39:99:99:99
dns-sd -G v4v6 "9299999000000.local."
Timestamp A/R Flags if Hostname Address TTL
17:07:12.460 Add 3 4 929999000000.local.
FE80:0000:0000:0000:F681:39FF:FE92:9999%en0 65
17:07:12.461 Add 2 4 929999000000.local.
192.168.99.108 65
Otis Expires November 10, 2015 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft mDNS xlinks May 2015
Appendix B. Uncontrolled Access Example
The risk is that adequate IPv6 filtering is simply not available on either
current printers, scanners, cameras and other devices that were never
intended to be used directly on the Internet.
For example, in the case of a printer:
ftp [DNS entry]
Trying 2699:9999:7300:1510:3205:5cff:fe23:9958...
Connected to [DNS entry]
220 FTP print service:V-1.13/Use the network password for the ID if
updating.
Name (BRN30066C239958.local.:dlr): ftp
230 User ftp logged in.
ftp> ls
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||62468|)
150 Transfer Start
total 1
-r--r--r-- 1 root printer 4096 Sep 28 2001 CFG-PAGE.TXT
---------- 1 root printer 0 Sep 28 2001 Toner-Low-------
226 Data Transfer OK.
ftp>
From here, I can print a file with no further authentication.
But the printer also now appears on the Internet with TCP ports
21,23,25,80,515,631 and 9100 active. I can scan a document that
was left in the flatbed. I can send a fax. Or I can print many
copies of black pages if I want to do a physical DOS. And, thanks
to the globally routable address present, I can reach this from
anywhere in the world.
Author's Address
Douglas Otis
Trend Micro
10101 N. De Anza Blvd
Cupertino, CA 95014
USA
Phone: +1.408.257-1500
Email: doug_otis@trendmicro.com
Otis Expires November 10, 2015 [Page 15]