LAMPS                                                       M. Ounsworth
Internet-Draft                                                 S. Mister
Intended status: Standards Track                                 J. Gray
Expires: September 9, 2019                              Entrust Datacard
                                                              S. Fluhrer
                                                           P. Kampanakis
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                          March 08, 2019

         Composite Keys and Signatures For Use In Internet PKI


   With the widespread adoption of post-quantum cryptography will come
   the need for an entity to possess multiple public keys on different
   cryptographic algorithms.  Since the trustworthiness of individual
   post-quantum algorithms is at question, a multi-key cryptographic
   operation will need to be performed in such a way that breaking it
   requires breaking each of the component algorithms individually.
   This requires defining new structures for holding composite public
   keys and composite signature data.

   This document defines the structures CompositePublicKey,
   CompositeSignatureAlgorithmParams, and CompositeSignatureValue which
   are sequences of the respective structure for each component
   algorithm.  This document also defines algorithms for generating and
   verifying composite signatures.  This document makes no assumptions
   about what the component algorithms are, provided that their
   algorithm identifiers and signature generation and verification
   algorithms are defined.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

Ounsworth, et al.       Expires September 9, 2019               [Page 1]

Internet-Draft             PQ Composite Certs                 March 2019

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 9, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   ( in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Definitions and notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Composite Structures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Composite Public Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  Composite Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.3.  Encoding Composite Structures As Octet Strings and Bit
           Strings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Composite Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  Composite Signature Generation  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.2.  Composite Signature Verification  . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Mechanisms to distribute verification policy to clients . . .   9
     6.1.  Local verifier policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.2.  Extra metadata in the public key or signature . . . . . .   9
     6.3.  Extra metadata in the certificate . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.4.  Policy certificate issued by the Certificate Authority  .  10
     6.5.  Policy constraints in a cross-certificate . . . . . . . .  10
     6.6.  Revoked Algorithms CRL Extension  . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       6.6.1.  Implicit Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  New Algorithm Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  In Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   9.  Implications for existing standards . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.1.  RFC 2986  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.2.  RFC 5280  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.3.  Cryptographic protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

Ounsworth, et al.       Expires September 9, 2019               [Page 2]

Internet-Draft             PQ Composite Certs                 March 2019

   12. Appendices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     12.1.  Intellection Property Considerations . . . . . . . . . .  13
     12.2.  Comparison with draft-truskovsky-lamps-pq-hybrid-x509  .  13
   13. Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   14. Acknowledgenents  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   15. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     15.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     15.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Introduction

   During the transition to post-quantum cryptography, there will be
   uncertainty as to the strength of cryptographic algorithms; we will
   no longer fully trust traditional cryptography such as RSA, Diffie-
   Hellman, DSA and their elliptic curve variants, but we will also not
   fully trust their post-quantum replacements until they have had
   sufficient scrutiny.  Unlike previous cryptographic algorithm
   migrations, the choice of when to migrate and which algorithms to
   migrate to, is not so clear.  Even after the migration period it may
   be advantageous for an entity's cryptographic identity to be composed
   of multiple public-key algorithms.  Even after the transition period,
   a composite approach may be advantageous as a single entity may have
   multiple public keys on different algorithms or strengths to address
   different use-cases, and a single signature may want to compase
   multiple of them together.

   The deployment of composite public keys and signatures using post-
   quantum algorithms will face two challenges

   o  Algorithm strength uncertainty: During the transition period, some
      post-quantum signature and encryption algorithms will not be fully
      trusted, while also the trust in legacy public key algorithms will
      also start to erode.  A relying party may learn some time after
      deployment that a public key algorithm has become untrustworthy,
      but in the interim, they may not know which algorithm an adversary
      has compromised.

   o  Backwards compatibility: During the transition period, post-
      quantum algorithms will not be supported by all clients.

   This document provides a mechanism to address algorithm strength
   uncertainty by providing formats for encoding multiple public keys
   and multiple signature values into existing public key and signature
   fields.  The issue of backwards compatibility is left open to be
   addressed in separate draft(s).

Ounsworth, et al.       Expires September 9, 2019               [Page 3]

Internet-Draft             PQ Composite Certs                 March 2019

   This document is intended for general applicability anywhere that
   public key structures or digital signatures are used, but where
   specific design decisions needed to be made, the authors chose the
   variant that caused the least disruption to existing X.509
   certificates, as defined in [RFC5280].

   _EDNOTE: While the scope of this document is restricted to
   signatures, we note that the same structure is equally applicable to
   asymmetric encryption keys.  Though a word of warning that the
   corresponding "encrypt / decrypt with a composite public key" logic
   is somewhat less obvious than; a naive implementer might be tempted
   to follow the same pattern as bellow and encrypt the message with
   each public key separately and then concatenate the ciphertexts,
   which is wrong.  Specifying the correct implementation of such an
   encryption scheme is out of scope for this document, but would be
   good work for someone in the standards community to pick

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Definitions and notation

3.1.  Definitions

   _EDNOTE: A glossary of terms we define for this document, or terms
   that we borrow from other RFCs._

   ALGORITHM: An information object class for identifying the type of
               cryptographic operation to be performed. This document is
               primarily concerned with algorithms for producing digital
               signatures, though the public key structure could just as
               easily hold encryption keys.

   COMPONENT ALGORITHM:  A single basic algorithm which is contained
                         within a composite algorithm.

   COMPOSITE ALGORITHM:  An algorithm which is a sequence of one or
                         more basic algorithm, as defined in

Ounsworth, et al.       Expires September 9, 2019               [Page 4]

Internet-Draft             PQ Composite Certs                 March 2019

3.2.  Notation

   No special notation is used in this document.

4.  Composite Structures

   In order for public keys and signatures to be composed of multiple
   algorithms, the respective structures defined in [RFC2986], [RFC5280]
   (AND OTHERS??) need to be extended.  We define encodings of sequences
   of public keys and signature data which consist of a sequence of
   public keys and signatures from more basic signature algorithms (aka
   "component algorithms") such that these structures can be places into
   any existing public key or signature structure.

   This section defines

   o  Composite public key: A general structure for holding multiple
      public keys within a single public key data structure.

   o  Composite signature: Data structures needed to make use of the
      Composite Signature signature algorithm (defined in Section 5),
      which encapsulates signatures made with multiple public keys.

   _EDNOTE: Defining composite algorithm parameters as a sequence inside
   the existing structure avoids an exponential proliferation of OIDs
   that are needed for each pairwise combination of signature algorithms
   in other competing schemes for achieving multi-key certificates.
   This scheme also naturally extends from 2-keypair to n-keypair keys
   and certificates._

4.1.  Composite Public Key

   A composite public key is a sequence of component public keys that
   are used together.  A composite public key is identified by the
   object identifier

   id-ce-compositePublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { OID }

   The parameters field for this public key type MUST be absent.  The
   composite public key data is represented by the following structure:

   CompositePublicKey ::= SEQUENCE OF SubjectPublicKeyInfo

   where each element of the sequence is a "SubjectPublicKeyInfo" of a
   public key that MAY be used in conjunction with the other keys in the
   sequence.  When the public key must be provided in octet string or
   bit string format, the data structure is converted as specified in
   Section 4.3.

Ounsworth, et al.       Expires September 9, 2019               [Page 5]

Internet-Draft             PQ Composite Certs                 March 2019

   _EDNOTE: This document does not define the corresponding private key
   formats because the authors deemed it to be out of scope.  We do note
   that the draft the Max Pala on a similar topic, does define private
   key formats, so there could be scope to merge these

4.2.  Composite Signature Algorithm

   The Composite Signature signature algorithm defined in Section 5 is
   identified by the following object identifier:

   id-ce-compositeSignature OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { OID }

   The following algorithm parameters MUST be included when this
   identifier is used:

   CompositeSignatureAlgorithmParams ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier

   When a composite signature is generated by a key with a
   CompositePublicKey, the signature's CompositeSignatureAlgorithmParams
   sequence MUST contain the same component algorithms listed in the
   same order as in the associated CompositePublicKey.

   The Composite Signature algorithm output is the DER encoding of the
   following structure:

   id-ce-CompositeSignatureValue OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { OID }

   CompositeSignatureValue ::= SEQUENCE OF BIT STRING

   Where each bit string within "CompositeSignatureValue" is a signature
   by one of the component signature algorithms.

   The choice of "SEQUENCE OF BIT STRING" rather than "BIT STRING" is so
   the type-length-value encoding can solve the problem of variable-
   length signature values.  The signature's "CompositeSignatureValue"
   sequence MUST contain the same component algorithms listed in the
   same order as in the associated "CompositeSignatureAlgorithmParams".

4.3.  Encoding Composite Structures As Octet Strings and Bit Strings

   Many specifications require that the composite public key and
   composite signature data structures be represented by an octet string
   or bit string.  When an octet string is required, the DER encoding of
   the composite data structure SHALL be used directly.  When a bit
   string is required, the octets of the DER encoded composite data
   structure SHALL be used as the bits of the bit string, with the most
   significant bit of the first octet becoming the first bit, and so on,

Ounsworth, et al.       Expires September 9, 2019               [Page 6]

Internet-Draft             PQ Composite Certs                 March 2019

   ending with the least significant bit of the last octet becoming the
   last bit of the bit string.

5.  Composite Signature Algorithm

   The Composite Signature signature algorithm generates a single
   composite signature by using multiple private keys to apply multiple
   signature algorithms to the input message, with the resulting
   signature effectively being the concatenation of the individual
   signature values.

   This algorithm addresses algorithm strength uncertainty by providing
   the verifier with parallel signatures from all the component
   signature algorithms used as part of the composite signature;
   breaking the composite signature would require breaking each of the
   component signatures.

5.1.  Composite Signature Generation

   The following algorithm is used to generate composite signature

        K1, K2, ..., Kn    Private keys for the n component signature
        M                  Message to be signed, an octet string

        S                  Signature, an octet string

   Signature Generation Procedure:
      1. Generate the n component signatures independently,
         according to their algorithm specifications.
           for i := 1 to n
               Si := Sign( Ki, M )
      2. DER encode the component signatures into an ASN.1 value of type
         Signature, where the type Signature has the syntax
           Signature ::= Sequence { S1, S2, ..., Sn }
        Let S be the DER encoding of the Signature
      3. Output S

5.2.  Composite Signature Verification

   Verification of a composite signature involves applying each
   component algorithm's verification routine according to its
   specification, and then outputting "Valid signature" (true) if a
   sufficient number of component algorithms were valid, and "Invalid
   signature" (false) otherwise.

Ounsworth, et al.       Expires September 9, 2019               [Page 7]

Internet-Draft             PQ Composite Certs                 March 2019

   Implementations MAY include policy mechanisms for determining which
   and how many component algorithms must be valid in order for the
   composite signature to be considered valid.  See Section 6 for
   further discussion of possible standardization of such mechanisms.
   This section assumes the existence of such a policy mechanism,
   specifically one that allows revocation of individual component

   This section provides a sample algorithm for validating composite
   signatures.  Compliant implementations MUST return "Invalid
   signature" whenever the sample algorithm does, but MAY require more
   than one signature to be valid.

     P    Signer's composite public key
     M    Message whose signature is to be verified, an octet string
     S    Composite Signature to be verified
     A    Composite Algorithm identifier

    Validity      "Valid signature" (true) if the composite signature is
                  valid, "Invalid signature" (false) otherwise.

Signature Verification Procedure::
   1. Parse P, S, A into the component public keys, signatures,
      algorithm identifiers
      P1, P2, ..., Pn := Desequence( P )
      S1, S2, ..., Sn := Desequence( S )
      A1, A2, ..., An := Desequence( A )

    If Error during Desequencing, or the three sequences have different
    numbers of elements, then output "Invalid signature" and stop.

   2. Check each signature individually
     V1, V2 , ..., Vn := BOOLEAN
     for i := 1 to n
        Check if Ai is a recognized algorithm,  if so then,
          Check if algorithm Ai has been revoked, if not then,
            Verify the component signature according to the component
            algorithm's specification
              Vi = verify( Pi, M, Si )

    3. Check policy to see whether V1, V2, ..., Vn constitutes a valid
      if isValid(V1, V2, ..., Vn), then
        output "Valid signature"
        output "Invalid signature"

Ounsworth, et al.       Expires September 9, 2019               [Page 8]

Internet-Draft             PQ Composite Certs                 March 2019

   If "V1 = V2 = ... = Vn = false" for all "Vi", then "isValid(V1, V2,
   ..., Vn)" MUST return false.  Implementations MAY include additional
   policy mechanisms as discussed in Section 6.

6.  Mechanisms to distribute verification policy to clients

   In the traditional world of single-key public keys and signatures,
   the semantics of a signature and a verification are straight-forward:
   if the key is trusted (via public key pinning, a PKIX revocation
   check, etc) and the signature is valid, then the signed content can
   be trusted.  However the semantics are less obvious in a world where
   public keys and signatures are composed of two or more algorithms; it
   is conceivable that even though one component algorithm fails
   verification, for example because the algorithm is revoked, a multi-
   algorithm signature may contain enough other trustworthy component
   algorithms to still be considered valid.

   This section addresses how a verifier can obtain policy information
   for which and/or how many component algorithms must be valid in order
   for the signature as a whole to be valid.  The authors ask for
   community feedback about whether this needs to be specified, and if
   so, how best to do it.

   This section lists rough outlines for several such mechanisms that
   have come up in discussion during the drafting of this document.
   They are mainly focused around X.509 PKIs, and provided here merely
   for the purposes of sparking debate.  The authors believe that by
   specifying such a mechanism, the world will be able to more quickly
   react to news of algorithm compromise with a lower service disruption
   compared to the need to revoke and re-issue all certificates using
   that algorithm.  However, we are not sure if the gains justify the
   added complexity.

6.1.  Local verifier policy

   Much as we do today, this is left up to domain administrators and
   software vendors to implement the guidance of governing bodies on a
   system-by-system basis.

6.2.  Extra metadata in the public key or signature

   This policy information could be specified by the signer at signing
   time.  Depending on the structure of the databeing signed, this
   metadata could go into the public key, or an extension to the
   signature, or some other field provided that it is inside the signed
   data blob.

Ounsworth, et al.       Expires September 9, 2019               [Page 9]

Internet-Draft             PQ Composite Certs                 March 2019

6.3.  Extra metadata in the certificate

   This policy information could be included in a certificate via an
   X.509 v3 extension.  This gives the Certificate Authority control,
   but has the drawback that updating the policy requires revoking and
   reissuing certificates.

6.4.  Policy certificate issued by the Certificate Authority

   Certificate Authorities have the ability to issue policy certificates
   that specify the behaviour when verifying signatures performed by
   keys in certificates within the scope of the policy certificate.

   This method has the advantage that policy is centrally-managed, and
   can be updated without needing to reissue any certificates, but has
   the drawback that not all PKI implementations support policy

6.5.  Policy constraints in a cross-certificate

   This method behaves similarly to the policy certificate method above,
   but has better support across PKI implementations.

6.6.  Revoked Algorithms CRL Extension

   Add an extension to CRLs so that in addition to revoking
   certificates, they can also revoke algorithms for all certificates
   within the scope of that CRL.  Implemented with care, this could
   allow a single PKI to do a staged algorithm migration by only
   revoking the algorithm for one CRL group at a time.

   id-ce-RevokedAlgorithms OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { OID }

   RevokedAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE  {
        algorithms              AlgorithmIdentifier,
        revocationDate          Time,
        crlEntryExtensions      Extensions OPTIONAL
                                 -- if present, version MUST be v2

   _EDNOTE: do we need the crlEntryExtensions field?  If so, which ones
   from are allowed

   There may only be one "RevokedAlgorithms" extension in a CRL.  This
   extension is OPTIONAL.  If a CRL contains only composite
   certificates, then this extension SHOULD be designated as critical.

Ounsworth, et al.       Expires September 9, 2019              [Page 10]

Internet-Draft             PQ Composite Certs                 March 2019

   If a CRL contains a mixture of composite and traditional certificates
   then it SHOULD be designated as non-critical.

   If the Revoked Algorithms extension is present in a CRL, then a
   client performing a certificate validation on an otherwise non-
   revoked certificate within the scope of that CRL MUST skip any
   signatures corresponding to a revoked algorithm; thus a certificate
   is valid only if it would have been valid had those Algorithm IDs and
   Signature Values been omitted from the certificate.

   Once a algorithm has been marked as revoked on a given CRL, it MUST
   remain revoked on subsequent CRLs.

   _EDNOTE: Is there corresponding wording about cert serial numbers on
   CRLs from RFC5280?  Or is this unnecessary implied?_

   Note that a similar mechanism could be used on a per-certificate
   basis via CRL Entry Extensions, however the authors believe that
   giving operators the ability to perform partial revocation of a
   certificate (ie revoking some keys or signatures but leaving the
   certificate as a whole valid) will greatly increase the complexity of
   certificate validation routines, thus increasing the chance of both
   human error, and implementation bugs leading to vulnerabilities,
   without providing a commensurate amount of increased functionality.
   By not defining a new CRL Entry Extension, the following requirement
   is implied: if any key within a certificate warrant revocation, the
   entire certificate MUST be revoked using the existing revocation
   mechanisms (this does not apply when the algorithm is globally
   revoked for the entire scope of this CRL).

6.6.1.  Implicit Revocation

   A Composite Signature Algorithm is considered to be "implicitly
   revoked" if the certificate is otherwise valid but one of the
   following conditions are met.

   o  A certificate using a single-key algorithm which is revoked within
      the scope of its CRL.  In this case, signature verification SHOULD
      fail when performed by a compliant client, but of course will
      succeed when performed by a legacy client which is not aware of
      this CRL extension.

   o  All of the component algorithms are revoked within the scope if
      its CRL.  In this case, signature verification MUST fail when
      performed by a compliant client, regardless of which verification
      algorithm is used.

Ounsworth, et al.       Expires September 9, 2019              [Page 11]

Internet-Draft             PQ Composite Certs                 March 2019

   At the time of an algorithm revocation, a certificate authority MAY
   revoke certificates meeting one ofd the above criteria (by placing
   them in the traditional "revokedCertificates" list) with a revocation
   reason of "keyCompromise".  OCSP responders SHOULD designate a
   certificate as revoked if it meets the above condition.

7.  New Algorithm Identifiers

   _EDNOTE: This subsection will define the OIDs for the initial
   composite algorithm combinations we want to define.  These are the
   OID that Section 10 will ask for IANA to assign._

8.  In Practice

   _EDNOTE: This section will talk about practical issue of how these
   certificates will be used.  For example it will talk about the size
   of these certs and cert chains.  It will explain that if a cert in
   the chain is a Composite cert then the whole chain needs to be of
   Composite Certs.  It will also explain that the root CA cert does not
   have to be of the same algorithms.  The root cert SHOULD NOT be
   transferred in the authentication exchange to save transport overhead
   and thus it can be different than the intermediate and leaf certs.
   It will talk about overhead (size and processing).  It will also
   discuss backwards compatibility.  It could include a subsection about
   implementation considerations._

9.  Implications for existing standards

9.1.  RFC 2986

   _EDNOTE: summarize the updates to RFC 2986 (CSR / PKCS#10)._

9.2.  RFC 5280

   _EDNOTE: summarize the updates to RFC 5280 (X.509)._

9.3.  Cryptographic protocols

   This section talks about how protocols like (D)TLS and IKEv2 are
   affected by this specifications.  It will not attempt to solve all
   these problems, but it will explain the rationale, how things will
   work and what open problems need to be solved.  Obvious issues that
   need to be discussed.

   o  How does the protocol declare support for composite signatures?
      TLS has hooks for declaring support for specific signature
      algorithms, however it would need to be extended, because the
      client would need to declare support for both the composite

Ounsworth, et al.       Expires September 9, 2019              [Page 12]

Internet-Draft             PQ Composite Certs                 March 2019

      infrastructure, as well as for the various component signature

   o  How does the protocol use the multiple keys.  The obvious way
      would be to have the server sign using its composite public key;
      is this sufficient.

   o  Overhead; including certificate size, signature processing time,
      and size of the signature.

   o  How to deal with crypto protocols that use public key encryption
      algorithms; this document only lists how to work with signature
      algorithms.  Encoding composite public keys is straightforward;
      encoding composite ciphertexts is less so - we decided to put that
      off to another draft.

10.  IANA Considerations

   _EDNOTE: This section will include content only if new OIDs or IANA
   codepoints are assigned for it._

11.  Security Considerations

   _EDNOTE: This section includes the Security Considerations._

   o  CA implementations need to be careful when checking for
      compromised key reuse, for example as required by WebTrust
      regulations; unpack the CompositePublicKey structure and compare
      individual keys.

   o  The corresponding multi-key encryption routine is considerably
      more prone to implementation errors that will result in a
      catestrophic loss of security, as compared with the signature
      algorithms specified in this document.

12.  Appendices

12.1.  Intellection Property Considerations

   The authors claim no IPR associated with any of the content of this

12.2.  Comparison with draft-truskovsky-lamps-pq-hybrid-x509

   _EDNOTE: This section will explain the differences from . IPR Claims
   should be mentioned here if necessary.  Other things to consider are
   the things like simplicity and format, inadvertnt implementation
   errors, algorithm agility._[I-D.truskovsky-lamps-pq-hybrid-x509]

Ounsworth, et al.       Expires September 9, 2019              [Page 13]

Internet-Draft             PQ Composite Certs                 March 2019

13.  Contributors

   This document incorporates contributions and comments from a large
   group of experts.  The Editor would especially like to acknowledge
   the tireless dedication of the following people, who attended many
   long meetings and generated millions of bytes of electronic mail over
   the past 3 years months in pursuit of this document:

   We are grateful to all, including any contributors who may have been
   inadvertently omitted from this list.

14.  Acknowledgenents

   _EDNOTE: this section include all those that need to be acknowledged
   in the draft_

15.  References

15.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

   [RFC2986]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
              Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <>.

15.2.  Informative References

              Pala, M., "Composite Public Keys and Signatures", draft-
              pala-composite-crypto-00 (work in progress), February

Ounsworth, et al.       Expires September 9, 2019              [Page 14]

Internet-Draft             PQ Composite Certs                 March 2019

              Truskovsky, A., Geest, D., Fluhrer, S., Kampanakis, P.,
              Ounsworth, M., and S. Mister, "Multiple Public-Key
              Algorithm X.509 Certificates", draft-truskovsky-lamps-pq-
              hybrid-x509-01 (work in progress), August 2018.

Authors' Addresses

   Mike Ounsworth
   Entrust Datacard Limited
   1000 Innovation Drive
   Ottawa, Ontario  K2K 1E3


   Serge Mister
   Entrust Datacard Limited


   John Gray
   Entrust Datacard Limited


   Scott Fluhrer
   Cisco Systems


   Panos Kampanakis
   Cisco Systems


Ounsworth, et al.       Expires September 9, 2019              [Page 15]