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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11               Experimental
          rfc9230                                                       
Network Working Group                                         E. Kinnear
Internet-Draft                                                Apple Inc.
Intended status: Experimental                                 P. McManus
Expires: 21 August 2022                                           Fastly
                                                                T. Pauly
                                                              Apple Inc.
                                                                T. Verma
                                                               C.A. Wood
                                                              Cloudflare
                                                        17 February 2022


                        Oblivious DNS Over HTTPS
                  draft-pauly-dprive-oblivious-doh-11

Abstract

   This document describes a protocol that allows clients to hide their
   IP addresses from DNS resolvers via proxying encrypted DNS over HTTPS
   (DoH) messages.  This improves privacy of DNS operations by not
   allowing any one server entity to be aware of both the client IP
   address and the content of DNS queries and answers.

   This experimental protocol is developed outside the IETF and is
   published here to guide implementation, ensure interoperability among
   implementations, and enable wide-scale experimentation.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 August 2022.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.



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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Deployment Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  HTTP Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  HTTP Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  HTTP Request Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.3.  HTTP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.4.  HTTP Response Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.5.  HTTP Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Configuration and Public Key Format . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Protocol Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.1.  Message Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.2.  Encryption and Decryption Routines  . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  Oblivious Client Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  Oblivious Target Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   9.  Compliance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   10. Experiment Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     11.1.  Denial of Service  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     11.2.  Proxy Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     11.3.  Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     12.1.  Oblivious DoH Message Media Type . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   14. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     14.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     14.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   Appendix A.  Use of Generic Proxy Services  . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20

1.  Introduction

   DNS Over HTTPS (DoH) [RFC8484] defines a mechanism to allow DNS
   messages to be transmitted in HTTP messages protected with TLS.  This
   provides improved confidentiality and authentication for DNS
   interactions in various circumstances.



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   While DoH can prevent eavesdroppers from directly reading the
   contents of DNS exchanges, clients cannot send DNS queries to and
   receive answers from servers without revealing their local IP address
   (and thus information about the identity or location of the client)
   to the server.

   Proposals such as Oblivious DNS ([I-D.annee-dprive-oblivious-dns])
   increase privacy by ensuring no single DNS server is aware of both
   the client IP address and the message contents.

   This document defines Oblivious DoH, an experimental protocol built
   on DoH that permits proxied resolution, in which DNS messages are
   encrypted so that no server can independently read both the client IP
   address and the DNS message contents.

   As with DoH, DNS messages exchanged over Oblivious DoH are fully-
   formed DNS messages.  Clients that want to receive answers that are
   relevant to the network they are on without revealing their exact IP
   address can thus use the EDNS0 Client Subnet option [RFC7871],
   Section 7.1.2 to provide a hint to the resolver using Oblivious DoH.

   This mechanism is intended to be used as one mechanism for resolving
   privacy-sensitive content in the broader context of DNS privacy.

   This experimental protocol is developed outside the IETF and is
   published here to guide implementation, ensure interoperability among
   implementations, and enable wide-scale experimentation.  See
   Section 10 for more details about the experiment.

1.1.  Specification of Requirements

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Terminology

   This document defines the following terms:

   Oblivious Proxy:  An HTTP server that proxies encrypted DNS queries
      and responses between a Client and an Oblivious Target, and is
      identified by a URI template [RFC6570] (see Section 4.1).  Note
      that this Oblivious Proxy is not acting as a full HTTP proxy, but
      is instead a specialized server used to forward oblivious DNS
      messages.




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   Oblivious Target:  An HTTP server that receives and decrypts
      encrypted Client DNS queries from an Oblivious Proxy, and returns
      encrypted DNS responses via that same Proxy.  In order to provide
      DNS responses, the Target can be a DNS resolver, be co-located
      with a resolver, or forward to a resolver.

   Throughout the rest of this document, we use the terms Proxy and
   Target to refer to an Oblivious Proxy and Oblivious Target,
   respectively.

3.  Deployment Requirements

   Oblivious DoH requires, at a minimum:

   *  An Oblivious Proxy server, identified by a URI template.

   *  An Oblivious Target server.  The Target and Proxy are expected to
      be non-colluding (see Section 11).

   *  One or more Target public keys for encrypting DNS queries send to
      a Target via a Proxy (Section 5).  These keys guarantee that only
      the intended Target can decrypt Client queries.

   The mechanism for discovering and provisioning the Proxy URI template
   and Target public keys is out of scope of this document.

4.  HTTP Exchange

   Unlike direct resolution, oblivious hostname resolution over DoH
   involves three parties:

   1.  The Client, which generates queries.

   2.  The Proxy, which receives encrypted queries from the Client and
       passes them on to a Target.

   3.  The Target, which receives proxied queries from the Client via
       the Proxy and produces proxied answers.

        --- [ Request encrypted with Target public key ] -->
   +---------+             +-----------+             +-----------+
   | Client  +-------------> Oblivious +-------------> Oblivious |
   |         <-------------+   Proxy   <-------------+  Target   |
   +---------+             +-----------+             +-----------+
       <-- [   Response encrypted with symmetric key   ] ---

                     Figure 1: Obvlivious DoH Exchange




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4.1.  HTTP Request

   Oblivious DoH queries are created by the Client, and sent to the
   Proxy as HTTP requests using the POST method.  Clients are configured
   with a Proxy URI Template [RFC6570] and the Target URI.  The scheme
   for both the Proxy URI Template and the Target URI MUST be "https".
   The Proxy URI Template uses the Level 3 encoding defined in
   Section 1.2 of [RFC6570], and contains two variables: "targethost",
   which indicates the host name of the Target server; and "targetpath",
   which indicates the path on which the Target is accessible.  Examples
   of Proxy URI Templates are shown below:

   https://dnsproxy.example/dns-query{?targethost,targetpath}
   https://dnsproxy.example/{targethost}/{targetpath}

   The URI Template MUST contain both the "targethost" and "targetpath"
   variables exactly once, and MUST NOT contain any other variables.
   The variables MUST be within the path or query components of the URI.
   Clients MUST ignore configurations that do not conform to this
   template.  See Section 4.2 for an example request.

   Oblivious DoH messages have no cache value since both requests and
   responses are encrypted using ephemeral key material.  Requests and
   responses MUST NOT be cached.

   Clients MUST set the HTTP Content-Type header to "application/
   oblivious-dns-message" to indicate that this request is an Oblivious
   DoH query intended for proxying.  Clients also SHOULD set this same
   value for the HTTP Accept header.

   A correctly encoded request has the HTTP Content-Type header
   "application/oblivious-dns-message", uses the HTTP POST method, and
   contains "targethost" and "targetpath" variables.  If the Proxy fails
   to match the "targethost" and "targetpath" variables from the path,
   it MUST treat the request as malformed.  The Proxy constructs the URI
   of the Target with the "https" scheme, using the value of
   "targethost" as the URI host, and the percent-decoded value of
   "targetpath" as the URI path.  Proxies MUST check that Client
   requests are correctly encoded, and MUST return a 4xx (Client Error)
   if the check fails, along with the Proxy-Status response header with
   an "error" parameter of type "http_request_error"
   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-proxy-status].

   Proxies MAY choose to not forward connections to non-standard ports.
   In such cases, Proxies can indicate the error with a 403 response
   status code, along with a Proxy-Status response header with an
   "error" parameter of type "http_request_denied", along with an
   appropriate explanation in "details".



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   If the Proxy cannot establish a connection to the Target, it can
   indicate the error with a 502 response status code, along with a
   Proxy-Status response header with an "error" parameter whose type
   indicates the reason.  For example, if DNS resolution fails, the
   error type might be "dns_timeout", whereas if the TLS connection
   failed the error type might be "tls_protocol_error".

   Upon receipt of requests from a Proxy, Targets MUST validate that the
   request has the HTTP Content-Type header "application/oblivious-dns-
   message" and uses the HTTP POST method.  Targets can respond with a
   4xx response status code if this check fails.

4.2.  HTTP Request Example

   The following example shows how a Client requests that a Proxy,
   "dnsproxy.example", forwards an encrypted message to
   "dnstarget.example".  The URI Template for the Proxy is
   "https://dnsproxy.example/dns-query{?targethost,targetpath}".  The
   URI for the Target is "https://dnstarget.example/dns-query".

   :method = POST
   :scheme = https
   :authority = dnsproxy.example
   :path = /dns-query?targethost=dnstarget.example&targetpath=/dns-query
   accept = application/oblivious-dns-message
   content-type = application/oblivious-dns-message
   content-length = 106

   <Bytes containing an encrypted Oblivious DNS query>

   The Proxy then sends the following request on to the Target:

   :method = POST
   :scheme = https
   :authority = dnstarget.example
   :path = /dns-query
   accept = application/oblivious-dns-message
   content-type = application/oblivious-dns-message
   content-length = 106

   <Bytes containing an encrypted Oblivious DNS query>

4.3.  HTTP Response

   The response to an Oblivious DoH query is generated by the Target.
   It MUST set the Content-Type HTTP header to "application/oblivious-
   dns-message" for all successful responses.  The body of the response
   contains an encrypted DNS message; see Section 6.



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   The response from a Target MUST set the Content-Type HTTP header to
   "application/oblivious-dns-message" which MUST be forwarded by the
   Proxy to the Client.  A Client MUST only consider a response which
   contains the Content-Type header in the response before processing
   the payload.  A response without the appropriate header MUST be
   treated as an error and be handled appropriately.  All other aspects
   of the HTTP response and error handling are inherited from standard
   DoH.

   Proxies forward responses from the Target to client, without any
   modifications to the body or status code.  The Proxy also SHOULD add
   a Proxy-Status response header with an "received-status" parameter
   indicating that the status code was generated by the Target.

   Note that if a Client receives a 3xx status code and chooses to
   follow a redirect, the subsequent request MUST also be performed
   through a Proxy in order to avoid directly exposing requests to the
   Target.

   Requests that cannot be processed by the Target result in 4xx (Client
   Error) responses.  If the Target and Client keys do not match, it is
   an authorization failure (HTTP status code 401; see Section 3.1 of
   [RFC7235]).  Otherwise, if the Client's request is invalid, such as
   in the case of decryption failure, wrong message type, or
   deserialization failure, this is a bad request (HTTP status code 400;
   see Section 6.5.1 of [RFC7231]).

   Even in case of DNS responses indicating failure, such as SERVFAIL or
   NXDOMAIN, a successful HTTP response with a 2xx status code is used
   as long as the DNS response is valid.  This is identical to how DoH
   [RFC8484] handles HTTP response codes.

4.4.  HTTP Response Example

   The following example shows a 2xx (Successful) response that can be
   sent from a Target to a Client via a Proxy.

   :status = 200
   content-type = application/oblivious-dns-message
   content-length = 154

   <Bytes containing an encrypted Oblivious DNS response>









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4.5.  HTTP Metadata

   Proxies forward requests and responses between Clients and Targets as
   specified in Section 4.1.  Metadata sent with these messages could
   inadvertently weaken or remove Oblivious DoH privacy properties.
   Proxies MUST NOT send any Client-identifying information about
   Clients to Targets, such as "Forwarded" HTTP headers [RFC7239].
   Additionally, Clients MUST NOT include any private state in requests
   to Proxies, such as HTTP cookies.  See Section 11.3 for related
   discussion about Client authentication information.

5.  Configuration and Public Key Format

   In order send a message to a Target, the Client needs to know a
   public key to use for encrypting its queries.  The mechanism for
   discovering this configuration is out of scope of this document.

   Servers ought to rotate public keys regularly.  It is RECOMMENDED
   that servers rotate keys every day.  Shorter rotation windows reduce
   the anonymity set of Clients that might use the public key, whereas
   longer rotation windows widen the timeframe of possible compromise.

   An Oblivious DNS public key configuration is a structure encoded,
   using TLS-style encoding [RFC8446], as follows:

   struct {
      uint16 kem_id;
      uint16 kdf_id;
      uint16 aead_id;
      opaque public_key<1..2^16-1>;
   } ObliviousDoHConfigContents;

   struct {
      uint16 version;
      uint16 length;
      select (ObliviousDoHConfig.version) {
         case 0x0001: ObliviousDoHConfigContents contents;
      }
   } ObliviousDoHConfig;

   ObliviousDoHConfig ObliviousDoHConfigs<1..2^16-1>;

   The ObliviousDoHConfigs structure contains one or more
   ObliviousDoHConfig structures in decreasing order of preference.
   This allows a server to support multiple versions of Oblivious DoH
   and multiple sets of Oblivious DoH parameters.





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   An ObliviousDoHConfig contains a versioned representation of an
   Oblivious DoH configuration, with the following fields.

   version  The version of Oblivious DoH for which this configuration is
      used.  Clients MUST ignore any ObliviousDoHConfig structure with a
      version they do not support.  The version of Oblivious DoH
      specified in this document is 0x0001.

   length  The length, in bytes, of the next field.

   contents  An opaque byte string whose contents depend on the version.
      For this specification, the contents are an
      ObliviousDoHConfigContents structure.

   An ObliviousDoHConfigContents contains the information needed to
   encrypt a message under ObliviousDoHConfigContents.public_key such
   that only the owner of the corresponding private key can decrypt the
   message.  The values for ObliviousDoHConfigContents.kem_id,
   ObliviousDoHConfigContents.kdf_id, and
   ObliviousDoHConfigContents.aead_id are described in Section 7 of
   [HPKE].  The fields in this structure are as follows:

   kem_id  The HPKE KEM identifier corresponding to public_key.  Clients
      MUST ignore any ObliviousDoHConfig structure with a key using a
      KEM they do not support.

   kdf_id  The HPKE KDF identifier corresponding to public_key.  Clients
      MUST ignore any ObliviousDoHConfig structure with a key using a
      KDF they do not support.

   aead_id  The HPKE AEAD identifier corresponding to public_key.
      Clients MUST ignore any ObliviousDoHConfig structure with a key
      using an AEAD they do not support.

   public_key  The HPKE public key used by the Client to encrypt
      Oblivious DoH queries.

6.  Protocol Encoding

   This section includes encoding and wire format details for Oblivious
   DoH, as well as routines for encrypting and decrypting encoded
   values.

6.1.  Message Format

   There are two types of Oblivious DoH messages: Queries (0x01) and
   Responses (0x02).  Both messages carry the following information:




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   1.  A DNS message, which is either a Query or Response, depending on
       context.

   2.  Padding of arbitrary length which MUST contain all zeros.

   They are encoded using the following structure:

   struct {
      opaque dns_message<1..2^16-1>;
      opaque padding<0..2^16-1>;
   } ObliviousDoHMessagePlaintext;

   Both Query and Response messages use the ObliviousDoHMessagePlaintext
   format.

   ObliviousDoHMessagePlaintext ObliviousDoHQuery;
   ObliviousDoHMessagePlaintext ObliviousDoHResponse;

   An encrypted ObliviousDoHMessagePlaintext is carried in a
   ObliviousDoHMessage message, encoded as follows:

   struct {
      uint8  message_type;
      opaque key_id<0..2^16-1>;
      opaque encrypted_message<1..2^16-1>;
   } ObliviousDoHMessage;

   The ObliviousDoHMessage structure contains the following fields:

   message_type  A one-byte identifier for the type of message.  Query
      messages use message_type 0x01, and Response messages use
      message_type 0x02.

   key_id  The identifier of the corresponding
      ObliviousDoHConfigContents key.  This is computed as
      Expand(Extract("", config), "odoh key id", Nh), where config is
      the ObliviousDoHConfigContents structure and Extract, Expand, and
      Nh are as specified by the HPKE cipher suite KDF corresponding to
      config.kdf_id.

   encrypted_message  An encrypted message for the Oblivious Target (for
      Query messages) or Client (for Response messages).
      Implementations MAY enforce limits on the size of this field
      depending on the size of plaintext DNS messages.  (DNS queries,
      for example, will not reach the size limit of 2^16-1 in practice.)






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   The contents of ObliviousDoHMessage.encrypted_message depend on
   ObliviousDoHMessage.message_type.  In particular,
   ObliviousDoHMessage.encrypted_message is an encryption of a
   ObliviousDoHQuery if the message is a Query, and ObliviousDoHResponse
   if the message is a Response.

6.2.  Encryption and Decryption Routines

   Clients use the following utility functions for encrypting a Query
   and decrypting a Response as described in Section 7.

   encrypt_query_body: Encrypt an Oblivious DoH query.

   def encrypt_query_body(pkR, key_id, Q_plain):
     enc, context = SetupBaseS(pkR, "odoh query")
     aad = 0x01 || len(key_id) || key_id
     ct = context.Seal(aad, Q_plain)
     Q_encrypted = enc || ct
     return Q_encrypted

   decrypt_response_body: Decrypt an Oblivious DoH response.

   def decrypt_response_body(context, Q_plain, R_encrypted, resp_nonce):
     aead_key, aead_nonce = derive_secrets(context, Q_plain, resp_nonce)
     aad = 0x02 || len(resp_nonce) || resp_nonce
     R_plain, error = Open(key, nonce, aad, R_encrypted)
     return R_plain, error

   The derive_secrets function is described below.

   Targets use the following utility functions in processing queries and
   producing responses as described in Section 8.

   setup_query_context: Set up an HPKE context used for decrypting an
   Oblivious DoH query.

   def setup_query_context(skR, key_id, Q_encrypted):
     enc || ct = Q_encrypted
     context = SetupBaseR(enc, skR, "odoh query")
     return context

   decrypt_query_body: Decrypt an Oblivious DoH query.

   def decrypt_query_body(context, key_id, Q_encrypted):
     aad = 0x01 || len(key_id) || key_id
     enc || ct = Q_encrypted
     Q_plain, error = context.Open(aad, ct)
     return Q_plain, error



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   derive_secrets: Derive keying material used for encrypting an
   Oblivious DoH response.

   def derive_secrets(context, Q_plain, resp_nonce):
     secret = context.Export("odoh response", Nk)
     salt = Q_plain || len(resp_nonce) || resp_nonce
     prk = Extract(salt, secret)
     key = Expand(odoh_prk, "odoh key", Nk)
     nonce = Expand(odoh_prk, "odoh nonce", Nn)
     return key, nonce

   The random(N) function returns N cryptographically secure random
   bytes from a good source of entropy [RFC4086].  The max(A, B)
   function returns A if A > B, and B otherwise.

   encrypt_response_body: Encrypt an Oblivious DoH response.

   def encrypt_response_body(R_plain, aead_key, aead_nonce, resp_nonce):
     aad = 0x02 || len(resp_nonce) || resp_nonce
     R_encrypted = Seal(aead_key, aead_nonce, aad, R_plain)
     return R_encrypted

7.  Oblivious Client Behavior

   Let M be a DNS message (query) a Client wishes to protect with
   Oblivious DoH.  When sending an Oblivious DoH Query for resolving M
   to an Oblivious Target with ObliviousDoHConfigContents config, a
   Client does the following:

   1.  Create an ObliviousDoHQuery structure, carrying the message M and
       padding, to produce Q_plain.

   2.  Deserialize config.public_key to produce a public key pkR of type
       config.kem_id.

   3.  Compute the encrypted message as Q_encrypted =
       encrypt_query_body(pkR, key_id, Q_plain), where key_id is as
       computed in Section 6.  Note also that len(key_id) outputs the
       length of key_id as a two-byte unsigned integer.

   4.  Output an ObliviousDoHMessage message Q where Q.message_type =
       0x01, Q.key_id carries key_id, and Q.encrypted_message =
       Q_encrypted.








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   The Client then sends Q to the Proxy according to Section 4.1.  Once
   the Client receives a response R, encrypted as specified in
   Section 8, it uses decrypt_response_body to decrypt
   R.encrypted_message (using R.key_id as a nonce) and produce R_plain.
   Clients MUST validate R_plain.padding (as all zeros) before using
   R_plain.dns_message.

8.  Oblivious Target Behavior

   Targets that receive a Query message Q decrypt and process it as
   follows:

   1.  Look up the ObliviousDoHConfigContents according to Q.key_id.  If
       no such key exists, the Target MAY discard the query, and if so,
       it MUST return a 401 (Unauthorized) response to the Proxy.
       Otherwise, let skR be the private key corresponding to this
       public key, or one chosen for trial decryption.

   2.  Compute context = setup_query_context(skR, Q.key_id,
       Q.encrypted_message).

   3.  Compute Q_plain, error = decrypt_query_body(context, Q.key_id,
       Q.encrypted_message).

   4.  If no error was returned, and Q_plain.padding is valid (all
       zeros), resolve Q_plain.dns_message as needed, yielding a DNS
       message M.  Otherwise, if an error was returned or the padding
       was invalid, return a 400 (Client Error) response to the Proxy.

   5.  Create an ObliviousDoHResponseBody structure, carrying the
       message M and padding, to produce R_plain.

   6.  Create a fresh nonce resp_nonce = random(max(Nn, Nk)).

   7.  Compute aead_key, aead_nonce = derive_secrets(context, Q_plain,
       resp_nonce).

   8.  Compute R_encrypted = encrypt_response_body(R_plain, aead_key,
       aead_nonce, resp_nonce).  The key_id field used for encryption
       carries resp_nonce in order for Clients to derive the same
       secrets.  Also, the Seal function is that which is associated
       with the HPKE AEAD.

   9.  Output an ObliviousDoHMessage message R where R.message_type =
       0x02, R.key_id = resp_nonce, and R.encrypted_message =
       R_encrypted.





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   The Target then sends R in a 2xx (Successful) response to the Proxy;
   see Section 4.3.  The Proxy forwards the message R without
   modification back to the Client as the HTTP response to the Client's
   original HTTP request.  In the event of an error (non 2xx status
   code), the Proxy forwards the Target error to the Client; see
   Section 4.3.

9.  Compliance Requirements

   Oblivious DoH uses HPKE for public key encryption [HPKE].  In the
   absence of an application profile standard specifying otherwise, a
   compliant Oblivious DoH implementation MUST support the following
   HPKE cipher suite:

   *  KEM: DHKEM(X25519, HKDF-SHA256) (see [HPKE], Section 7.1)

   *  KDF: HKDF-SHA256 (see [HPKE], Section 7.2)

   *  AEAD: AES-128-GCM (see [HPKE], Section 7.3)

10.  Experiment Overview

   This document describes an experimental protocol built on DoH.  The
   purpose of this experiment is to assess deployment configuration
   viability and related performance impacts on DNS resolution by
   measuring key performance indicators such as resolution latency.
   Experiment participants will test various parameters affecting
   service operation and performance, including mechanisms for discovery
   and configuration of DoH Proxies and Targets, as well as performance
   implications of connection reuse and pools where appropriate.  The
   results of this experiment will be used to influence future protocol
   design and deployment efforts related to Oblivious DoH, such as
   Oblivious HTTP [OHTP].  Implementations of DoH that are not involved
   in the experiment will not recognize this protocol and will not
   participate in the experiment.  It is anticipated that use of
   Oblivious DoH and the duration of this experiment to be widespread.

11.  Security Considerations

   Oblivious DoH aims to keep knowledge of the true query origin and its
   contents known only to Clients.  As a simplified model, consider a
   case where there exists two Clients C1 and C2, one proxy P, and one
   Target T.  Oblivious DoH assumes an extended Dolev-Yao style attacker
   which can observe all network activity and can adaptively compromise
   either P or T, but not C1 or C2.  Note that compromising both P and T
   is equivalent to collusion between these two parties in practice.
   Once compromised, the attacker has access to all session information
   and private key material.  (This generalizes to arbitrarily many



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   Clients, Proxies, and Targets, with the constraints that not all
   Targets and Proxies are simultaneously compromised, and at least two
   Clients are left uncompromised.)  The attacker is prohibited from
   sending Client identifying information, such as IP addresses, to
   Targets.  (This would allow the attacker to trivially link a query to
   the corresponding Client.)

   In this model, both C1 and C2 send an Oblivious DoH queries Q1 and
   Q2, respectively, through P to T, and T provides answers A1 and A2.
   The attacker aims to link C1 to (Q1, A1) and C2 to (Q2, A2),
   respectively.  The attacker succeeds if this linkability is possible
   without any additional interaction.  (For example, if T is
   compromised, it could return a DNS answer corresponding to an entity
   it controls, and then observe the subsequent connection from a
   Client, learning its identity in the process.  Such attacks are out
   of scope for this model.)

   Oblivious DoH security prevents such linkability.  Informally, this
   means:

   1.  Queries and answers are known only to Clients and Targets in
       possession of the corresponding response key and HPKE keying
       material.  In particular, Proxies know the origin and destination
       of an oblivious query, yet do not know the plaintext query.
       Likewise, Targets know only the oblivious query origin, i.e., the
       Proxy, and the plaintext query.  Only the Client knows both the
       plaintext query contents and destination.

   2.  Target resolvers cannot link queries from the same Client in the
       absence of unique per-Client keys.

   Traffic analysis mitigations are outside the scope of this document.
   In particular, this document does not prescribe padding lengths for
   ObliviousDoHQuery and ObliviousDoHResponse messages.  Implementations
   SHOULD follow the guidance for choosing padding length in [RFC8467].

   Oblivious DoH security does not depend on Proxy and Target
   indistinguishability.  Specifically, an on-path attacker could
   determine whether a connection a specific endpoint is used for
   oblivious or direct DoH queries.  However, this has no effect on
   confidentiality goals listed above.










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11.1.  Denial of Service

   Malicious clients (or Proxies) can send bogus Oblivious DoH queries
   to targets as a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack.  Target servers can
   throttle processing requests if such an event occurs.  Additionally,
   since Targets provide explicit errors upon decryption failure, i.e.,
   if ciphertext decryption fails or if the plaintext DNS message is
   malformed, Proxies can throttle specific clients in response to these
   errors.  In general, however, Targets trust Proxies to not overwhelm
   the Target, and it is expected that Proxies either implement some
   form of rate limiting or client authentication to limit abuse; see
   Section 11.3.

   Malicious Targets or Proxies can send bogus answers in response to
   Oblivious DoH queries.  Response decryption failure is a signal that
   either the Proxy or Target is misbehaving.  Clients can choose to
   stop using one or both of these servers in the event of such failure.
   However, as above, malicious Targets and Proxies are out of scope for
   the threat model.

11.2.  Proxy Policies

   Proxies are free to enforce any forwarding policy they desire for
   Clients.  For example, they can choose to only forward requests to
   known or otherwise trusted Targets.

   Proxies that do not reuse connections to Targets for many Clients may
   allow Targets to link individual queries to unknown Targets.  To
   mitigate this linkability vector, it is RECOMMENDED that Proxies pool
   and reuse connections to Targets.  Note that this benefits
   performance as well as privacy since queries do not incur any delay
   that might otherwise result from Proxy-to-Target connection
   establishment.

11.3.  Authentication

   Depending on the deployment scenario, Proxies and Targets might
   require authentication before use.  Regardless of the authentication
   mechanism in place, Proxies MUST NOT reveal any Client authentication
   information to Targets.  This is required so Targets cannot uniquely
   identify individual Clients.

   Note that if Targets require Proxies to authenticate at the HTTP- or
   application-layer before use, this ought to be done before attempting
   to forward any Client query to the Target.  This will allow Proxies
   to distinguish 401 Unauthorized response codes due to authentication
   failure from 401 Unauthorized response codes due to Client key
   mismatch; see Section 4.3.



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12.  IANA Considerations

   This document makes changes to the "Multipurpose Internet Mail
   Extensions (MIME) and Media Types" registry.  The changes are
   described in the following subsection.

12.1.  Oblivious DoH Message Media Type

   This document registers a new media type, "application/oblivious-dns-
   message".

   Type name: application

   Subtype name: oblivious-dns-message

   Required parameters: N/A

   Optional parameters: N/A

   Encoding considerations: This is a binary format, containing
   encrypted DNS requests and responses encoded as ObliviousDoHMessage
   values, as defined in Section 6.1.

   Security considerations: See this document.  The content is an
   encrypted DNS message, and not executable code.

   Interoperability considerations: This document specifies format of
   conforming messages and the interpretation thereof; see Section 6.1.

   Published specification: This document.

   Applications that use this media type: This media type is intended to
   be used by Clients wishing to hide their DNS queries when using DNS
   over HTTPS.

   Additional information: N/A

   Person and email address to contact for further information: See
   Authors' Addresses section

   Intended usage: COMMON

   Restrictions on usage: N/A

   Author: Tommy Pauly tpauly@apple.com (mailto:tpauly@apple.com)

   Change controller: IETF




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   Provisional registration? (standards tree only): No

13.  Acknowledgments

   This work is inspired by Oblivious DNS
   [I-D.annee-dprive-oblivious-dns].  Thanks to all of the authors of
   that document.  Thanks to Nafeez Ahamed, Elliot Briggs, Marwan Fayed,
   Frederic Jacobs, Tommy Jensen, Jonathan Hoyland, Paul Schmitt, Brian
   Swander, Erik Nygren, and Peter Wu for the feedback and input.

14.  References

14.1.  Normative References

   [HPKE]     Barnes, R. L., Bhargavan, K., Lipp, B., and C. A. Wood,
              "Hybrid Public Key Encryption", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-12, 2 September 2021,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-
              12.txt>.

   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-proxy-status]
              Nottingham, M. and P. Sikora, "The Proxy-Status HTTP
              Response Header Field", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-ietf-httpbis-proxy-status-08, 13 October 2021,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-proxy-
              status-08.txt>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
              "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.

   [RFC6570]  Gregorio, J., Fielding, R., Hadley, M., Nottingham, M.,
              and D. Orchard, "URI Template", RFC 6570,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6570, March 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6570>.

   [RFC7231]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.





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   [RFC7235]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

   [RFC8467]  Mayrhofer, A., "Padding Policies for Extension Mechanisms
              for DNS (EDNS(0))", RFC 8467, DOI 10.17487/RFC8467,
              October 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8467>.

   [RFC8484]  Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
              (DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.

14.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.annee-dprive-oblivious-dns]
              Edmundson, A., Schmitt, P., Feamster, N., and A. Mankin,
              "Oblivious DNS - Strong Privacy for DNS Queries", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-annee-dprive-oblivious-
              dns-00, 2 July 2018, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/
              draft-annee-dprive-oblivious-dns-00.txt>.

   [OHTP]     Thomson, M. and C. A. Wood, "Oblivious HTTP", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ohai-ohttp-01, 15
              February 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
              ietf-ohai-ohttp-01.txt>.

   [RFC7239]  Petersson, A. and M. Nilsson, "Forwarded HTTP Extension",
              RFC 7239, DOI 10.17487/RFC7239, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7239>.

   [RFC7871]  Contavalli, C., van der Gaast, W., Lawrence, D., and W.
              Kumari, "Client Subnet in DNS Queries", RFC 7871,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7871, May 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7871>.








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Appendix A.  Use of Generic Proxy Services

   Using DoH over anonymizing proxy services such as Tor can also
   achieve the desired goal of separating query origins from their
   contents.  However, there are several reasons why such systems are
   undesirable in comparison Oblivious DoH:

   1.  Tor is meant to be a generic connection-level anonymity system,
       and incurs higher latency costs and protocol complexity for the
       purpose of proxying individual DNS queries.  In contrast,
       Oblivious DoH is a lightweight protocol built on DoH, implemented
       as an application-layer proxy, that can be enabled as a default
       mode for users which need increased privacy.

   2.  As a one-hop proxy, Oblivious DoH encourages connection-less
       proxies to mitigate Client query correlation with few round-
       trips.  In contrast, multi-hop systems such as Tor often run
       secure connections (TLS) end-to-end, which means that DoH servers
       could track queries over the same connection.  Using a fresh DoH
       connection per query would incur a non-negligible penalty in
       connection setup time.

Authors' Addresses

   Eric Kinnear
   Apple Inc.
   One Apple Park Way
   Cupertino, California 95014,
   United States of America
   Email: ekinnear@apple.com


   Patrick McManus
   Fastly
   Email: mcmanus@ducksong.com


   Tommy Pauly
   Apple Inc.
   One Apple Park Way
   Cupertino, California 95014,
   United States of America
   Email: tpauly@apple.com








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   Tanya Verma
   Cloudflare
   101 Townsend St
   San Francisco,
   United States of America
   Email: vermatanyax@gmail.com


   Christopher A. Wood
   Cloudflare
   101 Townsend St
   San Francisco,
   United States of America
   Email: caw@heapingbits.net





































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