Network Working Group E. Karelina, Ed.
Internet-Draft InfoTeCS
Intended status: Informational April 30, 2021
Expires: November 1, 2021
Password-based key protection
draft-pkcs5-gost-00
Abstract
This document supplements [RFC8018]. It contains the specifications
of the cryptographic algorithms defined by the Russian national
standards for their implementation of generating general key in the
password-based schemes.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on November 1, 2021.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Basic Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Algorithm for generating a key from a password . . . . . . . 4
5. Data encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1. GOST 28147-89 data encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1.1. Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1.2. Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.2. GOST R 34.12-2015 data encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.2.1. Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2.2. Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Message Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. The MAC generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.2. The MAC verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. Identifiers and parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A.1. PBKDF2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.2. PBES2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.3. Identifier and parametrs of Gost28147-89 encryption sheme 12
A.4. Identifier and parametrs of Gost34.12-2015 encryption
sheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A.5. PBMAC1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix B. PBKDF2 HMAC_GOSTR3411 Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix C. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction
This document supplements [RFC8018]. It describes the
recommendations for using in the information systems with the
realisations of the GOST 28147-89 and GOST R 34.12-2015 encryption
algorithms and the GOST R 34.11-2012 hashing functions in public and
corporate networks to protect non-state information. The use of the
GOST 28147-89 encryption algorithm in these mechanisms remains for
compatibility with existing implementations. The methods described
in these recommendations are designed to generate key information
using the user's password and protect information using the generated
keys.
2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
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14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Basic Terms and Definitions
Throughout this document, the following notations are used:
P a password in Unicode UTF-8
S a random initializing value
c a number of iterations of algorithm, a
positive integer
dkLen a length in bytes of derived key, a
positive integer
DK a derived key of length dkLen
B_n a set of all byte row vectors
of length n, n >= 0; if n = 0,
then the set B_n consists of an empty
string of length 0
A||C a concatenation of two byte strings A, C,
i.e., a vector from B_(|A|+|C|), where the
left subvector from B_(|A|) is
equal to the vector A and the right
subvector from B_(|C|) is equal to the
vector C
\xor a bit-wise exclusive-or of two byte strings
of the same length
R^n_r: B_n -> B_r a truncating a byte string to size r by
removing the least significant n-r bytes
Int(i) a four-byte encoding of the integer i =<
2^32: (i_1, i_2, i_3, i_4) \in B_4, i = i_1
+ 2^8 * i_2 + 2^16 * i_3 + 2^24 * i_4
b[i, j] a substring extraction operator: extracts
bytes i through j, 0 =< i =< j.
CEIL(x) the smallest integer greater than, or equal
to, x
This document uses the following abbreviations and symbols:
HMAC_GOSTR3411 Hashed-based Message Authentication Code.
A function for calculating a message
authentication code, based on
the GOST R 34.11-2012 hash function with
512-bit output in accordance with
[RFC2104].
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4. Algorithm for generating a key from a password
The DK key is calculated as a diversification function PBKDF2(P, S,
c, dkLen) using the HMAC_GOSTR3411 function as the PRF pseudo-random
function:
DK = PBKDF2(P,S,c,dkLen).
The diversification function is calculated using the following
algorithm:
1. If dkLen > (2^32 - 1) * 64, output "derived key too long" and
stop.
2. Calculate n = CEIL(dkLen / 64).
3. Calculate a set of values for each i from 1 to n:
U_1(i) = HMAC_GOSTR3411 (P, S || INT (i))
U_2(i) = HMAC_GOSTR3411 (P, U_1(i))
...
U_c(i) = HMAC_GOSTR3411 (P, U_{c-1}(i))
T(i) = U_1(i) \xor U_2(i) \xor ... \xor U_c(i)
4. Concatenate the byte strings T(i) and extract the first dkLen
bytes to produce a derived key DK:
DK = R^{n * 64}_dkLen(T(1)||T(2)||...||T(n))
5. Data encryption
5.1. GOST 28147-89 data encryption
Data encryption using the DK key is carried out in accordance with
the PBES2 scheme (see [RFC8018], section 6.2) using GOST 28147-89 in
the Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) (see [RFC5830]).
5.1.1. Encryption
The encryption process for PBES2 consists of the following steps:
1. Select the random value S of length from 8 to 32 bytes. The
recommended length is 32 bytes.
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2. Select the iteration count c depending on the conditions of use.
The minimum allowable value for the parameter is 1000, the
recommended value is 2000.
3. Set the value dkLen = 32.
4. Apply the key derivation function to the password P, the salt S
and the iteration count c to produce a derived key DK of length
dkLen bytes in accordance with the algorithm from Section 4.
Generate the sequence T(1) and trunc it to 32 bytes, i.e., DK =
PBKFD2(P,S,c,32) = R^64_32(T(1)).
5. Select the random value S^{'} of length from 8 bytes.
6. Encrypt the message M with GOST 28147-89 algorithm in CFB mode
under the derived key DK and the random value S^{'} to produce a
ciphertext C.
7. Save the parameters S, S^{'}, c as algorithm parameters in
accordance with Appendix A.
5.1.2. Decryption
The decryption process for PBES2 consists of the following steps:
1. Set the value dkLen = 32.
2. Apply the key derivation function to the password P, the salt S
and the iteration count c to produce a derived key DK of length
dkLen bytes in accordance with the algorithm from Section 4.
Generate the sequence T(1) and trunc it to 32 bytes, i.e.,
DK = PBKFD2(P,S,c,32) = R^64_32(T(1)).
3. Decrypt the ciphertext C with GOST 28147-89 algorithm in CFB mode
under the derived key DK and the random value S^{'} to produce
the message M.
5.2. GOST R 34.12-2015 data encryption
Data encryption using the DK key is carried out in accordance with
the PBES2 scheme (see [RFC8018], section 6.2) using GOST R 34.12-2015
in CTR_ACPKM mode (see [RFC8645]).
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5.2.1. Encryption
The encryption process for PBES2 consists of the following steps:
1. Select the random value S of length from 8 to 32 bytes. The
recommended length is 32 bytes.
2. Select the iteration count c depending on the conditions of use.
The minimum allowable value for the parameter is 1000, the
recommended value is 2000.
3. Set the value dkLen = 32.
4. Apply the key derivation function to the password P, the salt S
and the iteration count c to produce a derived key DK of length
dkLen bytes in accordance with the algorithm from Section 4.
Generate the sequence T(1) and trunc it to 32 bytes, i.e.,
DK = PBKFD2(P,S,c,32) = R^64_32(T(1)).
5. Generate the value ukm of size n, where n takes a value of 12 or
16 bytes, depending on the selected encryption algorithm:
GOST R 34.12-2015 "Kuznyechik" n = 16 (see [RFC7801])
GOST R 34.12-2015 "Magma" n = 12 (see [RFC8891])
6. Set the value S^{'} = ukm[1..n-8]
7. For id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm and id-gostr3412-2015-
kuznyechik-ctracpkm algorithms (see Appendix A.4) encrypt the
message M with GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm under the derived key
DK and the random value S^{'} to produce a ciphertext C.
8. For id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm-omac and id-gostr3412-2015-
kuznyechik-ctracpkm-omac algorithms (see Appendix A.4) encrypt
the message M with GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm under the derived
key DK and the ukm in accordance with the following steps:
- Generate two keys from the derived key DK using the
KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256 algorithm (see [RFC7836]):
encryption key K(1)
MAC key K(2).
Input parameters for the KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256 algorithm
takes the folowing values:
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K_in = DK
label = "kdf tree"
seed = ukm[n-7..n]
R = 1
- Compute MAC for the message M using the K(2) key. Append to
the end of the message M the computing MAC value.
- Encrypt the resulting byte string with MAC with GOST R
34.12-2015 algorithm under the derived key K(1) and the random
value S^{'} to produce a ciphertext C.
9. Save the parameters S, c, ukm as algorithm parameters in
accordance with Appendix A.
5.2.2. Decryption
The decryption process for PBES2 consists of the following steps:
1. Set the value dkLen = 32.
2. Apply the key derivation function to the password P, the salt S
and the iteration count c to produce a derived key DK of length
dkLen bytes in accordance with the algorithm from Section 4.
Generate the sequence T(1) and trunc it to 32 bytes, i.e., DK =
PBKFD2(P,S,c,32) = R^64_32(T(1)).
3. Set the value S^{'} = ukm[1..n-8], where n is the size of ukm in
bytes.
4. For id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm and id-gostr3412-2015-
kuznyechik-ctracpkm algorithms (see Appendix A.4) decrypt the
ciphertext C with GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm under the derived
key DK and the random value S^{'} to produce the message M.
5. For id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm-omac and id-gostr3412-2015-
kuznyechik-ctracpkm-omac algorithms (see Appendix A.4) decrypt
the ciphertext C with GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm under the
derived key DK and the ukm in accordance with the following
steps:
- Generate two keys from the derived key DK using the
KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256 algorithm:
encryption key K(1)
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MAC key K(2).
Input parameters for the KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256 algorithm
takes the folowing values:
K_in = DK
label = "kdf tree"
seed = ukm[n-7..n]
R = 1
- Decrypt the ciphertext C with GOST R 34.12-2015 algorithm
under the derived key K(1) and the random value S^{'} to
produce the text. The last k bytes of the text are the mac,
where k depends on the selected encryption algorithm.
- Compute MAC for the text[1..m - k] using the K(2) key, where
m is the size of text.
- Compare the original mac and the receiving MAC. If the
sizes or values do not match, the message is distorted.
6. Message Authentication
PBMAC1 scheme is used for message authentication (see [RFC8018].
This scheme bases on the HMAC_GOSTR3411 function with the key DK =
PBKDF2 (P, S, c, 32).
6.1. The MAC generation
The MAC generation operation for PBMAC1 consists of the following
steps:
1. Select the random value S of length from 8 to 32 bytes. The
recommended length is 32 bytes.
2. Select the iteration count c depending on the conditions of use.
The minimum allowable value for the parameter is 1000, the
recommended value is 2000.
3. Set the dkLen at least 32 bytes. It depend on the selected key
generation scheme.
4. Apply the key derivation function to the password P, the salt S
and the iteration count c to produce a derived key DK of length
dkLen bytes in accordance with the algorithm from Section 4.
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Generate the sequence T(1) and trunc it to 32 bytes, i.e., DK =
PBKFD2(P,S,c,32) = R^64_32(T(1)).
5. Process the message M with the underlying message authentication
scheme under the derived key DK to generate a message
authentication code T.
6. Save the parameters S, c, ukm as algorithm parameters in
accordance with Appendix A.
6.2. The MAC verification
The MAC verification operation for PBMAC1 consists of the following
steps:
1. Set the dkLen at least 32 bytes. It depend on the selected key
generation scheme.
2. Apply the key derivation function to the password P, the salt S
and the iteration count c to produce a derived key DK of length
dkLen bytes in accordance with the algorithm from Section 4.
Generate the sequence T(1) and trunc it to 32 bytes, i.e., DK =
PBKFD2(P,S,c,32) = R^64_32(T(1)).
3. Process the message M with the underlying message authentication
scheme under the derived key DK to generate a message
authentication code T^{'}.
4. Compare the original message authentication code T and the
receiving message authentication code T^{'}. If the sizes or
values do not match, the message is distorted.
7. Security Considerations
The focus of this document is security; hence security considerations
permeate this specification.
8. Normative References
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[RFC5830] Dolmatov, V., Ed., "GOST 28147-89: Encryption, Decryption,
and Message Authentication Code (MAC) Algorithms",
RFC 5830, DOI 10.17487/RFC5830, March 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5830>.
[RFC6070] Josefsson, S., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Key Derivation
Function 2 (PBKDF2) Test Vectors", RFC 6070,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6070, January 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6070>.
[RFC7801] Dolmatov, V., Ed., "GOST R 34.12-2015: Block Cipher
"Kuznyechik"", RFC 7801, DOI 10.17487/RFC7801, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7801>.
[RFC7836] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., Alekseev, E., Oshkin, I., Popov, V.,
Leontiev, S., Podobaev, V., and D. Belyavsky, "Guidelines
on the Cryptographic Algorithms to Accompany the Usage of
Standards GOST R 34.10-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012",
RFC 7836, DOI 10.17487/RFC7836, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7836>.
[RFC8018] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., and A. Rusch, "PKCS #5:
Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.1",
RFC 8018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8018, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8018>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8645] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., "Re-keying Mechanisms for Symmetric
Keys", RFC 8645, DOI 10.17487/RFC8645, August 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8645>.
[RFC8891] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and D. Baryshkov, "GOST R 34.12-2015:
Block Cipher "Magma"", RFC 8891, DOI 10.17487/RFC8891,
September 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8891>.
Appendix A. Identifiers and parameters
This section defines ASN.1 syntax for the key derivation functions,
the encryption schemes, the message authentication scheme, and
supporting techniques ([RFC8018]).
rsadsi OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 113549 }
pkcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { rsadsi 1 }
pkcs-5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs 5 }
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A.1. PBKDF2
The object identifier id-PBKDF2 identifies the PBKDF2 key derivation
function:
id-PBKDF2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-5 12 }
The parameters field associated with this OID in an
AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type PBKDF2-params:
PBKDF2-params ::= SEQUENCE
{
salt CHOICE
{
specified OCTET STRING,
otherSource AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2- SaltSources}}
},
iterationCount INTEGER (1000..MAX),
keyLength INTEGER (32..MAX) OPTIONAL,
prf AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBKDF2-PRFs}}
}
The fields of type PBKDF2-params have the following meanings:
- salt contains the random value S in OCTET STRING.
- iterationCount specifies the iteration count c.
- keyLength is the length of the derived key in bytes. It is
optional field for PBES2 sheme since it is always 32 bytes. It
must be present for PBMAC1 sheme and must be at least 32 bytes
since the HMAC_GOSTR3411 function has a variable key size.
- prf identifies the pseudorandom function. The identifier value
must be id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-12-512, the parameters value must
be NULL:
id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-12-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{
iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) reg7(7)
tk26(1) algorithms(1) hmac(4) 512(2)
}
A.2. PBES2
The object identifier id-PBES2 identifies the PBES2 encryption
scheme:
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id-PBES2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-5 13 }
The parameters field associated with this OID in an
AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type PBES2-params:
PBES2-params ::= SEQUENCE
{
keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier { { PBES2-KDFs } },
encryptionScheme AlgorithmIdentifier { { PBES2-Encs } }
}
The fields of type PBES2-params have the following meanings:
- keyDerivationFunc identifies the key derivation function in
accordance with Appendix A.1.
- encryptionScheme identifies the encryption scheme in accordance
with Appendix A.3, Appendix A.4.
A.3. Identifier and parametrs of Gost28147-89 encryption sheme
The GOST 28147-89 encryption algorithm identifier should take the
following value:
id-Gost28147-89 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{
iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rans(2)
cryptopro(2) gost28147-89(21)
}
The parameters field associated with this OID in an
AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type Gost28147-89-Parameters:
Gost28147-89-Parameters ::= SEQUENCE
{
iv Gost28147-89-IV,
encryptionParamSet OBJECT IDENTIFIER
}
Gost28147-89-IV ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (8))
The fields of type Gost28147-89-Parameters have the following
meanings:
- iv contains the random value S^{'} in OCTET STRING.
- encryptionParamSet identifies the substitution block for
encryption. For PBES2 sheme it is recommended to use the set of
substitutions described in [RFC7836]. The OID of this block is:
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id-tc26-gost-28147-param-Z OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{
iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7)
tc26(1) constants(2) cipher(5) gost28147(1) paramZ(1)
}
A.4. Identifier and parametrs of Gost34.12-2015 encryption sheme
The Gost34.12-2015 encryption algorithm identifier SHOULD take one of
the following values:
id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{
iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7)
tc26(1) algorithms(1) cipher(5)
gostr3412-2015-magma(1) mode-ctracpkm(1)
}
In case of use id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm identifier the data
is encrypted by the GOST R 34.12-2015 Magma cipher in CTR_ACPKM mode
in accordance with [RFC8645]. The length of gamma block s is 64
bits, the section size is fixed within a specific protocol based on
the requirements of the system capacity and the key lifetime.
id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm-omac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{
iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7)
tc26(1) algorithms(1) cipher(5)
gostr3412-2015-magma(1) mode-ctracpkm-omac(2)
}
In case of use id-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm-omac identifier the
data is encrypted by the GOST R 34.12-2015 Magma cipher in CTR_ACPKM
mode in accordance with [RFC8645], and MAC is computed by the GOST R
34.12-2015 Magma cipher in MAC mode (MAC size is 64 bits). The
length of gamma block s is 64 bits, the section size is fixed within
a specific protocol based on the requirements of the system capacity
and the key lifetime.
id-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{
iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7)
tc26(1) algorithms(1) cipher(5)
gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik(2) mode-ctracpkm(1)
}
In case of use id-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm identifier the
data is encrypted by the GOST R 34.12-2015 Kuznyechik cipher in
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CTR_ACPKM mode in accordance with [RFC8645]. The length of gamma
block s is 128 bits, the section size is fixed within a specific
protocol based on the requirements of the system capacity and the key
lifetime.
id-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm-omac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{
iso(1) member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7)
tc26(1) algorithms(1) cipher(5)
gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik(2) mode-ctracpkm-omac(2)
}
In case of use id-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm-omac identifier
the data is encrypted by the GOST R 34.12-2015 Kuznyechik cipher in
CTR_ACPKM mode in accordance with [RFC8645], and MAC is computed by
the GOST R 34.12-2015 Kuznyechik cipher in MAC mode (MAC size is 128
bits). The length of gamma block s is 128 bits, the section size is
fixed within a specific protocol based on the requirements of the
system capacity and the key lifetime.
The parameters field in an AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type
Gost3412-15-Encryption-Parameters:
Gost3412-15-Encryption-Parameters ::= SEQUENCE
{
ukm OCTET STRING
}
The field of type Gost3412-15-Encryption-Parameters have the
following meanings:
- ukm must be present and must contain n bytes. It's value
depends on the selected encryption algorithm:
GOST R 34.12-2015 "Kuznyechik" n = 16 (see [RFC7801])
GOST R 34.12-2015 "Magma" n = 12 (see [RFC8891])
A.5. PBMAC1
The object identifier id-PBMAC1 identifies the PBMAC1 message
authentication scheme:
id-PBMAC1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-5 14 }
The parameters field associated with this OID in an
AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type PBMAC1-params:
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PBMAC1-params ::= SEQUENCE
{
keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier { { PBMAC1-KDFs } },
messageAuthScheme AlgorithmIdentifier { { PBMAC1-MACs } }
}
The fields of type PBMAC1-params have the following meanings:
- keyDerivationFunc is identifier and parameters of key
diversification function in accordance with Appendix A.1
- messageAuthScheme is identifier and parameters of HMAC_GOSTR3411
algorithm.
Appendix B. PBKDF2 HMAC_GOSTR3411 Test Vectors
These test vectors are formed by analogy with test vectors from
[RFC6070]. The input strings below are encoded using ASCII. The
sequence "\0" (without quotation marks) means a literal ASCII NULL
value (1 octet). "DK" refers to the Derived Key.
Input:
P = "password" (8 octets)
S = "salt" (4 octets)
c = 1
dkLen = 64
Output:
DK = 64 77 0a f7 f7 48 c3 b1 c9 ac 83 1d bc fd 85 c2
61 11 b3 0a 8a 65 7d dc 30 56 b8 0c a7 3e 04 0d
28 54 fd 36 81 1f 6d 82 5c c4 ab 66 ec 0a 68 a4
90 a9 e5 cf 51 56 b3 a2 b7 ee cd db f9 a1 6b 47
Input:
P = "password" (8 octets)
S = "salt" (4 octets)
c = 2
dkLen = 64
Output:
DK = 5a 58 5b af df bb 6e 88 30 d6 d6 8a a3 b4 3a c0
0d 2e 4a eb ce 01 c9 b3 1c 2c ae d5 6f 02 36 d4
d3 4b 2b 8f bd 2c 4e 89 d5 4d 46 f5 0e 47 d4 5b
ba c3 01 57 17 43 11 9e 8d 3c 42 ba 66 d3 48 de
Input:
P = "password" (8 octets)
S = "salt" (4 octets)
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c = 4096
dkLen = 64
Output:
DK = e5 2d eb 9a 2d 2a af f4 e2 ac 9d 47 a4 1f 34 c2
03 76 59 1c 67 80 7f 04 77 e3 25 49 dc 34 1b c7
86 7c 09 84 1b 6d 58 e2 9d 03 47 c9 96 30 1d 55
df 0d 34 e4 7c f6 8f 4e 3c 2c da f1 d9 ab 86 c3
Input:
P = "password" (8 octets)
S = "salt" (4 octets)
c = 16777216
dkLen = 64
Output:
DK = 49 e4 84 3b ba 76 e3 00 af e2 4c 4d 23 dc 73 92
de f1 2f 2c 0e 24 41 72 36 7c d7 0a 89 82 ac 36
1a db 60 1c 7e 2a 31 4e 8c b7 b1 e9 df 84 0e 36
ab 56 15 be 5d 74 2b 6c f2 03 fb 55 fd c4 80 71
Input:
P = "passwordPASSWORDpassword" (24 octets)
S = "saltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsalt" (36 octets)
c = 4096
dkLen = 100
Output:
DK = b2 d8 f1 24 5f c4 d2 92 74 80 20 57 e4 b5 4e 0a
07 53 aa 22 fc 53 76 0b 30 1c f0 08 67 9e 58 fe
4b ee 9a dd ca e9 9b a2 b0 b2 0f 43 1a 9c 5e 50
f3 95 c8 93 87 d0 94 5a ed ec a6 eb 40 15 df c2
bd 24 21 ee 9b b7 11 83 ba 88 2c ee bf ef 25 9f
33 f9 e2 7d c6 17 8c b8 9d c3 74 28 cf 9c c5 2a
2b aa 2d 3a
Input:
P = "pass\0word" (9 octets)
S = "sa\0lt" (5 octets)
c = 4096
dkLen = 64
Output:
DK = 50 df 06 28 85 b6 98 01 a3 c1 02 48 eb 0a 27 ab
6e 52 2f fe b2 0c 99 1c 66 0f 00 14 75 d7 3a 4e
16 7f 78 2c 18 e9 7e 92 97 6d 9c 1d 97 08 31 ea
78 cc b8 79 f6 70 68 cd ac 19 10 74 08 44 e8 30
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Appendix C. Acknowledgments
Author's Address
Karelina Ekaterina (editor)
InfoTeCS
2B stroenie 1, ul. Otradnaya
Moscow 127273
Russian Federation
Phone: +7 (495) 737-61-92
Email: Ekaterina.Karelina@infotecs.ru
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