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Versions: 00                                                            
INTERNET DRAFT          EXPIRES DEC 1998                INTERNET DRAFT
Network Working Group

Wirt Atmar
AICS Research, Inc.
University Park, NM 88003

Jeff Bandle
Hewlett-Packard Company
Commercial Systems Division
Lawrence, KS  66049

July, 1998






                  TELNET SUPPRESS LOCAL ECHO OPTION
                   <draft-rfced-exp-atmar-00.txt>


Status of This Memo

This document is an Internet-Draft.  Internet-Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its
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Distribution of this document is unlimited.


1. Command Name and Code

        SUPPRESS-LOCAL-ECHO (SLE)    45



2. Command Meanings

IAC WILL SUPRESS-LOCAL-ECHO

        The sender of this command, generally a device operating as an NVT
(network virtual terminal) terminal, CONFIRMS that it will suppress the
local echoing of characters onto its screen. This confirmation makes
valid sense only when the NVT is operating in an asymmetric, half-duplex
communications mode with a co-operating host.

IAC WONT SUPPRESS-LOCAL-ECHO

        The sender of this command, generally a device operating as an NVT
terminal, CONFIRMS that it will no longer suppress the echoing of
locally typed text onto its screen. This confirmation makes sense only
when the NVT is operating in a half-duplex mode with a co-operating
host.

IAC DO SUPPRESS-LOCAL-ECHO

        The sender of this command, generally a host computer, REQUESTS that a
client NVT terminal suspend the local echoing of text typed on its
keyboard. This request makes good sense only when the NVT and host are
operating in an asymmetric, half-duplex terminal mode with a
co-operating host. The command should have no effect on an NVT terminal
operating in full-duplex mode.

IAC DONT SUPPRESS-LOCAL-ECHO

        The sender of this command, generally a host computer, DEMANDS that a
client NVT terminal not suppress typed characters that would normally be
locally echoed onto the NVT's terminal screen when operating in an
asymmetric, half-duplex mode with a co-operating host. The command would
have no effect on an NVT terminal operating in full-duplex mode.



3. DEFAULT

WONT SUPPRESS-LOCAL-ECHO

DONT SUPPRESS-LOCAL-ECHO

As the SLE default, all typed characters at the NVT are either (i)
transmitted to the host when in full-duplex operation and are echoed
back to the NVT terminal by the host computer, or (ii), when in
half-duplex operation, are transmitted to the host and locally echoed
within the NVT itself onto the NVT's terminal screen.



4. MOTIVATION FOR THE OPTION

Telnet is a protocol that may be operated in either a peer-to-peer,
fully symmetric mode, or asymmetrically, in a host-terminal mode.
Although the original intention for the NVT mode of operation was both
asymmetric and half-duplex, where neither the host nor the terminal
echoed characters back to one another, the most common mode of usage has
come to be one of asymmetric full-duplex communications, where all
terminal characters are first transmitted to the host computer and then
echoed back to the terminal before being displayed.

Not only has full-duplex communication has proven itself to be quite
slow over long distances on the internet, and thus psychologically
difficult to tolerate, full-duplex communication is less efficient,
requiring twice as many packets be sent and returned.

Half-duplex NVT terminal operation decreases the overall packet count by
half. It also renders long-distance NVT terminal operation pleasant to
use. Characters are echoed to the terminal screen the instant they are
typed. However, a problem arising within half-duplex terminal operation
is that of passwords. Passwords, whose presence would ordinarily be
suppressed by a host computer when operating in a full-duplex mode, are
made visible in half-duplex. The SUPPRESS-LOCAL-ECHO option allows the
host to command the remote terminal to suspend local echoing of typed
text for the duration of the period of that password or other similar
confidential material is to be inputted.

A more complex method of terminal-local echo suppression is available to
telnet users and is described in RFC 726, "Remote Controlled
Transmission and Echoing Telnet Option." SUPPRESS-LOCAL-ECHO is a
significantly simpler option, requiring much less negiotiation between
the host and the client terminal, and is thus substantially easier to
implement.



5. DESCRIPTION OF THE OPTION

SUPPRESS-LOCAL-ECHO is among the mildest of all telnet options. The SLE
commands only act as an advisory flag to synchronize the behavior of a a
remote NVT terminal client with a host computer.

SUPPRESS-LOCAL-ECHO only has valid meaning when telnet communication has
been established in an asymmetric, half-duplex mode of operation between
a co-operating host and a client NVT terminal. In a half-duplex mode of
host-terminal operation, the host commands the terminal to perform no
echoes. Similarly, the terminal also commands the host to perform no
echoes and places itself in such a mode that all typed characters are
locally echoed to its screen. All subsequent communications between the
host and the terminal are one-way.

A host computer program inherently "knows" when confidential information
such as passwords are to be suppressed. At the beginning of such
password entry, when in half-duplex operation with a co-operating NVT
terminal, the host computer should issue a DO SLE to the remote client
terminal.

The remote terminal then suspends all local echoing of text until the
password entry has been completed, a process monitored by the host
computer. Once password entry has been completed, the host computer
issues a DONT SLE, at which point local echoing of text on the remote
NVT must resume.

If the remote client NVT terminal is operating in full-duplex mode, the
receipt of DO and DONT SLE commands would have no meaning and therefore
must have no effect.



6. IMPLEMENTATION SUGGESTIONS

To fully utilize the internet and communicate with all available host
computers, an NVT client terminal almost certainly should have two modes
of operation: full- and half-duplex.

Full-duplex communication requires a round-trip circuit for each packet
sent from the client NVT terminal to the host computer and back again
before those characters are displayed on the terminal's screen, thus
perceived transit times that are many times that of half-duplex
communications. Further, twice the number of packets must be sent and
received in full-duplex as in half-duplex. Nonetheless, full-duplex
communication has become the defacto standard of the telnet-based NVTs
and therefore must be supported.

In order to properly support both full- and half-duplex communications,
a mode status flag must be present in the NVT terminal. When in a
full-duplex mode, an NVT should respond do both a DO SLE and a DONT SLE
with a WONT SLE and do nothing otherwise.

In contrast, when an NVT is switched to half-duplex mode, the NVT must
first send a DONT ECHO command to the host computer. Only when the host
computer responds with a WONT ECHO should the NVT set its internal flag
to half-duplex mode and begin locally echoing all characters typed at
its keyboard to its screen.

When in the half-duplex mode of operation, upon receipt of a DO SLE
command, the NVT terminal should suspend local echoing. It otherwise
must continue to transmit all typed text to the host computer.
Similarly, the NVT terminal must resume local echoing of characters when
a DONT SLE command is received from the host.

Because the DO/DONT SLE commands are advisory only, the NVT terminal
need not return WILL/WONT SLE acknowledgements to the host, although
such acknowledgements are recommended. However, the acknowledgements
cannot have any effect on the behavior of the host computer. The host
must continue to receive text from the remote NVT under any
circumstance, thus such acknowledgements must effectively be ignored by
the host.

Further, the host computer can use its current echoing status as an
indication of whether or not it should be issuing DO/DONT SLE commands.
If the host is in an echoing state, where all incoming characters are
echoed back to the remote NVT terminal, there is no valid reason for the
host computer to be issuing DO/DONT SLE commands to the remote NVT
terminal. The only time that the SLE commands will carry meaning is when
the remote NVT terminal is in a half-duplex mode of operation and the
remote NVT has requested and received acknowledgement of echo
suppression in the host.



7. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

The negative impact of the SLE option on overall telnet use security is
quite minimal, but not completely non-existent. Almost all current
telnet transmissions are performed in clear text and are thus highly
susceptible to "sniffer" interceptions.

The DO/DONT SLE command transmissions from the host will inherently tend
to be transmitted just before and after passwords are typed in at the
remote NVT client. Because of this, a surreptitious automatic procedure
could be programmed to seek out the DO/DONT SLE commands and
automatically extract passwords from the reverse data flow.

If the text transmission were performed in cleartext, nothing would be
learned that could not be deduced otherwise. Only the possibility of
automatically bracketing and extracting passwords would be new.
Similarly, and perhaps much worse, if the entire text transmission were
encrypted, the location and length of passwords could be identified
within the reverse flow from the timing of the DO/DONT SLE command
transmissions.

However, conversely, because the DO/DONT SLE commands will inherently
bracket password entry on the NVT terminal, the DO/DONT SLE commands
could be faithfully used to cause a remote NVT client to fall into a
special (or alternate) encryption mode that lasts only for the duration
of password entry, actually augmenting overall security.

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INTERNET DRAFT          EXPIRES DEC 1998                INTERNET DRAFT