Network Working Group R. Housley
Internet-Draft Vigil Security
Intended status: Standards Track R. Droms
Expires: April 2, 2018 Interisle Consulting
September 29, 2017
TLS 1.3 Option for Negotiation of Visibility in the Datacenter
draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00
Abstract
Current drafts of TLS 1.3 do not include the use of the RSA
handshake. While (EC) Diffie-Hellman is in nearly all ways an
improvement over the TLS RSA handshake, the use of (EC)DH has impacts
certain enterprise network operational requirements. The TLS
Visibility Extension addresses one of the impacts of (EC)DH through
an opt-in mechanism that allows a TLS client and server to explicitly
grant access to the TLS session plaintext.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 2, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
Housley & Droms Expires April 2, 2018 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Option for TLS 1.3 in Datacenter September 2017
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
1. Introduction
Unlike earlier versions of TLS, current drafts of TLS 1.3
[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] do not provide support for the RSA handshake --
and have instead adopted ephemeral-mode Diffie-Hellman (DHE) and
elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) as the primary cryptographic
key exchange mechanism used in TLS.
While ephemeral (EC) Diffie-Hellman is in nearly all ways an
improvement over the TLS RSA handshake, the use of these mechanisms
has impacts on certain enterprise operational requirements.
Specifically, the use of ephemeral ciphersuites prevents the use of
current enterprise network monitoring tools such as Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) and application monitoring systems, which
leverage the current TLS RSA handshake to passively decrypt and
monitor intranet TLS connections made between endpoints under the
enterprise's control. This traffic includes TLS connections made
from enterprise network security devices (firewalls) and load
balancers at the edge of the enterprise network to internal
enterprise TLS servers. It does not include TLS connections
traveling over the external Internet.
Such monitoring of the enterprise network is ubiquitous and
indispensable in some industries, and is required for effective and
safe operation of their enterprise networks. Loss of this capability
may slow adoption of TLS 1.3 or force enterprises to continue to use
outdated and potentially vulnerable technology.
The TLS Visibility Extension provides an option to enable visibility
into a TLS 1.3 session by an authorized third party. Use of the
extension requires opt-in by the TLS client when it initiates a TLS
1.3 session. The TLS server then opts-in by including keying
material that will enable decryption in the TLS Visibility Extension.
The presence of the TLS Visibility Extension provides a clear
indication that other parties have been granted access to the TLS
session plaintext. The keying material in the TLS Visibility
Extension is encrypted and can only be decrypted by authorized
parties that have been given the private key from a managed Diffie-
Hellman key pair.
Housley & Droms Expires April 2, 2018 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Option for TLS 1.3 in Datacenter September 2017
2. Terminology
Two key pairs are used with the TLS Visibility Extension for
encryption of the session secrets:
SSWrapDH1: generated externally and the public key is provided to
the TLS 1.3 server prior to use of the TLS Visibility Extension;
the corresponding private key is provided to the parties that are
authorized to access the TLS session plaintext.
SSWrapDH2: an ephemeral key pair that is generated by the TLS 1.3
server for each TLS 1.3 session that uses the TLS Visibility
Extension; the server keeps the private key confidential, and
passes the public key to the other parties in the TLS Visibility
session.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Extension Overview
Prior to the use of the TLS Visibility Extension, the SSWrapDH1 key
pair is generated, possibly by an enterprise key manager. The
private key is passed to the parties that are authorized to access
the TLS session plaintext. The server is provisioned with the public
key. When a new TLS 1.3 session is initiated, the client includes an
empty TLS Visibility Extension in the ClientHello. The server then
generates a SSWrapDH2 ephemeral key pair. The server will then:
o Generate a key, Ke, from the SSWrapDH1 public key and the
SSWrapDH2 private key.
o Encrypt the TLS 1.3 session Early Secret (if one exists) and
Handshake Secret (session secret) using Ke.
o Send an identifier for the SSWrapDH1 public key (called the
fingerprint), the SSWrapDH2 public key, and the encrypted session
secrets in the TLS Visibility Extension in the ServerHello
message.
To decrypt the TLS 1.3 session, a party that is authorized to access
the TLS session plaintext must be given the SSWrapDH1 private key.
The party then:
o Obtains the SSWrapDH1 public key from the TLS Visibility extension
Housley & Droms Expires April 2, 2018 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Option for TLS 1.3 in Datacenter September 2017
o Uses the SSHWrapDH1 private key and the SSWrapDH2 public key to
generate Ke
o Uses Ke to decrypt the session secrets carried in the TLS
Visibility extension
o Uses the session secrets to derive the keying material needed
decrypt the TLS 1.3 session
4. TLS Visibility Extension
This section specifies the "tls_visibility" extension, which is
carried in the ClientHello message and the ServerHello message.
The general extension mechanisms enable clients and servers to
negotiate the use of specific extensions. As specified in
[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13], clients request extended functionality from
servers with the extensions field in the ClientHello message. If the
server responds HelloRetryRequest, then the client sends another
ClientHello message that includes the same extensions field as the
original ClientHello message.
Most server extensions are carried in the EncryptedExtensions
message; however, the "tls_visibility" extension is carried in the
ServerHello message in a manner similar to the "key_share" and
"pre_shared_key" extensions. It is only present in the ServerHello
message if the server wants to enable TLS Visibility for some other
parties and the client has offered the "tls_visibility" extension in
the ClientHello message.
The "tls_visibility" extension MAY appear in the CH (ClientHello
message) and SH (ServerHello message). It MUST NOT appear in any
other messages. The "tls_visibility" extension MUST NOT appear in
the ServerHello message unless "tls_visibility" extension appeared in
the preceding ClientHello message. If an implementation recognizes
the "tls_visibility" extension and receives it in any other message,
then the implementation MUST abort the handshake with an
"illegal_parameter" alert.
The Extension structure is defined in [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]; it is
repeated here for convenience.
struct {
ExtensionType extension_type;
opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>;
} Extension;
Housley & Droms Expires April 2, 2018 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Option for TLS 1.3 in Datacenter September 2017
The "extension_type" identifies the particular extension type, and
the "extension_data" contains information specific to the particular
extension type.
This document specifies the "tls_visibility" extension type, adding
one new type to ExtensionType:
enum {
tls_visibility(TBD), (65535)
} ExtensionType;
The "tls_visibility" extension is relevant when the client and server
choose to enable one or more other parties to decrypt the TLS
session.
Clients MUST include the "tls_visibility" extension in the
ClientHello message to indicate their willingness for other parties
to decrypt the TLS session. The server responds with data that
enables the other parties to derive the keying material needed to
decrypt the session if they are in possession of the indicated ECDH
private key.
struct {
select (Handshake.msg_type) {
case client_hello: Empty;
case server_hello: WrappedSessionSecrets visibility_data;
};
} TLSVisibilityExtension;
struct {
opaque early_secret<1..255>;
opaque hs_secret<1..255>;
} SessionSecrets;
struct {
opaque fingerprint<20>;
opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
opaque wrapped_secrets<1..2^16-1>;
} WrappedSessionSecrets;
The fields in WrappedSessionSecrets are used as follows:
o "fingerprint" contains the leftmost 20 octets of the SHA-256 hash
of SSWrapDH1 public key that was used by the server to compute the
Housley & Droms Expires April 2, 2018 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Option for TLS 1.3 in Datacenter September 2017
session secret wrapping key. The public key is DER-encoded in the
SubjectPublicKeyInfo [RFC5280] for the SHA-256 hash computation.
The key manager tells the server which AEAD algorithm to use with
this SSWrapDH1 public key at the time it is distributed.
o "key_exchange" contains the SSWrapDH2 ephemeral public key
generated by the server on the same elliptic curve as the
SSWrapDH1 public key identified by the "fingerprint". The server
uses the SSWrapDH2 ephemeral private key and the SSWrapDH1 public
key identified by the "fingerprint" to compute a shared secret
value, called Z, and then uses HKDF [RFC5869] to produce the
session secret wrapping key, called Ke, and an AEAD nonce, if one
is needed buy the AEAD algorithm. For example, AES-KEY-WRAP-256
[RFC5649] does not require a nonce, but AES-GCM-128 [GCM] does
require a nonce. Ke is computed as follows:
PRK = HKDF-Extract(0x00, Z)
Ke = HKDF-Expand(PRK, "tls_vis_key", AEAD_key_size)
nonce = HKDF-Expand(PRK, "tls_vis_nonce", AEAD_nonce_size)
o "wrapped_secrets" contains the SessionSecrets structure encrypted
with the AEAD algorithm under Ke.
The fields in SessionSecrets are used as follows:
o "early_secret" contains the Early Secret that was derived from the
pre-shared key. If this session did not use a pre-shared key,
then the Early Secret is HKDF-Extract(0, 0).
o "hs_secret" contains the handshake key that was computed using
(EC)DHE.
5. Alternative Approaches
This section captures the rationale for pursuing this approach to TLS
visibility instead of the various alternative approaches.
Server uses a static Diffie-Hellman key pair: Instead of generating
ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key pairs, the server reuses a static
Diffie-Hellman key pair. The static private Diffie-Hellman key
gets shared with the points that need visibility. While this
approach scales, the TLS client is unaware of the sharing. In
addition, this enables visibility of data of all clients
communicating with the server, versus only those that opt-in to
visibility.
Housley & Droms Expires April 2, 2018 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Option for TLS 1.3 in Datacenter September 2017
Export of ephemeral keys: In large enterprises there will be
billions of ephemeral keys to export and distribute. Transporting
these keys to tools for decryption of packets in real time will be
difficult, adding greatly to the complexity of the solution.
Export of decrypted traffic from TLS proxy devices: Decrypting
traffic only at the edge of the enterprise datacenter does not
meet all of the enterprise requirements, which include
troubleshooting, fraud detection, and network security monitoring.
Further, the number of TLS proxies needed are quite costly, add
latency, and increase production risk.
Continue to use TLS 1.2 within the enterprise network: TLS 1.2 could
be used within the enterprise network (with TLS 1.3 outside) to
enable TLS visibility via RSA key transport. However, TLS 1.3 has
security improvements over TLS 1.2. At some point in the future,
TLS 1.2 will not longer be supported and available in enterprise
applications and protocol implementations. In addition, based on
experience, standards bodies will deprecate the use of TLS 1.2 and
require enterprise networks to move to TLS 1.3.
Reliance on TCP/IP headers: TCP and IP headers are not adequate for
enterprise requirements. Troubleshooting, fraud detection, and
network security monitoring need access to the plaintext payload.
For example, troubleshooters must be able to find specific
transactions, user identifiers, session identifiers, URLs, and
time stamps.
Reliance on application and server logs: Logging is not adequate for
enterprise requirements. Code developers cannot anticipate every
possible problem for logging, and system administrators turn much
of the logging off to conserve system resources.
Troubleshooting and malware analysis at the endpoint: Endpoints are
focused on providing a service, and they cannot handle the
additional burden of the various enterprise monitoring
requirements.
Adding TCP/UDP extensions: An important part of troubleshooting,
network security monitoring, etc. is analysis of the application-
specific payload of the packet. It is not possible to anticipate
ahead of time, among thousands of unique applications, which
fields in the application payload will be important.
Housley & Droms Expires April 2, 2018 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft Option for TLS 1.3 in Datacenter September 2017
6. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to update the TLS ExtensionType Registry to include
"tls_visibility" with a value of [TBD] and the list of messages "CH,
SH" in which the "tls_visibility" extension may appear.
7. Security Considerations
The use of a TLS protocol extension ensures that both the TLS client
and the TLS server are aware that other parties have visibility into
the TLS session plaintext. However, the approach used here does not
allow those parties to masquerade since they do not have the ability
to sign the Finished message in the TLS handshake.
Use of the TLS Visibility extension represents a deliberate
introduction by the client and server of other parties that can
access the TLS session plaintext. Deployments that choose to make
use of this extension should carefully consider the risks associated
with the change to the Forward Secrecy. In particular, Forward
Secrecy will not begin for sessions where the TLS Visibility
Extension is used until all of these events take place:
(1) The server has securely discarded the session secrets.
(2) The server has securely discarded the session secret wrapping
key.
(3) The client has securely discarded the session secrets.
(4) The other parties have securely discarded the session secrets.
(5) The other parties have securely discarded the session secret
wrapping key.
(6) The other parties have securely discarded the ECDHE private key
that was used to derive the session secret wrapping key.
The SSWrapDH1 and SSWrapDH2 key size and parameters MUST be selected
to provide the same level (or more) of security as the (EC)DHE key
used in the TLS Handshake. Similarly, the Sessions Secret Wrapping
key size and algorithm MUST be selected to provide the same level (or
more) of security as the AEAD cipher used with the TLS Record
protocol. If weaker key sizes, parameters or algorithms are used,
the attacker will find it easier to obtain the session secrets from
the TLS Visibility extension.
Housley & Droms Expires April 2, 2018 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft Option for TLS 1.3 in Datacenter September 2017
8. Acknowledgments
Matthew Green was the primary author of
[I-D.green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13], which describes an earlier
solution to the TLS 1.3 session visibility problem. Nick Sullivan
and Richard Barnes suggested the use of client and server opt-in.
Peter Wu suggested the use of HKDF-Expand to get a nonce. Nalini
Elkins, Steven Fenter, Sinok Lao, Andrew Kennedy, Darin Pettis, Tim
Polk, Andrew Regenscheid, Murugiah Souppaya, and Paul Turner
contributed through discussion to the development of this document.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-21 (work in progress),
July 2017.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.
9.2. Informative References
[GCM] McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "The Galois/Counter Mode of
Operation (GCM)", January 2004.
Submission to NIST.
<http://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/modes/proposedmodes/
gcm/gcm-spec.pdf>
Housley & Droms Expires April 2, 2018 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft Option for TLS 1.3 in Datacenter September 2017
[I-D.green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13]
Green, M., Droms, R., Housley, R., Turner, P., and S.
Fenter, "Data Center use of Static Diffie-Hellman in TLS
1.3", draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-01 (work in
progress), July 2017.
[RFC5649] Housley, R. and M. Dworkin, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm", RFC 5649,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5649, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5649>.
Authors' Addresses
Russ Housley
Vigil Security
918 Spring Knoll Drive
Herndon, VA 20170
USA
Email: housley@vigilsec.com
Ralph Droms
Interisle Consulting
Email: rdroms.ietf@gmail.com
Housley & Droms Expires April 2, 2018 [Page 10]