NETWORK WORKING GROUP                                        N. Williams
Internet-Draft                                                       Sun
Expires: August 5, 2007                                    M. Richardson
                                                                     SSW
                                                           February 2007


 Extensions to IKEv1 and IKEv2 to indicate use of Better-Than-Nothing-
                                Security
               draft-richardson-btns-ikeextensions-00.txt

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   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).












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Abstract

   This document specifies how to use the Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
   protocols, such as IKEv1 and IKEv2, to setup "unauthenticated"
   security associations (SAs) for use with the IPsec Encapsulating
   Security Payload (ESP) and the IPsec Authentication Header (AH).
   This is part of the Better-Than-Nothing-Security (BTNS) work.  Two
   optional IKE extensions are documented here, and the format for one
   certificate payload type is fully specified.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  IKE Notify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Exchange of public keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   6.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 10






























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1.  Introduction

   When two nodes decide to use BTNS, they may wish to communicate this
   intention to the remote party.

   There are no protocol reasons to require this intention to be
   communicated, however, it is useful for diagnostic purposes to be
   able to indicate this fact in the IKE negotiation.

   As part of the BTNS IKE negotiation, it will be necessary for the
   parties to exchange authentication keying material, and one option is
   to use the certificate payload.  The use of Raw RSA Key type (11) is
   clarified with some examples.






































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2.  IKE Notify

   A new notify message is defined for both IKEv1 [RFC2408] and IKEv2
   [RFC4306].  The name of the new notify is BTNS_AUTHENTICATED, and the
   notify number is TBD1.

   This notify message MAY appear in any exchange of phase 1 (IKEv1),
   and in any exchange of the PARENT_SA (IKEv2).  It SHOULD be sent in
   after the phase 1 SA has become private, since there is little reason
   to advise a third party of what kind of authentication is being done.

   This means it SHOULD be sent during the third exchange of MAIN MODE
   (IKEv1), in the second exchange of Aggressive Mode (IKEv1), and
   during the second exchange of IKEv2.

   Note: Aggressive mode is SHOULD NOT be used for BTNS.



































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3.  Exchange of public keys

   A BTNS negotiation MUST include a public key for each end-point.
   This key will be carried in a Certificate Payload (section 3.6 of
   [RFC4306] and section 3.9 of [RFC2408]).  There are several options
   as to how to carry the key.

   The public KEY MUST be sent in a Certificate Type 11: Raw RSA Key.
   This code point is hereby defined for IKEv1 identically to IKEv2.

   An implementation MAY also include the same public KEY in a
   Certificate Payload of type 1 (PKCS #7 wrapped X.509), and it may be
   self-signed or relative to some CA.

   An IKEv2 implementation MAY also include the same public KEY as a
   Hash and URL of X.509 certificate bundle (type 13), or certificate
   (type 12).  (In general, an implementation should not send both type
   1 and types 12 or 13, as it would be redundant.)

   An implementation MAY also send additional Certificate Payload types
   which it believes may be useful, provided that they all lead to the
   same RSA key.  An implementation SHOULD avoid using so many
   Certificate Payload types that it causes the IKE messages to be
   fragmented.

   An implementation receiving more than one Certificate Payload SHOULD
   use the following sources to arrive at a public key to use to
   authenticate the peer, in the following order:

      a preconfigure RSA key contained in a local trusted store.

      an in-band X.509 certificate that can be verified against a
      locally trusted root CA

      a certificate or certificate bundle retrieved from the indicated
      URL, that matches the hash, and can be verified

      the key contained in the raw RSA Key payload

   All Certificate Payload types other than type 11 are optional, and
   type 11 is mandatory, so there will always be a public key available
   to confirm the signature on in the IKE AUTH payload.

   The additional payloads are present to deal with the situations where
   the trust relationship may in fact be asymetrical, such as for the
   Asymetrical SAB (A-SAB), and for the Asymetrical IKE CBB (AI-CBB).
   (see [I-D.ietf-btns-prob-and-applic])




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4.  IANA Considerations

   Please assign NOTIFY Type TBD1. from the Notify-Types in the ipsec-
   registry of IKEv1.

   Please assign NOTIFY Type TBD1. from the IKEv2 Notify Message Types
   table of the ikev2-parameters registry.












































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5.  Security Considerations

   This document does not introduce any new mechanisms or modes to IKEv1
   or IKEv2.  It details the order in which to look for authentication
   data for a protocol which does not in itself require any
   authentication data.













































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6.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-btns-connection-latching]
              Williams, N., "IPsec Channels: Connection Latching",
              draft-ietf-btns-connection-latching-00 (work in progress),
              February 2006.

   [I-D.ietf-btns-prob-and-applic]
              Touch, J., "Problem and Applicability Statement for Better
              Than Nothing Security  (BTNS)",
              draft-ietf-btns-prob-and-applic-03 (work in progress),
              June 2006.

   [I-D.ietf-kitten-gssapi-channel-bindings]
              Williams, N., "Clarifications and Extensions to the GSS-
              API for the Use of Channel  Bindings",
              draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-channel-bindings-01 (work in
              progress), October 2005.

   [I-D.ietf-nfsv4-channel-bindings]
              Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
              Channels", draft-ietf-nfsv4-channel-bindings-03 (work in
              progress), February 2005.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2408]  Maughan, D., Schneider, M., and M. Schertler, "Internet
              Security Association and Key Management Protocol
              (ISAKMP)", RFC 2408, November 1998.

   [RFC2409]  Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
              (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.

   [RFC2743]  Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
              Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.

   [RFC4251]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Protocol Architecture", RFC 4251, January 2006.

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

   [RFC4306]  Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
              RFC 4306, December 2005.






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Authors' Addresses

   Nicolas Williams
   Sun Microsystems
   5300 Riata Trace Ct
   Austin, TX  78727
   US

   Email: Nicolas.Williams@sun.com


   Michael C. Richardson
   Sandelman Software Works
   470 Dawson Avenue
   Ottawa, ON  K1Z 5V7
   CA

   Email: mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca
   URI:   http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/
































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