anima Working Group                                        M. Richardson
Internet-Draft                                  Sandelman Software Works
Intended status: Standards Track                                  W. Pan
Expires: 14 January 2021                             Huawei Technologies
                                                            13 July 2020

Security and Operational considerations for manufacturer installed keys
                              and anchors


   This document provides a nomenclature to describe ways in which
   manufacturers secure private keys and public trust anchors in

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 14 January 2021.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Applicability Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  A reference manufacturing/boot process  . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Types of Trust Anchors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Secured First Boot Trust Anchor . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  Software Update Trust Anchor  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Trusted Application Manager anchor  . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.4.  Public WebPKI anchors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.5.  DNSSEC root . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.6.  What else?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  Types of Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.1.  Manufacturer installed IDevID certificates  . . . . . . .   9
       4.1.1.  Operational Considerations for Manufacturer IDevID
               Public Key Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.1.2.  Key Generation process  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Public Key infrastructure for IDevIDs . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  Evaluation Questions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   11. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20

1.  Introduction

   An increasing number of protocols derive a significant part of their
   security by using trust anchors that are installed by manufacturers.
   Disclosure of the list of trust anchors does not usually cause a
   problem, but changing them in any way does.  This includes adding,
   replacing or deleting anchors.

   Many protocols also leverage manufacturer installed identities.
   These identities are usually in the form of [ieee802-1AR] Initial
   Device Identity certificates (IDevID).  The identity has two
   components: a private key that must remain under the strict control
   of a trusted part of the device, and a public part (the certificate),
   which (ignoring, for the moment, personal privacy concerns) may be
   freely disclosed.

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   There also situations where identities which are tied up in the
   provision of symmetric shared secret.  A common example is the SIM
   card ([_3GPP.51.011]), which now comes as a virtual SIM, but which is
   usually not provisioned at the factory.  The provision of an initial,
   per-device default password also falls into the category of symmetric
   shared secret.

   It is further not unusual for many devices (particularly smartphones)
   to also have one or more group identity keys.  This is used in, for
   instance, in [fidotechnote] to make claims about being a particular
   model of phone (see [I-D.richardson-rats-usecases]).  The keypair
   that does this is loaded into large batches of phones for privacy

   The trust anchors are used for a variety of purposes.  The following
   uses are specifically called out:

   *  to validate the signature on a software update (as per

   *  to verify the end of a TLS Server Certificate, such as when
      setting up an HTTPS connection.

   *  to verify the [RFC8366] format voucher that provides proof of an
      ownership change

   Device identity keys are used when performing enrollment requests (in
   [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra], and in some uses of
   [I-D.ietf-emu-eap-noob].  The device identity certificate is also
   used to sign Evidence by an Attesting Environment (see

   These security artifacts are used to anchor other chains of
   information: an EAT Claim as to the version of software/firmware
   running on a device (XXX and [I-D.birkholz-suit-coswid-manifest]), an
   EAT claim about legitimate network activity (via
   [I-D.birkholz-rats-mud], or embedded in the IDevID in [RFC8520]).
   Known software versions lead directly to vendor/distributor signed
   Software Bill of Materials (SBOM), such as those described by
   [I-D.ietf-sacm-coswid] and the NTIA/CISQ/OMG SBOM work underway

   In order to manage risks and assess vulnerabilities in a Supply
   Chain, it is necessary to determine a degree of trusthworthiness in
   each device.  A device may mislead audit systems as to its
   provenance, about its software load or even about what kind of device
   it is. (see [RFC7168] for a humourous example).  In order to properly
   assess he security of a Supply Chain it is necessary to understand

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   the kinds and severity of the threats which a device has been
   designed to resist.  To do this, it is necessary to understand the
   ways in which the different trust anchors and identities are
   initially provisioned, are protected, and are updated.

   To do this, this document details the different trust anchors (TrA)
   and identities (IDs) found in typical devices.  The privacy and
   integrity of the TAs and IDs is often provided by a different,
   superior artifacts.  This relationship is examined.

   While many might desire to assign numerical values to different
   mitigation techniques in order to be able to rank them, this document
   does not attempt to do, as there are too many other (mostly human)
   factors that would come into play.  Such an effort is more properly
   in the purvue of a formal ISO9001 process such as ISO14001.

1.1.  Terminology

   This document is not a standards track document, and it does not make
   use of formal requirements language.

   This section will be expanded to include needed terminology as

   The words Trust Anchor are contracted to TrA rather than TA, in order
   not to confuse with [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]'s "Trusted

   This document defines a number of hyphenated terms, and they are
   summarized here:

   device-generated :  a private or symmetric key which is generated on
      the device

   factory-generated :  a private or symmetric key which is generated by
      the factory

   mechanically-installed :  when a key or certificate is programmed
      into flash by out-of-band mechanism like JTAG

   mechanically-transfered :  when a key or certificate is transfered
      into a system via private interface, such as serial console, JTAG
      managed mailbox, or other physically private interface

   network-transfered :  when a key or certificate is transfered into a
      system using a network interface which would be available after
      the device has shipped.  This applies even if the network is
      physically attached using a bed-of-nails.

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   device/factory-co-generated :  when a private or symmetric key is
      derived from a secret previously synchronized between the silicon
      vendor and the factory using a common algorithm.

2.  Applicability Model

   There is a wide variety of devices to which this analysis can apply.
   (See [I-D.bormann-lwig-7228bis]) This document will use a J-group
   class C13 as a sample.  This class is sufficiently large to
   experience complex issues among multiple CPUs, packages and operating
   systems, but at the same time, small enough that this class is often
   deployed in single-purpose IoT-like uses.  Devices in this class
   often have Secure Enclaves (such as the "Grapeboard"), and can
   include silicon manufacturer controlled processors in the boot
   process (the Raspberry PI boots under control of the GPU).

   Almost all larger systems (servers, laptops, desktops) include a
   Baseboard Management Controller (BMC), which ranges from a M-Group
   Class 3 MCU, to a J-Group Class 10 CPU (see, for instance [openbmc]
   which uses a Linux kernel and system inside the BMC).  As the BMC
   usually has complete access to the main CPU's memory, I/O hardware
   and disk, the boot path security of such a system needs to be
   understood first as being about the security of the BMC.

2.1.  A reference manufacturing/boot process

   In order to provide for immutability and privacy of the critical TANs
   and IDs, many CPU manufacturers will provide for some kind of private
   memory area which is only accessible when the CPU is in certain
   priviledged states.  See the Terminology section of
   [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture], notably TEE, REE, and TAM, and also
   section 4, Architecture.

   The private memory that is important is usually non-volatile and
   rather small.  It may be located inside the CPU silicon die, or it
   may be located externally.  If the memory is external, then it is
   usually encrypted by a hardware mechanism on the CPU, with only the
   key kept inside the CPU.

   The entire mechanism may be external to the CPU in the form of a
   hardware-TPM module, or it may be entirely internal to the CPU in the
   form of a firmware-TPM.  It may use a custom interface to the rest of
   the system, or it may implement the TPM 1.2 or TPM 2.0
   specifications.  Those details are important to performing a full
   evaluation, but do not matter that to this model (see initial-
   enclave-location below).

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   During the manufacturing process, once the components have been
   soldered to the board, the system is usually put through a system-
   level test.  This is often done on as a "bed-of-nails" test
   [BedOfNails], where the board has key points attached mechanically to
   a test system.  A [JTAG] process tests the System Under Test, and
   then initializes some firmware into the still empty flash storage.
   It is now common for a factory test image to be loaded first: this
   image will include code to initialize the private memory key
   described above, and will include a first-stage bootloader and some
   kind of (primitive) Trusted Application Manager (TAM).  Embedded in
   the stage one bootloader will be a Trust Anchor that is able to
   verify the second-stage bootloader image.

   After the system has undergone testing, the factory test image is
   erased, leaving the first-stage bootloader.  One or more second-stage
   bootloader images is installed.  The production image may be
   installed at that time, or if the second-stage bootloader is able to
   install it over the network, it may be done that way instead.

   There are many variations of the above process, and this section is
   not attempting to be prescriptive, but to be provide enough
   illustration to motivate subsequent terminology.

   There process may be entirely automated, or it may be entirely driven
   by humans working in the factory.

   Or a combination of the above.

   These steps may all occur on an access-controlled assembly line, or
   the system boards may be shipped from one place to another (maybe
   another country) before undergoing testing.

   Some systems are intended to be shipped in a tamper-proof state, but
   it is usually not desireable that bed-of-nails testing be possible
   without tampering, so the initialization process is usually done
   prior to rendering the system tamper-proof.

   Quality control testing may be done prior to as well as after the
   application of tamper-proofing, as systems which do not pass
   inspection may be reworked to fix flaws, and this should ideally be
   impossible once the system has been made tamper-proof.

3.  Types of Trust Anchors

   Trust Anchors are fundamentally public keys.  They are used to
   validate other digitally signed artifacts.  Typically, these are
   chains of PKIX certificates leading to an End-Entity certificate

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   The chains are usually presented as part of an externally provided
   object, with the term "externally" to be understood as being as close
   as untrusted flash, to as far as objects retrieved over a network.

   There is no requirement that there be any chain at all: the trust
   anchor can be used to validate a signature over a target object

   The trust anchors are often stored in the form of self-signed
   certificates.  The self-signature does not offer any cryptographic
   assurange, but it does provide a form of error detection, providing
   verification against non-malicious forms of data corruption.  If
   storage is at a premium (such as inside-CPU non-volatile storage)
   then only the public key itself need to be stored.  For a 256-bit
   ECDSA key, this is 32-bytes of space.

   When evaluating the degree of trust for each trust anchor there are
   four aspects that need to be determined:

   *  can the trust anchor be replaced or modified?

   *  can additional trust anchors be added?

   *  can trust anchors be removed?

   *  how is the private key associated with the trust anchor stored?

   The first three things are device specific properties of how the
   integrity of the trust anchor is maintained.

   The fourth property has nothing to do with the device, but has to do
   with the reputation and care of the entity that maintains the private

   Different anchors have different purposes.

   These are:

3.1.  Secured First Boot Trust Anchor

   This anchor is part of the first-stage boot loader, and it is used to
   validate a second-stage bootloader which may be stored in external

3.2.  Software Update Trust Anchor

   This anchor is used to validate the main application (or operating
   system) load for the device.

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   It can be stored in a number of places.  First, it may be identical
   to the Secure Boot Trust Anchor.

   Second, it may be stored in the second-stage bootloader, and
   therefore it's integrity is protected by the Secured First Boot Trust

   Third, it may be stored in the application code itself, where the
   application validates updates to the application directly (update in
   place), or via a double-buffer arrangement.  The initial (factory)
   load of the application code initializes the trust arrangement.

   In this situation the application code is not in a secured boot
   situation, as the second-stage bootloader does not validate the
   application/operating system before starting it, but it may still
   provide measured boot mechanism.

3.3.  Trusted Application Manager anchor

   This anchor is part of a [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] Trusted
   Application Manager.  Code which is signed by this anchor will be
   given execution privileges as described by the manifest which
   accompanies the code.  This privilege may include updating anchors.

3.4.  Public WebPKI anchors

   These anchors are used to verify HTTPS certificates from web sites.
   These anchors are typically distributed as part of desktop browsers,
   and via desktop operating systems.

   The exact set of these anchors is not precisely defined: it is
   usually determined by the browser vendor (e.g., Mozilla, Google,
   Apple, Safari, Microsoft), or the operating system vendor (e.g.,
   Apple, Google, Microsoft, Ubuntu).  In most cases these vendors look
   to the CA/Browser Forum ([CABFORUM]) for inclusion criteria.

3.5.  DNSSEC root

   This anchor is part of the DNS Security extensions.  It provides an
   anchor for securing DNS lookups.  Secure DNS lookups may be important
   in order to get access to software updates.  This anchor is now
   scheduled to change approximately every 3 years, with the new key
   announced several years before it is used, making it possible to
   embed a keys that will be valid for up to five years.

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   This trust anchor is typically part of the application/operating
   system code and is usually updated by the manufacturer when they do
   updates.  However, a system which is connected to the Internet may
   update the DNSSEC anchor itself through the mechanism described in

   There are concerns that there may be a chicken and egg situation for
   devices have remained in a powered off state (or disconnected from
   the Internet) for some period of years.  That upon being reconnected,
   that the device would be unable to do DNSSEC validation.  This
   failure would result in them being unable to obtain operating system
   updates that would then include the updates to the DNSSEC key.

3.6.  What else?


4.  Types of Identities

   Identities are installed during manufacturing time for a variety of

   Identities require some private component.  Asymmetric identities
   (e.g., RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA systems) require a co-responding public
   component, usually in the form of a certificate signed by a trusted
   third party.

   The process of making this coordinated key pair and then installing
   it into the device is called identity provisioning.

4.1.  Manufacturer installed IDevID certificates

   [ieee802-1AR] defines a category of certificates that are to
   installed by the manufacturer, which contain at the least, a device
   unique serial number.

   A number of protocols depend upon this certificate.

   *  [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] introduces a mechanism for
      new devices (called pledges) to be onboarded into a network
      without intervention from an expert operator.  A number of derived
      protocols such as {{I-D.

   *  [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture] depends upon a key provisioned into
      the Attesting Environment to sign Evidence.

   *  [I-D.ietf-suit-architecture] may depend upon a key provisioned
      into the device in order to decrypt software updates.

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   *  TBD

4.1.1.  Operational Considerations for Manufacturer IDevID Public Key

   The manufacturer has the responsability to provision a keypair into
   each device as part of the manufacturing process.  There are a
   variety of mechanisms to accomplish this, which this document will

   There are three fundamental ways to generate IDevID certificates for

   1.  generating a private key on the device, creating a Certificate
       Signing Request (or equivalent), and then returning a certificate
       to the device.

   2.  generating a private key outside the device, signing the
       certificate, and the installing both into the device.

   3.  deriving the private key from a previously installed secret seed,
       that is shared with only the manufacturer

   There is a fourth situation where the IDevID is provided as part of a
   Trusted Platform Module (TPM), in which case the TPM vendor may be
   making the same tradeoffs.

   The document [I-D.moskowitz-ecdsa-pki] provides some practical
   instructions on setting up a reference implementation for ECDSA keys
   using a three-tier mechanism.

   This document recommends the use of ECDSA keys for the root and
   intermediate CAs, but there may be operational reasons why an RSA
   intermediate CA will be required for some legacy TPM equipment.

4.1.2.  Key Generation process  On-device private key generation

   Generating the key on-device has the advantage that the private key
   never leaves the device.  The disadvantage is that the device may not
   have a verified random number generator. [factoringrsa] is an example
   of this scenario!

   There are a number of options of how to get the public key securely
   from the device to the certification authority.

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   This transmission must be done in an integral manner, and must be
   securely associated with the assigned serial number.  The serial
   number goes into the certificate, and the resulting certificate needs
   to be loaded into the manufacturer's asset database.  This asset
   database needs to be shared with the MASA.

   One way to do the transmission is during a manufacturing during a Bed
   of Nails (see [BedOfNails]) or Boundary Scan.  When done via a
   physical connection like this, then this is referred to as a _device-
   generated_ / _mechanically-transfered_ .

   There are other ways that could be used where a certificate signing
   request is sent over a special network channel when the device is
   powered up in the factory.  This is referered to as the _device-
   generated_ / _network-transfered_ method.

   Regardless of how the certificate signing request is sent from the
   device to the factory, and the certificate is returned to the device,
   a concern from production line managers is that the assembly line may
   have to wait for the certification authority to respond with the

   After the key generation, the device needs to set a flag such that it
   no longer generates a new key, or will accept a new IDevID via the
   factory connection.  This may be a software setting, or could be as
   dramatic as blowing a fuse.

   The risk is that if an attacker with physical access is able to put
   the device back into an unconfigured mode, then the attacker may be
   able to substitute a new certificate into the device.  It is
   difficult to construct a rational for doing this, unless the network
   initialization also permits an attacker to load or replace trust
   anchors at the same time.

   Because the key is generated inside the device, it is assumed that
   the device can never be convinced to disclose the private key.  Off-device private key generation

   Generating the key off-device has the advantage that the randomness
   of the private key can be better analyzed.  As the private key is
   available to the manufacturing infrastructure, the authenticity of
   the public key is well known ahead of time.

   If the device does not come with a serial number in silicon, then one
   should be be assigned and placed into a certificate.  The private key
   and certificate could be programmed into the device along with the
   initial bootloader firmware in a single step.

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   Aside from the the change of origin for the randomness, a major
   advantage of this mechanism is that it can be done with a single
   write to the flash.  The entire firmware of the device, including
   configuration of trust anchors and private keys can be loaded in a
   single write pass.  Given some pipelining of the generation of the
   keys and the creation of certificates, it may be possible to install
   unique identities without taking any additional time.

   The major downside to generating the private key off-device is that
   it could be seen by the manufacturing infrastructure.  It could be
   compromised by humans in the factory, or the equipment could be
   compromised.  The use of this method increases the value of attacking
   the manufacturing infrastructure.

   If keys are generated by the manufacturing plant, and are immediately
   installed, but never stored, then the window in which an attacker can
   gain access to the private key is immensely reduced.

   As in the previous case, the transfer may be done via physical
   interfaces such as bed-of-nails, giving the _factory-generated_ /
   _mechanically-transfered_ method.

   There is also the possibility of having a _factory-generated_ /
   _network-transfered_ key.  There is a support for "server-generated"
   keys in [RFC7030], [I-D.gutmann-scep], and [RFC4210].  All methods
   strongly recommend encrypting the private key for transfer.  This is
   difficult to comply with as there is not yet any private key material
   in the device, so in many cases it will not be possible to encrypt
   the private key.  Key setup based on 256-bit secret seed

   A hybrid of the previous two methods leverages a symmetric key that
   is often provided by a silicon vendor to OEM manufacturers.

   Each CPU (or a Trusted Execution Environment
   [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture], or a TPM) is provisioned at fabrication
   time with a unique, secret seed, usually at least 256-bits in size.

   This value is revealed to the OEM board manufacturer only via a
   secure channel.  Upon first boot, the system (probably within a TEE,
   or within a TPM) will generate a key pair using the seed to
   initialize a Pseudo-Random-Number-Generator (PRNG).  The OEM, in a
   separate system, will initialize the same PRNG and generate the same
   key pair.  The OEM then derives the public key part, signs it and
   turns it into a certificate.  The private part is then destroyed,
   ideally never stored or seen by anyone.  The certificate (being
   public information) is placed into a database, in some cases it is

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   loaded by the device as its IDevID certificate, in other cases, it is
   retrieved during the onboarding process based upon a unique serial
   number asserted by the device.

   This method appears to have all of the downsides of the previous two
   methods: the device must correctly derive its own private key, and
   the OEM has access to the private key, making it also vulnerable.
   The secret seed must be created in a secure way and it must also be
   communicated securely.

   There are some advantages to the OEM however: the major one is that
   the problem of securely communicating with the device is outsourced
   to the silicon vendor.  The private keys and certificates may be
   calculated by the OEM asynchronously to the manufacturing process,
   either done in batches in advance of actual manufacturing, or on
   demand when an IDevID is demanded.  Doing the processing in this way
   permits the key derivation system to be completely disconnected from
   any network, and requires placing very little trust in the system
   assembly factory.  Operational security such as often incorrectly
   presented fictionalized stories of a "mainframe" system to which only
   physical access is permitted begins to become realistic.  That trust
   has been replaced with a heightened trust placed in the silicon
   (integrated circuit) fabrication facility.

   The downsides of this method to the OEM are: they must be supplied by
   a trusted silicon fabrication system, which must communicate the set
   of secrets seeds to the OEM in batches, and they OEM must store and
   care for these keys very carefully.  There are some operational
   advantages to keeping the secret seeds around in some form, as the
   same secret seed could be used for other things.  There are some
   significant downsides to keeping that secret seed around.

5.  Public Key infrastructure for IDevIDs

   A three-tier PKI infrastructure is appropriate.  This entails having
   a root CA created with the key kept offline, and a number of
   intermediate CAs that have online keys that issue "day-to-day"

   The root private key should be kept offline, quite probably in a
   Hardware Security Module if financially feasible.  If not, then it
   should be secret-split across seven to nine people, with a threshold
   of four to five people.  The split secrets should be kept in
   geographically diverse places if the manufacturer has operations in
   multiple places.  For examples of extreme measures, see
   [kskceremony].  There is however a wide spectrum of needs, as
   exampled in [rootkeyceremony].  The SAS70 audit standard is usually
   used as a basis for the Ceremony, see [keyceremony2].

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   Ongoing access to the root-CA is important, but not as critical as
   access to the MASA key.

   The root CA is then used to sign a number of intermediate entities.
   If manufacturing occurs in multiple factories, then an intermediate
   CA for each factory is appropriate.  It is also reasonable to use
   different intermediate CAs for different product lines.  It may also
   be valuable to split IDevID certificates across intermediate CAs in a
   round-robin fashion for products with high volumes.

   Cycling the intermediate CAs after a period of a few months or so is
   a quite reasonable strategy.  The intermediate CAs' private key may
   be destroyed after it signed some number of IDevIDs, and a new key
   generated.  The IDevID certificates have very long (ideally infinite)
   validity lifetimes for reasons that [ieee802-1AR] explains.  The
   intermediate CAs will have a private key, likely kept online, which
   is used to sign each generated IDevID.  Once the IDevIDs are created,
   the private key is no longer needed and can either be destroyed, or
   taken offline.  In other CAs, the intermediate CA's private key (or
   another designated key) is often needed to sign OCSP [RFC6960] or
   CRLS [RFC5280].  As the IDevID process does not in general support
   revocation, keeping such keys online is not necessary. {EDIT NOTE:
   REVIEW of this NEEDED}

   The intermediate CA certificate SHOULD be signed by the root-CA with
   indefinite (notAfter: 99991231) duration as well.

   In all cases the product DN-serialNumber embedded in the certificate
   must be unique across all products produced by the manufacturer.
   This suggests some amount of structure to the product DN-
   serialNumber, such that different intermediate CAs do not need to
   coordinate when issuing certificates.

6.  Evaluation Questions

   This section recaps the set of questions that may need to be
   answered.  This document does not assign valuation to the answers.

   initial-enclave-location :  Is the location of the initial software
      trust anchor internal to the CPU package?

   initial-enclave-integrity-key :  If the first-stage bootloader is
      external to the CPU, and it is integrity protected, where is the
      key used to check the integrity?

   initial-enclave-privacy-key :  If the first-stage data is external to
      the CPU, is it encrypted?

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   first-stage-initialization :  The number of people involved in the
      first stage initialization.  An entirely automated system would
      have a number zero.  A factory with three 8 hour shifts might have
      a number that is a multiple of three.  A system with humans
      involved may be subject to bribery attacks, while a system with no
      humans may be subject to attacks on the system which are hard to

   first-second-stage-gap :  If a board is initialized with a first-
      stage bootloader in one location (factory), and then shipped to
      another location, there may situations where the device can not be
      locked down until the second step.

7.  Privacy Considerations

   many yet to be detailed

8.  Security Considerations

   This entire document is a security considerations.

9.  IANA Considerations

   This document makes no IANA requests.

10.  Acknowledgements


11.  Changelog

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <>.

              Moskowitz, R., Birkholz, H., Xia, L., and M. Richardson,
              "Guide for building an ECC pki", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-ecdsa-pki-08, 14 February
              2020, <

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              IEEE Standard, ., "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier",
              2009, <

12.2.  Informative References

              Richardson, M. and W. Pan, "Operatonal Considerations for
              Voucher infrastructure for BRSKI MASA", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-richardson-anima-masa-
              considerations-04, 9 June 2020, <

              Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
              and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
              Infrastructures (BRSKI)", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-41, 8 April
              2020, <

   [RFC5011]  StJohns, M., "Automated Updates of DNS Security (DNSSEC)
              Trust Anchors", STD 74, RFC 5011, DOI 10.17487/RFC5011,
              September 2007, <>.

   [RFC8366]  Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert,
              "A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols",
              RFC 8366, DOI 10.17487/RFC8366, May 2018,

   [RFC7030]  Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
              "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,

              Gutmann, P., "Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-gutmann-scep-16, 27
              March 2020, <

   [RFC4210]  Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
              "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,

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              3GPP, "Specification of the Subscriber Identity Module -
              Mobile Equipment (SIM-ME) interface", 15 June 2005,

              Wikipedia, ., "Bed of nails tester", July 2020,

              ARM Pelion, "Factory provisioning overview", 28 June 2020,

              "Factoring RSA keys from certified smart cards:
              Coppersmith in the wild", 16 September 2013,

              Qualcomm press release, "Qualcomm Licenses Rambus
              CryptoManager Key and Feature Management Security
              Solution", 2014, <

              Verisign, "DNSSEC Practice Statement for the Root Zone ZSK
              Operator", 2017, <

              Community, "Root Key Ceremony, Cryptography Wiki", April

              Digi-Sign, "SAS 70 Key Ceremony", April 2020,

              NIST, "SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 4 Recommendation for Key
              Management, Part 1: General", 1 January 2016,

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              FIDO Alliance, ., "FIDO TechNotes: The Truth about
              Attestation", July 2018, <

   [ntiasbom] CISQ/Object Management Group, ., "TOOL-TO-TOOL SOFTWARE
              BILL OF MATERIALS EXCHANGE", July 2020, <

   [openbmc]  Linux Foundation/OpenBMC Group, ., "Defining a Standard
              Baseboard Management Controller Firmware Stack", July
              2020, <>.

   [JTAG]     IEEE Standard, ., "1149.7-2009 - IEEE Standard for
              Reduced-Pin and Enhanced-Functionality Test Access Port
              and Boundary-Scan Architecture", 2009,

              ICANN, ., "Proposal for Future Root Zone KSK Rollovers",
              2019, <

   [CABFORUM] CA/Browser Forum, ., "CA/Browser Forum Baseline
              Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-
              Trusted Certificates, v.1.2.2", October 2014,

              Richardson, M., Wallace, C., and W. Pan, "Use cases for
              Remote Attestation common encodings", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-richardson-rats-usecases-07, 9 March
              2020, <

              Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Brown, D., and M. Meriac, "A
              Firmware Update Architecture for Internet of Things", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-suit-architecture-
              11, 27 May 2020, <

              Aura, T. and M. Sethi, "Nimble out-of-band authentication
              for EAP (EAP-NOOB)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-ietf-emu-eap-noob-02, 12 July 2020,

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              Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
              W. Pan, "Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-architecture-
              05, 10 July 2020, <

              Birkholz, H., "A SUIT Manifest Extension for Concise
              Software Identifiers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-birkholz-suit-coswid-manifest-00, 17 July 2018,

              Birkholz, H., "MUD-Based RATS Resources Discovery", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-birkholz-rats-mud-00, 9
              March 2020, <

   [RFC8520]  Lear, E., Droms, R., and D. Romascanu, "Manufacturer Usage
              Description Specification", RFC 8520,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8520, March 2019,

              Birkholz, H., Fitzgerald-McKay, J., Schmidt, C., and D.
              Waltermire, "Concise Software Identification Tags", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sacm-coswid-15, 1
              May 2020, <

   [RFC7168]  Nazar, I., "The Hyper Text Coffee Pot Control Protocol for
              Tea Efflux Appliances (HTCPCP-TEA)", RFC 7168,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7168, April 2014,

              Bormann, C., Ersue, M., Keranen, A., and C. Gomez,
              "Terminology for Constrained-Node Networks", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-bormann-lwig-7228bis-06, 9
              March 2020, <

              Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Thaler, D., and D. Wheeler,
              "Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP)
              Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-

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              ietf-teep-architecture-11, 2 July 2020,

   [RFC6960]  Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
              Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
              Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
              RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,

Authors' Addresses

   Michael Richardson
   Sandelman Software Works


   Wei Pan
   Huawei Technologies


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