T2TRG Research Group                                       M. Richardson
Internet-Draft                                  Sandelman Software Works
Intended status: Informational                              21 June 2021
Expires: 23 December 2021


   A Taxonomy of operational security considerations for manufacturer
                    installed keys and Trust Anchors
            draft-richardson-t2trg-idevid-considerations-05

Abstract

   This document provides a taxonomy of methods used by manufacturers of
   silicon and devices to secure private keys and public trust anchors.
   This deals with two related activities: how trust anchors and private
   keys are installed into devices during manufacturing, and how the
   related manufacturer held private keys are secured against
   disclosure.

   This document does not evaluate the different mechanisms, but rather
   just serves to name them in a consistent manner in order to aid in
   communication.

   RFCEDITOR: please remove this paragraph.  This work is occurring in
   https://github.com/mcr/idevid-security-considerations

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 December 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.




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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
   as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Applicability Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  A reference manufacturing/boot process  . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Types of Trust Anchors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  Secured First Boot Trust Anchor . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  Software Update Trust Anchor  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.3.  Trusted Application Manager anchor  . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.4.  Public WebPKI anchors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.5.  DNSSEC root . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.6.  What else?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  Types of Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.1.  Manufacturer installed IDevID certificates  . . . . . . .  10
       4.1.1.  Operational Considerations for Manufacturer IDevID
               Public Key Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.1.2.  Key Generation process  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  Public Key Infrastructures (PKI)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.1.  Number of levels of certification authorities . . . . . .  15
     5.2.  Protection of CA private keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     5.3.  Supporting provisioned anchors in devices . . . . . . . .  17
   6.  Evaluation Questions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     6.1.  Integrity and Privacy of on-device data . . . . . . . . .  18
     6.2.  Integrity and Privacy of device identify
           infrastructure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     6.3.  Integrity and Privacy of included trust anchors . . . . .  19
   7.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   11. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25






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1.  Introduction

   An increasing number of protocols derive a significant part of their
   security by using trust anchors [RFC4949] that are installed by
   manufacturers.  Disclosure of the list of trust anchors does not
   usually cause a problem, but changing them in any way does.  This
   includes adding, replacing or deleting anchors.  [RFC6024] deals with
   how trust anchor stores are managed, while this document deals with
   how the associated PKI which is anchor is managed.

   Many protocols also leverage manufacturer installed identities.
   These identities are usually in the form of [ieee802-1AR] Initial
   Device Identity certificates (IDevID).  The identity has two
   components: a private key that must remain under the strict control
   of a trusted part of the device, and a public part (the certificate),
   which (ignoring, for the moment, personal privacy concerns) may be
   freely disclosed.

   There also situations where identities are tied up in the provision
   of symmetric shared secrets.  A common example is the SIM card
   ([_3GPP.51.011]), it now comes as a virtual SIM, but which is usually
   not provisioned at the factory.  The provision of an initial, per-
   device default password also falls into the category of symmetric
   shared secret.

   It is further not unusual for many devices (particularly smartphones)
   to also have one or more group identity keys.  This is used, for
   instance, in [fidotechnote] to make claims about being a particular
   model of phone (see [I-D.richardson-rats-usecases]).  The key pair
   that does this is loaded into large batches of phones for privacy
   reasons.

   The trust anchors are used for a variety of purposes.  Trust anchors
   are used to verify:

   *  the signature on a software update (as per
      [I-D.ietf-suit-architecture]),

   *  a TLS Server Certificate, such as when setting up an HTTPS
      connection,

   *  the [RFC8366] format voucher that provides proof of an ownership
      change.

   Device identity keys are used when performing enrollment requests (in
   [RFC8995], and in some uses of [I-D.ietf-emu-eap-noob].  The device
   identity certificate is also used to sign Evidence by an Attesting
   Environment (see [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]).



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   These security artifacts are used to anchor other chains of
   information: an EAT Claim as to the version of software/firmware
   running on a device ([I-D.birkholz-suit-coswid-manifest]), an EAT
   claim about legitimate network activity (via [I-D.birkholz-rats-mud],
   or embedded in the IDevID in [RFC8520]).

   Known software versions lead directly to vendor/distributor signed
   Software Bill of Materials (SBOM), such as those described by
   [I-D.ietf-sacm-coswid] and the NTIA/SBOM work [ntiasbom] and CISQ/OMG
   SBOM work underway [cisqsbom].

   In order to manage risks and assess vulnerabilities in a Supply
   Chain, it is necessary to determine a degree of trustworthiness in
   each device.  A device may mislead audit systems as to its
   provenance, about its software load or even about what kind of device
   it is (see [RFC7168] for a humorous example).

   In order to properly assess the security of a Supply Chain it is
   necessary to understand the kinds and severity of the threats which a
   device has been designed to resist.  To do this, it is necessary to
   understand the ways in which the different trust anchors and
   identities are initially provisioned, are protected, and are updated.

   To do this, this document details the different trust anchors (TrAnc)
   and identities (IDs) found in typical devices.  The privacy and
   integrity of the TrAncs and IDs is often provided by a different,
   superior artifact.  This relationship is examined.

   While many might desire to assign numerical values to different
   mitigation techniques in order to be able to rank them, this document
   does not attempt to do that, as there are too many other (mostly
   human) factors that would come into play.  Such an effort is more
   properly in the purview of a formal ISO9001 process such as ISO14001.

1.1.  Terminology

   This document is not a standards track document, and it does not make
   use of formal requirements language.

   This section will be expanded to include needed terminology as
   required.

   The words Trust Anchor are contracted to TrAnc rather than TA, in
   order not to confuse with [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]'s "Trusted
   Application".

   This document defines a number of hyphenated terms, and they are
   summarized here:



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   device-generated:  a private or symmetric key which is generated on
      the device

   infrastructure-generated:  a private or symmetric key which is
      generated by some system, likely located at the factory that built
      the device

   mechanically-installed:  when a key or certificate is programmed into
      non-volatile storage by an out-of-band mechanism such as JTAG
      [JTAG]

   mechanically-transferred:  when a key or certificate is transferred
      into a system via private interface, such as serial console, JTAG
      managed mailbox, or other physically private interface

   network-transferred:  when a key or certificate is transferred into a
      system using a network interface which would be available after
      the device has shipped.  This applies even if the network is
      physically attached using a bed-of-nails [BedOfNails].

   device/infrastructure-co-generated:  when a private or symmetric key
      is derived from a secret previously synchronized between the
      silicon vendor and the factory using a common algorithm.

2.  Applicability Model

   There is a wide variety of devices to which this analysis can apply.
   (See [I-D.bormann-lwig-7228bis].)  This document will use a J-group
   processor as a sample.  This class is sufficiently large to
   experience complex issues among multiple CPUs, packages and operating
   systems, but at the same time, small enough that this class is often
   deployed in single-purpose IoT-like uses.  Devices in this class
   often have Secure Enclaves (such as the "Grapeboard"), and can
   include silicon manufacturer controlled processors in the boot
   process (the Raspberry PI boots under control of the GPU).

   Almost all larger systems (servers, laptops, desktops) include a
   Baseboard Management Controller (BMC), which ranges from a M-Group
   Class 3 MCU, to a J-Group Class 10 CPU (see, for instance [openbmc]
   which uses a Linux kernel and system inside the BMC).  As the BMC
   usually has complete access to the main CPU's memory, I/O hardware
   and disk, the boot path security of such a system needs to be
   understood first as being about the security of the BMC.








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2.1.  A reference manufacturing/boot process

   In order to provide for immutability and privacy of the critical
   TrAnc and IDs, many CPU manufacturers will provide for some kind of
   private memory area which is only accessible when the CPU is in
   certain privileged states.  See the Terminology section of
   [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture], notably TEE, REE, and TAM, and also
   section 4, Architecture.

   The private memory that is important is usually non-volatile and
   rather small.  It may be located inside the CPU silicon die, or it
   may be located externally.  If the memory is external, then it is
   usually encrypted by a hardware mechanism on the CPU, with only the
   key kept inside the CPU.

   The entire mechanism may be external to the CPU in the form of a
   hardware-TPM module, or it may be entirely internal to the CPU in the
   form of a firmware-TPM.  It may use a custom interface to the rest of
   the system, or it may implement the TPM 1.2 or TPM 2.0
   specifications.  Those details are important to performing a full
   evaluation, but do not matter much to this model (see initial-
   enclave-location below).

   During the manufacturing process, once the components have been
   soldered to the board, the system is usually put through a system-
   level test.  This is often done as a "bed-of-nails" test
   [BedOfNails], where the board has key points attached mechanically to
   a test system.  A [JTAG] process tests the System Under Test, and
   then initializes some firmware into the still empty flash storage.

   It is now common for a factory test image to be loaded first: this
   image will include code to initialize the private memory key
   described above, and will include a first-stage bootloader and some
   kind of (primitive) Trusted Application Manager (TAM).  (The TAM is a
   piece of software that lives within the trusted execution
   environment.)

   Embedded in the stage one bootloader will be a Trust Anchor that is
   able to verify the second-stage bootloader image.

   After the system has undergone testing, the factory test image is
   erased, leaving the first-stage bootloader.  One or more second-stage
   bootloader images are installed.  The production image may be
   installed at that time, or if the second-stage bootloader is able to
   install it over the network, it may be done that way instead.






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   There are many variations of the above process, and this section is
   not attempting to be prescriptive, but to be provide enough
   illustration to motivate subsequent terminology.

   The process may be entirely automated, or it may be entirely driven
   by humans working in the factory, or a combination of the above.

   These steps may all occur on an access-controlled assembly line, or
   the system boards may be shipped from one place to another (maybe
   another country) before undergoing testing.

   Some systems are intended to be shipped in a tamper-proof state, but
   it is usually not desirable that bed-of-nails testing be possible
   without tampering, so the initialization process is usually done
   prior to rendering the system tamper-proof.  An example of a one-way
   tamper-proof, weather resistant treatment might to mount the system
   board in a case and fill the case with resin.

   Quality control testing may be done prior to as well as after the
   application of tamper-proofing, as systems which do not pass
   inspection may be reworked to fix flaws, and this should ideally be
   impossible once the system has been made tamper-proof.

3.  Types of Trust Anchors

   Trust Anchors (TrAnc) are fundamentally public keys with
   authorizations implicitly attached through the code that references
   them.

   They are used to validate other digitally signed artifacts.
   Typically, these are chains of PKIX certificates leading to an End-
   Entity certificate (EE).

   The chains are usually presented as part of an externally provided
   object, with the term "externally" to be understood as being as close
   as untrusted flash, to as far as objects retrieved over a network.

   There is no requirement that there be any chain at all: the trust
   anchor can be used to validate a signature over a target object
   directly.

   The trust anchors are often stored in the form of self-signed
   certificates.  The self-signature does not offer any cryptographic
   assurance, but it does provide a form of error detection, providing
   verification against non-malicious forms of data corruption.  If
   storage is at a premium (such as inside-CPU non-volatile storage)
   then only the public key itself need to be stored.  For a 256-bit
   ECDSA key, this is 32 bytes of space.



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   When evaluating the degree of trust for each trust anchor there are
   four aspects that need to be determined:

   *  can the trust anchor be replaced or modified?

   *  can additional trust anchors be added?

   *  can trust anchors be removed?

   *  how is the private key associated with the trust anchor,
      maintained by the manufacturer, maintained?

   The first three things are device specific properties of how the
   integrity of the trust anchor is maintained.

   The fourth property has nothing to do with the device, but has to do
   with the reputation and care of the entity that maintains the private
   key.

   Different anchors have different authorizations associated with them.

   These are:

3.1.  Secured First Boot Trust Anchor

   This anchor is part of the first-stage boot loader, and it is used to
   validate a second-stage bootloader which may be stored in external
   flash.  This is called the initial software trust anchor.

3.2.  Software Update Trust Anchor

   This anchor is used to validate the main application (or operating
   system) load for the device.

   It can be stored in a number of places.  First, it may be identical
   to the Secure Boot Trust Anchor.

   Second, it may be stored in the second-stage bootloader, and
   therefore its integrity is protected by the Secured First Boot Trust
   Anchor.

   Third, it may be stored in the application code itself, where the
   application validates updates to the application directly (update in
   place), or via a double-buffer arrangement.  The initial (factory)
   load of the application code initializes the trust arrangement.






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   In this situation the application code is not in a secured boot
   situation, as the second-stage bootloader does not validate the
   application/operating system before starting it, but it may still
   provide measured boot mechanism.

3.3.  Trusted Application Manager anchor

   This anchor is the secure key for the [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]
   Trusted Application Manager (TAM).  Code which is signed by this
   anchor will be given execution privileges as described by the
   manifest which accompanies the code.  This privilege may include
   updating anchors.

3.4.  Public WebPKI anchors

   These anchors are used to verify HTTPS certificates from web sites.
   These anchors are typically distributed as part of desktop browsers,
   and via desktop operating systems.

   The exact set of these anchors is not precisely defined: it is
   usually determined by the browser vendor (e.g., Mozilla, Google,
   Apple, Safari, Microsoft), or the operating system vendor (e.g.,
   Apple, Google, Microsoft, Ubuntu).  In most cases these vendors look
   to the CA/Browser Forum [CABFORUM] for inclusion criteria.

3.5.  DNSSEC root

   This anchor is part of the DNS Security extensions.  It provides an
   anchor for securing DNS lookups.  Secure DNS lookups may be important
   in order to get access to software updates.  This anchor is now
   scheduled to change approximately every 3 years, with the new key
   announced several years before it is used, making it possible to
   embed keys that will be valid for up to five years.

   This trust anchor is typically part of the application/operating
   system code and is usually updated by the manufacturer when they do
   updates.  However, a system that is connected to the Internet may
   update the DNSSEC anchor itself through the mechanism described in
   [RFC5011].

   There are concerns that there may be a chicken and egg situation for
   devices that have remained in a powered off state (or disconnected
   from the Internet) for some period of years.  That upon being
   reconnected, that the device would be unable to do DNSSEC validation.
   This failure would result in them being unable to obtain operating
   system updates that would then include the updates to the DNSSEC key.





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3.6.  What else?

   TBD?

4.  Types of Identities

   Identities are installed during manufacturing time for a variety of
   purposes.

   Identities require some private component.  Asymmetric identities
   (e.g., RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA systems) require a corresponding public
   component, usually in the form of a certificate signed by a trusted
   third party.

   This certificate associates the identity with attributes.

   The process of making this coordinated key pair and then installing
   it into the device is called identity provisioning.

4.1.  Manufacturer installed IDevID certificates

   [ieee802-1AR] defines a category of certificates that are installed
   by the manufacturer, which contain at the least, a device unique
   serial number.

   A number of protocols depend upon this certificate.

   *  [RFC8572] and [RFC8995] introduce mechanisms for new devices
      (called pledges) to be onboarded into a network without
      intervention from an expert operator.  A number of derived
      protocols such as [I-D.ietf-anima-brski-async-enroll],
      [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher],
      [I-D.richardson-anima-voucher-delegation],
      [I-D.friel-anima-brski-cloud] extend this in a number of ways.

   *  [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture] depends upon a key provisioned into
      the Attesting Environment to sign Evidence.

   *  [I-D.ietf-suit-architecture] may depend upon a key provisioned
      into the device in order to decrypt software updates.  Both
      symmetric and asymmetric keys are possible.  In both cases, the
      decrypt operation depends upon the device having access to a
      private key provisioned in advance.  The IDevID can be used for
      this if algorithm choices permit.  ECDSA keys do not directly
      support encryption in the same way that RSA does, for instance,
      but the addition of ECIES can solve this.  There may be other
      legal considerations why the IDevID might not be used, and a
      second key provisioned.



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   *  TBD

4.1.1.  Operational Considerations for Manufacturer IDevID Public Key
        Infrastructure

   The manufacturer has the responsibility to provision a key pair into
   each device as part of the manufacturing process.  There are a
   variety of mechanisms to accomplish this, which this document will
   overview.

   There are three fundamental ways to generate IDevID certificates for
   devices:

   1.  generating a private key on the device, creating a Certificate
       Signing Request (or equivalent), and then returning a certificate
       to the device.

   2.  generating a private key outside the device, signing the
       certificate, and the installing both into the device.

   3.  deriving the private key from a previously installed secret seed,
       that is shared with only the manufacturer.

   There is a fourth situation where the IDevID is provided as part of a
   Trusted Platform Module (TPM), in which case the TPM vendor may be
   making the same tradeoffs.

   The document [I-D.moskowitz-ecdsa-pki] provides some practical
   instructions on setting up a reference implementation for ECDSA keys
   using a three-tier mechanism.

4.1.2.  Key Generation process

4.1.2.1.  On-device private key generation

   Generating the key on-device has the advantage that the private key
   never leaves the device.  The disadvantage is that the device may not
   have a verified random number generator. [factoringrsa] is an example
   of a successful attack on this scenario.

   There are a number of options of how to get the public key securely
   from the device to the certification authority.

   This transmission must be done in an integral manner, and must be
   securely associated with the assigned serial number.  The serial
   number goes into the certificate, and the resulting certificate needs
   to be loaded into the manufacturer's asset database.




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   One way to do the transmission is during a factory Bed of Nails test
   (see [BedOfNails]) or Boundary Scan.  When done via a physical
   connection like this, then this is referred to as a _device-
   generated_ / _mechanically-transferred_ method.

   There are other ways that could be used where a certificate signing
   request is sent over a special network channel when the device is
   powered up in the factory.  This is referred to as the _device-
   generated_ / _network-transferred_ method.

   Regardless of how the certificate signing request is sent from the
   device to the factory, and how the certificate is returned to the
   device, a concern from production line managers is that the assembly
   line may have to wait for the certification authority to respond with
   the certificate.

   After the key generation, the device needs to set a flag such that it
   no longer will generate a new key / will accept a new IDevID via the
   factory connection.  This may be a software setting, or could be as
   dramatic as blowing a fuse.

   The risk is that if an attacker with physical access is able to put
   the device back into an unconfigured mode, then the attacker may be
   able to substitute a new certificate into the device.  It is
   difficult to construct a rationale for doing this, unless the network
   initialization also permits an attacker to load or replace trust
   anchors at the same time.

   Devices are typically constructed in a fashion such that the device
   is unable to ever disclose the private key via an external interface.
   This is usually done using a secure-enclave provided by the CPU
   architecture in combination with on-chip non-volatile memory.

4.1.2.2.  Off-device private key generation

   Generating the key off-device has the advantage that the randomness
   of the private key can be better analyzed.  As the private key is
   available to the manufacturing infrastructure, the authenticity of
   the public key is well known ahead of time.

   If the device does not come with a serial number in silicon, then one
   should be assigned and placed into a certificate.  The private key
   and certificate could be programmed into the device along with the
   initial bootloader firmware in a single step.

   Aside from the change of origin for the randomness, a major advantage
   of this mechanism is that it can be done with a single write to the
   flash.  The entire firmware of the device, including configuration of



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   trust anchors and private keys can be loaded in a single write pass.
   Given some pipelining of the generation of the keys and the creation
   of certificates, it may be possible to install unique identities
   without taking any additional time.

   The major downside to generating the private key off-device is that
   it could be seen by the manufacturing infrastructure.  It could be
   compromised by humans in the factory, or the equipment could be
   compromised.  The use of this method increases the value of attacking
   the manufacturing infrastructure.

   If private keys are generated by the manufacturing plant, and are
   immediately installed, but never stored, then the window in which an
   attacker can gain access to the private key is immensely reduced.

   As in the previous case, the transfer may be done via physical
   interfaces such as bed-of-nails, giving the _infrastructure-
   generated_ / _mechanically-transferred_ method.

   There is also the possibility of having a _infrastructure-generated_
   / _network-transferred_ key.  There is a support for "server-
   generated" keys in [RFC7030], [RFC8894], and [RFC4210].  All methods
   strongly recommend encrypting the private key for transfer.  This is
   difficult to comply with here as there is not yet any private key
   material in the device, so in many cases it will not be possible to
   encrypt the private key.

4.1.2.3.  Key setup based on 256 bit secret seed

   A hybrid of the previous two methods leverages a symmetric key that
   is often provided by a silicon vendor to OEM manufacturers.

   Each CPU (or a Trusted Execution Environment
   [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture], or a TPM) is provisioned at fabrication
   time with a unique, secret seed, usually at least 256 bits in size.

   This value is revealed to the OEM board manufacturer only via a
   secure channel.  Upon first boot, the system (probably within a TEE,
   or within a TPM) will generate a key pair using the seed to
   initialize a Pseudo-Random-Number-Generator (PRNG).  The OEM, in a
   separate system, will initialize the same PRNG and generate the same
   key pair.  The OEM then derives the public key part, signs it and
   turns it into a certificate.  The private part is then destroyed,
   ideally never stored or seen by anyone.  The certificate (being
   public information) is placed into a database, in some cases it is
   loaded by the device as its IDevID certificate, in other cases, it is
   retrieved during the onboarding process based upon a unique serial
   number asserted by the device.



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   This method appears to have all of the downsides of the previous two
   methods: the device must correctly derive its own private key, and
   the OEM has access to the private key, making it also vulnerable.
   The secret seed must be created in a secure way and it must also be
   communicated securely.

   There are some advantages to the OEM however: the major one is that
   the problem of securely communicating with the device is outsourced
   to the silicon vendor.  The private keys and certificates may be
   calculated by the OEM asynchronously to the manufacturing process,
   either done in batches in advance of actual manufacturing, or on
   demand when an IDevID is demanded.  Doing the processing in this way
   permits the key derivation system to be completely disconnected from
   any network, and requires placing very little trust in the system
   assembly factory.  Operational security such as often incorrectly
   presented fictionalized stories of a "mainframe" system to which only
   physical access is permitted begins to become realistic.  That trust
   has been replaced with a heightened trust placed in the silicon
   (integrated circuit) fabrication facility.

   The downsides of this method to the OEM are: they must be supplied by
   a trusted silicon fabrication system, which must communicate the set
   of secrets seeds to the OEM in batches, and they OEM must store and
   care for these keys very carefully.  There are some operational
   advantages to keeping the secret seeds around in some form, as the
   same secret seed could be used for other things.  There are some
   significant downsides to keeping that secret seed around.

5.  Public Key Infrastructures (PKI)

   [RFC5280] describes the format for certificates, and numerous
   mechanisms for doing enrollment have been defined (including: EST
   [RFC7030], CMP [RFC4210], SCEP [RFC8894]).

   [RFC5280] provides mechanisms to deal with multi-level certification
   authorities, but it is not always clear what operating rules apply.

   The certification authority (CA) that is central to [RFC5280]-style
   public key infrastructures can suffer three kinds of failures:

   1.  disclosure of a private key,

   2.  loss of a private key,

   3.  inappropriate signing of a certificate from an unauthorized
       source.





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   A PKI which discloses one or more private certification authority
   keys is no longer secure.

   An attacker can create new identities, and forge certificates
   connecting existing identities to attacker controlled public/private
   keypairs.  This can permit the attacker to impersonate any specific
   device.

   There is an additional kind of failure when the CA is convinced to
   sign (or issue) a certificate which it is not authorized to do so.
   See for instance [ComodoGate].  This is an authorization failure, and
   while a significant event, it does not result in the CA having to be
   re-initialized from scratch.

   This is distinguished from when a loss as described above renders the
   CA completely useless and likely requires a recall of all products
   that have ever had an IDevID issued from this CA.

   If the PKI uses Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL)s, then an attacker
   that has access to the private key can also revoke existing
   identities.

   In the other direction, a PKI which loses access to a private key can
   no longer function.  This does not immediately result in a failure,
   as existing identities remain valid until their expiry time
   (notAfter).  However, if CRLs or OCSP are in use, then the inability
   to sign a fresh CRL or OCSP response will result in all identities
   becoming invalid once the existing CRLs or OCSP statements expire.

   This section details some nomenclature about the structure of
   certification authorities.

5.1.  Number of levels of certification authorities

   Section 6.1 of [RFC5280] provides a Basic Path Validation.  In the
   formula, the certificates are arranged into a list.

   The certification authority (CA) starts with a Trust Anchor (TrAnc).
   This is counted as the first level of the authority.

   In the degenerate case of a self-signed certificate, then this a one
   level PKI.

   .----------.<-.
   |Issuer= X |  |
   |Subject=X |--'
   '----------'




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   The private key associated with the Trust Anchor signs one or more
   certificates.  When this first level authority trusts only End-Entity
   (EE) certificates, then this is a two level PKI.

   .----------.<-.
   |Issuer= X |  |   root
   |Subject=X +--'    CA
   '--+-----+-'
      |     |
      |     '-------.
      |             |
      v             v
   .----EE----.    .----EE----.
   |Issuer= X |    |Issuer= X |
   |Subject=Y1|    |Subject=Y2|
   '----------'    '----------'

   When this first level authority signs subordinate certification
   authorities, and those certification authorities sign End-Entity
   certificates, then this is a three level PKI.

                  .----------.<-.
      root        |Issuer= X |  |
       CA         |Subject=X +--'
                  '--+-----+-'
                     |     |
         .-----------'     '------------.
         |                              |
         v                              v
      .----------.                   .----------.
      |Issuer= X |    subordinate    |Issuer= X |
      |Subject=Y1|        CA         |Subject=Y2|
      '--+---+---'                   '--+----+--'
         |   |                          |    |
      .--'   '-------.              .---'    '------.
      |              |              |               |
      v              v              v               v
   .----EE----.    .----EE----.   .----EE----.    .----EE----.
   |Issuer= Y1|    |Issuer= Y1|   |Issuer= Y2|    |Issuer= Y2|
   |Subject=Z1|    |Subject=Z1|   |Subject=Z3|    |Subject=Z4|
   '----------'    '----------'   '----------'    '----------'

   In general, when arranged as a tree, with the End-Entity certificates
   at the bottom, and the Trust Anchor at the top, then the level is
   where the deepest EE certificates are, counting from one.






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   It is quite common to have a three-level PKI, where the root of the
   CA is stored in a Hardware Security Module, while the level one
   subordinate CA is available in an online form.

5.2.  Protection of CA private keys

   The private key for the certification authorities must be protected
   from disclosure.  The strongest protection is afforded by keeping
   them in a offline device, passing Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs)
   to the offline device by human process.

   For examples of extreme measures, see [kskceremony].  There is
   however a wide spectrum of needs, as exampled in [rootkeyceremony].
   The SAS70 audit standard is usually used as a basis for the Ceremony,
   see [keyceremony2].

   This is inconvenient, and may involve latencies of days, possibly
   even weeks to months if the offline device is kept in a locked
   environment that requires multiple keys to be present.

   There is therefore a tension between protection and convenience.
   This is often mitigated by having some levels of the PKI be offline,
   and some levels of the PKI be online.

   There is usually a need to maintain backup copies of the critical
   keys.  It is often appropriate to use secret splitting technology
   such as Shamir Secret Sharing among a number of parties [shamir79]
   This mechanism can be setup such that some threshold k (less than the
   total n) of shares are needed in order to recover the secret.

5.3.  Supporting provisioned anchors in devices

   IDevID-type Identity (or Birth) Certificates which are provisioned
   into devices need to be signed by a certification authority
   maintained by the manufacturer.  During the period of manufacture of
   new product, the manufacturer needs to be be able to sign new
   Identity Certificates.

   During the anticipated lifespan of the devices the manufacturer needs
   to maintain the ability for third parties to validate the Identity
   Certificates.  If there are Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)
   involved, then they will need to re-signed during this period.  Even
   for devices with a short active lifetime, the lifespan of the device
   could very long if devices are kept in a warehouse for many decades
   before being activated.






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   Trust anchors which are provisioned in the devices will have
   corresponding private keys maintained by the manufacturer.  The trust
   anchors will often anchor a PKI which is going to be used for a
   particular purpose.  There will be End-Entity (EE) certificates of
   this PKI which will be used to sign particular artifacts (such as
   software updates), or messages in communications protocols (such as
   TLS connections).  The private keys associated with these EE
   certificates are not stored in the device, but are maintained by the
   manufacturer.  These need even more care than the private keys stored
   in the devices, as compromise of the software update key compromises
   all of the devices, not just a single device.

6.  Evaluation Questions

   This section recaps the set of questions that may need to be
   answered.  This document does not assign valuation to the answers.

6.1.  Integrity and Privacy of on-device data

   initial-enclave-location:  Is the location of the initial software
      trust anchor internal to the CPU package?  Some systems have a
      software verification public key which is built into the CPU
      package, while other systems store that initial key in a non-
      volatile device external to the CPU.

   initial-enclave-integrity-key:  If the first-stage bootloader is
      external to the CPU, and if it is integrity protected, where is
      the key used to check the integrity?

   initial-enclave-privacy-key:  If the first-stage data is external to
      the CPU, is it kept confidential by use of encryption?

   first-stage-initialization:  The number of people involved in the
      first stage initialization.  An entirely automated system would
      have a number zero.  A factory with three 8 hour shifts might have
      a number that is a multiple of three.  A system with humans
      involved may be subject to bribery attacks, while a system with no
      humans may be subject to attacks on the system which are hard to
      notice.

   first-second-stage-gap:  If a board is initialized with a first-stage
      bootloader in one location (factory), and then shipped to another
      location, there may situations where the device can not be locked
      down until the second step.







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6.2.  Integrity and Privacy of device identify infrastructure

   For IDevID provisioning, which includes a private key and matching
   certificate installed into the device, the associated public key
   infrastructure that anchors this identity must be maintained by the
   manufacturer.

   identity-pki-level:  how deep are the IDevID certificates that are
      issued?

   identity-time-limits-per-subordinate:  how long is each subordinate
      CA maintained before a new subordinate CA key is generated?  There
      may be no time limit, only a device count limit.

   identity-number-per-subordinate:  how many identities are signed by a
      particular subordinate CA before it is retired?  There may be no
      numeric limit, only a time limit.

   identity-anchor-storage:  how is the root CA key stored?  How many
      people are needed to recover the private key?

6.3.  Integrity and Privacy of included trust anchors

   For each trust anchor (public key) stored in the device, there will
   be an associated PKI.  For each of those PKI the following questions
   need to be answered.

   pki-level:  how deep is the EE that will be evaluated (the trust root
      is at level 1)

   pki-algorithms:  what kind of algorithms and key sizes will be
      considered to valid

   pki-level-locked:  (a Boolean) is the level where the EE cert will be
      found locked by the device, or can levels be added or deleted by
      the PKI operator without code changes to the device.

   pki-breadth:  how many different non-expired EE certificates is the
      PKI designed to manage?

   pki-lock-policy:  can any EE certificate be used with this trust
      anchor to sign?  Or, is there some kind of policy OID or Subject
      restriction?  Are specific subordinate CAs needed that lead to the
      EE?

   pki-anchor-storage:  how is the private key associated with this
      trust root stored?  How many people are needed to recover it?




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7.  Privacy Considerations

   many yet to be detailed

8.  Security Considerations

   This entire document is about security considerations.

9.  IANA Considerations

   This document makes no IANA requests.

10.  Acknowledgements

   Robert Martin of MITRE provided some guidance about citing the SBOM
   efforts.  Carsten Borman provides many editorial suggestions.

11.  Changelog

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [ieee802-1AR]
              IEEE Standard, "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier",
              2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
              standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.

12.2.  Informative References

   [RFC8995]  Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
              and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
              Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995,
              May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8995>.

   [I-D.richardson-anima-voucher-delegation]
              Richardson, M. and W. Pan, "Delegated Authority for
              Bootstrap Voucher Artifacts", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-richardson-anima-voucher-delegation-03, 22
              March 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
              richardson-anima-voucher-delegation-03.txt>.




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   [I-D.friel-anima-brski-cloud]
              Friel, O., Shekh-Yusef, R., and M. Richardson, "BRSKI
              Cloud Registrar", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              friel-anima-brski-cloud-04, 6 April 2021,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-friel-anima-brski-
              cloud-04.txt>.

   [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher]
              Richardson, M., Stok, P. V. D., Kampanakis, P., and E.
              Dijk, "Constrained Voucher Artifacts for Bootstrapping
              Protocols", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              anima-constrained-voucher-11, 11 June 2021,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-anima-
              constrained-voucher-11.txt>.

   [I-D.ietf-anima-brski-async-enroll]
              Fries, S., Brockhaus, H., Lear, E., and T. Werner,
              "Support of asynchronous Enrollment in BRSKI (BRSKI-AE)",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-anima-brski-
              async-enroll-02, 14 June 2021,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-anima-brski-
              async-enroll-02.txt>.

   [I-D.moskowitz-ecdsa-pki]
              Moskowitz, R., Birkholz, H., Xia, L., and M. C.
              Richardson, "Guide for building an ECC pki", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-ecdsa-pki-10, 31
              January 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
              moskowitz-ecdsa-pki-10.txt>.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.

   [RFC5011]  StJohns, M., "Automated Updates of DNS Security (DNSSEC)
              Trust Anchors", STD 74, RFC 5011, DOI 10.17487/RFC5011,
              September 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5011>.

   [RFC8366]  Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert,
              "A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols",
              RFC 8366, DOI 10.17487/RFC8366, May 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8366>.

   [RFC8572]  Watsen, K., Farrer, I., and M. Abrahamsson, "Secure Zero
              Touch Provisioning (SZTP)", RFC 8572,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8572, April 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8572>.




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   [RFC7030]  Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
              "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.

   [RFC8894]  Gutmann, P., "Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol",
              RFC 8894, DOI 10.17487/RFC8894, September 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8894>.

   [RFC4210]  Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
              "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>.

   [_3GPP.51.011]
              3GPP, "Specification of the Subscriber Identity Module -
              Mobile Equipment (SIM-ME) interface", 3GPP TS 51.011
              4.15.0, 15 June 2005,
              <http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/51011.htm>.

   [RFC6024]  Reddy, R. and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor Management
              Requirements", RFC 6024, DOI 10.17487/RFC6024, October
              2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6024>.

   [BedOfNails]
              Wikipedia, "Bed of nails tester", 1 July 2020,
              <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In-
              circuit_test#Bed_of_nails_tester>.

   [pelionfcu]
              ARM Pelion, "Factory provisioning overview", 28 June 2020,
              <https://www.pelion.com/docs/device-management-
              provision/1.2/introduction/index.html>.

   [factoringrsa]
              "Factoring RSA keys from certified smart cards:
              Coppersmith in the wild", 16 September 2013,
              <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/204886987.pdf>.

   [kskceremony]
              Verisign, "DNSSEC Practice Statement for the Root Zone ZSK
              Operator", 2017, <https://www.iana.org/dnssec/dps/zsk-
              operator/dps-zsk-operator-v2.0.pdf>.







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   [rootkeyceremony]
              Community, "Root Key Ceremony, Cryptography Wiki", 4 April
              2020,
              <https://cryptography.fandom.com/wiki/Root_Key_Ceremony>.

   [keyceremony2]
              Digi-Sign, "SAS 70 Key Ceremony", 4 April 2020,
              <http://www.digi-sign.com/compliance/key%20ceremony/
              index>.

   [shamir79] Shamir, A., "How to share a secret.", 1979,
              <https://www.cs.jhu.edu/~sdoshi/crypto/papers/
              shamirturing.pdf>.

   [nistsp800-57]
              NIST, "SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 4 Recommendation for Key
              Management, Part 1: General", 1 January 2016,
              <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-57-part-
              1/rev-4/final>.

   [fidotechnote]
              FIDO Alliance, "FIDO TechNotes: The Truth about
              Attestation", 19 July 2018, <https://fidoalliance.org/
              fido-technotes-the-truth-about-attestation/>.

   [ntiasbom] NTIA, "NTIA Software Component Transparency", 1 July 2020,
              <https://www.ntia.doc.gov/SoftwareTransparency>.

   [cisqsbom] CISQ/Object Management Group, "TOOL-TO-TOOL SOFTWARE BILL
              OF MATERIALS EXCHANGE", 1 July 2020, <https://www.it-
              cisq.org/software-bill-of-materials/index.htm>.

   [ComodoGate]
              "Comodo-gate hacker brags about forged certificate
              exploit", 28 March 2011,
              <https://www.theregister.com/2011/03/28/
              comodo_gate_hacker_breaks_cover/>.

   [openbmc]  Linux Foundation/OpenBMC Group, "Defining a Standard
              Baseboard Management Controller Firmware Stack", 1 July
              2020, <https://www.openbmc.org/>.

   [JTAG]     "Joint Test Action Group", 26 August 2020,
              <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JTAG>.







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   [JTAGieee] IEEE Standard, "1149.7-2009 - IEEE Standard for Reduced-
              Pin and Enhanced-Functionality Test Access Port and
              Boundary-Scan Architecture",
              DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2010.5412866, 2009,
              <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5412866>.

   [rootkeyrollover]
              ICANN, "Proposal for Future Root Zone KSK Rollovers",
              2019, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/
              proposal-future-rz-ksk-rollovers-01nov19-en.pdf>.

   [CABFORUM] CA/Browser Forum, "CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements
              for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted
              Certificates, v.1.7.3", October 2020,
              <https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-
              BR-1.7.3.pdf>.

   [I-D.richardson-rats-usecases]
              Richardson, M., Wallace, C., and W. Pan, "Use cases for
              Remote Attestation common encodings", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-richardson-rats-usecases-08, 2
              November 2020, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
              richardson-rats-usecases-08.txt>.

   [I-D.ietf-suit-architecture]
              Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Brown, D., and M. Meriac, "A
              Firmware Update Architecture for Internet of Things", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-suit-architecture-
              16, 27 January 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/
              draft-ietf-suit-architecture-16.txt>.

   [I-D.ietf-emu-eap-noob]
              Aura, T., Sethi, M., and A. Peltonen, "Nimble out-of-band
              authentication for EAP (EAP-NOOB)", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-emu-eap-noob-04, 16 March 2021,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-emu-eap-noob-
              04.txt>.

   [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]
              Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
              W. Pan, "Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-architecture-
              12, 23 April 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
              ietf-rats-architecture-12.txt>.

   [I-D.birkholz-suit-coswid-manifest]
              Birkholz, H., "A SUIT Manifest Extension for Concise
              Software Identifiers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,



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              draft-birkholz-suit-coswid-manifest-00, 17 July 2018,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-birkholz-suit-
              coswid-manifest-00.txt>.

   [I-D.birkholz-rats-mud]
              Birkholz, H., "MUD-Based RATS Resources Discovery", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-birkholz-rats-mud-00, 9
              March 2020, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
              birkholz-rats-mud-00.txt>.

   [RFC8520]  Lear, E., Droms, R., and D. Romascanu, "Manufacturer Usage
              Description Specification", RFC 8520,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8520, March 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8520>.

   [I-D.ietf-sacm-coswid]
              Birkholz, H., Fitzgerald-McKay, J., Schmidt, C., and D.
              Waltermire, "Concise Software Identification Tags", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sacm-coswid-17, 22
              February 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
              ietf-sacm-coswid-17.txt>.

   [RFC7168]  Nazar, I., "The Hyper Text Coffee Pot Control Protocol for
              Tea Efflux Appliances (HTCPCP-TEA)", RFC 7168,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7168, April 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7168>.

   [I-D.bormann-lwig-7228bis]
              Bormann, C., Ersue, M., Keranen, A., and C. Gomez,
              "Terminology for Constrained-Node Networks", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-bormann-lwig-7228bis-06, 9
              March 2020, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
              bormann-lwig-7228bis-06.txt>.

   [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]
              Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Thaler, D., and D. Wheeler,
              "Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP)
              Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-teep-architecture-14, 22 February 2021,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-teep-
              architecture-14.txt>.

Author's Address

   Michael Richardson
   Sandelman Software Works

   Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca



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