| Internet-Draft | SEAT Proxies | July 2026 |
| Ritz, et al. | Expires 6 January 2027 | [Page] |
- Workgroup:
- Secure Evidence and Attestation Transport
- Internet-Draft:
- draft-ritz-seat-proxies-00
- Published:
- Intended Status:
- Standards Track
- Expires:
Bridging Remote Attestation with Secure Channel Protocol Proxies
Abstract
This document specifies a transport-layer mechanism to establish an end-to-end cryptographic channel across a cooperative secure channel protocol intermediary, such as a TLS-terminating proxy.¶
The mechanism enables Remote Attestation Evidence to remain bound to the true end-to-end endpoints even when the initial secure channel handshake is mediated by an intermediary. It uses an ephemeral HPKE challenge exchange, intra-handshake Evidence delivery, and an attestation-bound key update to evict the intermediary from Layer 7 visibility before application data is exchanged.¶
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
Discussion of this document takes place on the Secure Evidence and Attestation Transport Working Group mailing list (seat@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/seat.¶
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/telephonicrobotics/seat-proxies.¶
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."¶
This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 January 2027.¶
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
1. Introduction
This document operates within the Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) architecture [RFC9334] and addresses a specific deployment constraint: the presence of a TLS-terminating intermediary in the path between a RATS Attester and its Relying Party.¶
A prominent class of deployments where this condition fails is the enterprise environment. Organizations deploying MDM-enrolled, enterprise-controlled devices routinely route device-to-service traffic through TLS-terminating infrastructure -- corporate reverse proxies, API gateways, mobile device management policy enforcement points, and enterprise web application firewalls. In these environments, the device holds a TLS connection to enterprise-managed infrastructure, not to the remote attested origin with which it ultimately communicates.¶
Major platform vendors, including cloud productivity and device management providers, regularly publish lists of endpoints for which TLS inspection must be disabled, sometimes referred to as compliance modes. These exclusions are necessary to prevent the intermediary from interfering with the trust mechanisms those endpoints depend on. These existing modes provide an opportunity to integrate Remote Attestation, replacing "administrative trust" with cryptographic proof that an intermediary is not party to sensitive application data.¶
When a TLS-terminating intermediary is present, the client establishes a TLS connection to the intermediary, and the intermediary establishes a separate connection to the origin. The two connections have independent handshake transcripts. Intra- handshake attestation protocols that cryptographically bind Evidence to the connection transcript are therefore binding to the client-to- intermediary connection, not to the connection to the origin. Any attestation produced by the origin references a different cryptographic context than the one the client holds. The end-to-end binding on which transport-layer attestation depends is severed at the proxy boundary.¶
This document defines a cryptographic transport and proxy eviction mechanism. It does not define attestation Evidence profiles, claim formats, or identity document structures.¶
The mechanism establishes binding for both intra-handshake attestation (for example, Early Attestation [I-D.fossati-seat-early-attestation]) and post-handshake attestation (for example, EXPAT [I-D.fossati-seat-expat]).¶
These are named as examples; the mechanism is agnostic to the specific
attestation protocol. For intra-handshake Evidence delivery, this
document uses the attestation extension defined in
[I-D.fossati-seat-early-attestation].¶
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This document uses the following terms.¶
- Cooperative intermediary:
-
A TLS-terminating proxy that forwards the signalling defined in this document during connection establishment and that honours the transition to Layer 4 forwarding upon key rotation. A cooperative intermediary is not part of the origin's Trusted Computing Base.¶
- Client (Relying Party, RP):
-
The endpoint that verifies the origin's attested properties.¶
- Origin (Attesting Server):
-
The endpoint whose attested properties the client wishes to verify, reachable only through one or more intermediaries.¶
- Ephemeral KEM key pair (skE / pkE):
-
A Key Encapsulation Mechanism key pair generated fresh by the client for a single session and never reused, used as the recipient key for HPKE Base Mode (Mode 0) [RFC9180] operations.¶
- Origin KEM key (pkR):
-
The origin's KEM public key, distributed in an Identity Document and authenticated by the client prior to the handshake as described in the Origin Key Provisioning section.¶
- Identity Document:
-
A signed document such as an EAT Attestation Result (EAR) [I-D.ietf-rats-ear]. The Identity Document carries pkR. The signature provides a self-contained integrity guarantee, allowing the document to be fetched over untrusted channels.¶
- Challenge nonces (cnC, cnR):
-
Ephemeral random values exchanged between client and origin under HPKE. cnC is generated by the client and sealed to pkR; cnR is generated by the origin and sealed to pkE.¶
- psk_attest:
-
A symmetric secret derived from cnC and cnR. It is injected into the Extended Key Update key schedule to rotate traffic keys, evicting the intermediary from the session.¶
- Attestation Binder:
-
The cryptographic value bound into the attestation Evidence, ensuring per-session freshness and end-to-end connection binding. In this document, it is derived from the ephemeral KEM public keys exchanged during the HPKE challenge, replacing the severed TLS transcript hash as the session anchor.¶
3. Overview
A TLS-terminating intermediary severs the RA+TLS channel binding on which attestation depends, regardless of when attestation occurs. Major platform vendors already define endpoint sets for which TLS inspection must be disabled in order to preserve endpoint-specific trust properties. This document reuses that operational pattern and replaces administrative exclusion with a cryptographic mechanism: the proxy cooperates during handshake-time signalling, forwards encrypted Evidence without decrypting it, and is then mechanically evicted from Layer 7 visibility by an attestation-bound key update.¶
The mechanism is designed against the trust-boundary requirements identified for proxy-fronted attested channels. An implementation conforming to this document:¶
-
MUST establish a channel identity that is cryptographically bound to the attested origin endpoint even though connection establishment traverses a TLS-terminating intermediary.¶
-
MUST use object-layer encryption for Evidence payloads to maintain confidentiality from the Layer 7 intermediary.¶
3.1. Architectural Advantages
No nested encryption. Post-eviction, application data flows over standard TLS traffic keys on the origin-bound channel. No outer tunnel wraps an inner tunnel; the attested connection carries application data without additional encapsulation overhead.¶
Broad deployment without per-application modification. Attestation is handled at the proxy and TLS library layer. Every application communicating through a cooperative intermediary receives attestation coverage without modification, extending equally to legacy and modern software in the same estate.¶
Evidence privacy. Evidence is encrypted independently of the TLS session using object-level encryption. The privacy motivation for object-level protection in RATS deployments is discussed in [I-D.ounsworth-rats-privacy-framework]. The cooperative intermediary can read plaintext CMW routing headers but cannot access the Evidence payload, maintaining confidentiality of an Attester's measurements from infrastructure outside the broader network of trust.¶
3.2. State Machine
A session proceeds through the following states:¶
L7 Proxy Negotiation Client and origin exchange HPKE-sealed
| challenge nonces via nonce_challenge_ext;
| the intermediary forwards the signalling
| at Layer 7 and retains termination.
v
Intra-HS Attestation End-to-end Evidence delivery via the
| early-attestation TLS extension. Evidence
| is wrapped in a CMW and COSE_Encrypt0.
| The Proxy reads CMW headers and routes.
v
Handshake Complete Standard TLS 1.3 handshake completes.
|
v
EKU Key Rotation Immediately upon Finished, the client
| initiates the Extended Key Update. This
| step is unconditional and blind.
v
Proxy Eviction / L4 The intermediary cannot derive the
| rotated keys and steps down to Layer 4
| transparent forwarding.
v
Application Data Application data flows over the E2E
encrypted channel.
3.3. Proxy Handshake Behavior
The following diagram and algorithm define the complete behavior of a
cooperative intermediary executing a proxy-traversal session under the
Background Check Model. The diagram borrows the message notation of
[I-D.fossati-seat-early-attestation] Figure 5; content fully specified
by that document is shown as .... In the diagram, [EA §6
extensions] denotes the attestation negotiation extensions defined in
Section 6 of
[I-D.fossati-seat-early-attestation].¶
Relying Party TLS Proxy Attesting Server
| | |
| ClientHello | |
| + nonce_challenge_ext | |
| (pkE, ctC) | |
|---------------------->| [DETECT] |
| | ClientHello |
| | + nonce_challenge_ext |
| | (pkE, ctC) [fwd] |
| |------------------------>|
| | |
|<======= ServerHello, both legs ================>|
| | |
| | {EncryptedExtensions} |
| | + nonce_challenge_ext |
| | (ctR) |
| |<------------------------|
| {EncryptedExtensions} | |
| + nonce_challenge_ext | |
| (ctR) [relayed] | |
|<----------------------| |
| | {Certificate*} |
| | + attestation* |
| |<------------------------|
| {Certificate*} | |
| + attestation* | |
| [cmw routed] | |
|<----------------------| |
| | |
|<===== {CertVerify*} + {Finished}, both legs ===>|
| | [ARMED] |
| {Certificate*} | |
| + attestation* | |
|---------------------->| |
| | {Certificate*} |
| | + attestation* |
| | [cmw routed] |
| |------------------------>|
|<===== {CertVerify*} + {Finished}, both legs ===>|
| | |
| ExtendedKeyUpdate | |
| [psk_attest] | |
|---------------------->| [TRIGGERED] |
| | ExtendedKeyUpdate |
| | [fwd, Buffer Drain] |
| |------------------------>|
| | |
| [Application Data -- end-to-end encrypted] |
|<===============================================>|
| (proxy: opaque L4 forwarder) |
The proxy MUST execute the following steps:¶
-
Receive ClientHello from the RP. If the ClientHello contains an
nonce_challenge_extextension alongside one or more of the attestation negotiation extensions defined in Section 6 of [I-D.fossati-seat-early-attestation], enter DETECT state. Otherwise, process as a standard TLS connection.¶ -
Initiate the Leg B connection to the Attesting Server. Construct a ClientHello carrying all negotiation extensions from the RP's ClientHello. The
nonce_challenge_extextension MUST be forwarded withpkEandctCunchanged.¶ -
Relay the ServerHello received from the Attesting Server to the RP without modification.¶
-
Relay the
EncryptedExtensionsreceived from the Attesting Server to the RP. Thenonce_challenge_extextension carryingctRMUST be forwarded unchanged.¶ -
Receive the
Certificatemessage from the Attesting Server. Inspect the plaintext CMWindheader of thecmw_payloadcarried in theattestationextension to determine routing. Forward thecmw_payloadto the RP without decrypting the Evidence payload.¶ -
Relay
CertificateVerifyandFinishedfrom the Attesting Server to the RP. Enter ARMED state.¶ -
Receive the
Certificatemessage from the RP. Inspect the plaintext CMWindheader and route thecmw_payloadto the Attesting Server. The Evidence payload MUST NOT be decrypted.¶ -
Relay
CertificateVerifyandFinishedfrom the RP to the Attesting Server.¶ -
Receive
ExtendedKeyUpdatefrom the RP. Enter TRIGGERED state. Forward theExtendedKeyUpdateto the Attesting Server. Execute the Buffer Drain procedure defined below. Activate Layer 4 transparent forwarding for all subsequent records on both connections.¶
3.4. Mechanical Eviction
Before the key update, the intermediary holds the application traffic
keys of the terminated connection and can read and rewrite application
records at Layer 7. After the key update, the live traffic keys are
derived from main_secret_N+1, which is a function of combined_ikm
and therefore of psk_attest. An entity that cannot derive cnR
cannot derive psk_attest, cannot compute main_secret_N+1, and cannot
derive any traffic key from it.¶
The DETECT, ARMED, and TRIGGERED state transitions governing eviction are defined in the Proxy Handshake Behavior section.¶
- Buffer Drain:
-
Before activating Layer 4 forwarding, the intermediary MUST complete the following steps in the order given:¶
-
The intermediary MUST cease reading from both the client-facing and origin-facing transport connections.¶
-
Any bytes received from the client-facing connection that have been buffered beyond the final Extended Key Update record boundary MUST be written to the origin-facing connection in order, without modification or decryption.¶
-
Any bytes received from the origin-facing connection that have been buffered beyond the final Extended Key Update record boundary MUST be written to the client-facing connection in order, without modification or decryption.¶
-
Only upon confirming that both transport directions have been fully drained MUST the intermediary activate Layer 4 transparent forwarding for all subsequent records on both flows of that session.¶
The intermediary MUST NOT activate Layer 4 forwarding before completing steps 1 through 4. Bytes forwarded in steps 2 and 3 are post-rotation ciphertext that the intermediary cannot decrypt; they MUST be treated as opaque octets.¶
-
4. The Ephemeral HPKE Challenge Exchange
The challenge exchange is carried in a single TLS extension,
nonce_challenge_ext, which appears with distinct contents in the
ClientHello and in the EncryptedExtensions. Its presence is the
capability signal for this mechanism; an intermediary that does not
recognise it forwards it unmodified, and an origin that does not support
it omits the EncryptedExtensions variant.¶
4.1. Origin Key Provisioning
Before initiating the handshake, the client MUST obtain and
authenticate the origin's KEM public key pkR. Clients MUST
maintain a trust anchor store from which the Identity Document can be
authenticated; trust anchors MAY be self-signed certificates, raw
public keys, or JWK keys [RFC7517]. The details of trust anchor
maintenance and path validation are outside the scope of this document.¶
pkR is distributed in an Identity Document, such as an EAR
[I-D.ietf-rats-ear] whose ear_managed_keysets claim carries pkR
as a JWK [RFC7517] with key_ops set to ["encrypt"], under the
keyset name "hpke-kem-key". Because the EAR's Verifier signature
provides a self-contained integrity guarantee, the fetch MAY occur
over untrusted channels.¶
The client MUST verify the EAR signature against its trust anchor
store and extract pkR from the "hpke-kem-key" entry of
ear_managed_keysets before proceeding with ClientHello processing.¶
4.2. ClientHello Processing
Prior to the handshake the client obtains pkR as described in the
Origin Key Provisioning section above. The client generates a fresh,
single-use ephemeral KEM key pair (skE, pkE), generates a random
challenge nonce cnC, and seals it to the origin using HPKE Base Mode
(Mode 0) as defined in Section 5.1 of [RFC9180].¶
aad_ct = Hash(pkR || ClientHello.random || NegotiationOffer) /* HPKE Base Mode (RFC 9180, Section 5.1) */ ctC = HPKE-Base-Seal(pkR, aad_ct, cnC)¶
The client places pkE and ctC in the nonce_challenge_ext
extension of the ClientHello. aad_ct binds the ciphertext to the
target origin's KEM key, the client's fresh random, and the negotiated
key-exchange parameters, so the ciphertext cannot be replayed to a
different origin or across sessions.¶
The intermediary forwards the ClientHello to the origin. Because the
intermediary does not hold skR, it cannot recover cnC.¶
4.3. EncryptedExtensions Processing
The origin recovers the nonce by decapsulation using HPKE Base Mode:¶
aad_ct = Hash(pkR || ClientHello.random || NegotiationOffer) /* HPKE Base Mode (RFC 9180, Section 5.1) */ cnC = HPKE-Base-Open(skR, aad_ct, ctC)¶
Successful opening proves the origin's possession of skR. The
origin generates its counter-challenge cnR and seals it to the
client's ephemeral key, again using HPKE Base Mode:¶
aad_ee = Hash(cnC) /* HPKE Base Mode (RFC 9180, Section 5.1) */ ctR = HPKE-Base-Seal(pkE, aad_ee, cnR)¶
The origin returns ctR in the nonce_challenge_ext extension of the
EncryptedExtensions. The client recovers cnR:¶
aad_ee = Hash(cnC) /* HPKE Base Mode (RFC 9180, Section 5.1) */ cnR = HPKE-Base-Open(skE, aad_ee, ctR)¶
Only the holder of skE -- the client -- can recover cnR.¶
4.4. Derivation of psk_attest and Attestation Binder
Both endpoints now hold both nonces. The end-to-end Attestation Binder is derived from the ephemeral KEM public keys exchanged during the HPKE challenge:¶
c_attest_binder = HKDF-Expand-Label(0, "attestation",
Hash(TLS_Client_Public_Key || pkR), Hash.length)
s_attest_binder = HKDF-Expand-Label(0, "attestation",
Hash(TLS_Server_Public_Key || pkE), Hash.length)
¶
Hash is the hash of the negotiated TLS 1.3 cipher suite.¶
By incorporating the respective ephemeral KEM public key into the context hash, the Attestation Binder locks the resulting Evidence to the specific HPKE parameters used to traverse the proxy, binding the Evidence to the true end-to-end participants and replacing the severed proxy transcript.¶
5. Intra-Handshake Evidence Delivery
Evidence is delivered during the TLS handshake via the attestation
extension in the Certificate message, as defined in
[I-D.fossati-seat-early-attestation]. However, to ensure the
cooperative intermediary can route the evidence without violating the
confidentiality of the workload, the payload MUST be structured as
follows:¶
-
Evidence Generation: The Attester generates its Evidence (e.g., an EAT) and binds it to the session by placing
rdatain theeat_nonceclaim, whererdatais computed as:¶rdata = Hash(s_attest_binder || psk_attest)
¶This commits the signed Evidence to both the KEM public keys (via
s_attest_binder) and the dual-nonce session secret (viapsk_attest), ensuring the quote is bound to the full end-to-end exchange. To cryptographically commit to the proxy-traversing HPKE exchange and prevent the TEE from acting as a blind signing oracle, the Evidence MUST explicitly include the public parameters of the origin KEM key (pkR) within the standardizedcnfclaim.¶ -
Object-Level Encryption: To preserve confidentiality from the terminating intermediary, the Evidence MUST be encrypted to the public key of the receiving endpoint, for example using
COSE_Encrypt0. This follows the object-level confidentiality architecture discussed in [I-D.ounsworth-rats-privacy-framework].¶ -
CMW Encapsulation: The encrypted envelope is placed inside a Conceptual Message Wrapper (CMW) Record [I-D.ietf-rats-msg-wrap]. The outer CMW headers (such as the
indfield indicating Evidence) remain in plaintext.¶
Because the cooperative intermediary terminates TLS, it generates its
own Certificate message for the backend connection to the origin and
MUST actively move the attestation extension between the two
connections. Adapting the routing role of the Lead Verifier
[I-D.ietf-rats-multi-verifier] to a zero-trust posture, the
intermediary acts only as a router and never as a Verifier: it MUST NOT decrypt, decode, or appraise the inner Evidence. The complete
routing procedure is defined in the Proxy Handshake Behavior section,
steps 5 and 7.¶
6. Key Schedule Integration and Proxy Eviction
Immediately upon completion of the TLS handshake, the client initiates
an Extended Key Update [I-D.ietf-tls-extended-key-update] that injects
psk_attest into the key schedule. This rotates the application
traffic keys to values that incorporate attestation-derived keying
material inaccessible to the intermediary.¶
6.1. PSK-Injected Key Derivation
The Extended Key Update performs a fresh (EC)DHE (or KEM) exchange
yielding the shared secret eku_dh_shared. In the standard EKU key
schedule, Derive-Secret(main_secret_N, "derived", "") serves as the
HKDF-Extract salt, chaining the new secret to the prior session
state. Because the proxy terminated the original TLS connection, the
client and origin do not share a common main_secret_N; applying that
derivation would produce mismatched keys at the two endpoints.¶
This document therefore mandates a key schedule reset: the
HKDF-Extract salt MUST be set to 0, severing the chain to the
proxy-terminated session, and the input keying material MUST be the
concatenation of eku_dh_shared and psk_attest. A zero salt
instructs the key schedule to treat this rotation as a fresh derivation
anchored entirely in combined_ikm, analogous to how TLS 1.3 derives
its Early Secret from a PSK with no prior session state.¶
combined_ikm = eku_dh_shared || psk_attest
0 (zero-length salt)
|
v
combined_ikm -> HKDF-Extract = main_secret_N+1
|
+-----> Derive-Secret(., "c ap traffic",
| transcript_hash_N+1)
| = client_application_traffic_secret_N+1
|
+-----> Derive-Secret(., "s ap traffic",
| transcript_hash_N+1)
| = server_application_traffic_secret_N+1
|
+-----> Derive-Secret(., "exp master",
| transcript_hash_N+1)
= exporter_secret_N+1
6.2. Post-Handshake Re-Attestation
After eviction the client and origin share a common main_secret_N+1
and the connection is an ordinary end-to-end TLS session. Any
subsequent Extended Key Update is therefore a normal end-to-end
exchange: the proxy is already a Layer 4 forwarder and plays no
cryptographic role, so the key schedule reset used at eviction does not
apply and standard EKU chaining [I-D.ietf-tls-extended-key-update] is
used.¶
Each such rotation produces a fresh transcript_hash_N+1 and a
fresh exporter_secret_N+1, suitable for anchoring a new round of
attestation: an intra-handshake-style mechanism re-anchors to the
transcript, and a post-handshake-style mechanism re-anchors to the
exporter.¶
For example, EXPAT [I-D.fossati-seat-expat] performs its initial
attestation immediately after the handshake completes and re-attests by
initiating a fresh Exported Authenticator exchange. This mechanism
aligns its Extended Key Update to that same post-handshake instant; the
resulting exporter_secret_N+1 is the end-to-end exporter the EXPAT
binder consumes, which the evicted intermediary cannot reproduce. No
element of the post-handshake protocol is otherwise modified.¶
7. Security Considerations
The adversary of concern is a TLS-terminating intermediary that attempts to retain unauthorised Layer 7 visibility after the point at which it is expected to step down to Layer 4 forwarding, or attempts to read sensitive Evidence payloads.¶
7.1. Key Separation
The mechanism relies on the separation between the key-encapsulation
role (the KEM key pair) and the TLS identity/authentication role. The
ephemeral skE is generated by the client, never transmitted, and
never reused. An intermediary that terminates TLS observes every
plaintext handshake message, including the EncryptedExtensions carrying
ctR, yet cannot open ctR without skE.¶
7.2. Transcript and Replay Binding
Because the TLS-terminating intermediary breaks the native TLS
transcript hash by terminating the connection, the end-to-end
Attestation Binder is derived from the out-of-band HPKE exchange
instead. aad_ct binds ctC to pkR, the ClientHello random, and the
negotiated parameters, preventing replay to a different origin or
session. aad_ee is Hash(cnC): because cnC was HPKE-sealed to
pkR and is never transmitted in the clear, the intermediary cannot
observe it, making aad_ee opaque to the proxy despite the severed
transcript. An adversary cannot transfer either ciphertext to a
different origin or a different handshake.¶
7.3. Object-Level Confidentiality
Because the proxy terminates TLS, the Certificate message is visible
to the proxy in plaintext. The confidentiality of the Attester's
Evidence relies entirely on the object-level encryption (e.g.,
COSE_Encrypt0) applied to the Evidence payload. The proxy can only
view the unencrypted outer CMW routing headers. This confidentiality
guarantee is independent of transport security: the Evidence payload
remains confidential from the intermediary regardless of whether it is
cooperative or hostile, because confidentiality is a property of the
object, not the channel. The privacy architecture motivating this
object-level protection is discussed in
[I-D.ounsworth-rats-privacy-framework].¶
7.4. Non-cooperative and Malicious Intermediaries
A non-cooperative intermediary that suppresses the nonce_challenge_ext
extension or refuses the Extended Key Update eviction trigger cannot
derive post-rotation traffic keys. The session terminates rather than
continuing on a compromised channel, providing fail-secure behaviour
against both misconfigured and malicious intermediaries without
requiring explicit detection of adversarial intent.¶
7.5. Interaction with Post-Handshake Attestation
Intra-handshake Evidence delivery and the Extended Key Update complete before any post-handshake protocol window opens. For mechanisms such as EXPAT [I-D.fossati-seat-expat] that depend on an end-to-end channel, this ordering structurally closes the race condition that arises when Exported Authenticators operate over a proxy-terminated session.¶
Section 5.2.2 of [RFC9261] explicitly states that if the party generating an Exported Authenticator does so on a different connection than the party validating it -- including situations in which application data is sent via a TLS-terminating proxy -- the Handshake Context will not match and the CertificateVerify will not validate.¶
The tls-exporter binding defined in [RFC9266] is unique to each
TLS connection; a terminating proxy creates two independent sessions
with independent EKM values, producing exactly this condition. EXPAT
[I-D.fossati-seat-expat], which builds on Exported Authenticators,
therefore cannot function across a TLS-terminating proxy without the
end-to-end channel this document restores. The mechanism defined here
is a prerequisite for EXPAT to function in proxy-fronted deployments.¶
7.6. Key Substitution and Oracle Protection
Key binding to an attested execution environment is a complementary concern addressed by [I-D.reddy-rats-key-binding].¶
In proxy-fronted topologies, the TLS handshake is terminated by the intermediary, removing the standard transport-layer proofs of possession. If the origin TEE signs an Attestation Binder provided by the untrusted host OS without cryptographically committing to the key exchange material, an active attacker could execute the HPKE challenge exchange themselves and use the TEE as a blind signing oracle, producing valid-looking Evidence bound to attacker-controlled KEM parameters.¶
To mitigate this, the Evidence MUST explicitly carry the public parameters of the key that executed the HPKE decapsulation (pkR) using the EAT cnf claim. By enforcing this parameter-by-parameter match, the protocol guarantees that the private component of the key executing the HPKE exchange is physically confined within the exact execution context being attested, wholly mitigating key substitution.¶
8. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to register the following entry in the "TLS ExtensionType Values" registry [RFC8446]:¶
| Value | Extension Name | TLS 1.3 | DTLS-Only | Recommended |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TBD1 | nonce_challenge_ext | CH, EE | N | Y |
The nonce_challenge_ext extension is permitted in the ClientHello (CH)
and in the EncryptedExtensions (EE); its contents differ per message as
defined in this document. Its presence in EncryptedExtensions is
conditional on its presence in the corresponding ClientHello.¶
9. References
9.1. Normative References
- [I-D.fossati-seat-early-attestation]
- Sheffer, Y., Mihalcea, I., Deshpande, Y., Fossati, T., and T. Reddy.K, "Using Attestation in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-fossati-seat-early-attestation-05, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-fossati-seat-early-attestation-05>.
- [I-D.ietf-rats-ear]
- Fossati, T., Voit, E., Trofimov, S., and H. Birkholz, "EAT Attestation Results", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-ear-04, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-ear-04>.
- [I-D.ietf-rats-msg-wrap]
- Birkholz, H., Smith, N., Fossati, T., Tschofenig, H., and D. Glaze, "RATS Conceptual Messages Wrapper (CMW)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-msg-wrap-23, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-msg-wrap-23>.
- [I-D.ietf-tls-extended-key-update]
- Tschofenig, H., Tüxen, M., Reddy.K, T., Fries, S., and Y. Rosomakho, "Extended Key Update for Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update-13, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-extended-key-update-13>.
- [RFC2119]
- Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
- [RFC5869]
- Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5869>.
- [RFC7517]
- Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7517>.
- [RFC8174]
- Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
- [RFC8446]
- Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.
- [RFC9180]
- Barnes, R., Bhargavan, K., Lipp, B., and C. Wood, "Hybrid Public Key Encryption", RFC 9180, DOI 10.17487/RFC9180, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9180>.
- [RFC9334]
- Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9334>.
9.2. Informative References
- [I-D.fossati-seat-expat]
- Sardar, M. U., Fossati, T., Reddy.K, T., Sheffer, Y., Tschofenig, H., and I. Mihalcea, "Remote Attestation with Exported Authenticators", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-fossati-seat-expat-03, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-fossati-seat-expat-03>.
- [I-D.friel-tls-atls]
- Friel, O., Barnes, R., Pritikin, M., Tschofenig, H., and M. Baugher, "Application-Layer TLS", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-friel-tls-atls-05, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-friel-tls-atls-05>.
- [I-D.ietf-lake-ra]
- Song, Y. and G. Selander, "Remote attestation over EDHOC", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lake-ra-05, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lake-ra-05>.
- [I-D.ietf-rats-multi-verifier]
- Deshpande, Y., jun, Z., Labiod, H., and H. Birkholz, "Remote Attestation with Multiple Verifiers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-multi-verifier-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-multi-verifier-00>.
- [I-D.ounsworth-rats-privacy-framework]
- Ounsworth, M., Tschofenig, H., and G. Lehmann, "Privacy Framework for Remote ATtestation procedureS", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ounsworth-rats-privacy-framework-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ounsworth-rats-privacy-framework-00>.
- [I-D.reddy-rats-key-binding]
- Reddy.K, T., Tschofenig, H., Fossati, T., and I. Mihalcea, "Key Attestation for Entity Attestation Tokens (EAT)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-reddy-rats-key-binding-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reddy-rats-key-binding-01>.
- [I-D.reddy-wimse-workload-attestation]
- Reddy.K, T. and N. Ritz, "WIMSE Workload Attestation", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-reddy-wimse-workload-attestation-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reddy-wimse-workload-attestation-00>.
- [RFC9261]
- Sullivan, N., "Exported Authenticators in TLS", RFC 9261, DOI 10.17487/RFC9261, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9261>.
- [RFC9266]
- Whited, S., "Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3", RFC 9266, DOI 10.17487/RFC9266, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9266>.
Acknowledgments
TODO¶