Internet Draft R. Atkinson
draft-rja-ilnp-intro-01.txt Extreme Networks
Expires: 10 Dec 2008 10 June 2008
Category: Experimental
ILNP Concept of Operations
draft-rja-ilnp-intro-01.txt
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Abstract
This documents the Concept of Operations for an experimental
extension to IPv6 which is known as the Identifier Locator
Network Protocol (ILNP).
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction ...................................................2
2. Transport Protocols.............................................4
3. Multi-Homing....................................................5
4. Mobility........................................................6
5. Localised Addressing............................................7
6. IP Security Enhancements........................................7
7. Backwards Compatibility.........................................8
8. Incremental Deployment..........................................9
9. Security Considerations .......................................10
10. IANA Considerations ...........................................11
11. References ....................................................11
1. Introduction
At present, the IRTF Routing Research Group is studying
different approaches to evolving the Internet Architecture.
Several different classes of evolution are being considered.
One class is often called "Map and Encapsulate", where
traffic would be mapped and then tunnelled through the
inter-domain core of the Internet. Another class being
considered is sometimes known as "Identifier/Locator Split".
This document relates to a proposal that is in the latter
class of evoluationary approaches.
There has been substantial research relating to naming in
the Internet through the years.[IEN-1][IEN-19][IEN-23]
[IEN-31][RFC-814][RFC-1498] More recently, and mindful of
that important prior work, the author has been examining
enhancements to certain naming aspects of the Internet
Architecture.[MobiArch07][MobiWAC07]
This architectural concept derives originally from a note by
Dave Clark to the IETF mailing list suggesting that the IPv6
address be split into separate Identifier and Locator
fields. Afterwards, Mike O'Dell persued this concept in
Internet-Drafts describing "GSE" or "8+8".[8+8][GSE] More
recently, the IRTF Namespace Research Group (NSRG) studied
this matter. Unusually for an IRTF RG, the NSRG operated on
the principle that unanimity was required for the NSRG to
make a recommendation. The author was a member of the IRTF
NSRG. At least one other proposal, the Host Identity
Protocol (HIP), also derives in part from the IRTF NSRG
studies (and related antecedant work). This current
proposal differs from O'Dell's work in various ways.
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The crux of this proposal is to split each 128-bit IPv6
address into two separate fields, with crisp semantics for
each. It is worth remembering here that an IPv6 address
names a specific interface on a node, since the new scheme
will be different in that regard.
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1 1 2 3
0 4 8 2 6 4 1
+---------------+-----------------+----------------+---------------+
| Version| Traffic Class | Flow Label |
+---------------+-----------------+----------------+---------------+
| Payload Length | Next Header | Hop Limit |
+---------------+-----------------+--------------------------------+
| Source Address |
+ +
| |
+ +
| |
+ +
| |
+---------------+-----------------+----------------+---------------+
| Destination Address |
+ +
| |
+ +
| |
+ +
| |
+---------------+-----------------+----------------+---------------+
Figure 1: Existing ("Classic") IPv6 Header
The high-order 64-bits of the IPv6 address become the Locator.
The Locator indicates the subnetwork point of attachment for
a node. In essence, the Locator names a subnetwork. Locators
are also known as Routing Prefixes.
The low-order 64-bits of the IPv6 address become the
Identifier. The Identifier provides a fixed-length identity
for a node, rather than an identity for a specific interface
of a node. Identifiers are bound to nodes, not to
interfaces, and are in the same modified EUI-64 syntax
already specified for IPv6.[RFC-2460][RFC-4219][IEEE-EUI]
Identifiers are unique within the context of a given
Locator; in many cases, Identifiers might happen to be
globally unique, but that is not a functional requirement
for this proposal.
1 1 2 3
0 4 8 2 6 4 1
+---------------+-----------------+----------------+---------------+
| Version| Traffic Class | Flow Label |
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+---------------+-----------------+----------------+---------------+
| Payload Length | Next Header | Hop Limit |
+---------------+-----------------+----------------+---------------+
| Source Locator |
+ +
| |
+---------------+-----------------+----------------+---------------+
| Source Identifier |
+ +
| |
+---------------+-----------------+----------------+---------------+
| Destination Locator |
+ +
| |
+---------------+-----------------+----------------+---------------+
| Destination Identifier |
+ +
| |
+---------------+-----------------+----------------+---------------+
Figure 2: Enhanced IPv6 Header
Most commonly, a node's set of Identifiers are derived from
the IEEE 802 or IEEE 1394 MAC addresses associated with that
node. This use of MAC addresses to generate Identifiers is
convenient and is not required. Other methods also might be
used to generate Identifiers.
This proposal enhances the Internet Architecture by adding
crisp and clear semantics for the Identifier and for the
Locator, removing the semantically-muddled concept of the
IP address, and updating end system protocols slightly,
without requiring router changes.
With these naming enhancements, we have improved the
architectural support not only for multi-homing, but also
for mobility, localised addressing, and IP Security.
2. Transport Protocols
At present, commonly deployed transport protocols include a
pseudo-header checksum that includes certain network-layer
fields, the IP addresses used for the session, in its
calculation. This inclusion of network-layer information
within the transport-layer session state creates issues for
multi-homing, mobility, IP Security, and localised
addressing (e.g. using Network Address Translation).
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[RFC-1631][RFC-3022]
This unfortunate aspect of the TCP pseudo-header checksum
has been understood to be an architectural problem at least
since 1977, well before the transition from NCP to
IPv4.[IEN-1][IEN-19][IEN-23][IEN-31][RFC-1498]
With this proposal, transport protocols include only the
Identifier in their pseudo-header calculations, but do not
include the Locator in their pseudo-header calculations.
To minimise the changes required within transport protocol
implementations, when this proposal is in use for an IP
session, the Locator fields are zeroed before use by the
transport protocols.
Later in this document, methods for incremental deployment
of this change and backwards compatibility with non-upgraded
nodes are described.
3. Multi-Homing
Conceptually, there are two kinds of multi-homing. Site
multi-homing is when all nodes at a site are multi-homed at
the same time. This is what most people mean when they talk
about multi-homing. However, there is also a separate
concept of node multi-homing, where only a single node is
multi-homed.
At present, site multi-homing is common in the deployed
Internet. This is primarily achieved by advertising the
site's routing prefix(es) to more than upstream Internet
service provider at a given time. In turn, this requires
de-aggregation of routing prefixes within the inter-domain
routing system. In turn, this increases the entropy of the
inter-omain routing system (e.g. RIB/FIB size increases
beyond the minimal RIB/FIB size that would be required to
reach all sites).
At present, node multi-homing is not uncommon. When TCP
or UDP are in use for a session, node multi-homing cannot
provide session reslience, because the transport
pseudo-header checksum binds the session to a single
interface of the multi-homed node. It must be noted that
SCTP has a protocol-specific mechanism to support node
multi-homing; SCTP can support session resilience both at
present and also without change in the proposed approach.
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In the new scheme, when a node is multi-homed, it has more
than one valid Locator value. When one upstream connection
fails, the node sends an ICMP Locator Update message to each
existing correspondent node to remove the no-longer-valid
Locator from the set of valid Locators. [ILNP-ICMP] Also,
the node will use Secure Dynamic DNS Update to alter the set
of currently valid L records associated with that node.
[RFC-3007] This second step ensures that any new
correspondents can reach the node.
In the new scheme, site multi-homing works in a similar
manner, with nodes having one Locator for each upstream
connection to the Internet. To avoid a DNS Update burst
when a site or subnetwork moves location, a DNS record
optimisation is possible. This would change the number of
DNS Updates required from Order(number of nodes at the
site/subnetwork that moved) to Order(1).[ILNP-DNS]
4. Mobility
There are no standardised mechanisms to update most
transport protocols with new IP addresses in use for the
session. [NB: There is IETF work in progress to add this
capability into the Stream Control Transport Protocol
(SCTP).]
This creates various issues for mobility. For example,
there is no method at present to update the IP addresses
associated with a transport layer session when one of the
nodes in that session moves (i.e. changes one of its points
of network attachment). So, the several approaches to IP
mobility seek to hide the change in location (and
corresponding change in IP addresses) via tunnelling, home
agents, foreign agents, and so forth.[RFC-3775] All of this
can add substantial complexity to IP mobility approaches,
both in the initial deployment and also in ongoing
operation.
By contrast, this ILNP proposal hides the nodes location
information from the transport layer protocols at all times,
by removing location information from the transport session
state (e.g. pseudo-header checksum calculations).
In this proposal, mobility is supported using the same
mechanisms as multihoming. Both cases use Locator values to
identify different IP subnetworks. To handle the move of a
node, we add a new ICMP control message. The ICMP Locator
Update message is used by a node to inform its existing
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correspondents that the set of valid Locators for the node
has changed. This mechanism can be used to add newly valid
Locators, to remove no longer valid Locators, or to do both
at the same time. Further, the node uses Secure Dynamic DNS
Update to correct the set of L records in the DNS for that
node. This enables any new correspondents to correctly
initiate a new session with the node at its new location.
This use of DNS for initial rendezvous with mobile node was
independently proposed by others [PHG02] and then separately
by the current author later on.
Note that we can (and do) treat network mobility (as well as
node mobility) as a special case of multihoming. That is,
when a network moves, it uses a new Locator value for all of
its communications sessions. So, the same mechanism, using
a new or additional Locator value, also supports network
mobility.
5. Localised Addressing
As the Locator value no longer forms part of the node
session state (e.g. TCP pseudo-header), it is easier to
implement localised addressing based on the use of local
values of the Locator. This would be either in place of,
or to supplement, existing NAT-based schemes.[RFC-1631]
[RFC-3022]
In the simplest case, an ILNP capable NAT only would need to
change the value of the Source Locator in an outbound
packet, and the value of the Destination Locator for an
inbound packet. Identifier values would not need to change,
so a true end-to-end session can be maintained.
Please note that with this proposal, localised addressing
(e.g. using Network Address Translation) would work in
harmony with multihoming, mobility, and IP
Security.[MobiWAC07]
6. IP Security Enhancements
A current issue is that the IP Security protocols, AH and
ESP, have Security Associations that include the IP
addresses of the secure session endpoints. This was
understood to be a problem when AH and ESP were originally
defined, however the limited set of namespaces in the
Internet Architecture did not provide any better choices at
that time.
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Operationally, this binding causes problems for the use of
the IPsec protocols through Network Address Translation
devices, with mobile nodes (because the mobile node's IP
address changes at each network-layer handoff), and with
multi-homed nodes (because the session is bound to a
particular interface of the multi-homed node, rather than
being bound to the node itself).[RFC-3027][RFC-3715]
To resolve the issue of IPsec interoperability through a NAT
deployment, UDP encapsulation of IPsec is commonly used
today.[RFC-3948]
With this proposal, the IP Security protocols, AH and ESP,
are enhanced to bind Security Associations only to
Identifier values and never to Locator values (and also not
to an entire 128-bit IPv6 address).
Similarly, key management protocols used with IPsec would be
enhanced to deprecate use of IP addresses as identifiers and
to substitute the use of the new Identifier for that
purpose.
This small change enables IPsec to work in harmony with
multihoming, mobility, and localised addressing. Further,
it would obviate the need for specialised IPsec NAT
Traversal mechanisms, thus simplifying IPsec implementations
while enhancing deployability and
interoperability.[RFC-3948]
This change does not reduce the security provided by the IP
Security protocols.
7. Backwards Compatibility
First, if one comapres Figure 1 and Figure 2, one can see
that IPv6 with the Identifier/Locator Split enhancement is
fully backwards compatible with existing IPv6. This means
that no router software or silicon changes are necessary to
support the proposed enhancements. A router would be
unaware whether the packet being forwarded were classic IPv6
or the proposed enhanced version of IPv6. So no changes to
IPv6 routers is required to deploy this proposal.
Further, IPv6 Neighbour Discovery should work fine without
any significant protocol changes.
If a node that has been enhanced to support the Identifier/
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Locator Split mode initiates an IP session with another
node, normally it will first perform a DNS lookup on the
responding node's DNS name. If the inititator node does not
find any new I and L DNS resource records for the responder
node, then the initiator uses the Classical IPv6 mode of
operation for the new session with the responder, rather
than trying to use the I/L Split mode for that session.
If the responder node for a new IP session has not been
enhanced to support the I/L Split mode and receives initial
packet(s) containing the Nonce Destination Option, the
responder will drop the packet and send an ICMP Parameter
Problem error message back to the initiator.
If the initiator node does not receive a response from the
responder in a timely manner (e.g. within TCP timeout for a
TCP session) and also does not receive an ICMP Unreachable
error message for that packet, OR if the initiator receives
an ICMP Parameter Problem error message for that packet,
then the initiator knows that the responder is not able to
support the I/L Split Operating mode. In this case, the
initiator node should try again to create the new IP session
but this time OMITTING the Nonce Destination Option, and
this time operating in Classic IPv6 mode, rather than I/L
Split mode.
The existing BSD Sockets API can continue to be used. That
API can be implemented in a manner that hides the underlying
protocol changes from the applications. So it is believed
that existing IP address referrals can continue to work
properly.
It is suggested, however, that a new, optional, more
abstract, API be created so that new applications do not
have to delve needlessly into low-level details of the
underlying network protocols.
8. Incremental Deployment
If a node has been enhanced to support the Identifier/
Locator Split operating mode, that node's fully-qualified
domain name will normally have one or more I records and one
or more L records associated with it in the DNS.
When a host ("initiator') initiates a new IP session with a
correspondent ("responder"), it normally will perform a DNS
lookup to determine the address(es) of the responder. A
host that has been enhanced to support the Identifier/
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Locator Split operating mode normally will look for
Identifier ("I") and Locator ("L") records in any received
DNS replies. DNS servers that support I and L records
should include them (when they exist) as additional data in
all DNS replies to queries for DNS AAAA records.[ILNP-DNS]
If the initiator supports the I/L Split mode and from DNS
information learns that the responder also supports the I/L
Split mode, then the initiator will generate an
unpredictable nonce value, store that value in a local
session cache, and will include the Nonce Destination Option
in its initial packet(s) to the responder.[ILNP-Nonce]
If the responder supports the I/L Split mode and receives
initial packet(s) containing the Nonce Destination Option,
the responder will thereby know that the initiator supports
the I/L Split mode and the responder will also operate in
I/L Split mode for this new IP session.
If the responder supports the I/L Split mode and receives
initial packet(s) NOT containing the Nonce Destination Option,
the responder will thereby know that the initiator does NOT
support the I/L Split mode and the responder will operate
in classic IPv6 mode for this new IP session.
The previous section described how interoperability between
enhanced nodes and non-enhanced nodes is retained even if a
non-enhanced node erroneously has I and L DNS resource
records in place (e.g. due to some accident).
9. Security Considerations
This proposal outlines a proposed evolution for the
Internet Architecture to provide improved capabilities.
A separate document [ILNP-Nonce] proposed a new IPv6
Destination Option that can be used to carry a session nonce
end-to-end between communicating nodes. That nonce provides
protection against off-path attacks on an Identifier/Locator
session. The Nonce Destination Option is used ONLY for IP
sessions in the Identifier/Locator Split mode.
Ordinary IPv6 is vulnerable to on-path attacks unless
the IP Authentication Header or IP Encapsulating Security
Payload is in use. So the Nonce Destination Option
only seeks to provide protection against off-path attacks
on an IP session -- equivalent to ordinary IPv6 when
not using IP Security.
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When the Identifier/Locator split mode is in use for an
existing IP session, the Nonce Destination Option must be
included in any ICMP control messages (e.g. ICMP Unreachable,
ICMP Locator Update) sent with regard to that IP session.
When in the I/L Split operating mode for an existing IP
session, ICMP control messages received without a Nonce
Destination Option must be discarded as forgeries. This
security event should be logged.
When in the I/L Split operating mode for an existing IP
session, ICMP control messages received without a correct
nonce value inside the Nonce Destination Option must be
discarded as forgeries. This security event should be logged.
For ID/Locator Split mode sessions operating in higher risk
environments, the use of the cryptographic authentication
provided by IP Authentication Header is recommended
*in addition* to concurrent use of the Nonce Destination
Option.
The IP Security standards are enhanced here by binding IPsec
Security Associations to the Identifiers of the session
endpoints, rather than binding IPsec Security Associations
to the IP Addresses as at present. This change enhances the
deployability and interoperability of the IP Security
standards, but does not decrease the security provided by
those protocols.
The DNS enhancements proposed here are entirely compatible
with, and can be protected using, the existing IETF
standards for DNS Security.[RFC-4033] The Secure DNS Dynamic
Update mechanism used here is also used unchanged.[RFC-3007]
So there is no change to the security properties of the
Domain Name System.
In the proposed new scheme, firewalls are able to
authenticate ICMP control messages arriving on the external
interface. This enables more thoughtful handling of ICMP
messages by firewalls than is commonly the case at present.
As the firewall is along the path between the communicating
nodes, the firewall can snoop on any Session Nonce being
carried in the initial packets of an I/L Split mode session.
The firewall can verify that nonce is present on incoming
control packets, dropping any control packets that lack the
correct nonce value. By always including the nonce, even
when IP Security is also in use, the firewall can filter out
all off-path attacks. In this last case, a forged packet
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from an on-path attacker will still be detected when the
IPsec input processing occurs in the receiving node; this
will cause that forged packet to be dropped rather than
acted upon. It is important to note that at present an IPv6
session is entirely vulnerable to on-path attacks unless
IPsec is in use for that particular IPv6 session, so the
security properties of the new proposal are never worse than
for existing IPv6.
10. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA considerations.
11. References
This section provides both normative and informative
references relating to this note.
11.1. Normative References
[RFC-4033] R. Arends, et alia, "DNS Security Introduction
and Requirements", RFC-4033, March 2005.
[RFC-4219] R. Hinden & S. Deering, "IP Version 6
Addressing Architecture", RFC-4219, February
2006.
[RFC-2460] S. Deering & R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol
Version 6 Specification", RFC-2460, December
1998.
[RFC-3007] B. Wellington, "Secure Domain Name System
Dynamic Update", RFC-3007, November 2000.
11.2. Informative References
[8+8] M. O'Dell, "8+8 - An Alternate Addressing
Architecture for IPv6", Internet-Draft,
October 1996.
[GSE] M. O'Dell, "GSE - An Alternate Addressing
Architecture for IPv6", Internet-Draft,
February 1997.
[IEEE-EUI] IEEE Standards Association, "Guidelines for
64-bit Global Identifier (EUI-64)", IEEE,
2007.
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[IEN-1] C.J. Bennett, S.W. Edge, & A.J. Hinchley,
"Issues in the Interconnection of Datagram
Networks", Internet Experiment Note (IEN) 1,
INDRA Note 637, PSPWN 76, University College
London, 29 July 1977.
http://www.postel.org/ien/ien001.pdf
[IEN-19] J. F. Shoch, "Inter-Network Naming, Addressing,
and Routing", IEN-19, January 1978.
[IEN-23] J. F. Shoch, "On Names, Addresses, and
Routings", IEN-23, January 1978.
[IEN-31] D. Cohen, "On Names, Addresses, and Routings
(II)", IEN-31, April 1978.
[ILNP-Nonce] R. Atkinson, "Nonce Destination Option",
June 2008.
[ILNP-DNS] R. Atkinson, "DNS Resource Records for
Identifier/Locator Use", June 2008.
[ILNP-ICMP] R. Atkinson, "ICMP Locator Update message"
June 2008.
[MobiArch07] R. Atkinson, S. Bhatti, & S. Hailes,
"Mobility as an Integrated Service Through
the Use of Naming", Proceedings of
ACM MobiArch 2007, August 2007,
Kyoto, Japan.
[MobiWAC07] R. Atkinson, S. Bhatti, & S. Hailes,
"A Proposal for Unifying Mobility with
Multi-Homing, NAT, & Security",
Proceedings of ACM MobiWAC 2007, Chania,
Crete. ACM, October 2007.
[PHG02] Pappas, A, S. Hailes, & R. Giaffreda,
"Mobile Host Location Tracking through DNS",
Proceedings of IEEE London Communications
Symposium, IEEE, September 2002, London,
England, UK.
[RFC-814] D.D. Clark, "Names, Addresses, Ports, and
Routes", RFC-814, July 1982.
[RFC-1498] J.H. Saltzer, "On the Naming and Binding of
Network Destinations", RFC-1498, August 1993.
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[RFC-1631] K. Egevang & P. Francis, "The IP Network
Address Translator (NAT)", RFC-1631, May 1994.
[RFC-3022] P. Srisuresh & K. Egevang, "Traditional IP
Network Address Translator", RFC-3022,
January 2001.
[RFC-3027] M. Holdrege and P Srisuresh, "Protocol
Complications of the IP Network Address
Translator", RFC-3027, January 2001.
[RFC-3715] B. Aboba and W. Dixon, "IPsec-Network Address
Translation (NAT) Compatibility Requirements",
RFC-3715, March 2004.
[RFC-3775] D. Johnson, C. Perkins, and J. Arkko, "Mobility
Support in IPv6", RFC-3775, June 2004.
[RFC-3948] A. Huttunen, et alia, "UDP Encapsulation of
IPsec ESP Packets", RFC-3948, January 2005.
(Additional references to be added later.)
Author's Address
R. Atkinson
Extreme Networks
3585 Monroe Street
Santa Clara, CA
95051 USA
Telephone: +1 (408)579-2800
Email: rja@extremenetworks.com
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