OAuth Working Group N. Sakimura, Ed.
Internet-Draft Nomura Research Institute
Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley
Expires: January 31, 2014 Ping Identity
N. Agarwal
Google
July 30, 2013
OAuth Transient Client Secret Extension for Public Clients
draft-sakimura-oauth-tcse-01
Abstract
The OAuth 2.0 public client utilizing authorization code grant is
susceptible to the code interception attack. This specification
describe a mechanism that acts as a control against this threat.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 31, 2014.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. transient client secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. transient client secret hash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Client checks the server support . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. Client creates a transient client secret . . . . . . . . 3
3.3. Client sends the left hash with the authorization request 3
3.4. Server returns the code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.5. Client sends the code and the secret to the token
endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.6. Server verifies tcs before returning the tokens . . . . . 4
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. OAuth Parameters Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. Introduction
Public clients in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] is suseptible to the "code"
interception attack. The "code" interception attack is an attack
that a malicious client intercepts the "code" returned from the
authorization endpoint and uses it to obtain the access token. This
is possible on a public client as there is no client secret
associated for it to be sent to the token endpoint. This is
especially true on some smartphone platform in which the "code" is
returned to a redirect URI with a custom scheme as there can be
multiple apps that can register the same scheme.
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To mitigate this attack, this extension utilizes dynamically created
client secret called transient client secret whose left hash is sent
as a new authorization request parameter. The "code" obtained is
then sent to the token endpoint with the transient client secret and
the server compairs it with the previously received left hash of it
so that it can perfom the proof of posession by the client.
2. Terminology
In addition to the terms defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], this
specification defines the following terms.
2.1. transient client secret
a cryptographically random string with big enough entropy that is
used to correlate the authorization request to the token request
2.2. transient client secret hash
base64url encoding of the left most 128bit of SHA256 hash of
transient client secret
3. Protocol
3.1. Client checks the server support
Before starting the authorization process, the client MUST make sure
that the server supports this specification. It may be obtained out-
of-band or through some other mechanisms such as the discovery
document in OpenID Connect Discovery [OpenID.Discovery]. The exact
mechanism on how the client obtains this information is out of scope
of this specification.
The client that wishes to use this specification MUST stop proceeding
if the server does not support this extension.
3.2. Client creates a transient client secret
The client then creates a transient client secret, "tcs", in the
following manner.
tcs = high entropy cryptographic random string
NOTE: transient client secret MUST have high enough entropy to make
it inpractical to guess the value.
3.3. Client sends the left hash with the authorization request
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Then, the client calculates a transient client secret hash, "tcsh",
the left hash of the "tcs" as follows where L is a function that
calcualtes the base64url encoded left-most 128 bits of the binary
input, and H is a SHA256 function.
tcsh = L (H (tcs))
The client sends the transient client secret hash with the following
parameter with the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] Authorization Request:
tcsh REQUIRED. transient client secret hash
3.4. Server returns the code
When the server issues a "code", it MUST associate the "tcsh" value
with the "code" so that it can be used later.
Typically, the "tcsh" value is stored in encrypted form in the
"code", but it could as well be just stored in the server in
association with the code. The server MUST NOT include the "tcsh"
value in the form that any entity but itself can extract it.
3.5. Client sends the code and the secret to the token endpoint
Upon receipt of the "code", the client sends the request to the token
endpoint. In addition to the parameters defined in OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749], it sends the following parameter:
tcs REQUIRED. transient client secret
3.6. Server verifies tcs before returning the tokens
Upon receipt of the request at the token endpoint, the server
verifies it by calculating the transient client secret hash from
"tcs" value and comparing it with the previously associated "tcsh".
If they are equal, then the successful response SHOULD be returned.
If the values are not equal, an error response indicating
"invalid_grant" as described in section 5.2 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]
SHOULD be returned.
4. IANA Considerations
This specification makes a registration request as follows:
4.1. OAuth Parameters Registry
This specification registers the following parameters in the IANA
OAuth Parameters registry defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
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o Parameter name: tcs
o Parameter usage location: Access Token Request
o Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working
Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
o Specification document(s): this document
o Related information: None
o Parameter name: tcsh
o Parameter usage location: Authorization Request
o Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working
Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
o Specification document(s): this document
o Related information: None
5. Security Considerations
The security model relies on the fact that the transient client
secret is not being disclosed in the front channel. It is vitally
important to adhear to this principle. As such, the transient client
secret has to be created in such a manner that it is
cryptographically random and has high entropy that it is not
practical for the attacker to guess, and if it is to be returned
inside "code", it has to be encrypted in such a manner that only the
server can decrypt and extract it.
6. Acknowledgements
The initial draft of this specification was created by the OpenID AB/
Connect Working Group of the OpenID Foundation, by most notably of
the following people:
o Naveen Agarwal, Google
o Dirk Belfanz, Google
o John Bradley, Ping Identity
o Brian Campbell, Ping Identity
o Ryo Ito, mixi
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o Michael B. Jones, Microsoft
o Torsten Lodderstadt, Deutsche Telekom
o Breno de Madeiros, Google
o Anthony Nadalin, Microsoft
o Nat Sakimura, Nomura Research Institute
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627, July 2006.
[RFC6570] Gregorio, J., Fielding, R., Hadley, M., Nottingham, M.,
and D. Orchard, "URI Template", RFC 6570, March 2012.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC
6749, October 2012.
7.2. Informative References
[OpenID.Discovery]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and E. Jay, "OpenID
Connect Discovery 1.0", May 2013.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC
4949, August 2007.
Authors' Addresses
Nat Sakimura (editor)
Nomura Research Institute
Email: sakimura@gmail.com
John Bradley
Ping Identity
Email: jbradley@pingidentity.com
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Naveen Agarwal
Google
Email: naa@google.com
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