Network Working Group P. Sangster
Internet Draft Symantec Corporation
Intended status: Proposed Standard January 4, 2010
Expires: July 2010
PT-TLS: A Posture Transport (PT) Protocol Compatible with TNC Using
Transport Layer Security (TLS)
draft-sangster-nea-pt-tls-00.txt
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Abstract
This document specifies PT-TLS, a Posture Transport (PT) protocol
identical to the Trusted Computing Group's IF-T Binding to TLS 1.0
protocol. The document then evaluates PT-TLS against the
requirements defined in the NEA Overview and Requirements and PB-TNC
specifications.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction...................................................3
1.1. Prerequisites.............................................4
1.2. Message Diagram Conventions...............................4
1.3. Conventions used in this document.........................5
2. Design Considerations..........................................5
2.1. Benefits of TCP/IP Connectivity...........................5
2.2. Leveraging Proven TLS Security............................6
2.3. TLV-Oriented Based Message Encapsulation..................6
2.4. No Change to Base TLS Protocol............................6
3. PT-TLS Protocol................................................7
3.1. Initiating a PT-TLS Session...............................7
3.1.1. Issues with Server Initiated PT-TLS Sessions.........8
3.1.2. Establish or Re-Use Existing PT-TLS Session..........8
3.2. TCP Port Usage............................................9
3.3. PT-TLS Message Flow.......................................9
3.3.1. Assessment Triggers..................................9
3.3.2. PT-TLS Message Exchange Phases.......................9
3.3.2.1. TLS Setup Phase................................10
3.3.2.2. PT-TLS Negotiation Phase.......................11
3.3.2.3. PT-TLS Data Transport Phase....................12
3.3.3. TLS Requirements....................................13
3.4. PT-TLS Message Format....................................13
3.5. IETF Standard PT-TLS Message Types.......................16
3.6. PT-TLS Version Negotiation...............................18
3.6.1. Version Request Message.............................19
3.6.2. Version Response Message............................20
3.7. Client Authentication Message Exchange...................21
3.7.1. Client Authentication Request Message...............22
3.7.1.1. Auth Type Values...............................23
3.7.2. Client Authentication Selection Message.............24
3.7.3. Client Authentication Challenge Message.............25
3.7.3.1. Basic Authentication Challenge.................26
3.7.4. Client Authentication Response Message..............27
3.7.4.1. Basic Authentication Information...............28
3.7.5. Client Authentication Successful Message............29
3.8. Error Message............................................29
4. Security Considerations.......................................33
4.1. Trust Relationships......................................33
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4.1.1. Posture Transport Client............................33
4.1.2. Posture Transport Server............................34
4.2. Security Threats and Countermeasures.....................35
4.2.1. Message Theft.......................................35
4.2.2. Message Fabrication.................................36
4.2.3. Message Modification................................37
4.2.4. Denial of Service...................................37
5. Privacy Considerations........................................37
6. IANA Considerations...........................................38
6.1. Designated Expert Guidelines.............................39
6.2. Registry for PT-TLS Message Types........................40
6.3. Registry for PT-TLS Error Codes..........................41
6.4. Registry for PT-TLS Auth Types...........................42
7. Acknowledgments...............................................42
8. References....................................................43
8.1. Normative References.....................................43
8.2. Informative References...................................43
Appendix A. Evaluation Against NEA Requirements..................45
A.1. Evaluation Against Requirement C-1.......................45
A.2. Evaluation Against Requirements C-2......................45
A.3. Evaluation Against Requirements C-3......................45
A.4. Evaluation Against Requirements C-4......................45
A.5. Evaluation Against Requirements C-5......................46
A.6. Evaluation Against Requirements C-6......................46
A.7. Evaluation Against Requirements C-7......................47
A.8. Evaluation Against Requirements C-8......................47
A.9. Evaluation Against Requirements C-9......................47
A.10. Evaluation Against Requirements C-10....................48
A.11. Evaluation Against Requirements C-11....................48
A.12. Evaluation Against Requirements PT-1....................48
A.13. Evaluation Against Requirements PT-2....................49
A.14. Evaluation Against Requirements PT-3....................49
A.15. Evaluation Against Requirements PT-4....................49
A.16. Evaluation Against Requirements PT-5....................49
A.17. Evaluation Against Requirements PT-6 (from PB-TNC
specification)................................................50
A.18. Evaluation Against Requirements PT-7 (from PB-TNC
specification)................................................50
A.19. Evaluation Against Requirements PT-8 (from PB-TNC
specification)................................................50
A.20. Evaluation Against Requirements PT-9 (from PB-TNC
specification)................................................50
1. Introduction
This document specifies PT-TLS, a Posture Transport (PT) protocol
identical to the Trusted Computing Group's IF-T Binding to TLS 1.0
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protocol [IFT-TLS]. The document then evaluates PT-TLS against the
applicable requirements defined in the NEA Overview and Requirements
[RFC5209] and PB-TNC [RFCYYYY] specifications.
NEA protocols are intended to be used for pre-admission assessment of
endpoints joining the network and to assess endpoints already present
on the network. In order to support both usage models, two different
types (or bindings) of PT protocols are necessary to operate before
and after the endpoint has an assigned IP address and other network
layer information. This specification focuses on the PT protocol
used to assess endpoints already present on the network and thus is
able to use TCP/IP based transport protocols.
The PT protocol in the NEA architecture is responsible for
transporting PB-TNC batches (often containing PA-TNC [RFCXXXX]
attributes) over the network between the Posture Transport Client
component of the NEA Client and the Posture Transport Server
component of the NEA Server. The PT protocol also offers strong
security protections to ensure the exchanged messages are protected
from a variety of threats from hostile intermediaries.
1.1. Prerequisites
This document does not define an architecture or reference model.
Instead, it defines one binding of the PT protocol that works within
the reference model described in the NEA Overview and Requirements
specification. The reader is assumed to be thoroughly familiar with
the NEA Overview and Requirements specification. No familiarity with
TCG specifications is assumed.
1.2. Message Diagram Conventions
This specification defines the syntax of PT-TLS messages using
diagrams. Each diagram depicts the format and size of each field in
bits. Implementations MUST send the bits in each diagram as they are
shown, traversing the diagram from top to bottom and then from left
to right within each line (which represents a 32-bit quantity).
Multi-byte fields representing numeric values must be sent in network
(big endian) byte order.
Descriptions of bit field (e.g. flag) values are described referring
to the position of the bit within the field. These bit positions are
numbered from the most significant bit through the least significant
bit so a one octet field with only bit 0 set has the value 0x80.
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1.3. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Design Considerations
This section discusses some of the key design considerations for the
PT protocol. This document specifies the PT binding for use when
performing an assessment or reassessment after the endpoint has been
admitted to the network and is capable of using TCP/IP to communicate
with the NEA Server. If the endpoint does not yet have TCP/IP layer
access to the NEA Server (and vice versa), the endpoint should use
the PT-EAP (Posture Transport (PT) Protocol for EAP Tunnel Methods)
[PT-EAP] protocol when performing an assessment.
Because the endpoint has TCP/IP access to the NEA Server (potentially
on a restricted portion of the network), the NEA Client and NEA
Server have the ability to establish (or re-use) a reliable TCP/IP
connection in order to perform the assessment. The TCP/IP connection
enables the assessment to occur over a relatively high performance,
reliable channel capable of supporting multiple roundtrip message
exchanges in full duplex manner. These connection properties are
very different from what is available when the endpoint is initially
joining the network (e.g. during an 802.1X based assessment),
therefore the design described in this specification follows a
different path to maximize the benefits of the underlying TCP/IP
connection.
2.1. Benefits of TCP/IP Connectivity
The PT protocol is typically able to offer to the NEA Client and NEA
Server significantly higher quality of service and flexibility of
operation than link layer oriented bindings such as PT-EAP (Posture
Transport (PT) Protocol for EAP Tunnel Methods). However, there may
be some added risks when the endpoint is on the network prior to its
initial assessment (if no admission time assessment had been
performed). Because of these risks, the combined use of an EAP-based
assessment during admission followed by reassessment using TCP/IP may
be appropriate in some environments.
Some of the benefits to having a TCP/IP based transport during an
assessment include:
o Full Duplex connectivity - can send multiple assessment messages
prior to receiving a response including sending of asynchronous
messages (e.g. alerts of posture or policy changes)
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o High Bandwidth - potentially much higher bandwidth than other
transports (e.g. EAP) allowing more in-band data (e.g.
remediation, verbose posture information)
o Large Messages - ability to send very large PA messages without
directly fragmenting them (underlying carrier protocol may
introduce fragmentation)
o Bi-directional - NEA Client and NEA Server can initiate an
assessment or reassessment
o Multiple Roundtrips - NEA Client and NEA Server can exchange
numerous messages without fear of infrastructure timeouts.
However, the entire exchange should be kept as brief as possible
if the user has to wait for its completion.
2.2. Leveraging Proven TLS Security
All PT protocol bindings must be capable of providing strong
authentication, integrity and confidentiality protection for the PB-
TNC batches. Rather than define a new protocol over TCP/IP to
provide adequate protection, this specification requires the use of
Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] to secure the connection. TLS was
selected because it's a widely deployed protocol with parallel
protections to a number of the EAP tunnel methods, and it meets all
of the security requirements.
2.3. TLV-Oriented Based Message Encapsulation
The design of the PT-TLS protocol is based upon the use of type-
length-value (TLV) oriented protocol message that identifies the type
of message, the message's length and a potentially variable length
payload value. The use of a TLV orientated encoding was chosen to
match the Internet standard PA-TNC and PB-TNC protocols. Because the
PA-TNC, PB-TNC and PT-TLS protocols are typically implemented inside
the same process space, this allows a common set of message parsing
code to be used. Similarly creation of debugging tools is simplified
by the common encoding methodologies. TLV-based encoding was used in
each of the NEA protocols in part because it enables a very space
efficient representation on the network and is simpler to parse than
some other encodings to benefit lower powered (or battery
constrained) devices.
2.4. No Change to Base TLS Protocol
During the design of the PT-TLS protocol, several approaches were
considered with different costs and benefits. Several considered
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approaches involved integrating the PT protocol into the TLS
handshake protocol. Because the PT protocol requires the underlying
TLS carrier to provide security protections, the PT protocol couldn't
operate before the cipher suites were negotiated and in use. One
option was to integrate into the TLS handshake protocol after the
ChangeCipherSpec phase allowing the PT message to be protected. The
benefit of this approach is that the assessment protocol could
operate below the application protocols allowing for easier
integration into applications. However, making this change would
require some extensions to the TLS handshake protocol standards and
existing widely deployed TLS implementations, so it wasn't clear that
the cost was warranted, particularly because the application
independence can also be offered by a shim library between the
application and TLS library that provides the PT protocol
encapsulation/decapsulation.
The other general approach considered was to have PT-TLS layer on top
of TLS as an application protocol (using the standard
application_data ContentType). This has the advantage that existing
TLS software could be used. However, the PB-TNC traffic would need
to be encapsulated/decapsulated by a new PT-TLS protocol layer before
being passed to the TLS library. This didn't seem like a significant
issue as PB-TNC is architected to layer on PT anyway.
After considering the different options, it was determined that
layering the PT protocol on top of the TLS protocol without requiring
current TLS protocol implementations to change met all the
requirements and offered the best path toward rapid adoption and
deployment. Therefore the following sections describe a PT protocol
that is carried on top of TLS.
3. PT-TLS Protocol
This section specifies the PT-TLS protocol, a Posture Transport (PT)
protocol carried by the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol over
a TCP/IP network. This protocol runs directly on top of TLS as an
application. This means PT-TLS is encapsulated within the TLS Record
Layer protocol using the standard ContentType for applications
(application_data).
3.1. Initiating a PT-TLS Session
The PT-TLS protocol may be initiated by a Posture Transport Client or
a Posture Transport Server. This flexibility supports different use
cases. For example, a Posture Transport Client that wishes to
trigger a NEA assessment to determine whether its security posture is
good can start up a PT-TLS session and request a posture assessment.
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On the other hand, when an endpoint requests access to a protected
network or resource, a Posture Transport Server can start up a PT-TLS
session and perform a posture assessment before deciding whether to
grant access.
The party that initiates a PT-TLS session is known as the "PT-TLS
session initiator". The other party in the session (which receives
the request to open a PT-TLS session) is known as the "PT-TLS session
responder".
3.1.1. Issues with Server Initiated PT-TLS Sessions
In order for a NEA Server to establish a PT-TLS session, the NEA
Client needs to be listening for a connection request on a TCP port
known by the NEA Server. In many deployments, the security policies
(e.g. firewall software) of an endpoint are designed to minimize the
number of open inbound TCP/UDP ports that are available to the
network to reduce the potential attack footprint. This is one issue
that makes it difficult for a NEA Server to initiate a PT-TLS
session.
Another issue with this scenario involves X.509 certificates. When
the NEA Server creates a TLS session to the NEA Client, the NEA
Client is effectively acting as the TLS server during the TLS
protocol exchange. This means the NEA Client would typically need to
possess an X.509 certificate to protect the initial portion of the
TLS handshake. In situations where the NEA Server initiates the
creation of the TLS session, both the NEA Client and NEA Server MUST
possess X.509 certificates to fully authenticate the session. For
many deployments, provisioning X.509 certificates to all NEA Clients
has scalability and cost issues; therefore, it is recommended that
the NEA Client not listen for connection requests from the NEA Server
but instead establish and maintain a TLS session to the NEA Server
proactively, so either party can initiate an assessment using the
preexisting TLS session as required.
Therefore, NEA Clients SHOULD be capable of establishing and holding
open a TLS session with the NEA Server immediately after obtaining
network access. A NEA Client MAY listen for connection requests from
the NEA Server and establish a new PT-TLS session when one does not
already exist. Having an existing PT-TLS session allows either party
to initiate an assessment without requiring the NEA Client to be
listening for new connection requests.
3.1.2. Establish or Re-Use Existing PT-TLS Session
A single PT-TLS session can support multiple NEA assessments, which
can be started by either party (the PT-TLS session initiator or the
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PT-TLS session responder). The party that starts a NEA assessment is
known as the "assessment initiator" and the other party is known as
the "assessment responder".
If the assessment initiator already has a PT-TLS session to the
assessment responder, the initiator can re-use this session;
otherwise, a new PT-TLS session must be established.
3.2. TCP Port Usage
In order for a PT-TLS session initiator to establish a TCP connection
to a PT-TLS session responder, the initiator needs to know the TCP
port number on which the responder is listening for assessment
requests. Therefore, this specification requests the IANA reserve a
well known TCP port number for use with the PT-TLS protocol upon
publication of this specification as an Internet standard RFC.
3.3. PT-TLS Message Flow
This section discusses the general flow of messages between the NEA
Client's Posture Transport Client and the NEA Server's Posture
Transport Server in order to perform NEA assessments using the PT-TLS
protocol.
3.3.1. Assessment Triggers
Initially, the NEA Client or NEA Server will decide that an
assessment is needed. What stimulates the decision to perform an
assessment is outside the scope of this specification, but some
examples include:
o NEA Server becoming aware of suspicious behavior on an endpoint
o NEA Server receiving new policies requiring immediate action
o NEA Client noticing a change in local security posture
o NEA Client wishing to access a protected network or resource
Because either the NEA Client or NEA Server can trigger the
establishment of the TLS session and initiate the assessment, this
document will use the terms "assessment initiator" and the
"assessment responder". This nomenclature allows either NEA
component to fill either of the PT-TLS roles.
3.3.2. PT-TLS Message Exchange Phases
The PT-TLS message exchange occurs in three distinct phases:
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o TLS Setup (including TLS Handshake protocol)
o PT-TLS Negotiation
o PT-TLS Data Transport
The TLS Setup phase is responsible for the establishment of the TCP
connection and the TLS protections for the PT-TLS messages. The TLS
Setup phase normally starts with the establishment of a TCP
connection between the Posture Transport Client and Posture Transport
Server. The new connection triggers the TLS Handshake protocol to
establish the cryptographic protections for the TLS session. The TLS
Setup phase SHOULD NOT be repeated after the PT-TLS Data Transport
phase has been reached unless a change of TLS cipher suite or keying
material is required to properly protect the session.
The PT-TLS Negotiation phase is only performed at the start of the
first assessment on a TLS session. During this phase, the NEA Client
and NEA Server discover each other's PT-TLS capabilities and
establish a context that will apply to all future PT-TLS messages
sent over the TLS session. The PT-TLS Negotiation phase MUST NOT be
repeated after the session has entered the Data Transport phase. NEA
assessment messages (PB-TNC batches) MUST NOT be sent by the NEA
Client or NEA Server prior to the completion of the PT-TLS
Negotiation phase to ensure that the security protections for the
session are properly established and applied to the NEA assessment
messages.
Finally the Data Transport phase allows the NEA Client and NEA Server
to exchange PT messages under the protection of the TLS session
consistent with the capabilities established in earlier phases. The
exchanged messages can be a PT-TLS protected NEA assessment as
described in this specification or other vendor-defined PT-TLS
exchanged messages.
3.3.2.1. TLS Setup Phase
After a new TCP connection is established between the Posture
Transport Client and Posture Transport Server, a standard TLS
exchange is performed to negotiate a common security context for
protecting subsequent communications. As discussed in section 3.3.1,
the TCP connection establishment and/or the TLS handshake protocol
could be initiated by either the NEA Client or NEA Server. The most
common situation would be for the assessment initiator to trigger the
creation of the TCP connection and TLS handshake, so an assessment
could begin when no session already exists. When the NEA Server has
initiated the TLS Setup, the NEA Server is acting as a TLS client and
the NEA Client is the TLS server (accepting the inbound TLS session
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request). The expected normal case is that the NEA Client initiates
this phase, so that the NEA Server is acting as the TLS server and
therefore the bootstrapping of the security of the TLS session is
using the NEA Server's certificate. Having the NEA Client initiate
the TLS session avoids the need for the NEA Client to also possess a
certificate.
During the TLS Setup phase of PT-TLS, the PT-TLS session initiator
contacts the listening port of the TLS session responder and performs
a TLS handshake. The PT-TLS session responder MUST possess a
trustworthy X.509 certificate used to authenticate to the TLS
initiator and used to bootstrap the security protections of the TLS
session. The PT-TLS session initiator MAY also use an X.509
certificate to authenticate to the PT-TLS session responder providing
for a bi-directional authentication of the PT-TLS session.
Due to deployment issues with issuing and distributing certificates
to a potentially large number of NEA Clients, this specification
allows the NEA Client to be authenticated during the PT-TLS
Negotiation phase using other more cost effective methods. At the
conclusion of a successful initial TLS Setup phase, the NEA Client
and NEA Server have a protected session to exchange messages. This
allows the protocol to transition to the PT-TLS Negotiation phase.
3.3.2.2. PT-TLS Negotiation Phase
Once a TLS session has been established between Posture Transport
Client and Posture Transport Server, the PT-TLS session initiator
sends a Version Request Message indicating it is supported PT-TLS
protocol version range. Next, the PT-TLS session responder sends a
Version Response Message which selects a protocol version from within
the range offered. The PT-TLS session responder SHOULD select the
preferred version offered if supported; otherwise, the highest
version that the responder is able to support from the received
Version Request Message. If the PT-TLS session responder is unable or
unwilling to support any of the versions included in the Version
Request Message, the responder SHOULD send a Version Not Supported
error message.
If no client side authentication has occurred during the TLS Setup
phase, the Posture Transport Server can authenticate the client using
PT-TLS client authentication messages. If the Posture Transport
Server wishes to trigger a client authentication exchange, the
Posture Transport Server SHOULD send a Client Authentication Request
message (see section 3.7.1 for details). The Posture Transport
Server MAY skip the Client Authentication Request exchange and
instead start with the client authentication by sending a Client
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Authentication Challenge message if it only supports one type of
authentication.
When the Posture Transport Client receives the Client Authentication
Request, the Posture Transport Client responds with a Client
Authentication Selection message indicating the method of
authentication to be used. Upon selecting an appropriate
authentication method, the Posture Transport Server requests the
client's identity and authenticator information using the PT-TLS
Client Authentication Challenge message. The Posture Transport
Client responds with the requested information following the selected
authentication scheme in a Client Authentication Response message.
The Posture Transport Client and Server might exchange multiple
roundtrips of client authentication messages in order to perform the
authentication depending on the type of authentication selected.
When the client authentication successfully completes, the PT-TLS
session transitions into the Data Transport phase, where it will
remain for the duration of the session.
3.3.2.3. PT-TLS Data Transport Phase
Once a PT-TLS session is available to carry NEA assessments, either
the Posture Transport Client or Server can start an assessment when
provided a PB-TNC batch for transmission. The assessment initiator
first envelopes the PB-TNC batch in a PT-TLS message, then assigns a
message identifier to the message and finally transmits it over the
session. The assessment responder validates the PT-TLS message and
delivers the encapsulated PB-TNC batch to its upstream component
(Posture Broker Client or Server).
Most PT-TLS messages contain PB-TNC batches that house PA-TNC
requests for posture information or a response containing the
requested posture information. The Posture Transport Client and
Posture Transport Server may also exchange messages between them,
such as a PT-TLS Error Message indicating that a problem occurred
processing a message. During an assessment, the Posture Transport
Client and Server merely encapsulate and exchange the PB-TNC batches
and are unaware of the state of the assessment.
The PT-TLS protocol allows either party to send a PT-TLS message at
any time, reflecting the full duplex nature of the underlying TLS
session. For example, an assessment initiator may send several PT-
TLS messages prior to receiving any responses from the assessment
responder. All implementations of PT-TLS MUST support full duplex
PT-TLS message exchange. However, some NEA protocols may not be able
to make use of the full-duplex message exchange.
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3.3.3. TLS Requirements
In order to ensure that strong security is always available for
deployers and to improve interoperability, this section discusses
some requirements on the underlying TLS transport used by PT-TLS.
Implementations of PT-TLS MUST support use of TLS 1.1 [RFC4346] and
SHOULD also include support for TLS 1.2 [RFC5246]. For each TLS
version supported, implementations of the PT-TLS MUST at least
support the TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA cipher suite. This cipher
suite requires the server to provide a certificate that can be used
during the key exchange. Implementations SHOULD NOT include support
for cipher suites that do not minimally offer PT-TLS session
responder (typically Posture Transport Server) authentication, such
as the anonymous Diffie-Hellman cipher suites (e.g.
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA).
3.4. PT-TLS Message Format
This section describes the format and semantics of the PT-TLS
message. Every message sent over a PT-TLS session MUST start with
the PT-TLS header described in this section.
The following is the PT-TLS header:
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | Message Type Vendor ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Message Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Message Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Message Identifier |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Message Value (e.g. PB-TNC Batch) . . . |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Reserved
Reserved for future use. This field MUST be set to 0 on
transmission and ignored upon reception.
Message Type Vendor ID
This field indicates the owner of the name space associated with
the Message Type. This is accomplished by specifying the 24 bit
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SMI Private Enterprise Number (Vendor ID) of the party who owns
the Message Type name space. IETF Standard PT-TLS Message Types
MUST use zero (0) in this field.
The PT-TLS Message Type Vendor ID 0xffffff is reserved. Posture
Transport Clients and Servers MUST NOT send PT-TLS messages in
which the PT-TLS Message Type Vendor ID has this reserved value
(0xffffff). If a Posture Transport Client or Posture Transport
Server receives a message containing this reserved value
(0xffffff) in the PT-TLS Message Type Vendor ID, the recipient
SHOULD respond with an Invalid Parameter error code in a PT-TLS
Error message.
Message Type
This field defines the type of the PT-TLS message within the
scope of the specified Message Type Vendor ID that is included in
the Message Value field. The specific IETF standard values
allowable in this field when the Message Type Vendor ID is the
IETF SMI Private Enterprise Number value (0) are defined in
section 3.5. Recipients of a message containing a Message Type
Vendor ID and Message Type that is unrecognized SHOULD respond
with a Type Not Supported error code in a PT-TLS Error message.
Posture Transport Clients and Posture Transport Servers MUST NOT
require support for particular vendor-defined PT-TLS Message
Types and MUST interoperate with other parties despite any
differences in the set of vendor-defined PT-TLS Message Types
supported (although they MAY permit administrators to configure
them to require support for specific vendor-defined PT-TLS
message types).
If the PT-TLS Message Type Vendor ID field has the value zero
(0), then the PT-TLS Message Type field contains an IETF Standard
PT-TLS Message Type, as listed in the IANA registry. IANA
maintains a registry of PT-TLS Message Types. Entries in this
registry are added by Expert Review with Specification Required,
following the guidelines in section 6.1. Section 3.5 of this
specification defines the initial set of IETF Standard PT-TLS
Message Types.
The PT-TLS Message Type 0xffffffff is reserved. Posture
Transport Clients and Posture Transport Servers MUST NOT send PT-
TLS messages in which the PT-TLS Message Type has this reserved
value (0xffffffff). If a Posture Transport Client or Posture
Transport Server receives a message in which the PT-TLS Message
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Type has this reserved value (0xffffffff), it SHOULD respond with
an Invalid Parameter error code in a PT-TLS Error message.
Message Length
This field contains the length in octets of the entire PT-TLS
message (including the entire header). Therefore, this value
MUST always be at least 16. Any Posture Transport Client or
Posture Transport Server that receives a message with a PT-TLS
Message Length field whose value is less than 16 SHOULD respond
with an Invalid Parameter PT-TLS error code. Similarly, if a
Posture Transport Client or Posture Transport Server receives a
PT-TLS message for a Message Type that has a known Message Length
and the Message Length indicates a different value (greater or
less than the expected value), the recipient SHOULD respond with
an Invalid Parameter PT-TLS error code.
Message Identifier
This field contains a value that uniquely identifies the PT-TLS
message on a per message sender (Posture Transport Client or
Server) basis. This value can be copied into the body of a
response message to indicate which message was received and
caused the response. For example, this field is included in the
PT-TLS Error Message so the recipient can determine which message
sent caused the error.
The Message Identifier MUST be a monotonically increasing counter
starting at zero indicating the number of the messages the sender
has transmitted over the TLS session. It is possible that a busy
or long lived session might exceed 2^32-1 messages sent, so the
message sender MUST roll over to zero upon reaching the 2^32nd
message, thus restarting the increasing counter. During a
rollover, it is feasible that the message recipient could be
confused if it keeps track of every previously received Message
Identifier, so recipients MUST be able to handle roll over
situations without generating errors.
Message Value
The contents of this field vary depending on the particular
Message Type Vendor ID and Message Type given in the PT-TLS
header for this PT-TLS message. This field most frequently
contains a PB-TNC batch. The contents of this field for each of
the IETF Standard PT-TLS Message Types are defined in this
specification.
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3.5. IETF Standard PT-TLS Message Types
This section defines the NEA standard PT-TLS Message Types used to
carry PT-TLS messages and PB-TNC batches between the Posture
Transport Client and Posture Transport Server.
The following table summarizes the initial set of IETF standard
message type values, which are used with the PT-TLS Message Type
Vendor ID field set to the IETF SMI PEN (0).
Value (Name) Definition
------------ ----------
0 (Experimental) Reserved for experimental use. This
type will not offer interoperability
but allows for experimentation. This
message type MUST only be sent when
the NEA Client and NEA Server are in
the Data Transport phase and only on a
restricted, experimental network.
Production code MUST send an Invalid
Message error code in a PT-TLS Error
message if an Experimental message is
received.
1 (Version Request) Version negotiation request including
the range of versions supported by the
sender. This message type MUST only
be sent by the TLS session initiator
as the first PT-TLS message in the PT-
TLS Negotiation phase. Recipients
MUST send an Invalid Message error
code in a PT-TLS Error message if a
Version Request is received at another
time.
2 (Version Response) PT-TLS protocol version selected by
the responder. This message type MUST
only be sent by the TLS session
responder as the second message in the
PT-TLS Negotiation phase. Recipients
MUST send an Invalid Message error
code in a PT-TLS Error message if a
Version Response is received at
another time.
3 (Client Auth Request) Request for authentication of client
(PT-TLS session initiator). This
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message includes the PT-TLS session
responder's supported set of
authentication methods. This message
can be used to start an authentication
of the PT-TLS session initiator. This
message type MUST only be sent by the
PT-TLS session initiator in the PT-TLS
Negotiation phase. Recipients MUST
send an Invalid Message error code in
a PT-TLS Error message if a Client
Auth Request message is received at
another time.
4 (Client Auth Selection) Authentication method selected by PT-
TLS session initiator. This message
type MUST only be sent by the PT-TLS
session initiator in response to a
Client Auth Request message sent in
the PT-TLS Negotiation phase.
Recipients MUST send an Invalid
Message error code in a PT-TLS Error
message if a Client Auth Selection
message is received at another time.
5 (Client Auth Challenge) Client authentication challenge from
the PT-TLS session responder (normally
NEA Server). This message type MUST
only be sent by the PT-TLS session
responder in the PT-TLS Negotiation
phase. Recipients MUST send an
Invalid Message error code in a PT-TLS
Error message if a Client Auth
Challenge is received after the PT-TLS
Negotiation phase.
6 (Client Auth Response) Identity and authenticator information
from the PT-TLS session initiator
(normally NEA Client). This message
type MUST only be sent by the PT-TLS
session initiator in the PT-TLS
Negotiation phase. Recipients MUST
send an Invalid Message error code in
a PT-TLS Error message if a Client
Auth Response message is received
after the PT-TLS Negotiation phase.
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7 (Client Auth Success) Indication that client authentication
was completed successfully so PT-TLS
data messages may now be sent. This
message type MUST only be sent by the
PT-TLS session responder when the NEA
Client and NEA Server are in the PT-
TLS Negotiation phase. Recipients
MUST send an Invalid Message error
code in a PT-TLS Error message if a
Client Auth Success is received after
the PT-TLS Negotiation phase.
8 (PB-TNC Batch) Contains a PB-TNC batch. For more
information on PB-TNC batches see
section 4 of the PB-TNC specification
[RFCYYYY]. This message type MUST
only be sent when the NEA Client and
NEA Server are in the PT-TLS Data
Transport phase. Recipients SHOULD
send an Invalid Message error code in
a PT-TLS Error message if a PB-TNC
Batch is received outside of the Data
Transport phase.
9 (PT-TLS Error) PT-TLS Error message as described in
section 3.8. This message type may be
used during any PT-TLS phase.
10+ (Reserved) These values are reserved for future
allocation following guidelines
defined in the IANA Considerations
section 6.1. Recipients of messages
of type 13 or higher that do not
support the PT-TLS Message Type Vendor
ID and PT-TLS Message Type of a
received PT-TLS message MUST respond
with a Type Not Supported PT-TLS error
code in a PT-TLS Error message.
3.6. PT-TLS Version Negotiation
This section describes the message format and semantics for the PT-
TLS protocol version negotiation. This exchange is used by the PT-
TLS Session Initiator to trigger a version negotiation at the start
of an assessment. The PT-TLS session initiator MUST send a Version
Request message as its first PT-TLS message and MUST NOT send any
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other PT-TLS messages on this connection until it receives a Version
Response message or an Error message. The PT-TLS session responder
MUST complete the version negotiation (or cause an error) prior to
sending or accepting reception of any additional messages. After the
successful completion of the version negotiation, both the Posture
Transport Client and Posture Transport Server MUST only send messages
compliant with the negotiated protocol version. Subsequent
assessments on the same session MUST use the negotiated version
number and therefore SHOULD NOT send additional version negotiation
messages.
3.6.1. Version Request Message
This message is sent by a PT-TLS Session Initiator as the first PT-
TLS message in a PT-TLS session. This message discloses the sender's
supported versions of the PT-TLS protocol. To ensure compatibility,
this message MUST always be sent using version 1 of the PT-TLS
protocol. Recipients of this message MUST respond with a Version
Response, or a PT-TLS Error message (Version Not Supported or Invalid
Message). The following diagram shows the format of the Version
Request Message:
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | Min Vers | Max Vers | Pref Vers |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Reserved
Reserved for future use. This field MUST be set to 0 on
transmission and ignored upon reception.
Min Vers
This field contains the minimum version of the PT-TLS
protocol supported by the sender. This field MUST be set to
1 indicating support for the first version of PT-TLS.
However, future versions of this specification will probably
remove this requirement so PT-TLS Session Responders MUST be
prepared to receive other values.
Max Vers
This field contains the maximum version of the PT-TLS
protocol supported by the sender. This field MUST be set to
1 indicating support for the first version of PT-TLS.
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However, future versions of this specification will probably
remove this requirement so PT-TLS Session Responders MUST be
prepared to receive other values.
Pref Vers
This field contains the sender's preferred version of the
PT-TLS protocol. This is a hint to the recipient that the
sender would like this version selected if supported. The
value of this field MUST fall within the range of Min Vers
to Max Vers. This field MUST be set to 1 indicating support
for the first version of PT-TLS. However, future versions
of this specification will probably remove this requirement
so PT-TLS Session Responders MUST be prepared to receive
other values.
3.6.2. Version Response Message
This message is sent in response to receiving a Version Request
Message at the start of a new assessment session. If a recipient
receives a Version Request after a successful version negotiation has
occurred on the session, the recipient SHOULD send an Invalid Message
error code in a PT-TLS Error message and have TLS close the session.
This message MUST be sent using the syntax, semantics, and
requirements of the protocol version specified in this message.
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | Version |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Reserved
Reserved for future use. This field MUST be set to 0 on
transmission and ignored upon reception.
Version
This field contains the version selected by the sender of
this message. The version selected MUST be within the Min
Vers to Max Vers inclusive range sent in the Version Request
Message. If a PT-TLS Session Initiator receives a message
with an invalid Version selected, the PT-TLS Session
Initiator MUST respond with a Version Not Supported PT-TLS
error message.
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3.7. Client Authentication Message Exchange
This section includes a description of the message format and
contents necessary to perform client authentication
(authentication of the PT-TLS Session Initiator) over PT-TLS.
The general model used for providing a client side
authentication using PT-TLS messages over TLS is to have a
simple authentication exchange roughly equivalent to basic
authentication for HTTP [RFC2617] while also allowing for
extensibility so stronger methods can be added in the future.
Implementations compliant with the PT-TLS specification MUST
implement the Basic authentication type described in this
section. Future specifications are expected to include
additional types of authentication. For example, it is
expected that a widely used extensible authentication
technology such as EAP [RFC3748] will be included in the
future.
Because either the NEA Client or NEA Server can initiate the
TLS session used for the assessment, either could act as the
TLS server and be authenticated as part of the TLS exchange.
Therefore, either the NEA Client or NEA Server could also be
the party not authenticated during the TLS handshake (assuming
that TLS mutual authentication is not used) and be required to
authenticate using the PT-TLS client authentication. Typically
the NEA Client would setup the PT-TLS session (see Error!
Reference source not found.), so the NEA Server would be
triggering the client authentication message exchanges and the
NEA Client would be the party being authenticated, thus the
name "client authentication".
If a client authentication is required, the TLS session
responder (typically the NEA Server) MUST initiate the client
authentication exchange by sending a Client Authentication
Request message or a Client Authentication Challenge message.
The Client Authentication Request message SHOULD be sent when
the TLS session responder is willing to authenticate the client
using multiple alternative authentication methods. The Client
Authentication Request message includes a prioritized list of
the authentication methods that the TLS session responder
(often the NEA Server) is willing to use and allows for the
selection of one for use with this session.
When a TLS session responder is only willing to accept the use
of a single authentication method, the TLS session responder
SHOULD optimistically start the authentication exchange by
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sending a Client Authentication Challenge in hopes that the
other party is willing and able to use the supported type of
authentication. If the PT-TLS Session Responder requires an
authentication of the other party that was not performed during
the TLS handshake and receives a PT-TLS Data Transport Phase
message prior to client authentication successfully completing,
the PT-TLS Session Responder SHOULD ignore the message and
start the client authentication exchange (if it has not already
done so). If a TLS Session Initiator receives a Client
Authentication Challenge or Client Authentication Request as
the next PT-TLS message after sending its first PT-TLS Data
Transport Phase message, the initiator MUST assume that this
happened.
Upon reception of a Client Authentication Request, the
recipient MUST send a Client Authentication Selection message
that selects a single authentication method from the list in
the Client Authentication Request message or send an
Authentication Error error code in a PT-TLS Error message.
When the TLS session responder (e.g. NEA Server) receives the
Client Authentication Selection message, it MUST respond with a
Client Authentication Challenge message containing the
challenge information relevant to the selected type of
authentication. Some authentication schemes might not require
an initial challenge from the server so the Client
Authentication Challenge message might contain minimal
information and largely serve to start the authentication
exchange. After the successful selection of an authentication
method, the Client Authentication Request and Client
Authentication Selection messages MUST NOT be used again on the
session.
Now that an authentication method has been established, the
client authentication involves a potentially multi-roundtrip
message exchange until the PT-TLS Session Responder has
confirmed the identity of the PT-TLS Session Initiator. The
number of roundtrip messages and the contents of each message
depend on the type of authentication selected. The client
authentication messages are described in the following sub-
sections.
3.7.1. Client Authentication Request Message
This message is sent when the TLS session responder (e.g. NEA Server)
has decided that a client authentication is required. For example,
this situation could occur following the initial establishment of the
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TLS session performing authentication only of the NEA Server when the
NEA Server requires an authentication of the NEA Client.
The following diagram shows the format of the Client Authentication
Request message. Note that this message contains a list of Auth Type
Vendor ID and associated Auth Type fields. The overall length of the
PT-TLS message is used by the recipient to determine the number of
authentication types offered in this message since each entry is 32
bits in length.
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Auth Type Vendor ID | Auth Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Auth Type Vendor ID | Auth Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| . . . . . . | . . . . . |
Auth Type Vendor ID
This field indicates the owner of the name space associated
with the following Auth Type field. Note that this field
and the following Auth Type field will appear in pairs with
one pair for every type of authentication being offered by
the party requesting the authentication.
This field is the 24 bit SMI Private Enterprise Number
(Vendor ID) of the party who owns the Auth Type name space
for the subsequent field. The IETF standard Auth Type
values defined in this specification MUST use the IETF SMI
Private Enterprise Number value (0) in this field.
Auth Type
This field indicates a type of authentication that the PT-
TLS Session Responder is willing to perform in order to
authenticate the PT-TLS Session Initiator's identity. The
ordering of the authentication types in the list SHOULD be
in the order of preference of the sender with the most
preferred type first. Client Authentication Request message
recipients SHOULD process the list of authentication types
in the order received and select the first type that is
acceptable based on local policies.
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3.7.1.1. Auth Type Values
This section defines the IETF standard PT-TLS Auth Types used to
identify the method of client authentication being used within a PT-
TLS session.
Posture Transport Clients and Posture Transport Servers MUST NOT
require support for particular vendor-specific PT-TLS Auth Types and
MUST interoperate with other parties despite any differences in the
set of vendor-specific PT-TLS Auth Types supported (although they MAY
permit administrators to configure vendor defined authentication
types to be used).
When the PT-TLS Auth Type Vendor ID is set to zero (0), the PT-TLS
Auth Type is an IETF Standard PT-TLS authentication method. IANA
maintains a registry of the IETF standard and vendor-specific PT-TLS
Auth Types. Entries in this registry are added by Expert Review with
Specification Required, following the guidelines in section 6.1.
The following table summarizes the Auth Type values used when the
Auth Type Vendor ID is set to the IETF SMI PEN (0).
Value (Name) Definition
------------ ----------
0 (Experimental) Reserved for experimental use. This
type will not offer interoperability
but allows for experimentation. This
value MUST be used only on a
restricted, experimental network.
Production code MUST NOT send an
Experimental Auth Type and MUST send
an Invalid Message error code in a PT-
TLS Error message if an Experimental
Auth Type is received.
1 (Basic Auth) Indicates that the Authentication
Information field contains a username
and password as described in section
3.7.4.1.
3.7.2. Client Authentication Selection Message
This message is sent by the PT-TLS Session Initiator in response to
reception of a Client Authentication Request message. This message
indicates the TLS session initiator's (typically the NEA Client's)
selection of an authentication method offered in the Client
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Authentication Request message. The values in this message (Auth
Type Vendor ID and Auth Type) must match one of the options listed in
the preceding Client Authentication Request message. During the
establishment of the TLS session, the TLS session initiator (e.g. NEA
Client) MAY authenticate using a TLS defined client authentication
method such as using client side X.509 certificates. If the TLS
client authentication did not occur and is required by the TLS
session responder, then it SHOULD request the authentication using
the PT-TLS Client Authentication Request message.
The following message shows the format of the Client Authentication
Selection message:
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Auth Type Vendor ID | Auth Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Auth Type Vendor ID
This field indicates the owner of the name space associated
with the following Auth Type field that was selected. The
name space owner information is expressed as the 24 bit SMI
Private Enterprise Number (Vendor ID) of the party who owns
the Auth Type name space for the subsequent Auth Type field.
IETF standard values defined in this specification MUST use
the IETF SMI Private Enterprise Number value of zero (0) in
this field.
Auth Type
This field indicates a type of authentication that was
selected from the list in the Client Authentication Request
message received. The PT-TLS Session Initiator MUST select
one authentication type (Auth Type Vendor ID and Auth Type)
from the list sent in the Client Authentication Request
message or send an Authentication error code in a PT-TLS
Error message. The authentication type selection process
SHOULD process the list in order and select the first type
that is acceptable based upon its policies.
3.7.3. Client Authentication Challenge Message
This message is sent by the PT-TLS Session Responder (typically by
the NEA Server) to initiate the authentication of the PT-TLS Session
Initiator. Based upon the type of authentication being performed,
the contents of the Challenge Information field will vary. For the
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details of the Challenge Information field for the Basic
Authentication type see section 3.7.4.1.
The following message shows the format of the Client Authentication
Challenge message:
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Auth Type Vendor ID | Auth Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Challenge Information |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| . . . . . . | . . . . . |
Auth Type Vendor ID
This field indicates the owner of the name space associated
with the following Auth Type field that was selected. The
name space owner information is expressed as the 24 bit SMI
Private Enterprise Number (Vendor ID) of the party who owns
the Auth Type name space for the subsequent field. IETF
standard values defined in this specification MUST use the
IETF SMI Private Enterprise Number value of zero (0) in this
field.
Auth Type
This field indicates the type of client authentication in
use on the session. This field also indicates to the
recipient the contents of the Challenge Information field
(whose information varies based on authentication type and
state).
Challenge Information
This field contains the authentication challenge in a format
indicated by the type of authentication. The detailed
format and semantics of this field for authentication types
specified in this document are found in the following
subsections.
3.7.3.1. Basic Authentication Challenge
This type of authentication is modeled on HTTP basic authentication.
This authentication involves the client sending a username and
password (or passphrase) to the server for authentication. Note that
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the password will travel over the PT-TLS session without special
protection but it is afforded the full protections of TLS, so passive
attacks should be unable to steal these credentials.
For the Basic Authentication type of authentication, the Challenge
Information field is empty. Basic authentication does not allow for
the server to send information that alters the authentication
response.
3.7.4. Client Authentication Response Message
This message is sent by the PT-TLS Session Initiator to prove its
identity to the PT-TLS Session Responder. The format and contents of
the Authentication Information vary depending on the type of
authentication being performed and the state of the authentication
exchange (e.g. when multi-roundtrip authentication protocols are
used).
The following message shows the format of the Client Authentication
Response message:
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Auth Type Vendor ID | Auth Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Authentication Information |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| . . . . . . | . . . . . |
Auth Type Vendor ID
This field indicates the owner of the name space associated
with the following Auth Type field that was selected. The
name space owner information is expressed as the 24 bit SMI
Private Enterprise Number (Vendor ID) of the party who owns
the Auth Type name space for the subsequent field. IETF
standard values defined in this specification MUST use the
IETF SMI Private Enterprise Number value of zero (0) in this
field.
Auth Type
This field indicates the type of client authentication in
use on the session. This field also indicates to the
recipient the contents of the Challenge Information field
(whose information varies based on authentication type and
state).
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Authentication Information
This field contains the authentication information in a
format indicated by the type of authentication. The
detailed format and semantics of this field for
authentication types specified in this document are found in
the following subsections.
3.7.4.1. Basic Authentication Information
This type of authentication is modeled on the HTTP basic
authentication. This authentication involves the party being
authenticated (the PT-TLS Session Initiator) sending a username and
password (or passphrase) as a credential for authentication.
Typically, the Authentication Information field will include the
username and password for the NEA Client. The format and semantics
are as follows:
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Auth Type Vendor ID | Auth Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Username Length | Username |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Password |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
Auth Type Vendor ID
This field indicates the owner of the name space associated
with the following Auth Type field that was selected. The
name space owner information is expressed as the 24 bit SMI
Private Enterprise Number (Vendor ID) of the party who owns
the Auth Type name space for the subsequent field. IETF
standard values defined in this specification MUST use the
IETF SMI Private Enterprise Number value of zero (0) in this
field.
Auth Type
This field indicates the type of authentication in use on
the session. This field also indicates to the recipient the
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contents of the Challenge Information field (whose
information varies based on authentication type and state).
Username Length
This unsigned integer field indicates the octet length of
the subsequent Username field. The Username field is
variable length and is followed by the Password field that
is also variable length, so the recipient needs to be able
to identify the end of the Username and the start of the
password.
Username
This field contains a string containing the identity of the
party being authenticated. The Username MUST be encoded as
a UTF-8 [RFC3629] string. NUL termination MUST NOT be employed.
Password
This field contains a string containing the authenticator
associated with the claimed identity in the Username field.
For the Basic type of authentication, the Password field
MUST include a UTF-8 encoded string. NUL termination MUST
NOT be employed.
3.7.5. Client Authentication Successful Message
This message is sent by the PT-TLS Session Responder to indicate that
it has successfully completed authentication of the claimed identity
and the PT-TLS session will now enter the PT-TLS Data Transport
Phase. This message does not contain a Message Value field since the
Message Type carries the only needed semantic (authentication was
successful). The Client Authentication Successful message MUST be
sent by a PT-TLS Session Responder (typically the NEA Server) at the
completion of a successful authentication to indicate that the PT-TLS
Session Initiator may now start sending NEA assessment messages.
3.8. Error Message
This section describes the format and contents of the PT-TLS Error
Message sent by the NEA Client or NEA Server when it detects a PT-TLS
level protocol error. Each error message contains an error code
indicating the error that occurred, followed by a copy of the message
that caused the error.
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When a PT-TLS error is received, the recipient MUST NOT respond with
a PT-TLS error because this could result in an infinite loop of error
messages being sent. Instead, the recipient MAY log the error,
modify its behavior to avoid future errors, ignore the error,
terminate the assessment, or take other action as appropriate (as
long as it is consistent with the requirements of this
specification).
The Message Value portion of a PT-TLS Error Message contains the
following information:
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | Error Code Vendor ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Error Code |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Copy of Original Message (Variable Length) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| . . . . . . . |
Reserved
Reserved for future use. This field MUST be set to 0 on
transmission and ignored upon reception.
Error Code Vendor ID
This field contains the IANA assigned SMI Private Enterprise
Number for the vendor whose Error Code name space is being
used in the message. For IETF standard Error Code values
this field MUST be set to zero (0). For other vendor-
defined Error Code name spaces this field MUST be set to the
SMI Private Enterprise Number of the vendor.
Error Code
This field contains the error code. This error code exists
within the scope of Error Code Vendor ID in this message.
Posture Transport Clients and Posture Transport Servers MUST
NOT require support for particular vendor-specific PT-TLS
Error Codes and MUST interoperate with other parties despite
any differences in the set of vendor-specific PT-TLS Error
Codes supported (although they MAY permit administrators to
configure them to require support for specific PT-TLS error
codes).
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When the Error Code Vendor ID is set to the IETF Private
Enterprise Number, the following table lists the supported
IETF standard numeric error codes:
Value (Name) Definition
------------ ----------
0 (Reserved) Reserved value indicates that the PT-
TLS Error Message SHOULD be ignored by
all recipients. This MAY be used for
debugging purposes to allow a sender
to see a copy of the message that was
received while a receiver is operating
on its contents.
1 (Malformed Message) PT-TLS message unrecognized or
unsupported. This error code SHOULD
be sent when the basic message content
sanity test fails. The sender of this
error code MUST consider it a fatal
error and abort the assessment.
2 (Version Not Supported) This error SHOULD be sent when a PT-
TLS session responder receives a PT-
TLS Version Request message containing
a range of version numbers that
doesn't include any version numbers
that the recipient is willing and able
to support on the session. All PT-TLS
messages carrying the Version Not
Supported error code MUST use a
Version number of 1. All parties that
receive or send PT-TLS messages MUST
be able to properly process an error
message that meets this description,
even if they cannot process any other
aspect of PT-TLS version 1. The
sender and receiver of this error code
MUST consider this a fatal error and
close the TLS session after sending or
receiving this PT-TLS message.
3 (Type Not Supported) PT-TLS message type unknown or not
supported. When a recipient receives
a PT-TLS message type that it does not
support, it MUST send back this error,
ignore the message and proceed. For
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example, this could occur if the
sender used a Vendor ID for the
Message Type that is not supported by
the recipient. This error message
does not indicate a fatal error has
occurred, so the assessment is allowed
to continue.
4 (Failed Authentication) The authentication of the identity of
the client failed. This could occur
if the sent Username and Password (for
the Basic authentication type) did not
match those expected by the
authenticating party. This error
message does not indicate a fatal
error has occurred, so the
authentication is allowed to be re-
started.
5 (Invalid Message) PT-TLS message received was invalid
based on the protocol state. For
example, this error would be sent if a
recipient receives a message
associated with the PT-TLS Negotiation
Phase (such as Version messages) after
the protocol has reached the PT-TLS
Data Transport Phase. The sender and
receiver of this error code MUST
consider it a fatal error and close
the TLS session after sending or
receiving this PT-TLS message.
6 (Authentication Error) A fatal error occurred while trying to
perform the client authentication.
For example, the NEA Client is unable
to support any of the offered types of
authentication. The sender and
receiver of this error code MUST
consider it a fatal error and close
the TLS session after sending or
receiving this PT-TLS message.
Copy of Original Message
This variable length value contains a copy (up to 1024
bytes) of the original PT-TLS message that caused the error.
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If the original message is longer than 1024 bytes, only the
initial 1024 bytes will be included in this field. This
field is included so the error recipient can determine which
message sent caused the error. In particular, the recipient
can use the Message Identifier field from the Copy of
Original Message to determine which message caused the
error.
4. Security Considerations
This section discusses the major threats potentially faced by each
binding of the PT protocol and countermeasures provided by the PT-TLS
protocol.
4.1. Trust Relationships
In order to understand where security countermeasures are necessary,
this section starts with a discussion of where the NEA architecture
envisions some trust relationships between the processing elements of
the PT-TLS protocol. The following sub-sections discuss the trust
properties associated with each portion of the NEA reference model
directly involved with the processing of the PT-TLS protocol.
4.1.1. Posture Transport Client
The Posture Transport Client is trusted by the Posture Broker Client
to:
o Not observe, fabricate or alter the contents of the PB-TNC batches
received from the network
o Not observe, fabricate or alter the PB-TNC batches passed down
from the Posture Broker Client for transmission on the network
o Transmit on the network any PB-TNC batches passed down from the
Posture Broker Client
o Deliver properly security protected messages received from the
network that are destined for the Posture Broker Client
o Provide configured security protections (e.g. authentication,
integrity and confidentiality) for the Posture Broker Client's PB-
TNC batches sent on the network
o Expose the authenticated identity of the Posture Transport Server
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o Verify the security protections placed upon messages received from
the network to ensure the messages are authentic and protected
from attacks on the network
o Provide a secure, reliable, in order delivery, full duplex
transport for the Posture Broker Client's messages
The Posture Transport Client is trusted by the Posture Transport
Server to:
o Not send malicious traffic intending to harm (e.g. denial of
service) the Posture Transport Server
o Not send malformed messages (e.g. messages lacking PT-TLS header)
o Not send invalid or incorrect responses to messages (e.g. errors
when no error is warranted)
o Not ignore or drop messages causing issues for the protocol
processing (e.g. dropping PT-TLS Client Authentication Challenge
messages)
o Verify the security protections placed upon messages received from
the network to ensure the messages are authentic and protected
from attacks on the network
4.1.2. Posture Transport Server
The Posture Transport Server is trusted by the Posture Broker Server
to:
o Not observe, fabricate or alter the contents of the PB-TNC batches
received from the network
o Not observe, fabricate or alter the PB-TNC batches passed down
from the Posture Broker Server for transmission on the network
o Transmit on the network any PB-TNC batches passed down from the
Posture Broker Server
o Deliver properly security protected messages received from the
network that are destined for the Posture Broker Server
o Provide configured security protections (e.g. authentication,
integrity and confidentiality) for the Posture Broker Server's
messages sent on the network
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o Expose the authenticated identity of the Posture Transport Client
o Verify the security protections placed upon messages received from
the network to ensure the messages are authentic and protected
from attacks on the network
o Provide a secure, reliable, in order delivery, full duplex
transport for the Posture Broker Server's messages
The Posture Transport Server is trusted by the Posture Transport
Client to:
o Not send malicious traffic intending to harm (e.g. denial of
service) the Posture Transport Server
o Not send malformed messages (e.g. messages lacking PT-TLS header)
o Not send invalid or incorrect responses to messages (e.g. errors
when no error is warranted)
o Not ignore or drop messages causing issues for the protocol
processing (e.g. dropping PT-TLS Client Authentication Successful
messages)
o Verify the security protections placed upon messages received from
the network to ensure the messages are authentic and protected
from attacks on the network
4.2. Security Threats and Countermeasures
Beyond the trusted relationships assumed in section 4.1 the PT-TLS
protocol faces a number of potential security attacks that could
require security countermeasures.
Generally, the PT-TLS protocol is responsible for offering strong
security protections for all of the NEA protocols so any threats to
its ability to protect NEA protocol messages could be very damaging
to deployments. Once the message is delivered to the Posture Broker
Client or Posture Broker Server, the posture brokers are trusted to
properly and safely process the messages.
4.2.1. Message Theft
When PT-TLS messages are sent over unprotected network links or
spanning local software stacks that are not trusted, the contents of
the messages may be subject to information theft by an intermediary
party. This theft could result in information being recorded for
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future use or analysis by the adversary. Messages observed by
eavesdroppers could contain information that exposes potential
weaknesses in the security of the endpoint, or system fingerprinting
information easing the ability of the attacker to employ attacks more
likely to be successful against the endpoint. The eavesdropper might
also learn information about the endpoint or network policies that
either singularly or collectively is considered sensitive
information. For example, if PT-TLS does not provide confidentiality
protection, an adversary could observe the PA-TNC attributes included
in the PT-TLS message and determine that the endpoint is lacking
patches, or particular sub-networks have more lenient policies.
In order to protect against NEA assessment message theft, the PT-TLS
protocol provides strong cryptographic authentication, integrity and
confidentiality protection. Deployers are strongly encouraged to
employ best practice of the day TLS ciphers to ensure the information
remains safe despite advances in technology and discovered cipher
weaknesses. The use of bi-directional authentication of the
assessment transport session ensures that only properly authenticated
and authorized parties may be involved in an assessment dialog. The
PT-TLS protocol also provides strong cryptography for all of the PB-
TNC and PA-TNC protocol messages traveling over the network allowing
the message contents to be hidden from potential theft by the
adversary even if the attacker is able to observe the encrypted PT-
TLS session.
4.2.2. Message Fabrication
Attackers on the network or present within the NEA system could
introduce fabricated PT-TLS messages intending to trick or create a
denial of service against aspects of an assessment. For example, an
adversary could attempt to insert into the message exchange fake PT-
TLS error codes in order to disrupt communications.
The PT-TLS protocol provides strong security protections for the
complete message exchange over the network. These security
protections prevent an intermediary from being able to insert fake
messages into the assessment. In particular, the TLS's protocol use
of hashing algorithms provides strong integrity protections that
allow for detection of any changes in the content of the message
stream. Additionally, adversaries are unable to observe the PT-TLS
protocol exchanges because they are encrypted by the TLS ciphers, so
would have difficulty in determining where to insert the falsified
message, since the attacker is unable to determine where the message
boundaries exist. Even a successful message insertion did occur; the
recipient would be able to detect it due to the TLS cipher suite's
integrity checking failing.
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4.2.3. Message Modification
This attack could allow an active attacker capable of intercepting a
message to modify a PT-TLS message or transported PA-TNC attribute to
a desired value to ease the compromise of an endpoint. Without the
ability for message recipients to detect whether a received message
contains the same content as what was originally sent, active
attackers can stealthily modify the attribute exchange.
The PT-TLS protocol leverages the TLS protocol to provide strong
authentication and integrity protections as a countermeasure to this
theat. The bi-directional authentication prevents the attacker from
acting as an active man-in-the-middle to the protocol that could be
used to modify the message exchange. The strong integrity
protections (e.g. hashing) offered by TLS allows PT-TLS message
recipients to detect message alterations by other types of network
based adversaries.
4.2.4. Denial of Service
A variety of types of denial of service attacks are possible against
the PT-TLS protocol if the message exchanges are left unprotected
while traveling over the network. The Posture Transport Client and
Posture Transport Server are trusted not to participate in the denial
of service of the assessment session, leaving the threats to come
from the network.
The PT-TLS protocol provides bi-directional authentication
capabilities in order to prevent a man-in-the-middle on the network
from becoming an undetected active proxy of PT-TLS messages. Because
the PT-TLS protocol runs after the TLS handshake and thus cipher
establishment/use, all of the PT-TLC messages are protected from
undetected modification that could create a denial of service
situation. However it is possible for an adversary to alter the
message flows causing each message to be rejected by the recipient
because it fails the integrity checking.
The PT-TLS protocol operates as an application protocol on top of TLS
and thus TCP/IP protocols, so is subject to denial of service attacks
against the TLS, TCP and IP protocols.
5. Privacy Considerations
The role of PT-TLS is to act as a secure transport for PB-TNC and
other higher layer protocols. As such, PT-TLS does not directly
utilize personally identifiable information (PII) except when client
authentication is enabled. When client authentication is being used,
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the NEA Client will be asked to disclose a local identifier (e.g.
username) associated with the endpoint and an authenticator (e.g.
password) to authenticate that identity. Because the identity and
authenticator are potentially privacy sensitive information, the NEA
Client MUST offer a mechanism to restrict which NEA Servers will be
sent this information. Similarly, the NEA Client should provide an
indication to the person being identified that a request for their
identity has been made in case they choose to opt out of the
authentication to remain anonymous.
PT-TLS provides cryptographic peer authentication, message integrity
and data confidentiality protections to higher layer NEA protocols
that may exchange data potentially including PII. These security
services can be used to protect any PII involved in an assessment
from passive and active attackers on the network. Endpoints sending
potentially privacy sensitive information should ensure that the PT-
TLS security protections (TLS cipher suites) negotiated for an
assessment of the endpoint are adequate to avoid interception and
off-line attacks of any long term privacy sensitive information.
6. IANA Considerations
This section defines the contents of three new IANA registries:
PT-TLS Message Types, PT-TLS Auth Types, and PT-TLS Error
Codes. This section explains how these registries work.
All of the registries defined in this document support IETF
standard values and vendor-defined values. To explain this
phenomenon, we will use the PT-TLS Message Type as an example
but the other registries work the same way.
Whenever a PT-TLS Message Type appears on a network, it is
always accompanied by an SMI Private Enterprise Number (PEN),
also known as a vendor ID. If this vendor ID is zero, the
accompanying PT-TLS Message Type is an IETF standard value
listed in the IANA registry for PT-TLS Message Types and its
meaning is defined in the specification listed for that PT-TLS
Message Type in that registry. If the vendor ID is not zero,
the meaning of the PT-TLS Message Type is defined by the vendor
identified by the vendor ID (as listed in the IANA registry for
SMI PENs). The identified vendor is encouraged but not required
to register with IANA some or all of the PT-TLS Message Types
used with their vendor ID and publish a specification for each
of these values.
This delegation of namespace is analogous to the technique used
for OIDs. It can result in interoperability problems if
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vendors require support for particular vendor-specific values.
However, such behavior is explicitly prohibited by this
specification, which dictates that "Posture Transport Clients
and Posture Transport Servers MUST NOT require support for
particular vendor-specific PT-TLS Error Codes and MUST
interoperate with other parties despite any differences in the
set of vendor-specific PT-TLS Error Codes supported (although
they MAY permit administrators to configure them to require
support for specific PT-TLS error codes)." Similar requirements
are included for PT-TLS Message Types and PT-TLS Auth Types.
6.1. Designated Expert Guidelines
For all of the IANA registries defined by this specification,
new values are added to the registry by Expert Review with
Specification Required, using the Designated Expert process
defined in RFC 5226 [RFC5226].
This section provides guidance to designated experts so that
they may make decisions using a philosophy appropriate for
these registries.
The registries defined in this document have plenty of values.
In most cases, the IETF has approximately 2^32 values available
for it to define and each vendor has the same number of values
for its use. Because there are so many values available,
designated experts should not be terribly concerned about
exhausting the set of values.
Instead, designated experts should focus on the following
requirements. All values in these IANA registries MUST be
documented in a specification that is permanently and publicly
available. IETF standard values MUST also be useful, not
harmful to the Internet, and defined in a manner that is clear
and likely to ensure interoperability.
Designated experts should encourage vendors to avoid defining
similar but incompatible values and instead agree on a single
IETF standard value. However, it is beneficial to document
existing practice.
There are several ways to ensure that a specification is
permanently and publicly available. It may be published as an
RFC. Alternatively, it may be published in another manner that
makes it freely available to anyone. However, in this latter
case, the vendor MUST supply a copy to the IANA and authorize
the IANA to archive this copy and make it freely available to
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all if at some point the document becomes no longer freely
available to all through other channels.
The following three sections provide guidance to the IANA in
creating and managing the new IANA registries defined by this
specification.
6.2. Registry for PT-TLS Message Types
The name for this registry is "PT-TLS Message Types". Each
entry in this registry should include a human-readable name, an
SMI Private Enterprise Number, a decimal integer value between
0 and 2^32-1, and a reference to the specification where the
contents of this message type are defined. This specification
must define the meaning of the PT-TLS message type and the
format and semantics of the PT-TLS Message Value field that
include the designated Private Enterprise Number in the PT-TLS
Message Type Vendor ID field and the designated numeric value
in the PT-TLS Message Type field.
The following entries for this registry are defined in this
document. Once this document becomes an RFC, they should
become the initial entries in the registry for PT-TLS Message
Types. Additional entries to this registry are added by Expert
Review with Specification Required, following the guidelines in
section 6.1.
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PEN Value Name Defining Specification
--- ----- ---- ----------------------
0 0 Experimental RFC # Assigned to this I-D
0 1 Version Request RFC # Assigned to this I-D
0 2 Version Response RFC # Assigned to this I-D
0 3 Client Auth Request RFC # Assigned to this I-D
0 4 Client Auth Selection RFC # Assigned to this I-D
0 5 Client Auth Challenge RFC # Assigned to this I-D
0 6 Client Auth Response RFC # Assigned to this I-D
0 7 Client Auth Success RFC # Assigned to this I-D
0 8 PT-TLS Batch RFC # Assigned to this I-D
0 9 Reserved RFC # Assigned to this I-D
0 10 Reserved RFC # Assigned to this I-D
0 11 PT-TLS Error RFC # Assigned to this I-D
0 12 Reserved RFC # Assigned to this I-D
0 0xffffffff Reserved RFC # Assigned to this I-D
6.3. Registry for PT-TLS Error Codes
The name for this registry is "PT-TLS Error Codes". Each entry
in this registry should include a human-readable name, an SMI
Private Enterprise Number, a decimal integer value between 0
and 2^32-1, and a reference to the specification where this
error code is defined. This specification must define the
meaning of this error code and the format and semantics of the
Error Information field for PT-TLS messages that have a PT-TLS
Vendor ID of 0, a PT-TLS Message Type of PT-TLS Error, the
designated Private Enterprise Number in the PT-TLS Error Code
Vendor ID field, and the designated numeric value in the PT-TLS
Error Code field.
The following entries for this registry are defined in this
document. Once this document becomes an RFC, they should
become the initial entries in the registry for PT-TLS Error
Codes. Additional entries to this registry are added by Expert
Review with Specification Required, following the guidelines in
section 6.1.
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PEN Value Name Defining Specification
--- ----- ---- ----------------------
0 0 Reserved RFC # Assigned to this I-D
0 1 Malformed Message RFC # Assigned to this I-D
0 2 Version Not Supported RFC # Assigned to this I-D
0 3 Type Not Supported RFC # Assigned to this I-D
0 4 Failed Authentication RFC # Assigned to this I-D
0 5 Invalid Message Error RFC # Assigned to this I-D
0 6 Authentication Error RFC # Assigned to this I-D
6.4. Registry for PT-TLS Auth Types
The name for this registry is "PT-TLS Auth Types". Each entry
in this registry should include a human-readable name, an SMI
Private Enterprise Number, a decimal integer value between 0
and 255, and a reference to the specification where this
authentication type is defined. This specification must define
the defined authentication mechanism including the format and
semantics of the Authentication Information and Challenge
Information fields for PT-TLS client authentication message
exchange described in section 3.7.
The following entries for this registry are defined in this
document. Once this document becomes an RFC, they should
become the initial entries in the registry for PT-TLS Auth
Types. Additional entries to this registry are added by Expert
Review with Specification Required, following the guidelines in
section 6.1.
PEN Value Name Defining Specification
--- ----- ---- ----------------------
0 0 Experimental RFC # Assigned to this I-D
0 1 Basic Auth RFC # Assigned to this I-D
7. Acknowledgments
The author of this draft would also like to acknowledge the following
people who have contributed to or provided substantial input on the
preparation of this document or predecessors to it: Stuart Bailey,
Lauren Giroux, Steve Hanna, Josh Howlett, Scott Kelly, Sung Lee, Lisa
Lorenzin, Ravi Sahita, and Mark Townsend.
This document was prepared using 2-Word-v2.0.template.dot.
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8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2617] Franks, J., P. Hallam-Baker, J. Hostetler, S. Lawrence, P.
Leach, A. Luotonen, and L. Stewart, "HTTP Authentication:
Basic and Digest Access Authentication", RFC 2617, June
1999.
[RFC3629] Yergeau F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646",
RFC 3629, November 2003.
[RFC4346] Dierks T., Rescorla E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006.
[RFC5226] Narten T., Alvestrand H., "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, May 2008.
[RFC5246] Dierks T., Rescorla E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFCXXXX] Sangster P., Narayan K., "PA-TNC: A Posture Attribute
Protocol (PA) Compatible with TNC", RFC XXXX, January 2010.
[RFCYYYY] Sahita, R., Hanna, S., and R. Hurst, "PB-TNC: A Posture
Broker Protocol (PB) Compatible with TNC", RFC YYYY,
January 2010.
8.2. Informative References
[IFT-TLS] Trusted Computing Group, "TNC IF-T: Binding to TLS",
http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/files/resource_files/5
1F0757E-1D09-3519-
AD63B6FD099658A6/TNC_IFT_TLS_v1_0_r16.pdf, May 2009.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC
3748, June 2004.
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[RFC5209] Sangster, P., Khosravi, H., Mani, M., Narayan, K., and J.
Tardo, "Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA): Overview and
Requirements", RFC 5209, June 2008.
[PT-EAP] Hanna, S., Sangster, P., "PT-EAP: Posture Transport (PT)
Protocol For EAP Tunnel Methods", draft-hanna-nea-pt-eap-
00.txt (work in progress), January 2010.
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Appendix A. Evaluation Against NEA Requirements
This section evaluates the PT-TLS protocol against the PT
requirements defined in the NEA Overview and Requirements and
PB-TNC specifications. Each subsection considers a separate
requirement and highlights how PT-TLS meets the requirement.
A.1. Evaluation Against Requirement C-1
Requirement C-1 says:
C-1 NEA protocols MUST support multiple round trips between
the NEA Client and NEA Server in a single assessment.
PT-TLS meets this requirement. Use of the TLS protocol over
TCP/IP allows for multiple round trips of PT-TLS messages,
which can carry multiple round trips of PB-TNC batches.
A.2. Evaluation Against Requirements C-2
Requirement C-2 says:
C-2 NEA protocols SHOULD provide a way for both the NEA
Client and the NEA Server to initiate a posture assessment or
reassessment as needed.
PT-TLS meets this requirement. PT-TLS allows the NEA Client or
the NEA Server to initiate a posture assessment or
reassessment.
A.3. Evaluation Against Requirements C-3
Requirement C-3 says:
C-3 NEA protocols including security capabilities MUST be
capable of protecting against active and passive attacks by
intermediaries and endpoints including prevention from replay
based attacks.
PT-TLS meets this requirement. The use of TLS provides strong
cryptographic authentication, integrity and confidentiality
services for the NEA protocols.
A.4. Evaluation Against Requirements C-4
Requirement C-4 says:
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C-4 The PA and PB protocols MUST be capable of operating over
any PT protocol. For example, the PB protocol must provide a
transport independent interface allowing the PA protocol to
operate without change across a variety of network protocol
environments (e.g. EAP/802.1X, PANA, TLS and IKE/IPsec).
While this requirement is not applicable to PT, the PT-TLS
protocol is independent of PA and PB allowing those protocols
to operate over other PT protocols.
A.5. Evaluation Against Requirements C-5
Requirement C-5 says:
C-5 The selection process for NEA protocols MUST evaluate and
prefer the reuse of existing open standards that meet the
requirements before defining new ones. The goal of NEA is not
to create additional alternative protocols where acceptable
solutions already exist.
Based on this requirement, PT-TLS should receive a strong
preference. PT-TLS is equivalent with IF-T Binding to TLS 1.0,
an open TCG specification. Selecting PT-TLS as the basis for
the PT protocol will ensure compatibility with IF-T Binding to
TLS, and with its implementations.
A.6. Evaluation Against Requirements C-6
Requirement C-6 says:
C-6 NEA protocols MUST be highly scalable; the protocols MUST
support many Posture Collectors on a large number of NEA
Clients to be assessed by numerous Posture Validators residing
on multiple NEA Servers.
PT-TLS meets this requirement. The PT-TLS protocol is
independent of the quantity or size of the PA-TNC messages and
the number of Posture Collectors and Posture Validators. PT-
TLS provides the Posture Broker Client and Posture Broker
Server a transport capable of carrying PT-TNC batches up to
2^32-16 octets in length. Posture Broker Clients and Posture
Broker Servers wishing to send a PB-TNC batch longer than 2^32-
16 octets could opt to split up set of attributes into multiple
PB-TNC batches and send them sequentially since PT-TLS is full
duplex.
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The fields present in the PT-TLS protocol are also very
scalable, allowing for the definition of a large (2^32) number
of IETF standard and vendor-defined PT-TLS message types and
message identifiers.
A.7. Evaluation Against Requirements C-7
Requirement C-7 says:
C-7 The protocols MUST support efficient transport of a large
number of attribute messages between the NEA Client and the NEA
Server.
PT-TLS meets this requirement. PT-TLS will allow for transport
of a very large number of attributes leveraging the underlying
TCP/IP network access. The PT-TLS protocol only adds 16 octets
of overhead per PT-TLS message, which is negligible since a
single PT-TLS message might carry very many PA-TNC attributes
within a single PB-TNC batch.
A.8. Evaluation Against Requirements C-8
Requirement C-8 says:
C-8 NEA protocols MUST operate efficiently over low bandwidth
or high latency links.
PT-TLS protocols meet this requirement. TLS will operate well
over high latency or low bandwidth links leveraging TCP's
ability to adjust to the underlying network carrier. The NEA
protocols encapsulated by the PT-TLS protocol are designed to
be able to operate over EAP with long RADIUS proxy chains so
they can adapt to high latency or low bandwidth links. With the
small amount of overhead added by PT-TLS, TLS, and TCP/IP,
these protocols should still be efficient over high latency or
low bandwidth networks.
A.9. Evaluation Against Requirements C-9
Requirement C-9 says:
C-9 For any strings intended for display to a user, the
protocols MUST support adapting these strings to the user's
language preferences.
PT-TLS meets this requirement. The PT-TLS protocol does not
include messages intended for display to the user.
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A.10. Evaluation Against Requirements C-10
Requirement C-10 says:
C-10 NEA protocols MUST support encoding of strings in UTF-8
format.
PT-TLS meets this requirement. All strings in the PT-TLS
protocol are encoded in UTF-8 format. This allows the protocol
to support a wide range of languages efficiently.
A.11. Evaluation Against Requirements C-11
Requirement C-11 says:
C-11 Due to the potentially different transport
characteristics provided by the underlying candidate PT
protocols, the NEA Client and NEA Server MUST be capable of
becoming aware of and adapting to the limitations of the
available PT protocol. For example, some PT protocol
characteristics that might impact the operation of PA and PB
include restrictions on: which end can initiate a NEA
connection, maximum data size in a message or full assessment,
upper bound on number of roundtrips, and ordering (duplex) of
messages exchanged. The selection process for the PT protocols
MUST consider the limitations the candidate PT protocol would
impose upon the PA and PB protocols.
PT-TLS meets this requirement. The PT-TLS protocol leverages
the underlying TLS connection to offer a reliable, full duplex
session capable of being initiated by the NEA Client or NEA
Server. This TLS session allows for transmission of large PB-
TNC batches with many roundtrips with very low overhead (only
16 octets of protocol overhead per PT-TLS message).
A.12. Evaluation Against Requirements PT-1
Requirement PT-1 says:
PT-1 The PT protocol MUST NOT interpret the contents of PB
messages being transported, i.e., the data it is carrying must
be opaque to it.
PT-TLS meets this requirement. The PT-TLS protocol
encapsulates PB-TNC batches without interpreting their
contents.
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A.13. Evaluation Against Requirements PT-2
Requirement PT-2 says:
PT-2 The PT protocol MUST be capable of supporting mutual
authentication, integrity, confidentiality, and replay
protection of the PB messages between the Posture Transport
Client and the Posture Transport Server.
PT-TLS meets this requirement. The PT-TLS protocol leverages
TLS to provide mutual authentication, integrity protection and
confidentiality as well as replay protection. For more
information see the Security Considerations section 4.
A.14. Evaluation Against Requirements PT-3
Requirement PT-3 says:
PT-3 The PT protocol MUST provide reliable delivery for the PB
protocol. This includes the ability to perform fragmentation
and reassembly, detect duplicates, and reorder to provide in-
sequence delivery, as required.
PT-TLS meets this requirement. The PT-TLS protocol operates
over TCP/IP which provides fragmentation/reassembly services
and can detect/discard duplicate message and re-order messages
if they arrive out of order over the network. PT-TLS provides
a reliable, in-order delivery NEA message transport to the
Posture Broker Client and Posture Broker Server components.
A.15. Evaluation Against Requirements PT-4
Requirement PT-4 says:
PT-4 The PT protocol SHOULD be able to run over existing
network access protocols such as 802.1X and IKEv2.
PT-TLS does NOT meet this requirement as it's intended for a
different usage. PT-TLS protocol requires the use of a TCP/IP
connection to the network. PT-EAP (PT Binding to EAP Tunnel
Methods) meets this requirement. PT-TLS is intended to be used
after the endpoint has been admitted to the network.
A.16. Evaluation Against Requirements PT-5
Requirement PT-5 says:
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PT-5 The PT protocol SHOULD be able to run between a NEA Client
and NEA Server over TCP or UDP (similar to Lightweight
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)).
PT-TLS meets this requirement. The PT-TLS protocol operates on
top of an existing TCP/IP connection using TLS for network
security.
A.17. Evaluation Against Requirements PT-6 (from PB-TNC specification)
Requirement PT-6 says:
PT-6 The PT protocol MUST be connection oriented; it MUST
support confirmed initiation and close down.
PT-TLS meets this requirement. The PT-TLS protocol operates on
top of an existing TCP/IP connection which is connection
oriented and supports confirmed initiation and tear down of the
connection.
A.18. Evaluation Against Requirements PT-7 (from PB-TNC specification)
Requirement PT-7 says:
PT-7 The PT protocol MUST be able to carry binary data.
PT-TLS meets this requirement. The PT-TLS protocol is capable
of carrying binary data.
A.19. Evaluation Against Requirements PT-8 (from PB-TNC specification)
Requirement PT-8 says:
PT-8 The PT protocol MUST provide mechanisms for flow control
and congestion control.
PT-TLS meets this requirement. The PT-TLS protocol operates on
top of TCP/IP which provides flow and congestion control.
A.20. Evaluation Against Requirements PT-9 (from PB-TNC specification)
Requirement PT-9 says:
PT-9 PT protocol specifications MUST describe the capabilities
that they provide for and limitations that they impose on the
PB protocol (e.g. half/full duplex, maximum message size).
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PT-TLS meets this requirement. This specification discusses
the level of transport service provided to the Posture Broker
Client and Posture Broker Server. Generally, the PT-TLS
protocol supports the post network admission usages discussed
in RFC 5209. The maximum message size for PT-TLS is only 16
octets less then the maximum message size allowable by PB-TNC.
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Authors' Addresses
Paul Sangster
Symantec Corporation
6825 Citrine Dr
Carlsbad, CA 92009
Email: paul_sangster@symantec.com
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