ACE Working Group L. Seitz
SICS Swedish ICT
Internet-Draft F. Palombini
Intended Status: Standards Track Ericsson AB
Expires: May 4, 2017 October 31, 2016
OSCOAP profile of ACE
draft-seitz-ace-oscoap-profile-01
Abstract
This memo specifies a profile for the ACE framework for
Authentication and Authorization. It utilizes Object Security of
CoAP (OSCOAP) and Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman over COSE (EDHOC) to
provide communication security, server authentication, and proof-of-
possession for a key owned by the client and bound to an OAuth 2.0
access token.
Status of this Memo
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Copyright and License Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Client to Resource Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Signaling the use of OSCOAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Key establishment for OSCOAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Client to Authorization Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Resource Server to Authorization Server . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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1. Introduction
This memo specifies a profile of the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-
oauth-authz]. In this profile, a client and a resource server use
CoAP [RFC7252] to communicate. The client uses an access token,
bound to a key (the proof-of-possession key) to authorize its access
to the resource server. In order to provide communication security,
proof of possession, and server authentication they use Object
Security of CoAP (OSCOAP) [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] and
Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC) [I-D.selander-ace-cose-
ecdhe]. Optionally the client and the resource server may also use
CoAP and OSCOAP to communicate with the authorization server. The
use of EDHOC in this profile in addition to OSCOAP, provides perfect
forward secrecy (PFS) and the initial proof-of-possession, which ties
the proof-of-possession key to an OSCOAP security context.
OSCOAP specifies how to use CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg] to secure CoAP messages. In order to provide
replay and reordering protection OSCOAP also introduces sequence
numbers that are used together with COSE. EDHOC specifies an
authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocol that allows two parties to use
CBOR [RFC7049] and COSE in order to establish a shared secret key
with perfect forward secrecy.
1.1 Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. These
words may also appear in this document in lowercase, absent their
normative meanings.
Certain security-related terms such as "authentication",
"authorization", "confidentiality", "(data) integrity", "message
authentication code", and "verify" are taken from [RFC4949].
Since we describe exchanges as RESTful protocol interactions HTTP
[RFC7231] offers useful terminology.
Terminology for entities in the architecture is defined in OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749] and [I-D.ietf-ace-actors], such as client (C), resource
server (RS), and authorization server (AS).
Note that the term "endpoint" is used here following its OAuth
definition, which is to denote resources such as /token and
/introspect at the AS and /authz-info at the RS. The CoAP [RFC7252]
definition, which is "An entity participating in the CoAP protocol"
is not used in this memo.
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2. Client to Resource Server
The use of OSCOAP for arbitrary CoAP messages is specified in [I-
D.ietf-core-object-security]. This section defines the specific uses
and their purpose for securing the communication between a client and
a resource server, and the parameters for to negotiating the use of
this profile with the token endpoint at the authorization server as
specified in section 6 of the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-
authz].
2.1. Signaling the use of OSCOAP
A client requests a token at an AS via the /token endpoint. This
follows the message formats specified in section 6.1 of the ACE
framework [I-D.ietf.ace-oauth-authz].
The AS responding to a successful access token request as defined in
section 6.2 of the ACE framework can signal that the use of OSCOAP is
REQUIRED for a specific access token by including the "profile"
parameter with the value "coap_oscoap" in the access token response.
This means that the client MUST use OSCOAP towards all resource
servers for which this access token is valid.
The error response procedures defined in section 6.3 of the ACE
framework are unchanged by this profile.
Note the the client and the authorization server MAY OPTIONALLY use
OSCOAP to protect the interaction via the /token endpoint. See
section 3 for details.
2.2. Key establishment for OSCOAP
Section 3.2 of OSCOAP [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] defines how to
derive a security context based on a symmetric base_key and a few
other parameters, established between client and server. The proof-
of-possession key (pop-key) provisioned from the AS MAY, in case of
pre-shared keys, be used directly as base_key in OSCOAP.
Alternatively the pop-key (symmetric or asymmetric) MAY be used to
authenticate the messages in the key exchange protocol EDHOC [I-
D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe], from which a base_key is derived.
If OSCOAP is used directly with the symmetric pop-key as base_key,
then the AS MUST provision the following data, in response to the
access token request:
o a symmetric key (pop-key)
o a context identifier
o an AEAD algorithm
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o the sender identifier
o the recipient identifier
The pop-key MUST be communicated as COSE_Key in the 'cnf' parameter
of the access token response as defined in section 6.2. of [I-D.ietf-
ace-oauth-authz]. The 'kid' parameter of this COSE_Key MUST be used
as the context identifier. The AEAD algorithm MUST be included as
the 'alg' parameter of the COSE_key. The same parameters MUST be
included as metadata of the access token, if the token is a CWT [I-
D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token], the same COSE_Key structure MUST be
placed in the 'cnf' claim of this token. The AS MUST also assign
identifiers to both client and RS, which are then used as Sender ID
and Recipient ID in the OSCOAP context as described in section 3.1.
of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]. These MUST be included in the
COSE_Key as header parameters, as defined in table 1.
Note that C should receive the client id as 'sid' and the RS id as
'rid', while the RS should receive the RS id as 'sid' and the client
id as 'rid'.
+---------+-------+----------------+------------+-------------------+
| name | label | CBOR type | registry | description |
+---------+-------+----------------+------------+-------------------+
| sid | TBD | bstr | | Identifies the |
| | | | | sender in an |
| | | | | OSCOAP context |
| | | | | using this key |
| | | | | |
| rid | TBD | bstr | | Identifies the |
| | | | | recipient in an |
| | | | | OSCOAP context |
| | | | | using this key |
+---------+-------+----------------+------------+-------------------+
Table 1: Additional common header parameters for COSE_Key
Figure 1 shows an example of such an AS response, in CBOR diagnostic
notation without the tag and value abbreviations.
Header: Created (Code=2.01)
Content-Type: "application/cose+cbor"
Payload:
{
"access_token" : b64'SlAV32hkKG ...
(remainder of access token omitted for brevity)',
"profile" : "coap_oscoap",
"expires_in" : "3600",
"cnf" : {
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"COSE_Key" : {
"kty" : "Symmetric",
"kid" : b64'5tOS+h42dkw',
"alg" : "AES-CCM-16-64-128",
"sid" : b64'qA',
"cid" : b64'Qg',
"k" : b64'+a+Dg2jjU+eIiOFCa9lObw'
}
}
}
Figure 1: Example AS response with OSCOAP parameters.
Figure 2 shows an example CWT, containing the necessary OSCOAP
parameters in the 'cnf' claim, in CBOR diagnostic notation without
tag and value abbreviations.
{
"aud" : "tempSensorInLivingRoom",
"iat" : "1360189224",
"exp" : "1360289224",
"scope" : "temperature_g firmware_p",
"cnf" : {
"COSE_Key" : {
"kty" : "Symmetric",
"kid" : b64'5tOS+h42dkw',
"alg" : "AES-CCM-16-64-128",
"sid" : b64'Qg',
"cid" : b64'qA',
"k" : b64'+a+Dg2jjU+eIiOFCa9lObw'
}
}
Figure 2: Example CWT with OSCOAP parameters.
If EDHOC is used together with OSCOAP, and the pop-key (symmetric or
asymmetric) is used to authenticate the messages in EDHOC, then the
AS MUST provision the following data, in response to the access token
request:
o a symmetric or asymmetric key (pop-key)
o if the pop-key is symmetric, a key identifier;
How these parameters are communicated depends on the type of key
(asymmetric or symmetric).
In case of an asymmetric key, C MUST communicate the key to the AS in
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the 'cnf' parameter of the access token request, as specified in
section 6.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
Figure 3 shows an example of such a request in CBOR diagnostic
notation without tag and value abbreviations.
Header: POST (Code=0.02)
Uri-Host: "server.example.com"
Uri-Path: "token"
Content-Type: "application/cose+cbor"
Payload:
{
"grant_type" : "client_credentials",
"cnf" : {
"COSE_Key" : {
"kty" : "EC",
"crv" : "P-256",
"x" : b64'usWxHK2PmfnHKwXPS54m0kTcGJ90UiglWiGahtagnv8',
"y" : b64'IBOL+C3BttVivg+lSreASjpkttcsz+1rb7btKLv8EX4'
}
}
}
Figure 3: Example access token request with asymmetric pop key.
In the case of a symmetric key, the AS MUST communicate the key to
the client in the 'cnf' parameter of the access token response, as
specified in section 6.2. of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. AS MUST
also select a key identifier, that MUST be included as the 'kid'
parameter either directly in the 'cnf' structure, as in figure 4 of
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], or as the 'kid' parameter of the
COSE_key, as in figure 3 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
Figure 4 shows an example of the necessary parameters in the AS
response to the access token request when EDHOC is used. The example
uses CBOR diagnostic notation without tag and value abbreviations.
Header: Created (Code=2.01)
Content-Type: "application/cose+cbor"
Payload:
{
"access_token" : b64'SlAV32hkKG ...
(remainder of access token omitted for brevity)',
"profile" : "coap_oscoap",
"expires_in" : "3600",
"cnf" : {
"COSE_Key" : {
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"kty" : "Symmetric",
"kid" : b64'5tOS+h42dkw',
"k" : b64'+a+Dg2jjU+eIiOFCa9lObw'
}
}
}
Figure 4: Example AS response with EDHOC+OSCOAP parameters.
In both cases, the AS MUST also include the same key identifier as
'kid' parameter in the access token metadata. If the access token is
a CWT [I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token], the key identifier MUST be
placed inside the 'cnf' claim as 'kid' parameter of the COSE_Key or
directly in the 'cnf' structure (if the key is only referenced).
Figure 5 shows an example CWT containing the necessary EDHOC+OSCOAP
parameters in the 'cnf' claim, in CBOR diagnostic notation without
tag and value abbreviations.
{
"aud" : "tempSensorInLivingRoom",
"iat" : "1360189224",
"exp" : "1360289224",
"scope" : "temperature_g firmware_p",
"cnf" : {
"COSE_Key" : {
"kty" : "Symmetric",
"kid" : b64'5tOS+h42dkw',
"k" : b64'+a+Dg2jjU+eIiOFCa9lObw'
}
}
Figure 5: Example CWT with EDHOC+OSCOAP parameters.
All other parameters defining OSCOAP security context are derived
from EDHOC message exchange, including the base_key (see Appendix B
of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]).
To provide forward secrecy and mutual authentication in the case of
pre-shared keys, pre-established raw public keys or with X.509
certificates it is RECOMMENDED to use EDHOC [I-D.selander-ace-cose-
ecdhe] to generate the keying material. EDHOC MUST be used as
defined in Appendix B, with the following additions and
modifications.
The first CoAP message is sent to the RS using the /authz-info
endpoint as specified in section 8.1 of the ACE framework. This
message MUST carry message_1 of the EDHOC protocol (section 4.1.1. if
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asymmetric keys are used or 5.1.1. if symmetric keys are used of [I-
D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe]) in the CoAP payload, and the access token
MUST be added to the message_1 CBOR map, with the label
'access_token' (Figure 11 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]). An example
can be seen in the first message (POST) of Figure 1.
Before the RS continues with the EDHOC protocol and responds to this
token submission request, additional verifications on the access
token are done: the RS SHALL process the access token according to
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. If the token is valid then the RS
continues processing EDHOC following Appendix B of [I-D.selander-ace-
cose-ecdhe], else it discontinues EDHOC and responds with the error
code as specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
When the RS receives an OSCOAP message including a field with label
'edhoc_m3' in the unprotected Headers of the COSE object, it SHALL
follow the process described in Appendix B of [I-D.selander-ace-cose-
ecdhe]. If the OSCOAP message was valid, the RS SHALL also verify
that the client is authorized to perform the requested action on the
requested resource using the previously received access token.
o In case the EDHOC verification fails, the RS MUST return an
error response to the client with code 4.01 (Unauthorized).
o If RS has an access token for C but not for the resource that C
has requested, RS MUST reject the request with a 4.03 (Forbidden).
o If RS has an access token for C but it does not cover the
action C requested on the resource, RS MUST reject the request with a
4.05 (Method Not Allowed).
If all verifications above succeeds, further communication between
client and RS is protected with OSCOAP, including the RS response to
the OSCOAP request.
In the case of EDHOC being used with symmetric pop-keys, the protocol
in section 5 of [I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe] MUST be used. If the
pop-key is asymmetric, the RS MUST also use an asymmetric key for
authentication. This key is known to the client through the access
token response (see section 6.2 of the ACE framework). In this case
the protocol in section 4 of [I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe] MUST be
used.
Note that if the OSCOAP profile is used, the /authz-info endpoint at
the Resource Server MUST be prepared to process and generate the
protocol messages of the EDHOC protocol as specified above. Hence
the use of EDHOC does not add any additional roundtrips to the ACE
message exchange.
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Figure 6 illustrates the message exchanges for using EDHOC on the
/authz-info endpoint (step C in figure 1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-
authz]).
Resource
Client Server
| |
| |
+--------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
| POST | Uri-Path:"authz-info"
| | Content-Type: application/cbor
| | Payload: EDHOC message_1 + access token
| |
|<---------+ Header: 2.04 Changed
| | Content-Type: application/cose+cbor
| 2.05 | Payload: EDHOC message_2
| |
| |
+--------->| CoAP request +
| OSCOAP | Object-Security option
| request | COSE_Encrypt0:
| | unprotected Header: EDHOC message_3
| |
|<---------+ CoAP response +
| OSCOAP | Object-Security option
| response |
| |
Figure 6: Key establishment with EDHOC via the authz-info endpoint
Figure 7 shows an example of message_1 with an access token embedded
in the unprotected header.
{
'N_U' : h'5598a57b47db7f2c',
'E_U' : h'a120a50102024478f679012001215
82098f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a6
38ea56c3f5ad7590bbfbf054e1c7b
4d91d628022f5', # COSE_Key
'ALG_U' : [
[ -27 ], # ECDH-SS + HKDF-256
[ 12 ], # AES-CCM-64-64-128
[ -7 ], # ES256
[ 4 ] # HMAC 256/64
],
18 : h'4a5015df6864286979'
}
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Figure 7: diagnostic notation of EDHOC message_1 with an access token
N_U, E_U, and ALG_U, as defined in [I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe], are
the freshness nonce for party U, the ECDH ephemeral public keys of
party U, and the proposed set of algorithms to be negotiated,
respectively.
3. Client to Authorization Server
As specified in the ACE framework section 5 [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-
authz], the Client and AS can also use CoAP instead of HTTP to
communicate via the token endpoint. This section specifies how to
use OSCOAP between Client and AS together with CoAP. The use of
OSCOAP for this communication is OPTIONAL in this profile, other
security protocols (such as DTLS) MAY be used instead.
The client and the AS are expected to have pre-established
credentials (e.g. raw public keys). How these credentials are
established is out of scope for this profile. Furthermore the client
and the AS communicate using CoAP through the token endpoint as
specified in section 6 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. At first point
of contact, prior to making the token request and response, the
client and the AS MAY perform an EDHOC exchange with the pre-
established credentials to create forward secret keying material for
use with OSCOAP. Subsequent requests and the responses MUST be
protected with OSCOAP.
4. Resource Server to Authorization Server
As specified in the ACE framework section 5 [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-
authz], the RS and AS can also use CoAP instead of HTTP to
communicate via the introspection endpoint. This section specifies
how to use OSCOAP between RS and AS together with CoAP. The use of
OSCOAP for this communication is OPTIONAL in this profile, other
security protocols (such as DTLS) MAY be used instead.
The RS and the AS are expected to have pre-established credentials
(e.g. symmetric keys). How these credentials are established is out
of scope for this profile. Furthermore the RS and the AS communicate
using CoAP through the introspection endpoint as specified in section
7 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. At first point of contact, prior to
making the introspection request and response, the RS and the AS MAY
perform an EDHOC exchange with the pre-established credentials to
create forward secret keying material for use with OSCOAP.
Subsequent requests and the responses MUST be protected with OSCOAP.
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5. Security Considerations
TBD.
6. Privacy Considerations
TBD.
7. IANA Considerations
TBD. 'coap_oscoap' as profile id. Header parameters 'sid' and 'rid'
for COSE_Key.
8. Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Goeran Selander for the input on this
memo. The error responses specified in section 2.2. were originally
specified by Gerdes et al. in [I-D.gerdes-ace-dcaf-authorize].
9. References
9.1 Normative References
[I-D.ietf-core-object-security]
Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
"Object Security of CoAP (OSCOAP)", draft-ietf-core-
object-security-00 (work in progress), October 2016.
[I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe]
Selander, G., Mattsson, J., and F. Palombini, "Ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)", draft-selander-ace-
cose-ecdhe-04 (work in progress), October 2016.
[I-D.ietf-cose-msg]
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
draft-ietf-cose-msg-23 (work in progress), October 2016.
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]
Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtmann, S., and
H. Tschofenig. "Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments (ACE)", draft-ietf-ace-oauth-
authz-04 (work in progress), October 2016.
[I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token] Wahlstroem, E., Jones, M., Tschofenig,
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H., and S. Erdtman. "CBOR Web Token (CWT)", draft-ietf-
ace-cbor-web-token-01 (work in progress), July 2016.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI
10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252, DOI
10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014, <http://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
9.2 Informative References
[I-D.gerdes-ace-actors]
Gerdes, S., Seitz, L., Selander, G., and C. Bormann (ed).
"An Arhitecture for Authorization in Constrained
Environments", draft-ietf-ace-actors-03 (work in
progress), March 2016.
[I-D.gerdes-ace-dcaf-authorize]
Gerdes, S., Bergmann, O., Bormann C. "Delegated CoAP
Authentication and Authorization Framework (DCAF)", draft-
gerdes-ace-dcaf-authorize-04 (work in progress), October
2015.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", FYI
36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
October 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content",
RFC 7231, DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
Author's Address
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Ludwig Seitz
SICS Swedish ICT AB
Scheelevagen 17
22370 Lund
SWEDEN
EMail: ludwig@sics.se
Francesca Palombini
Ericsson AB
Farogatan 6
SE-16480 Stockholm
SWEDEN
EMail: francesca.palombini@ericsson.com
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