IETF ENUM WG
      Internet Draft                                       Richard Shockey
      Document:                                                NeuStar,Inc
      draft-shockey-enum-privacy-security-00.txt
      Expires: March 2003                                     October 2002
   
   
   
                 Privacy and Security Considerations in ENUM
   
   
   Status of this Memo
   
      This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance
      with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 [1].
   
      Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
      Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
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      in progress."
   
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   Copyright Notice
   
      Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved.
   
   Abstract
   
      Many individuals and groups have expressed concerns about the
      privacy and security of personal information to be established in
      implementations of RFC 2916. This document discusses some of the
      technical as well as security and privacy considerations national
      implementations of ENUM should consider.
   
      This is a work in progress. Input from security and privacy
      experts is welcome.
   
   
   
   
   
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      Discussion of this document is welcomed on the IETF ENUM mailing
      list.
   
      General Discussion:enum@ietf.org
      To Subscribe: enum-request@ietf.org
      In Body: subscribe
      Archive: ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf-mail-archive/enum/
   
   
   Conventions used in this document
   
      The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
      NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and
      "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
      RFC-2119 [2].
   
   Table of Contents
   
      1)   Introduction...............................................2
      2)   THE RATIONALE FOR ENUM.....................................3
      3)   THREE VIEWS OF ENUM........................................4
         3.1 NUMBER TRANSLATION DATABASE...............................4
         3.2 CALLED PARTY CONTROL OF ENUM ENABLED COMMUNICAITONS.......5
         3.2.1 THE USE OF REAL AND OR ALIAS NAMES IN A SIP ADDRESS-OF-
         RECORD........................................................6
         3.3 CALLING PARTY CONTROL OF COMMUNICATIONS...................7
         3.4 OBSERVATIONS ON CALLED PARTY VS CALLING PARTY CONTROL.....8
      4)   WHAT INFORMATION IS NECESSARY FOR ENUM REGISTRATION?.......8
      5)   PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS IN THE NORTH
      AMERICAN CONTEXT.................................................9
      6)   PRIVACY and DATA PROTECTIONS CONSIDERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN
      COMMUNITY CONTEXT...............................................10
      7)   SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS IN ENUM...........................10
         7.1 SECURITY OF THE DNS......................................10
         7.2 SECURITY OF ENUM PROVISIONING INFRASTRUCTURE.............10
      8)   References................................................10
      9)   Acknowledgments...........................................11
      10)  Author's Addresses........................................11
   
   1) Introduction
   
   Readers of this Internet Draft are expected to have a working knowledge of                                                                                                            the technology and
   principals embodied in [RFC2916bis].
   
   Many individuals groups have expressed concerns about the privacy
   and data security implications of ENUM as it moves forward toward
   global deployment. In that context there are several different views
   
   
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   of what ENUM is, what it does, and how a global ENUM system may
   affect personal privacy and the security of data contained in the
   global ENUM system.
   
   It is important to note that ENUM is first and foremost the DNS.
   Specifically ENUM is a system that translates E.164 phone numbers
   [ITU-T] into Fully Qualified Domain Names that can be queried to
   return a specific set of data (URIÆs)in the form of NAPTR records
   [RFC 3403]. The global and distributed nature of the DNS means
   delegation and control can occur at any point within the ENUM
   defined FQDN. Many entities, service providers, enterprises and
   indeed some consumers could, control their own DNS servers for ENUM
   registered domain names.
   
   There are two forms of data required for the ENUM system to work.
   First is the actual data to be entered into the global ENUM DNS
   system, the NAPTR records, that can be accessed by any IP end point
   any where in the world, without restriction and second, the data
   that will be required to maintain appropriate authentication, valid
   registration, administrative and technical contact for DNS servers.
   Issues involving domain name registration are well known to the
   privacy and security communities and have continually surfaced in
   context with the Domain Name Registration industry and ICANN
   approved registry-registrar business practices.
   
   The agreements between the IAB and the ITU over the management and
   control of the e164.arpa namespace [RFC 3026] for those portions of
   the E.164 global numbering plan clearly articulates that the
   administration, management and control of the zones and
   administrative portions of the E.164 plan are nation-state issues
   governed by appropriate national laws and regulations, many of which
   have yet to be determined.
   
   
   2) THE RATIONALE FOR ENUM
   
   Before a discussion of privacy and security issues can be applied to
   various parts of the global ENUM system it is essential to note why
   the IETF technical community developed ENUM, what applications it
   was designed to serve and the implications of those applications for
   privacy and security issues.
   
   
   
   
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   Since Telephone Numbers are the global naming and addressing scheme
   for Public Switched Telephony, ENUM was designed to map phone
   numbers with the Internet DNS and its naming and addressing
   conventions (IP numbers and Domain Names). Principally ENUM enables
   the use of phone numbers as identifiers of services defined as URIÆs
   on the Internet as well as facilitate the interconnection of systems
   that rely on telephone numbers with those that use URIÆs to route
   transactions.
   
   It is well known that businesses and consumers are very comfortable
   with using telephone numbers for PSTN communications. The E.164
   numbering plan is a well organized and internationally recognized
   system of naming and addressing that is essential to the proper
   functioning of the PSTN. Phone Numbers have the additional advantage
   of being easily understood, are a useful input mechanism on billions
   of terminal devices (telephones) that do not have QWERTY like
   keyboards and, significantly, are linguistically neutral, unlike
   domain names.
   
   Though it is clear that ENUM can and will be used for service
   routing of applications other than voice, the principal focus of
   attention on ENUM application development has, naturally, been voice
   communications based on SIP [RFC 3261] and ITU developed H.323, and
   the general concept of convergence in IP and PSTN networks.
   
   
   3) THREE VIEWS OF ENUM
   
   Even within the technical community there are different views of
   what ENUM is and what it is designed to accomplish.
   
    3.1 NUMBER TRANSLATION DATABASE
   
   One view sees ENUM in the DNS as essentially a benign number
   translation database that exposes on the minimal subset of data
   necessary to establish a connection between two endpoints. This is
   the model we essentially have in the DNS now.  DNS translates the
   URI concept such as http://www.foobar.org to an IP number necessary
   for a client to find a server running HTTP. No other intervention by
   the DNS is necessary.
   
   
   
   
   
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   This is also the function of the DNS in E-mail where the DNS is used
   to locate an MX record for a SMTP server within a domain. No policy
   or personal information is exposed in the DNS beyond a server name.
   
   This concept is roughly analogous to the concept of a Service
   Control Point within the architecture of the PSTN that provide
   routing data to a circuit switch based on the numeric input of a
   phone number.
   
   3.2 CALLED PARTY CONTROL OF ENUM ENABLED COMMUNICAITONS
   
   An emerging view of ENUM is that it enables an advanced form of
   called party control of communications since it is presumed that the
   communications servers at the edge of network are under the
   administrative or operational control of the called party. Called
   party control of those servers permits policy in some form to be
   directly applied to inbound communications irrespective of the
   wishes of the calling party.
   
   This view is particularly relevant in the case of SIP based
   communication [PETERSON et.al.]. The classic SIP model is based on
   the use of proxies between end point client/user agents that can
   then negotiate information about each other in order to establish a
   session. The calling party has no need to discover the capabilities
   of the called parties end point since those are established during
   the signaling portion of a SIP session using Session Description
   Protocol.
   
   The called parties proxy can also be used to enforce policy about
   sessions including how, when and from whom to establish sessions.
   The presumption of this model is that only the minimum information
   about an endpoint is necessary to expose in the global DNS, since
   the proxies perform all other forms of session negotiation and
   policy enforcement.
   
   Consequently it is not necessary to expose in the DNS whether a
   particular SIP endpoint supports voice, instant messaging, video or
   fax or whether that endpoint operates on a wire line or wireless
   connection.
   
   
   
   
   
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   3.3.1 THE USE OF REAL AND OR ALIAS NAMES IN A SIP ADDRESS-OF-RECORD.
   
   Because SIP can negotiate the session creation between end points,
   it is not necessary expose in the global DNS specific personal
   identification elements, such as a personal name, to establish a
   successful end-to-end SIP connection.
   
   Information, such as a personal name, is exposed only because an end
   user chooses to do so by configuration of their entries into the
   DNS.
   
   For example, a classic example of a ENUM response with a SIP URI
   using a personal name might be as follows:
   
   $ORIGIN 4.3.2.1.6.7.9.8.6.4.e164.arpa.
   IN NAPTR 100 10 "u" "E2U+sip"      "!^.*$!sip:patrik.faltstrom@foobar.se!"
   
   One alternative method of achieving the same result with out
   exposing a real name is to configure the called parties ENUM DNS
   entries to use other forms of names as aliases. In the following
   example, the identification of the SIP endpoint is configured using
   the generic format "sip:e164number@userdomain.foo"
   
   $ORIGIN 4.3.2.1.6.7.9.8.6.4.e164.arpa.
   IN NAPTR 100 10 "u" "E2U+sip"      "!^.*$!sip:4689761234@foobar.se!"
   
   OR
   
   $ORIGIN 4.3.2.1.6.7.9.8.6.4.e164.arpa.
   IN NAPTR 100 10 "u" "E2U+sip"      "!^.*$!sip:anon5613@foobar.se!"
   
   Where the user name "anon5616" is randomly selected.
   
   Notice that the ENUM query only returns information that a SIP proxy
   for the user "4689761234" or "anon5616" exists within the domain
   foobar.se. No personal information is exposed in the global DNS
   other than the domain to which a SIP proxy exists and a form of user
   name.
   
   From the perspective of the called parties SIP proxy, if properly
   configured, there is no functional difference between
   sip:patrik.faltstrom@foobar.se or
   sip:4689761234@foobar.se or
   sip:anon5651@foobar.se.
   
   
   
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   All three could accurately describe a unique SIP client or user
   agent and transactions could be routed equally among all three
   names.
   
   These examples illustrate an alternate view of what is necessary to
   establish a connection between two parties using ENUM and SIP. This
   concept of can easily be applied to many applications which can be
   ENUM enabled.
   
   An individual may choose give out a form of personal SIP URI using
   their personal on their business card, but there is no practical
   reason this must be entered into the global DNS.
   
   Current discussion in the IETF ENUM WG have explored the concept of
   indirect resolution to all forms of communications, not just SIP,
   through the use of presence servers or a concept called a Service
   resolution service. Once again the called party who is registering
   their phone number in the global ENUM system would then have control
   of how he or she could be contacted by any method.
   
   The concept of a Service Resolution Service has not been defined in
   the IETF, however it is within the realm of technical possibility.
   
   TBD Examples
   
   3.3 CALLING PARTY CONTROL OF COMMUNICATIONS
   
   One other view of ENUM wishes to give the calling party the maximum
   control and options over how they wish to contact someone else. The
   preference here is for the maximum amount of information exposed in
   the DNS to permit the calling party the choice of contact
   methodology to the called party.
   
   Not only are all potential communications endpoints exposed in the
   global DNS but verbose hints to the nature and capabilities of those
   endpoints are described in the NAPTR enumservice field.[BRADNER]
   
   The ENUM DNS query returns all the available URIÆs listed, however
   the in these examples the called party has chosen to display other
   attributes about those services such as voice:home, sip:im ,
   voice:mobile,mailto, etc.
   
   
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   A client application or service parses the NAPTR records and
   displays the various options and the calling party then selects the
   most appropriate option based on their preference and not that of
   the called party.
   
   
   $ORIGIN 4.3.2.1.6.7.9.8.6.4.e164.arpa.
   IN NAPTR 100 10 "u" "E2U+sip:voice:home"    "!^.*$!sip:patrik.faltstrom@foobar.se!"
   
   IN NAPTR 100 10 "u" "E2U+sip:voice:mobile"  " !^.*$!sip:faltstrom@carrier.se!"
   
   IN NAPTR 100 10 "u" "E2U+mailto"             "!^.*$!mailto:faltstrom@dorame.se!"
   
   IN NAPTR 100 10 "u" "E2U+sip:im"           "!^.*$!sip:patrik@hugesoftwareco.se!"
   
   IN NAPTR 100 10 "u" "E2U+sip:fax"           "!^.*$!sip:patrik@fasolaredo.se!"
   
   
   
   3.4 OBSERVATIONS ON CALLED PARTY VS CALLING PARTY CONTROL
   
   It would be unreasonable and inappropriate to conclude that either
   view of ENUM enabled communications is right or wrong. There are
   clearly circumstances where consumers or businesses, for various
   reasons, might prefer each option.
   
   A variety of businesses and enterprises my wish to expose and
   individually describe the maximum number of contact points in the
   global DNS order to facilitate communications by calling parties by
   the most convenient means available.
   
   Consumers may prefer information about them to be masked or aliases
   in the DNS, in order to benefit from advanced IP communications,
   such as SIP, while preserving personal preferences and privacy.
   
   What is important is ENUM and the global ENUM system is flexible
   enough to permit either concept. The choice is directly a function
   of called parties registering their E.164 resources in the global
   ENUM system and configuring their NAPTR resources appropriately to
   their wishes.
   
   4) WHAT OTHER INFORMATION IS NECESSARY FOR ENUM REGISTRATION?
   
   
   
   
   
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   Various national ENUM groups have emerged with the task of
   developing policies and procedures for administrating the ENUM
   system within their various jurisdictions.  Many of these forums
   have described a multi-tier model for ENUM registration and
   provisioning that will require some forms of personal data to be
   collected and stored as well as technical contact data on who is the
   responsible party for the management of the authoritive name servers
   that hold and manage ENUM records.
   
   Many concepts and principals have been borrowed from domain name
   registration where there are three distinct parties to the
   transaction, Registrant, Registrar and Registry.
   
   Various jurisdictions have different laws and regulations regarding
   data acquisition and the protection of data acquired from consumers
   (registrants). (See 5 and 6)
   
   Unlike the ICANN administered domain name industry, the global ENUM
   system has no requirement for a central WHOIS registry of
   registrants. Information on whom or what entity is in administrative
   control of a phone number is widely available as a part of normal
   telephone service subscription.
   
   What is different about the ENUM system is that it depends on the
   security and stability of DNS servers to function properly. It is
   necessary and prudent that this technical contact data for these
   servers be widely available to network administrators so that they
   can be contacted in the event there is a technical problem with
   aspects of the DNS under their management and control. Consequently
   it is suggested that national ENUM implementations SHOULD implement
   a form of WHOIS for the technical contact data appropriate to the
   registration of a E.164 number.
   
   
   
   
   5) PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS IN THE NORTH AMERICAN
      CONTEXT
   
      TBD
   
   
   
   
   
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   6) PRIVACY and DATA PROTECTIONS CONSIDERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN
      COMMUNITY CONTEXT
   
      TBD
   
   
   7) SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS IN ENUM
   
   7.1 SECURITY OF THE DNS
   
      The security issues surrounding the DNS are well understood. This
      has enormous implications for emerging national ENUM
      administrations. In particular a DNS request can be subject to
      man-in-the-middle attacks where the response from the DNS may be
      altered in transit. This has serious implications for the
      accuracy and authentication of responses from the DNS to ENUM
      formatted queries by applications.
   
      The IETF has developed DNSSEC [ARENDS] to authenticate that the
      responses from the DNS are indeed from the zone from which they
      have been requested, however DNSSEC is still in early testing and
      deployment and has not been deployed in a large scale environment
      such as generic or country code Top Level Domain.[RFC 3130]
   
      Consequently it is premature for emerging national ENUM
      administrations to consider mandating DNSSEC for those Country
      Code zones and administrative number ranges under their control
      until such time as there is sufficient operational experience
      with DNSSEC.
   
   7.2 SECURITY OF ENUM PROVISIONING INFRASTRUCTURE.
   
      TBD
   
   
   
   8) References
   
   
   
   
      1. [RFC2916bis] Faltstrom, P.&  Mealling,M. ôThe E.164 to URI
         DDDS Applicationsö,draft-ietf-enum-rfc2916bis-01.txt, (work in
         progress), May 2002
   
   
   
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      2. Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
         Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997
   
   
      3. [ITU-T], "The International Public Telecommunication Number
         Plan", Recommendation E.164, May 1997.
   
      4. [RFC3026] Blaine, R. öLiaison to IETF/ISOC on ENUMö RFC
         3026,January 2001
   
      5. [RFC 3403] Mealling, M., "Dynamic Delegation Discovery System
         (DDDS) Part Four: The URI Resolution Application", RFC 3403
         October 2002.
   
      6. [PETERSON]  Peterson, J. etal, ôUsing ENUM for SIP
         Applicationsö, draft-ietf-sipping-e164.02.txt, (work in
         progress), October 2002
   
      7. [BRANDER] Brandner, R. et.al."Categorical enumservices",
         draft-brandner-enum-categorical-enumservices-00.txt, (work in
         progress, June 2002
   
      8. [DNSEXT] Arends, R.,ôDNS Security Introduction and
         Requirementsö, draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-03.txt, (work in
         progress) October 2002
   
      9. [RFC 3130] Lewis, E. ôNotes from the State-Of-The-Technology:
         DNSSECö RFC 3130, June 2001
   
   
   9) Acknowledgments
   
      The original suggestion for this document came from Allison
      Mankin and Scott Bradner.
   
   
   10)  Author's Addresses
   
      Richard Shockey
      NeuStar, Inc
      46000 Center Oak Plaza
      Sterling, VA  20166
      Phone: +1 571 434 5651
      Email: richard.shockey@neustar.biz
   
   
   
   
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