Network Working Group Robert Siemborski
INTERNET-DRAFT Google, Inc.
Intended Category: Proposed Standard February, 2005
Obsoletes: RFC 1734 Updates: RFC 2449
POP3 SASL Authentication Mechanism
<draft-siemborski-rfc1734bis-04.txt>
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When published as an RFC this document will obsolete RFC 1734 and
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POP3 SASL Authentication Mechanism February, 2005
Abstract
This document defines a profile of the Simple Authentication and
Security Layer (SASL) for the Post Office Protocol (POP3). This
extension allows a POP3 client to indicate an authentication
mechanism to the server, perform an authentication protocol
exchange, and optionally negotiate a security layer for subsequent
protocol interactions during this session.
This document seeks to consolidate the information related to POP3
AUTH into a single document. To this end, this document obsoletes
RFC 1734, replacing it as a Proposed Standard and updates
information contained in Section 6.3 of RFC 2449.
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Table of Contents
1. How to Read This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. The SASL Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. The AUTH Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Formal Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Protocol Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Intellectual Property Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Copyright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Changes From RFC 1734, RFC 2449. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10. Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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1. How to Read This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD
NOT", "RECOMMENDED", and "MAY" in this document are to be
interpreted as defined in "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels" [KEYWORDS]
In examples, "C:" and "S:" indicate lines sent by the client and
server respectively.
2. Introduction
The [POP3] AUTH command [POP3-AUTH] has suffered several problems in
its specification. The first is that it was very similar to a
[SASL] framework, but pre-dated the initial SASL specification. It
was therefore missing some key components, such as a way to list the
available authentication mechanisms.
Later, [POP3-EXT] attempted to remedy this situation by adding the
CAPA command and allowing an initial client response to the AUTH
command, however problems in the clarity of the specification of how
the initial client response was to be handled remained.
Additionally, there is yet another document, [POP3-CODES], that
provides additional response codes that are useful during
authentication. Together, this means creating a full POP3 AUTH
implementaiton requires an understanding of material in at least
five (and probably six) different documents.
This document attempts to combine the information in [POP3-AUTH] and
[POP3-EXT] to simplify this situation. Additionally, it aims to
clarify and update the older specifications where appropriate.
3. The SASL Capability
This section supercedes the definition of the SASL Capability in
section 6.3 of [POP3-EXT].
CAPA tag:
SASL
Arguments:
Supported SASL Mechanisms
Added commands:
AUTH
Standard Commands Affected
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None
Announced states / possible differences:
both / no
Commands valid in states:
AUTHORIZATION
Specification Reference:
This Document, [SASL]
Discussion
The SASL capability permits the use of the AUTH command (as
defined in section 4 of this document) to begin a [SASL]
negotiation. The argument to the SASL capability is a space-
separated list of SASL mechanisms which are supported.
If a server either does not support the CAPA command or does not
advertise the SASL capability, clients SHOULD NOT attempt the
AUTH command. If a client does attempt the AUTH command in such
a situation, it MUST NOT supply the client initial response
parameter (for backwards compatibility with [POP3-AUTH]).
Note that the list of available mechanisms MAY change after a
successful STLS command [POP3-TLS]. However, as required by
[POP3-EXT] implementations MUST continue to include the SASL
capability even after a successful AUTH command has been
completed (even though no further AUTH commands may be issued).
Example
S: +OK pop.example.com BlurdyBlurp POP3 server ready
C: CAPA
S: +OK List of capabilities follows
S: SASL KERBEROS_V4 GSSAPI ANONYMOUS
S: STLS
S: IMPLEMENTATION BlurdyBlurp POP3 server
S: .
4. The AUTH Command
AUTH mechanism [initial-response]
Arguments:
mechanism: A string identifying a [SASL] authentication
mechanism.
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initial-response: An optional initial client response. If
present, this response MUST be encoded as specified in Section
3 of [BASE64].
Restrictions:
After an AUTH command has been successfully completed, no more
AUTH commands may be issued in the same session. After a
successful AUTH command completes, a server MUST reject any
further AUTH commands with an -ERR reply.
The AUTH command may only be given during the AUTHORIZATION
state.
Discussion:
The AUTH command initiates a [SASL] authentication exchange
between the client and the server. The client identifies the
SASL mechanism to use with the first parameter of the AUTH
command. If the server supports the requested authentication
mechanism, it performs the SASL exchange to authenticate the
user. Optionally, it also negotiates a security layer for
subsequent protocol interactions during this session. If the
requested authentication mechanism is not supported, the
server rejects the AUTH command with an -ERR reply.
The authentication protocol exchange consists of a series of
server challenges and client responses that are specific to
the chosen [SASL] mechanism.
A server challenge is sent as a line consisting of a "+"
character followed by a single space and a string encoded as
specified in Section 3 of [BASE64]. This line MUST NOT
contain any text other than the BASE64 encoded challenge.
A client response consists of a line containing a string
encoded as defined in Section 3 of [BASE64]. If the client
wishes to cancel the authentication exchange, it issues a line
with a single "*". If the server receives such a response, it
MUST reject the AUTH command by sending an -ERR reply.
The optional initial response argument to the AUTH command is
used to save a round trip when using authentication mechanisms
that support an initial client response. If the initial
response argument is omitted and the chosen mechanism requires
an initial client response, the server MUST proceed as defined
in section 5.1 of [SASL]. In POP3, a server challenge with no
data is defined as line with only a "+" followed by a single
space. It MUST NOT contain any other data.
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For the purposes of the initial client response, the line
length limitation defined in [POP3-EXT] still applies. If a
client initial send would cause the AUTH command to exceed
this length, the client MUST NOT use the initial response
parameter (and instead proceed as defined in section 5.1 of
[SASL]).
If the client needs to send a zero-length initial response,
the client MUST transmit the response as a single equals sign
("="). This indicates that the response is present, but
contains no data.
If the client uses an initial-response argument to the AUTH
command with a SASL mechanism that does not support an initial
client send, the server MUST reject the AUTH command with an
-ERR reply.
If the server cannot [BASE64] decode a client response, it
MUST reject the AUTH command with an -ERR reply. If the
client cannot BASE64 decode a server challenge, it MUST cancel
the authentication using the "*" response. In particular,
servers and clients MUST reject (and not ignore) any character
not explicitly allowed by the BASE64 alphabet, and MUST reject
any sequence of BASE64 characters that contains the pad
character ('=') anywhere other than the end of the string
(e.g. "=AAA" and "AAA=BBB" are not allowed).
Note that these [BASE64] strings (excepting the initial client
response) may be of arbitrarily length. Clients and servers
MUST be able to handle the maximum encoded size of challenges
and responses generated by their supported authentication
mechanisms. This requirement is independent of any line
length limitations the client or server may have in other
parts of its protocol implementation.
If the server is unable to authenticate the client, it MUST
reject the AUTH command with an -ERR reply. Should the client
successfully complete the exchange, the server issues a +OK
reply. Additionally, upon success, the POP3 session enters
the TRANSACTION state.
The authorization identity generated by the [SASL] exchange is
a simple username, and MUST use the [SASLprep] profile of the
[StringPrep] algorithm to prepare these names for matching.
If preparation of the authorization identity fails or results
in an empty string (unless it was transmitted as the empty
string), the server MUST fail the authentication.
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If a security layer is negotiated during the SASL exchange, it
takes effect for the client on the octet immediately following
the CRLF that concludes the last response generated by the
client. For the server, it takes effect immediately following
the CRLF of its success reply.
When a security layer takes effect, the server MUST discard
any knowledge previously obtained from the client, which was
not obtained from the SASL negotiation itself. Likewise, the
client MUST discard any knowledge obtained from the server,
such as the list of available POP3 service extensions.
When both [TLS] and SASL security layers are in effect, the
TLS encoding MUST be applied after the SASL encoding,
regardless of the order in which the layers were negotiated.
The service name specified by this protocol's profile of SASL
is "pop".
If an AUTH command fails, the client may try another
authentication mechanism or present different credentials by
issuing another AUTH command (or by using one of the other
[POP3] authentication mechanisms). Likewise, the server MUST
behave as if the client had not issued the AUTH command.
To ensure interoperability, client and server implementations
of this extension MUST implement the [DIGEST-MD5] SASL
mechanism.
4.1. Formal Syntax
The following syntax specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur
Form notation as specified in [ABNF].
Except as noted otherwise, all alphabetic characters are case-
insensitive. The use of upper or lower case characters to define
token strings is for editorial clarity only. Implementations MUST
accept these strings in a case-insensitive fashion.
UPALPHA = %x41-5A ;; Uppercase: A-Z
LOALPHA = %x61-7A ;; Lowercase: a-z
ALPHA = UPALPHA / LOALPHA ;; case insensitive
DIGIT = %x30-39 ;; Digits 0-9
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AUTH_CHAR = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "_"
auth_type = 1*20AUTH_CHAR
auth_command = "AUTH" SPACE auth_type [SPACE (base64 / "=")]
*(CRLF [base64]) CRLF
auth_resp = ("*" / base64) CRLF
base64 = base64_terminal /
( 1*(4base64_CHAR) [base64_terminal] )
base64_char = UPALPHA / LOALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "/"
;; Case-sensitive
base64_terminal = (2base64_char "==") / (3base64_char "=")
continue_req = "+" SPACE [base64] CRLF
CR = %x0C ;; ASCII CR, carriage return
CRLF = CR LF
LF = %x0A ;; ASCII LF, line feed
SPACE = %x20 ;; ASCII SP, space
Additionally, the ABNF specified in [POP3-EXT] is updated as
follows:
response = greeting / single-line / capa-resp / multi-line /
continue_req
4.2. Examples
Here is an example of a client attempting AUTH PLAIN under TLS and
making use of the initial client response:
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S: +OK pop.example.com BlurdyBlurp POP3 server ready
C: CAPA
S: +OK List of capabilities follows
S: SASL KERBEROS_V4 GSSAPI ANONYMOUS
S: STLS
S: IMPLEMENTATION BlurdyBlurp POP3 server
S: .
C: STLS
S: +OK Begin TLS negotiation now
... TLS negotiation proceeds, further commands protected by TLS layer ...
C: CAPA
S: +OK List of capabilities follows
S: SASL PLAIN KERBEROS_V4 GSSAPI ANONYMOUS
S: IMPLEMENTATION BlurdyBlurp POP3 server
S: .
C: AUTH PLAIN dGVzdAB0ZXN0AHRlc3Q=
S: +OK Maildrop locked and ready
Here is another client that is attempting AUTH PLAIN under a TLS
layer, this time without the initial response. Parts of the
negotiation before the TLS layer was established have been omitted:
... TLS negotiation proceeds, further commands protected by TLS layer ...
C: CAPA
S: +OK List of capabilities follows
S: SASL PLAIN KERBEROS_V4 GSSAPI ANONYMOUS
S: IMPLEMENTATION BlurdyBlurp POP3 server
S: .
C: AUTH PLAIN
(note that there is a space following the '+' on the following line)
S: +
C: dGVzdAB0ZXN0AHRlc3Q=
S: +OK Maildrop locked and ready
Here is an example using a mechanism which does not support an
initial client send, and includes server challenges:
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S: +OK pop.example.com BlurdyBlurp POP3 server ready
C: CAPA
S: +OK List of capabilities follows
S: SASL KERBEROS_V4 GSSAPI ANONYMOUS
S: STLS
S: IMPLEMENTATION BlurdyBlurp POP3 server
S: .
C: AUTH KERBEROS_V4
S: + ezLUFA==
(the following lines are broken for editorial clarity only)
C: BAYFQU5EUkVXLkNNVS5FRFUAOCCXeMiVyFe9K6Nwne7+sPLgIoF9YQ5ePfxUsMlJAf
C7aoNySU8nrqS9m8JAddsUeuyc5HFXXovaKLrZNo2bTLH0Lyolwy0W9ryJDojbKmHy
zSMqFsGD4EL0
S: + Z74fTwDw7KQ=
C: vSAF7ha6qotK2UHUgKlsEA==
S: +OK Maildrop locked and ready
... at this point a security layer has been established and additional
commands and responses proceed within it ...
5. Protocol Actions
[RFC Editor: Remove this section before publication]
This document obsoletes RFC 1734 and replaces it as a Proposed
Standard. By moving RFC 1734 to Historic, RFC 1731 can also be
moved to Historic (as RFC 1734 was the last document to have a
normative reference).
It also updates information contained in Section 6.3 of RFC 2449.
6. Intellectual Property Rights
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the
IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of
claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances
of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made
to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification
can be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
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copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive
Director.
7. Copyright
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights."
"This document and the information contained herein are provided on
an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE
REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE
INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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8. References
The following documents contain normative definitions or
specifications that are necessary for correct understanding of this
protocol:
[BASE64] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 3548, July 2003.
[DIGEST-MD5]
Leach, P., Melnikov, A., and Newman C., "Using Digest
Authentication as a SASL Mechanism", draft-ietf-sasl-
rfc2831bis-*.txt, a work in progress.
[KEYWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997
[POP3] Myers, J. and Rose, M., "Post Office Protocol - Version 3",
STD 53, RFC 1939, May 1996.
[POP3-EXT] Gellens, R., Newman, C., and Lundblade, L., "POP3 Extension
Mechanism", RFC 2449, November 1998.
[POP3-TLS] Newman, C., "Using TLS with IMAP, POP3, and ACAP", RFC 2595,
June 1999.
[SASL] Melnikov, A., "Simple Authentication and Security Layer
(SASL)", draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis-*.txt, a work in
progress.
[SASLprep] Zeilega, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep profile for user names
and passwords", draft-ietf-sasl-saslprep-*.txt, a work in
progress
[StringPrep]
Hoffman, P. and Blanchet, M., "Preparation of
Internationalized Strings ("stringprep")", draft-hoffman-
rfc3454bis-*.txt, a work in progress
The following references are for informational purposes only:
[PLAIN] Zeilenga, K., "The Plain SASL Mechanism", draft-ietf-sasl-
plain-*.txt, a work in progress.
[POP3-AUTH] Myers, J., "POP3 AUTHentication Command", RFC 1734, January
1994.
[POP3-CODES]
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Gellens, R., "The SYS and AUTH POP Response Codes", RFC
3206, February 2002.
[TLS] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC
2246, January 1999.
9. Changes From RFC 1734, RFC 2449.
1. The SASL-based semantics defined in RFC 2449 are now
normative for the AUTH extension.
2. Clarifications and examples of the proper behavior of
initial client response handling.
3. Minimum requirement of support for DIGEST-MD5.
4. Clarify ordering of TLS and SASL security layers.
5. Update references to newer versions of various
specifications.
6. Clarify that the mechanism list can change.
7. Add the use of the SASLprep profile for preparing
authorization identities.
8. General other editorial clarifications.
9. Consolidation of much applicable information into a
single document.
10. Author's Address:
Robert Siemborski
Google, Inc.
1600 Ampitheatre Parkway
Mountain View, CA 94043
+1 650 623 6925
robsiemb@google.com
11. Acknowledgments:
The author would like to acknowledge the contributions of John
Myers, Randall Gellens, Chris Newman, Laurence Lundblade, and other
contributors to RFC 1734 and RFC 2554, on which this document draws
heavily.
The author would also like to thank Ken Murchison, Randall Gellens,
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Alexey Melnikov, and Mark Crispin for the time they devoted to
reviewing early drafts of this document.
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