Network Working Group V. Smyslov
Internet-Draft ELVIS-PLUS
Intended status: Informational July 5, 2019
Expires: January 6, 2020
Using GOST ciphers in ESP and IKEv2
draft-smyslov-esp-gost-00
Abstract
This document defines a set of encryption transforms for use in
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Internet Key Exchange
version 2 (IKEv2) protocols. The transforms are based on Russian
cryptographic standard algorithms (GOST) in a Multilinear Galois Mode
(MGM).
Status of This Memo
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Transforms Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1. Tree-based External Re-Keying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. Initialization Vector Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.3. Nonce Format for MGM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.3.1. MGM Nonce Format for "Kuznyechik" based Transforms . 6
4.3.2. MGM Nonce Format for "Magma" based Transforms . . . . 6
4.4. Keying Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.5. Integrity Check Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.6. Plaintext Padding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.7. AAD Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.7.1. ESP AAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.7.2. IKEv2 AAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.8. Using Transforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
This document defines four encryption transforms for the
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [RFC4303] and the Internet Key
Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) [RFC7296]. These transforms are based on
two block ciphers from Russian cryptographic standard algorithms
(often called "GOST" algorithms) - "Kuznyechik" [RFC7801] and "Magma"
[I-D.dolmatov-magma]. These ciphers are used in Multilinear Galois
Mode (MGM) [I-D.smyshlyaev-mgm] which provides Authenticated
Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD). In addition these transforms
use external re-keying mechanism, described in
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-re-keying] to limit a load on a session key.
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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3. Overview
Russian cryptographic standard algorithms, often referred as "GOST"
algorithms, are a set of cryptographic algorithms of different types
- ciphers, hash functions, digital signatures etc. In particular,
Russian cryptographic standard [GOST3412-2015] defines two block
ciphers - "Kuznyechik" (also defined in [RFC7801]) and "Magma" (also
defined in [I-D.dolmatov-magma]). Both these ciphers use 256-bit
key. "Kuznyechik" has a block size of 128 bits, while "Magma" has a
64-bit block.
Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM) is an AEAD mode defined in
[I-D.smyshlyaev-mgm]. It is claimed to provide defense against some
attacks on well-known AEAD modes, like Galois Counter Mode (GCM).
In addition, [I-D.irtf-cfrg-re-keying] defines some mechanisms that
can be used to limit the number of times any particular session key
is used. One of these mechanisms, called External Re-Keying with
Tree-based Construction (defined in Section 5.2.3 of
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-re-keying]), is used in the defined transforms. For
the purpose of deriving subordinate keys a Key Derivation Function
(KDF) KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256 defined in Section 4.5 of [RFC7836], is
used. This KDF is based on an HMAC [RFC2104] in a combination with a
Russian GOST hash function defined in Russian cryptographic standard
[GOST3411-2012] (also defined in [RFC6986]).
4. Transforms Description
This document defines four transforms for use in ESP and IKEv2. All
of them use MGM mode of operation with Tree-based External Re-Keying.
The transforms differ in used underlying algorithms and in
cryptographic services they provide.
o ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE is an AEAD transform based on
"Kuznyechik" algorithm; it provides confidentiality and message
authentication and thus can be used both in ESP and IKEv2; the
Transform ID is <TBA1 by IANA>;
o ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE is an AEAD transform based on "Magma"
algorithm; it provides confidentiality and message authentication
and thus can be used both in ESP and IKEv2; the Transform ID is
<TBA2 by IANA>
o ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE is a MAC-only transform based on
"Kuznyechik" algorithm; it provides no confidentiality and thus
can only be used in ESP, but not in IKEv2; the Transform ID is
<TBA3 by IANA>
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o ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE is a MAC-only transform based on "Magma"
algorithm; it provides no confidentiality and thus can only be
used in ESP, but not in IKEv2; the Transform ID is <TBA4 by IANA>
4.1. Tree-based External Re-Keying
All four transforms use the same Tree-based External Re-Keying
mechanism. The idea is that the key that is provided for the
transform (Child SA key derived from KEYMAT in case of ESP or SK_ei/
SK_er in case of IKEv2) is not directly use to protect messages.
Instead a tree of keys is derived using this key as a root. This
tree may have several levels. The leaf keys are used for message
protection, while intermediate nodes keys are used to derive lower
level keys (including leaf keys). See Section 5.2.3 of
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-re-keying] for more detail. This construction allows
to protect a large amount of data, but at the same time providing a
bound on a number of times any particular key in the tree is used,
thus defending from some side channel attacks.
The transforms defined in this document use three-level tree. The
leaf key that protects a message is computed as follows:
Kmsg = KDF (KDF (KDF (K, L1, I1), L2, I2), L3, I3)
where:
KDF (k, l, s) Key Derivation Function KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256
defined in Section 4.5 of [RFC7836], which accepts
three input parameters - a key (k), a label (l) and a
seed (s) and provides a new key as an output;
K the key for the transform (ESP SA key derived from
KEYMAT or SK_ei/SK_er in case of IKEv2);
L1, L2, L3 labels defined as 6 octet ASCII strings without null
termination:
L1 = "level1"
L2 = "level2"
L3 = "level3"
I1, I2, I3 parameters that determine which keys out of the tree
are used on each level, altogether they determine a
leaf key that is used for message protection; these
parameters are two octet integers in network byte
order;
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This construction allows to generate up to 2^16 keys on each level,
but due to IV construction (see Section 4.2) the number of possible
keys on the level 1 is limited to 2^8. So, the total number of
possible leaf keys generated from one SA key is 2^40.
This specifications doesn't any requirements on the frequency the
external re-keying takes place. It is expected that sending
application will follow its own policy dictating how many times the
keys on each level must be used.
4.2. Initialization Vector Format
Each message protected by the defined transforms must contain
Initialization Vector (IV). The IV has a size of 64 bits and
consists of the four fields, three of which are I1, I2 and I3
parameters that determine the particular leaf key this message was
protected with (see Section 4.1), and the fourh is a counter,
representing the message number for this key.
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| I1 | I2 | I3 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| I3 (cont) | C |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: IV Format
where:
o I1 (1 octet), I2 (2 octets), I3 (2 octets) - parameters,
determining the particular key used to protect this message;
2-octets parameters are integers in network byte order
o C (3 octets) - message counter for the leaf key protecting this
message; up to 2^24 messages may be protected using a single leaf
key
For any given SA the IV MUST NOT repeat, but there is no requirement
that IV is unpredictable.
4.3. Nonce Format for MGM
MGM requires a per-message nonce (called Initial Counter Nonce, ICN,
in the [I-D.smyshlyaev-mgm]) that must be unique in the context of
any leaf key (that are used to actually protect messages). The size
of the ICN is n-1 bits, where n is the size of the block of the
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underlying cipher. The two ciphers used in the defined transforms
have different block sizes, so the two formats for the ICN are
defined.
MGM specification requires that the nonce be n-1 bits in size, where
n is a block size of underlying cipher. This document defines MGM
nonces that are n bits in size, because that makes them having whole
number of bytes. When used inside MGM the most significant bit of
the first octet if the nonce (represented as an octet string) is
dropped, making an effective size of the nonce equal to n-1 bits.
Note, that the dropped bit is a part of zero field (see Figure 2 and
Figure 3) which is always set to 0, so no information is lost when it
is dropped.
4.3.1. MGM Nonce Format for "Kuznyechik" based Transforms
For transforms based on "Kuznyechik" cipher
(ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE and ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE) the ICN
consists of a zero octet, a 24-bit message counter and a 96-bit
secret salt, that is fixed for SA and not transmitted.
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| zero | C |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| salt |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: Nonce format for "Kuznyechik" based transforms
where:
o zero (1 octet) - set to 0
o C (3 octets) - the counter for the messages protected by the given
leaf key; this field MUST be equal to the C field in the IV
o salt (12 octets) - secret salt
4.3.2. MGM Nonce Format for "Magma" based Transforms
For transforms based on "Magma" cipher (ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE and
ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE) the ICN consists of a zero octet, a 24-bit
message counter and a 32-bit secret salt, that is fixed for SA and
not transmitted.
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1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| zero | C |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| salt |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3: Nonce format for "Magma" based transforms
where:
o zero (1 octet) - set to 0
o C (3 octets) - the counter for the messages protected by the given
leaf key; this field MUST be equal to the C field in the IV
o salt (4 octets) - secret salt
4.4. Keying Material
The key for ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE and
ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE transforms consists of 352 bits, of
which the first 256 bits is a root key for the tree (denoted as K in
Section 4.1) and the remaining 96 bits is a secret salt (see
Section 4.3.1).
The key for ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE and ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE
transforms consists of 288 bits, of which the first 256 bits is a
root key for the tree (denoted as K in Section 4.1) and the remaining
32 bits is a secret salt (see Section 4.3.2).
The keys in case ESP are extracted from the KEYMAT, and in case IKEv2
they are SK_ei/SK_er keys. Note, that since these transforms provide
authenticated encryption, no additional keys are needed for
authentication. It means that in case of IKEv2 the keys SK_ai/SK_ar
are not used.
4.5. Integrity Check Value
The MGM computes authentication tag equal to the size of the block of
the underlying cipher. For "Kuznyechik" based transforms
(ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE and ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE) the
resulting Integrity Check Value (ICV) is truncated to 96 bits by
dropping the last 4 octets of the produced authentication tag. For
"Magma" based transforms the full 64-bit authentication tag is used
as ICV.
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4.6. Plaintext Padding
All transforms defined in this document doesn't require any special
plaintext padding, as specified in [I-D.smyshlyaev-mgm]. It means,
that only those padding requirements that are imposed by the protocol
are applied (4 bytes for ESP, no special padding for IKEv2).
4.7. AAD Construction
4.7.1. ESP AAD
Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) in ESP are constructed
differently depending on the transform being used and whether
Extended Sequence Number (ESN) is in use or not. The
ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE and ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE provide
confidentiality, so the content of the ESP body is encrypted and AAD
consists of the ESP SPI and (E)SN. The AAD is constructed similar to
the one in [RFC4106].
On the other hand the ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE and
ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE don't provide confidentiality, they provide
only message authentication. For this purpose the part of ESP packet
that is normally encrypted is included in the AAD instead. For these
transforms encryption capability provided by MGM is not used. The
AAD is constructed similar to the one in [RFC4543].
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SPI |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 32-bit Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4: AAD for AEAD transforms with 32-bit SN
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SPI |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 64-bit Extended Sequence Number |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 5: AAD for AEAD transforms with 64-bit ESN
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1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SPI |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 32-bit Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Payload Data (variable) ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Padding (0-255 bytes) |
+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | Pad Length | Next Header |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 6: AAD for authentication only transforms with 32-bit SN
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SPI |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 64-bit Extended Sequence Number |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Payload Data (variable) ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Padding (0-255 bytes) |
+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | Pad Length | Next Header |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 7: AAD for authentication only transforms with 64-bit ESN
4.7.2. IKEv2 AAD
For IKEv2 the AAD consists of the IKEv2 Header, the unencrypted
payload followed it and an Encrypted (or Encrypted Fragment) payload
header. The AAD is constructed similar to one in [RFC5282].
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1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ IKEv2 Header ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ Unencrypted IKE Payloads ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Payload |C| RESERVED | Payload Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 8: AAD for IKEv2
4.8. Using Transforms
When SA is established the I1, I2 and I3 parameters are set to 0 by
the sender and a leaf key is calculated. The C parameter starts from
0 and is incremented with each message protected by the same leaf
key. When sender decides that the leaf should be changed, it
increments I3 parameter and generates a new leaf key. The C
parameter for the new leaf key is reset to 0 and the process
continues. If the sender decides, that 3-rd level key corresponding
to I3 is used enough times, it increments I2, resets I3 to 0 and
calculates a new leaf key. The C is reset to 0 (as with every new
leaf key) and the process continues.
The receiver always use I1, I2 and I3 from the incoming message. If
they differ from the values in previous packets, a new leaf key is
calculated . The C parameter is always used from the incoming packet.
To improve performance implementations may cache recently used leaf
key. When new leaf key is calculated (based on the values from
incoming message) the old key may be cacheed for some time to improve
performance in case of possible packet reordering (when packets
protected by the old leaf key may be delayed and arrive later).
5. Security Considerations
TBD
6. IANA Considerations
IANA has assigned four Transform IDs in the "Transform Type 1 -
Encryption Algorithm Transform IDs" registry (where RFCXXXX is this
document):
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Number Name ESP Reference IKEv2 Reference
---------------------------------------------------------------------
TBA1 ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE [RFCXXXX] [RFCXXXX]
TBA2 ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE [RFCXXXX] [RFCXXXX]
TBA3 ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE [RFCXXXX] Not allowed
TBA4 ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE [RFCXXXX] Not allowed
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC6986] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and A. Degtyarev, "GOST R 34.11-2012:
Hash Function", RFC 6986, DOI 10.17487/RFC6986, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6986>.
[RFC7801] Dolmatov, V., Ed., "GOST R 34.12-2015: Block Cipher
"Kuznyechik"", RFC 7801, DOI 10.17487/RFC7801, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7801>.
[I-D.dolmatov-magma]
Dolmatov, V. and D. Eremin-Solenikov, "GOST R 34.12-2015:
Block Cipher "Magma"", draft-dolmatov-magma-01 (work in
progress), June 2019.
[I-D.smyshlyaev-mgm]
Smyshlyaev, S., Nozdrunov, V., Shishkin, V., and S.
Ekaterina, "Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM)", draft-
smyshlyaev-mgm-11 (work in progress), June 2019.
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[RFC7836] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., Alekseev, E., Oshkin, I., Popov, V.,
Leontiev, S., Podobaev, V., and D. Belyavsky, "Guidelines
on the Cryptographic Algorithms to Accompany the Usage of
Standards GOST R 34.10-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012",
RFC 7836, DOI 10.17487/RFC7836, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7836>.
7.2. Informative References
[GOST3411-2012]
Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology,
"Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
Hashing function", GOST R 34.11-2012 (in Russian), 2012.
[GOST3412-2015]
Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology,
"Information technology. Cryptographic data security.
Block ciphers", GOST R 34.12-2015 (in Russian), 2015.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-re-keying]
Smyshlyaev, S., "Re-keying Mechanisms for Symmetric Keys",
draft-irtf-cfrg-re-keying-17 (work in progress), May 2019.
[RFC4106] Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4106, DOI 10.17487/RFC4106, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4106>.
[RFC4543] McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "The Use of Galois Message
Authentication Code (GMAC) in IPsec ESP and AH", RFC 4543,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4543, May 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4543>.
[RFC5282] Black, D. and D. McGrew, "Using Authenticated Encryption
Algorithms with the Encrypted Payload of the Internet Key
Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) Protocol", RFC 5282,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5282, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5282>.
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Author's Address
Valery Smyslov
ELVIS-PLUS
PO Box 81
Moscow (Zelenograd) 124460
RU
Phone: +7 495 276 0211
Email: svan@elvis.ru
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