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          13 14 rfc9227                                                 
Network Working Group                                         V. Smyslov
Internet-Draft                                                ELVIS-PLUS
Intended status: Informational                           7 February 2022
Expires: 11 August 2022


                  Using GOST ciphers in ESP and IKEv2
                       draft-smyslov-esp-gost-13

Abstract

   This document defines a set of encryption transforms for use in the
   Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and in the Internet Key Exchange
   version 2 (IKEv2) protocols which are parts of the IP Security
   (IPsec) protocols suite.  The transforms are based on the GOST R
   34.12-2015 block ciphers (which are named "Magma" and "Kuznyechik")
   in a Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM) and the external re-keying
   approach.

   This specification is developed to facilitate implementations that
   wish to support the GOST algorithms.  This document does not imply
   IETF endorsement of the cryptographic algorithms used in this
   document.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 11 August 2022.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.






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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Transforms Description  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Tree-based External Re-Keying . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2.  Initialization Vector Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.3.  Nonce Format for MGM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       4.3.1.  MGM Nonce Format for "Kuznyechik" based Transforms  .   7
       4.3.2.  MGM Nonce Format for "Magma" based Transforms . . . .   7
     4.4.  Keying Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.5.  Integrity Check Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.6.  Plaintext Padding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.7.  AAD Construction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       4.7.1.  ESP AAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       4.7.2.  IKEv2 AAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.8.  Using Transforms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Appendix A.  Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24

1.  Introduction

   The IP Security (IPsec) protocols suite consists of several
   protocols, of which the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
   [RFC4303] and the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) [RFC7296]
   are most widely used.  This document defines four transforms for ESP
   and IKEv2 based on Russian cryptographic standard algorithms (often
   referred to as "GOST" algorithms).  This definition is based on the
   Recommendations [GOST-ESP] established by Federal Agency on Technical
   Regulating and Metrology (Rosstandart), which describe how Russian
   cryptographic standard algorithms are used in ESP and IKEv2.
   Transforms defined in this document are based on two block ciphers



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   from Russian cryptographic standard algorithms - "Kuznyechik"
   [GOST3412-2015][RFC7801] and "Magma" [GOST3412-2015][RFC8891] in
   Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM) [GOST-MGM][RFC9058].  These transforms
   provide Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD).  An
   external re-keying mechanism, described in [RFC8645] is also used in
   these transforms to limit load on session keys.

   Because the GOST specification includes the definition of both 128
   ("Kuznyechik") and 64 ("Magma") bit block ciphers, both are included
   in this document.  Implementers should make themselves aware of the
   relative security and other cost-benefit implications of the two
   ciphers.  See Section 5 for more details.

   This specification is developed to facilitate implementations that
   wish to support the GOST algorithms.  This document does not imply
   IETF endorsement of the cryptographic algorithms used in this
   document.

2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Overview

   Russian cryptographic standard algorithms, often referred as "GOST"
   algorithms, constitute a set of cryptographic algorithms of different
   types - ciphers, hash functions, digital signatures, etc.  In
   particular, Russian cryptographic standard [GOST3412-2015] defines
   two block ciphers - "Kuznyechik" (also defined in [RFC7801]) and
   "Magma" (also defined in [RFC8891]).  Both ciphers use 256-bit key.
   "Kuznyechik" has a block size of 128 bits, while "Magma" has a 64-bit
   block.

   Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM) is an AEAD mode defined in
   [GOST-MGM][RFC9058].  It is claimed to provide defense against some
   attacks on well-known AEAD modes, like Galois Counter Mode (GCM).











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   [RFC8645] defines mechanisms that can be used to limit the number of
   times any particular session key is used.  One of these mechanisms,
   called external re-keying with tree-based construction (defined in
   Section 5.2.3 of [RFC8645]), is used in the defined transforms.  For
   the purpose of deriving subordinate keys a Key Derivation Function
   (KDF) KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256 defined in Section 4.5 of [RFC7836], is
   used.  This KDF is based on an HMAC [RFC2104] construction with a
   Russian GOST hash function defined in Russian cryptographic standard
   [GOST3411-2012] (also defined in [RFC6986]).

4.  Transforms Description

   This document defines four transforms of Type 1 (Encryption
   Algorithm) for use in ESP and IKEv2.  All of them use MGM mode of
   operation with tree-based external re-keying.  The transforms differ
   in underlying ciphers and in cryptographic services they provide.

   *  ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE (Transform ID 32) is an AEAD transform
      based on "Kuznyechik" algorithm; it provides confidentiality and
      message authentication and thus can be used in both ESP and IKEv2

   *  ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE (Transform ID 33) is an AEAD transform based
      on "Magma" algorithm; it provides confidentiality and message
      authentication and thus can be used in both ESP and IKEv2

   *  ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE (Transform ID 34) is a MAC-only
      transform based on "Kuznyechik" algorithm; it provides no
      confidentiality and thus can only be used in ESP, but not in IKEv2

   *  ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE (Transform ID 35) is a MAC-only transform
      based on "Magma" algorithm; it provides no confidentiality and
      thus can only be used in ESP, but not in IKEv2

   Note that transforms ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE and
   ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE don't provide any confidentiality, but they
   are defined as Type 1 (Encryption Algorithm) transforms because of
   the need to include an Initialization Vector, which is impossible for
   Type 3 (Integrity Algorithm) transforms.

4.1.  Tree-based External Re-Keying

   All four transforms use the same tree-based external re-keying
   mechanism.  The idea is that the key that is provided for the
   transform is not directly used to protect messages.  Instead, a tree
   of keys is derived using this key as a root.  This tree may have
   several levels.  The leaf keys are used for message protection, while
   intermediate nodes keys are used to derive lower-level keys,
   including leaf keys.  See Section 5.2.3 of [RFC8645] for more



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   details.  This construction allows us to protect a large amount of
   data, at the same time providing a bound on a number of times any
   particular key in the tree is used, thus defending against some side
   channel attacks and also increasing the key lifetime limitations
   based on combinatorial properties.

   The transforms defined in this document use a three-level tree.  The
   leaf key that protects a message is computed as follows:


        K_msg = KDF (KDF (KDF (K, l1, 0x00 | i1), l2, i2), l3, i3)

   where:

   KDF (k, l, s)   Key Derivation Function KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256
                   defined in Section 4.5 of [RFC7836], which accepts
                   three input parameters - a key (k), a label (l) and a
                   seed (s) and provides a new key as an output;

   K               the root key for the tree (see Section 4.4);

   l1, l2, l3      labels defined as 6 octet ASCII strings without null
                   termination:

                      l1 = "level1"

                      l2 = "level2"

                      l3 = "level3"

   i1, i2, i3      parameters that determine which keys out of the tree
                   are used on each level, altogether they determine a
                   leaf key that is used for message protection; the
                   length of i1 is one octet, i2 and i3 are two octet
                   integers in network byte order;

   |               indicates concatenation;

   This construction allows us to generate up to 2^8 keys on level 1 and
   up to 2^16 keys on levels 2 and 3.  So, the total number of possible
   leaf keys generated from a single SA key is 2^40.

   This specification doesn't impose any requirements on the frequency
   of which the external re-keying takes place.  It is expected that
   sending application will follow its own policy dictating how many
   times the keys on each level must be used.





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4.2.  Initialization Vector Format

   Each message protected by the defined transforms MUST contain an
   Initialization Vector (IV).  The IV has a size of 64 bits and
   consists of the four fields, three of which are i1, i2 and i3
   parameters that determine the particular leaf key this message was
   protected with (see Section 4.1), and the fourth is a counter,
   representing the message number for this key.


                          1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |      i1       |               i2              |      i3       |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   i3 (cont)   |                     pnum                      |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                            Figure 1: IV Format

   where:

   *  i1 (1 octet), i2 (2 octets), i3 (2 octets) - parameters,
      determining the particular key used to protect this message;
      2-octets parameters are integers in network byte order

   *  pnum (3 octets) - message counter in network byte order for the
      leaf key protecting this message; up to 2^24 messages may be
      protected using a single leaf key

   For any given SA the IV MUST NOT be used more than once, but there is
   no requirement that IV is unpredictable.

4.3.  Nonce Format for MGM

   MGM requires a per-message nonce (called Initial Counter Nonce, ICN,
   in the [RFC9058]) that MUST be unique in the context of any leaf key.
   The size of the ICN is n-1 bits, where n is the block size of the
   underlying cipher.  The two ciphers used in the transforms defined in
   this document have different block sizes, so two different formats
   for the ICN are defined.

   MGM specification requires that the nonce be n-1 bits in size, where
   n is the block size of the underlying cipher.  This document defines
   MGM nonces having n bits (the block size of the underlying cipher) in
   size.  Since the n is always a multiple of 8 bits, this makes MGM
   nonces having a whole number of octets.  When used inside MGM the
   most significant bit of the first octet of the nonce (represented as



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   an octet string) is dropped, making the effective size of the nonce
   equal to n-1 bits.  Note that the dropped bit is a part of zero field
   (see Figure 2 and Figure 3) which is always set to 0, so no
   information is lost when it is dropped.

4.3.1.  MGM Nonce Format for "Kuznyechik" based Transforms

   For transforms based on "Kuznyechik" cipher
   (ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE and ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE) the ICN
   consists of a zero octet, a 24-bit message counter and a 96-bit
   secret salt, that is fixed for SA and is not transmitted.


                          1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     zero      |                     pnum                      |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                                                               |
     |                             salt                              |
     |                                                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

          Figure 2: Nonce format for "Kuznyechik" based transforms

   where:

   *  zero (1 octet) - set to 0

   *  pnum (3 octets) - the counter for the messages protected by the
      given leaf key; this field MUST be equal to the pnum field in the
      IV

   *  salt (12 octets) - secret salt

4.3.2.  MGM Nonce Format for "Magma" based Transforms

   For transforms based on "Magma" cipher (ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE and
   ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE) the ICN consists of a zero octet, a 24-bit
   message counter and a 32-bit secret salt, that is fixed for SA and is
   not transmitted.










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                          1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     zero      |                     pnum                      |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                             salt                              |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

            Figure 3: Nonce format for "Magma" based transforms

   where:

   *  zero (1 octet) - set to 0

   *  pnum (3 octets) - the counter for the messages protected by the
      given leaf key; this field MUST be equal to the pnum field in the
      IV

   *  salt (4 octets) - secret salt

4.4.  Keying Material

   We'll refer as "transform key" to a string of bits that are used to
   initialize the transforms defined in this specification.  The
   transform key is a composite entity consisting of the root key for
   the tree and the secret salt.

   The transform key for ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE and
   ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE transforms consists of 352 bits (44
   octets), of which the first 256 bits is a root key for the tree
   (denoted as K in Section 4.1) and the remaining 96 bits is a secret
   salt (see Section 4.3.1).

   The transform key for ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE and
   ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE transforms consists of 288 bits (36 octets),
   of which the first 256 bits is a root key for the tree (denoted as K
   in Section 4.1) and the remaining 32 bits is a secret salt (see
   Section 4.3.2).

   In case of ESP the transform keys are extracted from the KEYMAT as
   defined in Section 2.17 of [RFC7296].  In case of IKEv2 the transform
   keys are either SK_ei or SK_er, which are generated as defined in
   Section 2.14 of [RFC7296].  Note that since these transforms provide
   authenticated encryption, no additional keys are needed for
   authentication.  It means that in case of IKEv2 the keys SK_ai/SK_ar
   are not used and MUST be treated as having zero length.





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4.5.  Integrity Check Value

   The length of the authentication tag that MGM can compute is in the
   range from 32 bits to the block size of the underlying cipher.
   Section 4 of the [RFC9058] states that the authentication tag length
   must be fixed for a particular protocol.  For "Kuznyechik" based
   transforms (ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE and
   ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE) the resulting Integrity Check Value
   (ICV) length is set to 96 bits.  For "Magma" based transforms
   (ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE and ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE) the full ICV
   length is set to the block size (64 bits).

4.6.  Plaintext Padding

   Transforms defined in this document don't require any plaintext
   padding, as specified in [RFC9058].  It means, that only those
   padding requirements that are imposed by the protocol are applied (4
   bytes for ESP, no padding for IKEv2).

4.7.  AAD Construction

4.7.1.  ESP AAD

   Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) in ESP is constructed differently
   depending on the transform being used and whether Extended Sequence
   Number (ESN) is in use or not.  The ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE and
   ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE provide confidentiality, so the content of the
   ESP body is encrypted and AAD consists of the ESP SPI and (E)SN.  The
   AAD is constructed similarly to the one in [RFC4106].

   On the other hand the ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE and
   ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE don't provide confidentiality, they provide
   only message authentication.  For this purpose the IV and the part of
   ESP packet that is normally encrypted are included in the AAD.  For
   these transforms encryption capability provided by MGM is not used.
   The AAD is constructed similarly to the one in [RFC4543].


                          1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                               SPI                             |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                     32-bit Sequence Number                    |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

              Figure 4: AAD for AEAD transforms with 32-bit SN




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                          1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                               SPI                             |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                 64-bit Extended Sequence Number               |
     |                                                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

             Figure 5: AAD for AEAD transforms with 64-bit ESN


                          1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                               SPI                             |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                     32-bit Sequence Number                    |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                               IV                              |
     |                                                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                                                               |
     ~                     Payload Data (variable)                   ~
     |                                                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                    Padding (0-255 bytes)                      |
     +                               +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                               |  Pad Length   | Next Header   |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

      Figure 6: AAD for authentication only transforms with 32-bit SN



















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                          1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                               SPI                             |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                 64-bit Extended Sequence Number               |
     |                                                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                               IV                              |
     |                                                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                                                               |
     ~                     Payload Data (variable)                   ~
     |                                                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                    Padding (0-255 bytes)                      |
     +                               +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                               |  Pad Length   | Next Header   |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

      Figure 7: AAD for authentication only transforms with 64-bit ESN

4.7.2.  IKEv2 AAD

   For IKEv2 the AAD consists of the IKEv2 Header, any unencrypted
   payloads following it (if present) and the Encrypted (or the
   Encrypted Fragment) payload header.  The AAD is constructed similar
   to the one in [RFC5282].


                          1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     ~                         IKEv2 Header                          ~
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     ~                   Unencrypted IKE Payloads                    ~
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Next Payload  |C|  RESERVED   |         Payload Length        |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                          Figure 8: AAD for IKEv2










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4.8.  Using Transforms

   When SA is established the i1, i2 and i3 parameters are set to 0 by
   the sender and a leaf key is calculated.  The pnum parameter starts
   from 0 and is incremented with each message protected by the same
   leaf key.  When sender decides that the leaf should be changed, it
   increments i3 parameter and generates a new leaf key.  The pnum
   parameter for the new leaf key is reset to 0 and the process
   continues.  If the sender decides, that third-level key corresponding
   to i3 is used enough times, it increments i2, resets i3 to 0 and
   calculates a new leaf key.  The pnum is reset to 0 (as with every new
   leaf key) and the process continues.  Similar procedure is used when
   second-level key needs to be changed.

   A combination of i1, i2, i3 and pnum MUST NOT repeat for any
   particular SA.  This means that wrapping around of these counters is
   not allowed: when i2, i3 or pnum reach their maximum values, a
   procedure of changing a leaf key described above is executed, and if
   all four parameters reach their maximum values, the IPsec SA becomes
   unusable.

   There may be other reasons to recalculate leaf keys beside reaching
   maximum values for the counters.  For example, as described in
   Section 5, it is RECOMMENDED that the sender count the number of
   octets protected by a particular leaf key and generate a new key when
   some threshold is reached, and at the latest when reaching the octet
   limits stated in Section 5 for each of the ciphers.

   The receiver always uses i1, i2 and i3 from the received message.  If
   they differ from the values in previously received packets, a new
   leaf key is calculated.  The pnum parameter is always used from the
   received packet.  To improve performance implementations may cache
   recently used leaf key.  When a new leaf key is calculated (based on
   the values from received message) the old key may be kept for some
   time to improve performance in case of possible packet reordering
   (when packets protected by the old leaf key are delayed and arrive
   later).

5.  Security Considerations

   The most important security consideration for MGM is that the nonce
   MUST NOT repeat for a given key.  For this reason the transforms
   defined in this document MUST NOT be used with manual keying.

   Excessive use of the same key can give an attacker advantages in
   breaking security properties of the transforms defined in this
   document.  For this reason the amount of data any particular key is
   used to protect should be limited.  This is especially important for



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   algorithms with 64-bit block size (like "Magma"), which currently are
   generally considered insecure after protecting relatively small
   amount of data.  For example, Section 3.4 of [SP800-67] limits the
   number of blocks that are allowed to be encrypted with Triple DES
   cipher by 2^20 (8 Mbytes of data).  This document defines a rekeying
   mechanism that allows to mitigate a weak security of a 64-bit block
   cipher by frequent changing of encryption key.

   For transforms defined in this document, [GOST-ESP] recommends
   limiting the number of octets protected with a single Kmsg key by the
   following values:

   *  for transforms based on "Kuznyechik" cipher
      (ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE and ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE) -
      2^41 octets;

   *  for transforms based on "Magma" cipher (ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE and
      ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE) - 2^28 octets;

   These values are based on combinatorial properties and may be further
   restricted if side channels attacks are taken into considerations.
   Note that the limit for "Kuznyechik" based transforms is unreachable
   because due to transforms construction the number of protected
   messages is limited to 2^24 and each message (either IKEv2 message or
   ESP datagram) is limited to 2^16 octets in size, giving 2^40 octets
   as the maximum amount of data that can be protected with a single
   Kmsg.

   Section 4 of [RFC9058] discusses the possibility of truncating
   authentication tags in MGM as a trade-off between message expansion
   and the forgery probability.  This specification truncates an
   authentication tag length for "Kuznyechik" based transforms to 96
   bits.  This decreases message expansion still providing very low
   forgery probability of 2^-96.

   An attacker can send a lot of packets with arbitrary chosen i1, i2,
   and i3 parameters.  This will 1) force a recepient to recalculate the
   leaf key for every received packet if i1, i2, and i3 are different
   from the previous one, thus consuming CPU resources and 2) force a
   recepient to make verification attempts (that would fail) on a large
   amount of data, thus allowing the attacker for deeper analyzing of
   the underlying cryptographic primitive (see
   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits]).  Implementations MAY initiate ESP SA
   re-keying if they deem they receive too many packets with invalid
   ICV.

   Security properties of MGM are discussed in [MGM-SECURITY].




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6.  IANA Considerations

   IANA maintains a registry of "Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)
   Parameters" with a sub-registry of "Transform Type Values".  IANA has
   assigned four Transform IDs in the "Transform Type 1 - Encryption
   Algorithm Transform IDs" registry and is requested to update their
   references to this document (where RFCXXXX is this document):


   Number   Name                          ESP Reference  IKEv2 Reference
   ---------------------------------------------------------------------
    32    ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE       [RFCXXXX]       [RFCXXXX]
    33    ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE            [RFCXXXX]       [RFCXXXX]
    34    ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE   [RFCXXXX]      Not allowed
    35    ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE        [RFCXXXX]      Not allowed

7.  Acknowledgments

   Author wants to thank Adrian Farrel, Russ Housley, Yaron Sheffer and
   Stanislav Smyshlyaev for valuable input in the process of publication
   this document.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.

   [RFC7296]  Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
              Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
              (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.

   [RFC6986]  Dolmatov, V., Ed. and A. Degtyarev, "GOST R 34.11-2012:
              Hash Function", RFC 6986, DOI 10.17487/RFC6986, August
              2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6986>.




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   [RFC7801]  Dolmatov, V., Ed., "GOST R 34.12-2015: Block Cipher
              "Kuznyechik"", RFC 7801, DOI 10.17487/RFC7801, March 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7801>.

   [RFC8891]  Dolmatov, V., Ed. and D. Baryshkov, "GOST R 34.12-2015:
              Block Cipher "Magma"", RFC 8891, DOI 10.17487/RFC8891,
              September 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8891>.

   [RFC9058]  Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., Nozdrunov, V., Shishkin, V., and E.
              Griboedova, "Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM)", RFC 9058,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9058, June 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9058>.

   [RFC7836]  Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., Alekseev, E., Oshkin, I., Popov, V.,
              Leontiev, S., Podobaev, V., and D. Belyavsky, "Guidelines
              on the Cryptographic Algorithms to Accompany the Usage of
              Standards GOST R 34.10-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012",
              RFC 7836, DOI 10.17487/RFC7836, March 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7836>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [GOST3411-2012]
              Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology,
              "Information technology. Cryptographic Data Security.
              Hashing function", GOST R 34.11-2012, 2012.  (In Russian)

   [GOST3412-2015]
              Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology,
              "Information technology. Cryptographic data security.
              Block ciphers", GOST R 34.12-2015, 2015.  (In Russian)

   [GOST-MGM] Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology,
              "Information technology. Cryptographic data security.
              Authenticated encryption block cipher operation modes",
              R 1323565.1.026-2019, 2019.  (In Russian)

   [GOST-ESP] Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology,
              "Information technology. Cryptographic data security.
              Using Russian cryptographic algorithms in data security
              protocol ESP", R 1323565.1.035-2021, 2021.  (In Russian)

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.





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   [RFC4106]  Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode
              (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4106, DOI 10.17487/RFC4106, June 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4106>.

   [RFC4543]  McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "The Use of Galois Message
              Authentication Code (GMAC) in IPsec ESP and AH", RFC 4543,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4543, May 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4543>.

   [RFC5282]  Black, D. and D. McGrew, "Using Authenticated Encryption
              Algorithms with the Encrypted Payload of the Internet Key
              Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) Protocol", RFC 5282,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5282, August 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5282>.

   [RFC8645]  Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., "Re-keying Mechanisms for Symmetric
              Keys", RFC 8645, DOI 10.17487/RFC8645, August 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8645>.

   [MGM-SECURITY]
              Akhmetzyanova, L., Alekseev, E., Karpunin, G., and V.
              Nozdrunov, "Security of Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM)",
              2019, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/123.pdf>.

   [SP800-67] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
              "Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
              (TDEA) Block Cipher", November 2017,
              <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
              NIST.SP.800-67r2.pdf>.

   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits]
              G√ľnther, F., Thomson, M., and C. A. Wood, "Usage Limits on
              AEAD Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              irtf-cfrg-aead-limits-03, 12 July 2021,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-
              limits-03.txt>.

Appendix A.  Test Vectors

   In the following test vectors binary data is represented in
   hexadecimal format.  The numbers in square bracket indicate the size
   of the corresponding data in decimal format.

   1.  ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE, example 1:






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      transform key [44]:
          b6 18 0c 14 5c 51 2d bd 69 d9 ce a9 2c ac 1b 5c
          e1 bc fa 73 79 2d 61 af 0b 44 0d 84 b5 22 cc 38
          7b 67 e6 f2 44 f9 7f 06 78 95 2e 45
      K [32]:
          b6 18 0c 14 5c 51 2d bd 69 d9 ce a9 2c ac 1b 5c
          e1 bc fa 73 79 2d 61 af 0b 44 0d 84 b5 22 cc 38
      salt [12]:
          7b 67 e6 f2 44 f9 7f 06 78 95 2e 45
      i1 = 00, i2 = 0000, i3 = 0000, pnum = 000000
      K_msg [32]:
          2f f1 c9 0e de 78 6e 06 1e 17 b3 74 d7 82 af 7b
          d8 80 bd 52 7c 66 a2 ba dc 3e 56 9a ab 27 1d a4
      nonce [16]:
          00 00 00 00 7b 67 e6 f2 44 f9 7f 06 78 95 2e 45
      IV [8]:
          00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      AAD [8]:
          51 46 53 6b 00 00 00 01
      plaintext [64]:
          45 00 00 3c 23 35 00 00 7f 01 ee cc 0a 6f 0a c5
          0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 f3 5b 02 00 58 00 61 62 63 64
          65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
          75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
      ciphertext [64]:
          18 9d 12 88 b7 18 f9 ea be 55 4b 23 9b ee 65 96
          c6 d4 ea fd 31 64 96 ef 90 1c ac 31 60 05 aa 07
          62 97 b2 24 bf 6d 2b e3 5f d6 f6 7e 7b 9d eb 31
          85 ff e9 17 9c a9 bf 0b db af c2 3e ae 4d a5 6f
      ESP ICV [12]:
          50 b0 70 a1 5a 2b d9 73 86 89 f8 ed
      ESP packet [112]:
          45 00 00 70 00 4d 00 00 ff 32 91 4f 0a 6f 0a c5
          0a 6f 0a 1d 51 46 53 6b 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00
          00 00 00 00 18 9d 12 88 b7 18 f9 ea be 55 4b 23
          9b ee 65 96 c6 d4 ea fd 31 64 96 ef 90 1c ac 31
          60 05 aa 07 62 97 b2 24 bf 6d 2b e3 5f d6 f6 7e
          7b 9d eb 31 85 ff e9 17 9c a9 bf 0b db af c2 3e
          ae 4d a5 6f 50 b0 70 a1 5a 2b d9 73 86 89 f8 ed

   2.  ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE, example 2:










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      transform key [44]:
          b6 18 0c 14 5c 51 2d bd 69 d9 ce a9 2c ac 1b 5c
          e1 bc fa 73 79 2d 61 af 0b 44 0d 84 b5 22 cc 38
          7b 67 e6 f2 44 f9 7f 06 78 95 2e 45
      K [32]:
          b6 18 0c 14 5c 51 2d bd 69 d9 ce a9 2c ac 1b 5c
          e1 bc fa 73 79 2d 61 af 0b 44 0d 84 b5 22 cc 38
      salt [12]:
          7b 67 e6 f2 44 f9 7f 06 78 95 2e 45
      i1 = 00, i2 = 0001, i3 = 0001, pnum = 000000
      K_msg [32]:
          9a ba c6 57 78 18 0e 6f 2a f6 1f b8 d5 71 62 36
          66 c2 f5 13 0d 54 e2 11 6c 7d 53 0e 6e 7d 48 bc
      nonce [16]:
          00 00 00 00 7b 67 e6 f2 44 f9 7f 06 78 95 2e 45
      IV [8]:
          00 00 01 00 01 00 00 00
      AAD [8]:
          51 46 53 6b 00 00 00 10
      plaintext [64]:
          45 00 00 3c 23 48 00 00 7f 01 ee b9 0a 6f 0a c5
          0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 e4 5b 02 00 67 00 61 62 63 64
          65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
          75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
      ciphertext [64]:
          78 0a 2c 62 62 32 15 7b fe 01 76 32 f3 2d b4 d0
          a4 fa 61 2f 66 c2 bf 79 d5 e2 14 9b ac 1d fc 4b
          15 4b 69 03 4d c2 1d ef 20 90 6d 59 62 81 12 7c
          ff 72 56 ab f0 0b a1 22 bb 5e 6c 71 a4 d4 9a 4d
      ESP ICV [12]:
          c2 2f 87 40 83 8e 3d fa ce 91 cc b8
      ESP packet [112]:
          45 00 00 70 00 5c 00 00 ff 32 91 40 0a 6f 0a c5
          0a 6f 0a 1d 51 46 53 6b 00 00 00 10 00 00 01 00
          01 00 00 00 78 0a 2c 62 62 32 15 7b fe 01 76 32
          f3 2d b4 d0 a4 fa 61 2f 66 c2 bf 79 d5 e2 14 9b
          ac 1d fc 4b 15 4b 69 03 4d c2 1d ef 20 90 6d 59
          62 81 12 7c ff 72 56 ab f0 0b a1 22 bb 5e 6c 71
          a4 d4 9a 4d c2 2f 87 40 83 8e 3d fa ce 91 cc b8

   3.  ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE, example 1:










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      transform key [36]:
          5b 50 bf 33 78 87 02 38 f3 ca 74 0f d1 24 ba 6c
          22 83 ef 58 9b e6 f4 6a 89 4a a3 5d 5f 06 b2 03
          cf 36 63 12
      K [32]:
          5b 50 bf 33 78 87 02 38 f3 ca 74 0f d1 24 ba 6c
          22 83 ef 58 9b e6 f4 6a 89 4a a3 5d 5f 06 b2 03
      salt [4]:
          cf 36 63 12
      i1 = 00, i2 = 0000, i3 = 0000, pnum = 000000
      K_msg [32]:
          25 65 21 e2 70 b7 4a 16 4d fc 26 e6 bf 0c ca 76
          5e 9d 41 02 7d 4b 7b 19 76 2b 1c c9 01 dc de 7f
      nonce [8]:
          00 00 00 00 cf 36 63 12
      IV [8]:
          00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      AAD [8]:
          c8 c2 b2 8d 00 00 00 01
      plaintext [64]:
          45 00 00 3c 24 2d 00 00 7f 01 ed d4 0a 6f 0a c5
          0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 de 5b 02 00 6d 00 61 62 63 64
          65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
          75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
      ciphertext [64]:
          fa 08 40 33 2c 4f 3f c9 64 4d 8c 2c 4a 91 7e 0c
          d8 6f 8e 61 04 03 87 64 6b b9 df bd 91 50 3f 4a
          f5 d2 42 69 49 d3 5a 22 9e 1e 0e fc 99 ac ee 9e
          32 43 e2 3b a4 d1 1e 84 5c 91 a7 19 15 52 cc e8
      ESP ICV [8]:
          5f 4a fa 8b 02 94 0f 5c
      ESP packet [108]:
          45 00 00 6c 00 62 00 00 ff 32 91 3e 0a 6f 0a c5
          0a 6f 0a 1d c8 c2 b2 8d 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00
          00 00 00 00 fa 08 40 33 2c 4f 3f c9 64 4d 8c 2c
          4a 91 7e 0c d8 6f 8e 61 04 03 87 64 6b b9 df bd
          91 50 3f 4a f5 d2 42 69 49 d3 5a 22 9e 1e 0e fc
          99 ac ee 9e 32 43 e2 3b a4 d1 1e 84 5c 91 a7 19
          15 52 cc e8 5f 4a fa 8b 02 94 0f 5c

   4.  ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE, example 2:










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      transform key [36]:
          5b 50 bf 33 78 87 02 38 f3 ca 74 0f d1 24 ba 6c
          22 83 ef 58 9b e6 f4 6a 89 4a a3 5d 5f 06 b2 03
          cf 36 63 12
      K [32]:
          5b 50 bf 33 78 87 02 38 f3 ca 74 0f d1 24 ba 6c
          22 83 ef 58 9b e6 f4 6a 89 4a a3 5d 5f 06 b2 03
      salt [4]:
          cf 36 63 12
      i1 = 00, i2 = 0001, i3 = 0001, pnum = 000000
      K_msg [32]:
          20 e0 46 d4 09 83 9b 23 f0 66 a5 0a 7a 06 5b 4a
          39 24 4f 0e 29 ef 1e 6f 2e 5d 2e 13 55 f5 da 08
      nonce [8]:
          00 00 00 00 cf 36 63 12
      IV [8]:
          00 00 01 00 01 00 00 00
      AAD [8]:
          c8 c2 b2 8d 00 00 00 10
      plaintext [64]:
          45 00 00 3c 24 40 00 00 7f 01 ed c1 0a 6f 0a c5
          0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 cf 5b 02 00 7c 00 61 62 63 64
          65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
          75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
      ciphertext [64]:
          7a 71 48 41 a5 34 b7 58 93 6a 8e ab 26 91 40 a8
          25 a7 f3 5d b9 e4 37 1f e7 6c 99 9c 9b 88 db 72
          1d c7 59 f6 56 b5 b3 ea b6 b1 4d 6b d7 7a 07 1d
          4b 93 78 bd 08 97 6c 33 ed 9a 01 91 bf fe a1 dd
      ESP ICV [8]:
          dd 5d 50 9a fd b8 09 98
      ESP packet [108]:
          45 00 00 6c 00 71 00 00 ff 32 91 2f 0a 6f 0a c5
          0a 6f 0a 1d c8 c2 b2 8d 00 00 00 10 00 00 01 00
          01 00 00 00 7a 71 48 41 a5 34 b7 58 93 6a 8e ab
          26 91 40 a8 25 a7 f3 5d b9 e4 37 1f e7 6c 99 9c
          9b 88 db 72 1d c7 59 f6 56 b5 b3 ea b6 b1 4d 6b
          d7 7a 07 1d 4b 93 78 bd 08 97 6c 33 ed 9a 01 91
          bf fe a1 dd dd 5d 50 9a fd b8 09 98

   5.  ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE, example 1:










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      transform key [44]:
          98 bd 34 ce 3b e1 9a 34 65 e4 87 c0 06 48 83 f4
          88 cc 23 92 63 dc 32 04 91 9b 64 3f e7 57 b2 be
          6c 51 cb ac 93 c4 5b ea 99 62 79 1d
      K [32]:
          98 bd 34 ce 3b e1 9a 34 65 e4 87 c0 06 48 83 f4
          88 cc 23 92 63 dc 32 04 91 9b 64 3f e7 57 b2 be
      salt [12]:
          6c 51 cb ac 93 c4 5b ea 99 62 79 1d
      i1 = 00, i2 = 0000, i3 = 0000, pnum = 000000
      K_msg [32]:
          98 f1 03 01 81 0a 04 1c da dd e1 bd 85 a0 8f 21
          8b ac b5 7e 00 35 e2 22 c8 31 e3 e4 f0 a2 0c 8f
      nonce [16]:
          00 00 00 00 6c 51 cb ac 93 c4 5b ea 99 62 79 1d
      IV [8]:
          00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      AAD [80]:
          3d ac 92 6a 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
          45 00 00 3c 0c f1 00 00 7f 01 05 11 0a 6f 0a c5
          0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 48 5c 02 00 03 00 61 62 63 64
          65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
          75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
      plaintext [0]:
      ciphertext [0]:
      ESP ICV [12]:
          ca c5 8c e5 e8 8b 4b f3 2d 6c f0 4d
      ESP packet [112]:
          45 00 00 70 00 01 00 00 ff 32 91 9b 0a 6f 0a c5
          0a 6f 0a 1d 3d ac 92 6a 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00
          00 00 00 00 45 00 00 3c 0c f1 00 00 7f 01 05 11
          0a 6f 0a c5 0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 48 5c 02 00 03 00
          61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70
          71 72 73 74 75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
          01 02 02 04 ca c5 8c e5 e8 8b 4b f3 2d 6c f0 4d

   6.  ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE, example 2:














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      transform key [44]:
          98 bd 34 ce 3b e1 9a 34 65 e4 87 c0 06 48 83 f4
          88 cc 23 92 63 dc 32 04 91 9b 64 3f e7 57 b2 be
          6c 51 cb ac 93 c4 5b ea 99 62 79 1d
      K [32]:
          98 bd 34 ce 3b e1 9a 34 65 e4 87 c0 06 48 83 f4
          88 cc 23 92 63 dc 32 04 91 9b 64 3f e7 57 b2 be
      salt [12]:
          6c 51 cb ac 93 c4 5b ea 99 62 79 1d
      i1 = 00, i2 = 0000, i3 = 0001, pnum = 000000
      K_msg [32]:
          02 c5 41 87 7c c6 23 f3 f1 35 91 9a 75 13 b6 f8
          a8 a1 8c b2 63 99 86 2f 50 81 4f 52 91 01 67 84
      nonce [16]:
          00 00 00 00 6c 51 cb ac 93 c4 5b ea 99 62 79 1d
      IV [8]:
          00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
      AAD [80]:
          3d ac 92 6a 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
          45 00 00 3c 0c fb 00 00 7f 01 05 07 0a 6f 0a c5
          0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 43 5c 02 00 08 00 61 62 63 64
          65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
          75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
      plaintext [0]:
      ciphertext [0]:
      ESP ICV [12]:
          ba bc 67 ec 72 a8 c3 1a 89 b4 0e 91
      ESP packet [112]:
          45 00 00 70 00 06 00 00 ff 32 91 96 0a 6f 0a c5
          0a 6f 0a 1d 3d ac 92 6a 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 00
          01 00 00 00 45 00 00 3c 0c fb 00 00 7f 01 05 07
          0a 6f 0a c5 0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 43 5c 02 00 08 00
          61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70
          71 72 73 74 75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
          01 02 02 04 ba bc 67 ec 72 a8 c3 1a 89 b4 0e 91

   7.  ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE, example 1:














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      transform key [36]:
          d0 65 b5 30 fa 20 b8 24 c7 57 0c 1d 86 2a e3 39
          2c 1c 07 6d fa da 69 75 74 4a 07 a8 85 7d bd 30
          88 79 8f 29
      K [32]:
          d0 65 b5 30 fa 20 b8 24 c7 57 0c 1d 86 2a e3 39
          2c 1c 07 6d fa da 69 75 74 4a 07 a8 85 7d bd 30
      salt [4]:
          88 79 8f 29
      i1 = 00, i2 = 0000, i3 = 0000, pnum = 000000
      K_msg [32]:
          4c 61 45 99 a0 a0 67 f1 94 87 24 0a e1 00 e1 b7
          ea f2 3e da f8 7e 38 73 50 86 1c 68 3b a4 04 46
      nonce [8]:
          00 00 00 00 88 79 8f 29
      IV [8]:
          00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      AAD [80]:
          3e 40 69 9c 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
          45 00 00 3c 0e 08 00 00 7f 01 03 fa 0a 6f 0a c5
          0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 36 5c 02 00 15 00 61 62 63 64
          65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
          75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
      plaintext [0]:
      ciphertext [0]:
      ESP ICV [8]:
          4d d4 25 8a 25 35 95 df
      ESP packet [108]:
          45 00 00 6c 00 13 00 00 ff 32 91 8d 0a 6f 0a c5
          0a 6f 0a 1d 3e 40 69 9c 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00
          00 00 00 00 45 00 00 3c 0e 08 00 00 7f 01 03 fa
          0a 6f 0a c5 0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 36 5c 02 00 15 00
          61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70
          71 72 73 74 75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
          01 02 02 04 4d d4 25 8a 25 35 95 df

   8.  ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE, example 2:














Smyslov                  Expires 11 August 2022                [Page 23]


Internet-Draft         GOST ciphers in ESP & IKEv2         February 2022


      transform key [36]:
          d0 65 b5 30 fa 20 b8 24 c7 57 0c 1d 86 2a e3 39
          2c 1c 07 6d fa da 69 75 74 4a 07 a8 85 7d bd 30
          88 79 8f 29
      K [32]:
          d0 65 b5 30 fa 20 b8 24 c7 57 0c 1d 86 2a e3 39
          2c 1c 07 6d fa da 69 75 74 4a 07 a8 85 7d bd 30
      salt [4]:
          88 79 8f 29
      i1 = 00, i2 = 0000, i3 = 0001, pnum = 000000
      K_msg [32]:
          b4 f3 f9 0d c4 87 fa b8 c4 af d0 eb 45 49 f2 f0
          e4 36 32 b6 79 19 37 2e 1e 96 09 ea f0 b8 e2 28
      nonce [8]:
          00 00 00 00 88 79 8f 29
      IV [8]:
          00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
      AAD [80]:
          3e 40 69 9c 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
          45 00 00 3c 0e 13 00 00 7f 01 03 ef 0a 6f 0a c5
          0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 31 5c 02 00 1a 00 61 62 63 64
          65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
          75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
      plaintext [0]:
      ciphertext [0]:
      ESP ICV [8]:
          84 84 a9 23 30 a0 b1 96
      ESP packet [108]:
          45 00 00 6c 00 18 00 00 ff 32 91 88 0a 6f 0a c5
          0a 6f 0a 1d 3e 40 69 9c 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 00
          01 00 00 00 45 00 00 3c 0e 13 00 00 7f 01 03 ef
          0a 6f 0a c5 0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 31 5c 02 00 1a 00
          61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70
          71 72 73 74 75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
          01 02 02 04 84 84 a9 23 30 a0 b1 96

Author's Address

   Valery Smyslov
   ELVIS-PLUS
   PO Box 81
   Moscow (Zelenograd)
   124460
   Russian Federation

   Phone: +7 495 276 0211
   Email: svan@elvis.ru




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