INTERNET-DRAFT J. Solinas
Intended Status: Informational L. Zieglar
NSA
Expires December 2, 2009 June 2, 2009
Suite B Certificate and Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile
<draft-solinas-suiteb-cert-profile-03.txt>
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Abstract
This document specifies a base profile for X.509 v3 Certificates and
X.509 v2 Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) for use with the United
States National Security Agency's Suite B Cryptography. The reader is
assumed to have familiarity with RFC 5280, "Internet X.509 Public
Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile."
Table of Contents
1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Terminology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Requirements and Assumptions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Implementing Suite B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. Suite B Object Identifiers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Suite B Certificates and Certificate Extensions Profile . . . 4
4.1. signatureAlgorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. signatureValue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.3. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.4. SubjectPublicKeyInfo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.5. Certificate Extensions for Particular Types of
Certificates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.5.1. Suite B Self-Signed CA Certificates . . . . . . . . 7
4.5.2 Suite B Non-Self-Signed CA Certificates . . . . . . 7
4.5.3. Suite B End Entity Signature and Key Establishment.
Certificates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Suite B CRL and CRL Extensions Profile. . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1 Normative. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2 Informative. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
This document specifies a base profile for X.509 v3 Certificates and
X.509 v2 Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) for use by applications
that support the United States National Security Agency's Suite B
Cryptography.
The reader is assumed to have familiarity with [RFC5280]. This
Suite B Certificate and CRL Profile is a profile of RFC 5280.
All MUST-level requirements of RFC 5280 apply throughout this
profile and are generally not repeated here. In cases where a
MUST-level requirement is repeated for emphasis, the text notes
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the requirement is "in adherence with [RFC5280]." This profile
contains changes that elevate some MAY-level options in RFC 5280 to
SHOULD-level and MUST-level in this profile; this profile also
contains changes that elevate some SHOULD-level options in RFC 5280
to MUST-level for this profile. All options from RFC 5280 that are
not listed in this profile remain at the requirements level of
RFC 5280.
The reader is also assumed to have familiarity with [RFC5480],
which specifies the syntax and semantics for the Subject Public
Key Information field in certificates that support Elliptic Curve
Cryptography and [sha2-dsa-ecdsa] which specifies algorithm
identifiers for ECDSA.
2. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY" and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Requirements and Assumptions
The goal of this document is to define a base set of certificate and
CRL formats to support interoperability among Suite B solutions.
Specific communities, such as the US National Security Systems, may
define community profiles which further restrict certificate and CRL
formats by mandating the presence of extensions which are optional in
this base profile, defining new optional or critical extension types,
or restricting the values and/or presence of fields within existing
extensions. However, communications between distinct communities MUST
use the formats specified in this document when interoperability is
desired. (Applications may add additional non-critical extensions to
these formats but they MUST NOT assume that a remote peer will be able
to process them.)
3.1 Implementing Suite B
Every Suite B certificate MUST use the X.509 v3 format, and contain
either:
* An ECDSA capable signing key, using curve P-256 or P-384; or
* An ECDH capable key establishment key, using curve P-256 or
P-384.
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Every Suite B certificate and CRL MUST be signed using ECDSA. The
signing Certification Authority's (CA's) key MUST be on the curve P-256
or P-384 if the certificate contains a key on the curve P-256. If the
certificate contains a key on the curve P-384, the signing CA's key MUST
be on the curve P-384. Any certificate and CRL MUST be hashed using
SHA256 or SHA384, matched to the size of the signing CA's key.
3.2 Suite B Object Identifiers
The primary OID structure for Suite B is as follows per [X9.62],
[SEC2], [RFC5480], and [sha2-dsa-ecdsa].
ansi-X9-62 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 10045 }
certicom-arc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) }
id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
ansi-X9-62 keyType(2) 1 }
id-ecDh OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
certicom-arc schemes(1) ecdh(12) }
secp256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
ansi-X9-62 curves(3) prime(1) 7 }
secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
certicom-arc curve(0) 34 }
id-ecSigType OBJECT IDENTIFER ::= {
ansi X9-62 signatures(4) }
ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
id-ecSigType ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }
ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
id-ecSigType ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }
4. Suite B Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile
This Suite B certificate profile is a profile of [RFC5280].
The changes in the requirements from RFC 5280 are listed here.
Note that RFC 5280 has varying mandates for marking extensions as
critical or non-critical. This profile changes some of those
mandates for extensions that are included in Suite B certificates.
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4.1. signatureAlgorithm
The two algorithm identifiers used by Suite B are:
1.2.840.10045.4.3.2 for ecdsa-with-SHA256 and
1.2.840.10045.4.3.3 for ecdsa-with-SHA384, as described in
[X9.62] and [sha2-dsa-ecdsa].
The parameters MUST be absent as per [sha2-dsa-ecdsa].
4.2. signatureValue
ECDSA digital signature generation is described in [X9.62]. An ECDSA
signature value is comprised of two unsigned integers, denoted as r
and s. r and s MUST be represented as ASN.1 INTEGERs. If the high
order bit of the unsigned integer is a 1, an octet with the value
0x00 MUST be prepended to the binary representation before encoding
it as an ASN.1 INTEGER. Unsigned integers for the P-256 and P-384
curves can be a maximum of 32 and 48 bytes, respectively. Therefore,
converting each r and s to an ASN.1 INTEGER will result in a maximum of
33 bytes for the P-256 curve and 49 bytes for the P-384 curve.
The ECDSA signatureValue in an X.509 certificate is encoded as a BIT
STRING value of a DER encoded SEQUENCE of the two INTEGERS. For
example, in a signature using P-256 and hex notation:
r= 52e3f7b7 27fba9e8 eddb1d08 3b75c188
2517e6dc 63ded9c0 524f8f9a 45dc8661
s= b8930438 de8d33bd ab12c3a2 bdad9795
92a1fd65 76d1734c 3eb0af34 0456aef4
r represented as a DER encoded INTEGER:
022052e3 f7b727fb a9e8eddb 1d083b75
c1882517 e6dc63de d9c0524f 8f9a45dc
8661
s represented as a DER encoded INTEGER:
022100b8 930438de 8d33bdab 12c3a2bd
ad979592 a1fd6576 d1734c3e b0af3404
56aef4
Representation of SEQUENCE of r and s:
30450220 52e3f7b7 27fba9e8 eddb1d08
3b75c188 2517e6dc 63ded9c0 524f8f9a
45dc8661 022100b8 930438de 8d33bdab
12c3a2bd ad979592 a1fd6576 d1734c3e
b0af3404 56aef4
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Representation of resulting signatureValue:
03480030 45022052 e3f7b727 fba9e8ed
db1d083b 75c18825 17e6dc63 ded9c052
4f8f9a45 dc866102 2100b893 0438de8d
33bdab12 c3a2bdad 979592a1 fd6576d1
734c3eb0 af340456 aef4
4.3. Version
For this profile, Version MUST be 3, which means the value MUST be
set to 2.
4.4. SubjectPublicKeyInfo
For ECDSA signing keys, the algorithm ID, id-ecPublicKey, MUST be
used. For ECDH key establishment keys, either the algorithm ID,
id-ecPublicKey, or the algorithm ID, id-ecDh, MAY be used, as
described in [RFC5480]. However, for interoperability
purposes all relying parties MUST be prepared to process the
algorithm ID id-ecPublicKey.
The parameters of the AlgorithmIdentifier in this field MUST use
the namedCurve option. The specifiedCurve and implicitCurve options
described in [RFC5480] MUST NOT be used. The namedCurve
MUST be either the OID for secp256r1 (curve P-256) or secp384r1
(curve P-384) [RFC5480].
The elliptic curve public key, ECPoint, SHALL be the OCTET STRING
representation of an elliptic curve point following the conversion
routine in section 2.3.5 of [RFC3279] and section 4.3.6 of [X9.63].
Suite B implementations MAY use either the uncompressed form or the
compressed form of the elliptic curve point [RFC5480]. For
interoperability purposes, all relying parties MUST be prepared to
process the uncompressed form.
The elliptic curve public key (an ECPoint which is an OCTET STRING)
is mapped to a subjectPublicKey (a BIT STRING) as follows: the most
significant bit of the OCTET STRING becomes the most significant bit
of the BIT STRING and the least significant bit of the OCTET STRING
becomes the least significant bit of the BIT STRING [RFC3279].
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An octet string representation of a P-256 uncompressed elliptic curve
point:
046cc93a 2cdb0308 47fa0734 2bc8e130
4c77f04f 63557372 43f3a5d7 f51baa82
23d21ebf b87d9944 f7ec170d 64f9924e
9ce20e4d 361c2db5 f1d52257 4259edad
5e
A DER encoded bit string representation of the subject public key:
03420004 6cc93a2c db030847 fa07342b
c8e1304c 77f04f63 55737243 f3a5d7f5
1baa8223 d21ebfb8 7d9944f7 ec170d64
f9924e9c e20e4d36 1c2db5f1 d5225742
59edad5e
A DER encoded representation of the AlgorithmIdentifier:
30130607 2a8648ce 3d020106 082a8648
ce3d0301 07
A DER encoded representation of the subjectPublicKeyInfo using the
P-256 curve:
30593013 06072a86 48ce3d02 0106082a
8648ce3d 03010703 4200046c c93a2cdb
030847fa 07342bc8 e1304c77 f04f6355
737243f3 a5d7f51b aa8223d2 1ebfb87d
9944f7ec 170d64f9 924e9ce2 0e4d361c
2db5f1d5 22574259 edad5e
4.5. Certificate Extensions for Particular Types of Certificates
Different types of certificates in this profile have different
required and recommended extensions. Those are listed in this
section. Those extensions from RFC 5280 not explicitly listed
in this profile remain at the requirement levels of RFC 5280.
4.5.1. Suite B Self-Signed CA Certificates
In adherence with [RFC5280], self-signed CA certificates in this
profile MUST contain the subjectKeyIdentifier, keyUsage, and
basicConstraints extensions.
The keyUsage extension MUST be marked as critical. The keyCertSign
and cRLSign bits MUST be set. The digitalSignature and
nonRepudiation bits MAY be set. All other bits MUST NOT be set.
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In adherence with [RFC5280], the basicConstraints extension MUST be
marked as critical. The cA boolean MUST be set to indicate that the
subject is a CA and the pathLenConstraint MUST NOT be present.
4.5.2. Suite B Non-Self-Signed CA Certificates
Non-self-signed CA Certificates in this profile MUST contain the
authorityKeyIdentifier, subjectKeyIdentifier, keyUsage,
basicConstraints and certificatePolicies extensions.
The keyUsage extension MUST be marked as critical. The keyCertSign
and CRLSign bits MUST be set. The digitalSignature and
nonRepudiation bits MAY be set. All other bits MUST NOT be set.
In adherence with [5280], the basicConstraints extension MUST be
marked as critical. The cA boolean MUST be set to indicate that the
subject is a CA and the pathLenConstraint subfield is OPTIONAL.
The certificatePolicies extension MUST be marked as non-critical,
MUST contain the OIDs for the applicable certificate policies and
SHOULD NOT use the policyQualifiers option; the "anyPolicy" policy
MAY be used.
Relying party applications conforming to this profile MUST be
prepared to process the policyMappings, policyConstraints and
inhibitAnyPolicy extensions, regardless of criticality, following
the guidance in [RFC5280] when they appear in non-self-signed CA
certificates.
4.5.3. Suite B End Entity Signature and Key Establishment Certificates
In adherence with [RFC5280], end entity certificates in this profile
MUST contain the authorityKeyIdentifier, keyUsage and
certificatePolicies extensions. End entity certificates SHOULD
contain the subjectKeyIdentifier extension.
The keyUsage extension MUST be marked as critical.
For end entity digital signature certificates, the keyUsage extension
MUST be set for digitalSignature. The nonRepudiation bit MAY be set.
All other bits in the keyUsage extension MUST NOT be set.
For end entity key establishment certificates, the keyUsage extension
MUST BE set for keyAgreement. The encipherOnly or decipherOnly bit
MAY be set. All other bits in the keyUsage extension MUST NOT be
set.
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The certificatePolicies extension MUST be marked as non-critical,
MUST contain the OIDs for the applicable certificate policies and
SHOULD NOT use the policyQualifiers option; the "anyPolicy" policy
MAY be used.
5. Suite B CRL and CRL Extensions Profile
This Suite B CRL profile is a profile of [RFC5280]. The changes in
the requirements from [RFC5280] are listed here.
The signatures on CRLs in this profile follow the same rules from
this profile that apply to signatures in the certificates.
6. Security Considerations
The security considerations in [RFC5280], [RFC5480],
and [sha2-dsa-ecdsa] apply.
A single key pair SHOULD NOT be used for both signature and key
establishment per [SP-800-57].
The Suite B algorithms provide significantly improved performance
when compared to equivalent-strength cryptography that does not
employ elliptic curve cryptography. Where performance has previously
been an impediment, use of Suite B may permit employment of PKI-based
cryptographic security mechanisms.
7. IANA Considerations
This document makes extensive use of object identifiers to register
public key types, elliptic curves, and algorithms. Most of them are
registered in the ANSI X9.62 arc with the exception of some of the
curves, which are in the Certicom, Inc. arc (these curves have been
adopted by ANSI and NIST). Extensions in certificates and CRLs are
identified using the object identifiers defined in an arc delegated
by IANA to the PKIX working group. No further action by IANA is
necessary for this document or any anticipated updates.
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8. References
8.1 Normative
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, March 1997.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S. Farrell., S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., Polk, W., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile",
May 2008.
8.2 Informative
[sha2-dsa-ecdsa] Dang, Q., Moriarty, K., Brown, D., Polk, T.,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithms
and Identifiers for DSA and ECDSA",
draft-ietf-pkix-sha2-dsa-ecdsa-06.txt., work-in-progress, March
2009.
[RFC3279] Polk, W., Housley, R., Bassham, L., "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile",
April 2002.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., Polk, T.,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information",
March 2009.
[SEC2] Standards for Efficient Cryptography, "SEC 2: Recommended
Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters", September 2000.
[SP-800-57] Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr, W., Polk, W. Smid, M.,
"NIST SP-800-57:Recommendation for Key Management-Part 1:
General", March 2007.
[X9.62] ANS X9.62, "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
Services Industry; The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)", December 2005.
[X9.63] ANS X9.63, "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
Services Industry; Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic
Curve Cryptography", December 2001.
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Author's Address
Solinas, J.
National Information Assurance Research Laboratory
National Security Agency
Email: jasolin@orion.ncsc.mil
Zieglar, L.
National Information Assurance Research Laboratory
National Security Agency
Email: llziegl@tycho.ncsc.mil
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