L. Law, NSA
INTERNET-DRAFT J. Solinas, NSA
Expires July 10, 2007 January 10, 2007
Suite B Cryptographic Suites for IPsec
<draft-solinas-ui-suites-01.txt>
{{{ RFC Editor: Please replace every occurrence of "RFC xxxx" and
"[RFCxxxx]" with the RFC number that is assigned to
draft-kelly-ipsec-ciph-sha2 once it is approved and published. }}}
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Abstract
This document proposes four optional cryptographic user interface
suites ("UI suites") for IPsec similar to the two suites specified
in RFC 4308. The four new suites provide compatibility with the
United States National Security Agency's Suite B specifications.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Terminology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. New UI Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3.1 Suite "Suite-B-GCM-128" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3.2 Suite "Suite-B-GCM-256" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.3 Suite "Suite-B-GMAC-128". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.4 Suite "Suite-B-GMAC-256". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1 Normative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.2. Informative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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1. Introduction
RFC 4308 proposes two optional cryptographic user interface suites
("UI suites") for IPsec. The two suites, VPN-A and VPN-B, represent
commonly used present-day corporate VPN security choices and
anticipated future choices, respectively. This document proposes
four new UI suites based on implementations of the United States
National Security Agency's Suite B algorithms (see [SuiteB]).
As with the VPN suites, the Suite B suites are simply collections of
values for some options in IPsec. Use of UI suites does not change
the IPsec protocols in any way.
2. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY"
in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. New UI Suites
Each of the following UI suites provides choices for ESP (see
[RFC4303]) and for IKEv1 and IKEv2 (see [RFC2409] and [RFC4306]).
The four suites are differentiated by the choice of cryptographic
algorithm strengths and a choice of whether ESP is to provide both
confidentiality and integrity or integrity only. The suite names
are based on the AES mode and AES key length specified for ESP.
IPsec implementations that use these UI suites SHOULD use the suite
names listed here. IPsec implementations SHOULD NOT use names
different than those listed here for the suites that are described,
and MUST NOT use the names listed here for suites that do not match
these values. These requirements are necessary for interoperability.
3.1 Suite "Suite-B-GCM-128"
This suite provides ESP integrity protection and confidentiality
using 128-bit AES-GCM (see [RFC4106]). This suite or the following
suite should be used when ESP integrity protection and encryption
are both needed.
ESP:
Encryption AES with 128-bit keys and 16 octet ICV in GCM mode
[RFC4106]
Integrity NULL
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IKEv1:
Encryption AES with 128-bit keys in CBC mode
[RFC3602]
Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-256 [RFCxxxx]
Hash SHA-256 [FIPS-180-2]
Diffie-Hellman group 256-bit random ECP group [RFC4753]
Group Type ECP
For IKEv1, Phase 1 SHOULD use Main mode. IKEv1 implementations MUST
support pre-shared key authentication [RFC2409] for
interoperability. The authentication method used with IKEv1 MAY be
either pre-shared key [RFC2409] or ECDSA-256 [RFC4754].
IKEv2:
Encryption AES with 128-bit keys in CBC mode
[RFC3602]
Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-256 [RFCxxxx]
Integrity HMAC-SHA-256-128 [RFCxxxx]
Diffie-Hellman group 256-bit random ECP group [RFC4753]
Authentication ECDSA-256 [RFC4754]
Rekeying of Phase 2 (for IKEv1) or the CREATE_CHILD_SA (for IKEv2)
MUST be supported by both parties in this suite.
3.2 Suite "Suite-B-GCM-256"
This suite provides ESP integrity protection and confidentiality
using 256-bit AES-GCM (see [RFC4106]). This suite or the preceding
suite should be used when ESP integrity protection and encryption
are both needed.
ESP:
Encryption AES with 256-bit keys and 16 octet ICV in GCM mode
[RFC4106]
Integrity NULL
IKEv1:
Encryption AES with 256-bit keys in CBC mode
[RFC3602]
Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-384 [RFCxxxx]
Hash SHA-384 [FIPS-180-2]
Diffie-Hellman group 384-bit random ECP group [RFC4753]
Group Type ECP
For IKEv1, Phase 1 SHOULD use Main mode. IKEv1 implementations MUST
support pre-shared key authentication [RFC2409] for
interoperability. The authentication method used with IKEv1 MAY be
either pre-shared key [RFC2409] or ECDSA-384 [RFC4754].
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IKEv2:
Encryption AES with 256-bit keys in CBC mode
[RFC3602]
Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-384 [RFCxxxx]
Integrity HMAC-SHA-384-192 [RFCxxxx]
Diffie-Hellman group 384-bit random ECP group [RFC4753]
Authentication ECDSA-384 [RFC4754]
Rekeying of Phase 2 (for IKEv1) or the CREATE_CHILD_SA (for IKEv2)
MUST be supported by both parties in this suite.
3.3 Suite "Suite-B-GMAC-128"
This suite provides ESP integrity protection using 128-bit AES-GMAC
(see [RFC4543]) but does not provide confidentiality. This suite
or the following suite should be used only when there is no need for
ESP encryption.
ESP:
Encryption NULL
Integrity AES with 128-bit keys in GMAC mode [RFC4543]
IKEv1:
Encryption AES with 128-bit keys in CBC mode
[RFC3602]
Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-256 [RFCxxxx]
Hash SHA-256 [FIPS-180-2]
Diffie-Hellman group 256-bit random ECP group [RFC4753]
Group Type ECP
For IKEv1, Phase 1 SHOULD use Main mode. IKEv1 implementations MUST
support pre-shared key authentication [RFC2409] for
interoperability. The authentication method used with IKEv1 MAY be
either pre-shared key [RFC2409] or ECDSA-256 [RFC4754].
IKEv2:
Encryption AES with 128-bit keys in CBC mode
[RFC3602]
Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-256 [RFCxxxx]
Integrity HMAC-SHA-256-128 [RFCxxxx]
Diffie-Hellman group 256-bit random ECP group [RFC4753]
Authentication ECDSA-256 [RFC4754]
Rekeying of Phase 2 (for IKEv1) or the CREATE_CHILD_SA (for IKEv2)
MUST be supported by both parties in this suite.
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3.4 Suite "Suite-B-GMAC-256"
This suite provides ESP integrity protection using 256-bit AES-GMAC
(see [RFC4543]) but does not provide confidentiality. This suite
or the preceding suite should be used only when there is no need for
ESP encryption.
ESP:
Encryption NULL
Integrity AES with 256-bit keys in GMAC mode [RFC4543]
IKEv1:
Encryption AES with 256-bit keys in CBC mode
[RFC3602]
Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-384 [RFCxxxx]
Hash SHA-384 [FIPS-180-2]
Diffie-Hellman group 384-bit random ECP group [RFC4753]
Group Type ECP
For IKEv1, Phase 1 SHOULD use Main mode. IKEv1 implementations MUST
support pre-shared key authentication [RFC2409] for
interoperability. The authentication method used with IKEv1 MAY be
either pre-shared key [RFC2409] or ECDSA-384 [RFC4754].
IKEv2:
Encryption AES with 256-bit keys in CBC mode
[RFC3602]
Pseudo-random function HMAC-SHA-384 [RFCxxxx]
Integrity HMAC-SHA-384-192 [RFCxxxx]
Diffie-Hellman group 384-bit random ECP group [RFC4753]
Authentication ECDSA-384 [RFC4754]
Rekeying of Phase 2 (for IKEv1) or the CREATE_CHILD_SA (for IKEv2)
MUST be supported by both parties in this suite.
4. Security Considerations
This document inherits all of the security considerations of the
IPsec, IKEv1, and IKEv2 documents. See [CNSSP-15] for guidance on
the use of AES in these suites for the protection of U.S. Government
information.
Some of the security options specified in these suites may be found
in the future to have properties significantly weaker than those that
were believed at the time this document was produced.
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5. IANA Considerations
IANA has created and will maintain a registry called, "Cryptographic
Suites for IKEv1, IKEv2, and IPsec" (see [IANA-Suites]). The
registry consists of a text string and an RFC number that lists the
associated transforms. The four new suites in this document should
be added to this registry after RFC publication and approval by an
expert designated by the IESG.
The new values for the registry are:
Identifier Defined in
Suite-B-GCM-128 RFC draft-solinas-ui-suites-00.txt
Suite-B-GCM-256 RFC draft-solinas-ui-suites-00.txt
Suite-B-GMAC-128 RFC draft-solinas-ui-suites-00.txt
Suite-B-GMAC-256 RFC draft-solinas-ui-suites-00.txt
6. References
6.1 Normative
[FIPS-180-2] FIPS 180-2 with change notice, "Secure Hash Standard",
National Institute of Standards and Technology, February 2004.
[IANA-Suites] Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, "Cryptographic
Suites for IKEv1, IKEv2, and IPsec", January 5, 2006.
(http://www.iana.org/assignments/crypto-suites)
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2409] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
(IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.
[RFC3602] Frankel, S., Glenn, R., and S. Kelly, "The AES-CBC Cipher
Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec", RFC 3602, September 2003.
[RFC4106] Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 4106,
June 2005.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, December 2005.
[RFC4306] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
RFC 4306, December 2005.
[RFC4308] Hoffman, P., "Cryptographic Suites for IPsec", RFC 4308,
December 2005.
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[RFC4543] McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "The Use of Galois Message
Authentication Code (GMAC) in IPsec ESP and AH", RFC 4543, May
2006.
[RFC4753] Fu, D. and J. Solinas, "ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2",
RFC 4753, November 2006.
[RFC4754] Fu, D. and J. Solinas, "IKE and IKEv2 Authentication Using
ECDSA", RFC 4754, November 2006.
[RFCxxxx] Kelly, S., and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 With IPsec", RFC xxxx, 2007.
6.2 Informative
[AES] U.S. Department of Commerce/National Institute of Standards
and Technology, "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197,
November 2001. (http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/index.html)
[CNSSP-15] Committee on National Security Systems, "National Policy on
the Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to Protect
National Security Systems and National Security Information", June
2003. (http://www.cnss.gov/Assets/pdf/cnssp_15_fs.pdf)
[IANA-IKEv1] Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Internet Key
Exchange (IKE) Attributes, 5 Jun 2006.
(http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipsec-registry)
[IANA-IKEv2] Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, IKEv2 Parameters, 26
September 2006.
(http://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters)
[RFC4634] D. Eastlake 3rd and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and HMAC-SHA)", RFC 4634, July 2006.
[SuiteB] U.S. National Security Agency, "Fact Sheet NSA Suite B
Cryptography", July 2005.
(http://www.nsa.gov/ia/industry/crypto_Suite_b.cfm?MenuID=10.2.7)
Authors' Addresses
Laurie E. Law
National Information Assurance Research Laboratory
National Security Agency
EMail: lelaw@orion.ncsc.mil
Jerome A. Solinas
National Information Assurance Research Laboratory
National Security Agency
EMail: jasolin@orion.ncsc.mil
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Expires July 10, 2007
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