ATR: Additional Truncated Response for Large DNS Response
draft-song-atr-large-resp-00

Versions: 00                                                            
Internet Engineering Task Force                                  L. Song
Internet-Draft                                Beijing Internet Institute
Intended status: Informational                        September 10, 2017
Expires: March 14, 2018


       ATR: Additional Truncated Response for Large DNS Response
                      draft-song-atr-large-resp-00

Abstract

   As the increasing use of DNSSEC and IPv6, there are more public
   evidence and concerns on IPv6 fragmentation issues due to larger DNS
   payloads over IPv6.  This memo introduces an simple improvement on
   authoritative server by replying additional truncated response just
   after the normal large response.

   REMOVE BEFORE PUBLICATION: The source of the document with test
   script is currently placed at GitHub [ATR-Github].  Comments and pull
   request are welcome.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 14, 2018.

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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  EDNS0 and DNS TCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  The ATR mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Author's Commnets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   Large DNS response is identified as a issue for a long time.  It has
   been regarded mainly as a issue or limitation on authoritative server
   (delegation) as [I-D.ietf-dnsop-respsize] introduced.  As the
   increasing use of DNSSEC and IPv6, there are more public evidence and
   concerns on resolver's suffering due to packets dropping caused by
   IPv6 fragmentation in DNS.

   It is observed that some IPv6 network devices like firewalls
   intentionally choose to drop the IPv6 packets with fragmentation
   Headers[I-D.taylor-v6ops-fragdrop].  [RFC7872] reported more than 30%
   drop rates for sending fragmented packets.  Regarding IPv6
   fragmentation issue due to larger DNS payloads in response, one
   measurement [IPv6-frag-DNS] reported 37% of endpoints using
   IPv6-capable DNS resolver can not receive a fragmented IPv6 response
   over UDP.

   Some workarounds and short-term solutions are proposed.  One is to
   continue to keep the response within a safe boundary, 512 octets for
   IPv4 and 1232 octets for IPv6 (IPv6 MTU minus IPv6 header and UDP
   header).  It avoids fragmentation, but it requires TCP and UDP
   applications to fit this limitation explicitly.  Currently
   coordination between IP layer and upper layer still do not go well.
   For example the draft [I-D.andrews-tcp-and-ipv6-use-minmtu] viewed it
   as a problem that TCP fails to respect IPV6_USE_MIN_MTU.

   Still, some cases are hard to avoid, for example the coming KSK
   rollover which will produce 1424 octets DNS response containing the
   new key and signature.  To encounter this problem, some root servers
   (A, B, G and J) implemented countermeasures by truncating the



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   response once the large IPv6 packet surpasses 1280 octets
   [root-stars].  But it is reported that 17% resolvers is not capable
   to send query via TCP [IPv6-frag-DNS] (It is also possbile that the
   middle boxes drop the tcp queries).  It becomes a dilemma to choose
   hurting the users who can not receive fragmentation or users without
   TCP capacity.

   To relieve the dilemma in short term, this memo introduces an small
   improvement on DNS responding process by replying Additional
   Truncated Response (ATR) just after the normal response.  The
   original design of ENDS0 and Truncation mechanism for Large response
   are orthogonal.  ATR intends to decouple the two.  In ATR EDNS0 and
   TCP fall-back can work independently according to Authoritative
   server's requirement.

   ATR targets to relieve the hurt of resolver (both stub and recursive
   resolver) from the position of server (both authoritative and
   recursive server).  It does not require any changes on resolver and
   has a deploy-and-gain feature to encourage operators to implement it
   to benefit their resolvers.

   ATR can be also used as a measurement tool for those operators who
   would like to know how much and which resolvers can not receive IPv6
   fragmented response.  They can turn on the ATR function occasionally
   and record the TCP connection it received during the period.  The
   data may be helpful to do some fine-grained analysis between
   different NS servers and provide ATR to specific group of resolvers.

   Note that the methodology of ATR can be extended to support other
   transport protocol like DNS over HTTP(s), DNS over QUIC, if they
   become one optional transport for DNS.

2.  EDNS0 and DNS TCP

   DNS has an inherent mechanism defined in [RFC1035] to handle large
   DNS response by indicating (set TrunCation bit) the resolver to fall
   back to query via TCP.  However, due to the fear of cost of TCP, TCP
   fall-back in DNS was in negative position from the very beginning of
   DNS.  people had to seek another way to handle large DNS response.

   EDNS(0) [RFC2671] was introduced as a cure for the issue of large DNS
   response and TCP fall back firstly in 1999 and obsoleted by [RFC6891]
   in 2013.  The basic idea of EDNS(0) is to introduce a channel for
   resolver and authoritative server to negotiate an appropriate DNS
   payload size in end-to-end approach.

   The intention of EDNS(0) is to avoid TCP fall back.  So the use of
   EDNS(0) make TCP fall-back rare, which in turn gives people a wrong



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   implication that EDNS(0) is more advanced than DNS TCP and DNS TCP is
   not necessary if EDNS(0) is already supported for both resolver and
   authoritative server.  Plus the fear of "poor" TCP performance, DNS
   TCP function is stripped even for modern DNS implementations.  An
   measurement study [Not-speak-TCP]showed that about 17% of resolvers
   in the samples can not ask a query in TCP when they receive truncated
   response.

   Ironically today when TCP is recalled as a solutions to large DNS
   response, the installed base of resolver without TCP function (or the
   middle box stops DNS TCP connections) become a real issue which
   should be consider.

3.  The ATR mechanism

   The ATR mechanism is very simple that it involves a ATR module in the
   responding process of current DNS implementation . As show in the
   following diagram the ATR module is right after truncation loop if
   the packet is not going to be fragmented.



   A DNS query +-------------+        +-------------+
               |             | No     |             |  Normal response
        +------>  Truncation +-------->     ATR     +------------->
               |    loop     |        |    Module   |
               | truncation? |        | truncation? |
               +-------------+        +-------------+
                   yes|                   yes|         +-----+
                      |                      +---------+timer+---->
                      |                                +-----+
                      |                          Truncated Response
                      +---------------------------->
                       Truncated Response



                  Figure 1: High-Level Testbed Components

   The ATR responding process goes as follows:

   o  1) When an authoritative server receives a query and enters the
      responding process, it first go through the normal truncation loop
      to see whether the size of response surpasses the EDNS0 payload
      size.  If yes, it ends up with responding a truncated packets.  If
      no, it enters the ATR module.





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   o  2) In ATR module, similar like truncation loop, the size of
      response is compared with a fixed size.  If the response of a
      query is larger than a certain value, 1220 octets for example, the
      server firstly sends the normal response and then coin a truncated
      response with the same ID of the query.

   o  3) The server can send the coined truncated response in not time.
      But considering the possibility of network reordering, it is
      suggested a timer to delay the second truncated response to around
      10 millisecond which can be configured by local operation.

   There are three cases when ATR are deployed in the authoritative
   sever:

   o  Case 1: A resolver (or sub-resolver) will receive both the large
      response and a very small truncated response in sequence.  It will
      happily accepts the first response and drop the second one because
      the transaction is over.

   o  Case 2: In case a fragment is dropped in the middle, the resolver
      will end up with only receiving the small truncated response.  It
      will retry using TCP in no time.

   o  Case 3: For those (probably 30%*17% of them) who can not speak TCP
      and sitting behind a firewall stubbornly dropping fragments.  Just
      say good luck to them!

   Especially regarding the coming KSK rollover, if the root server
   implements ATR rather than setting IPv6-edns-size to 1220 octets, it
   would be helpful for resolver without TCP capacity, because it still
   has a fair chance to receive the large response.

   As to case 2, there is one performance consideration on resolver
   side.  It is about how resolver react to ATR when it receives only
   the truncated response.  They can choose TCP right away or wait other
   NS servers to respond.  Normally the fragments are dropped in the
   ASes along the path.  A different NS server with different path may
   avoid "bad" ASes.  But in the extreme case, implementation may first
   try UDP queries with all NS servers, but all fail due to the dropped
   fragments.  It may end up with "no servers could be reached" or
   revert automatically to TCP which also introduce delay.  So if
   allowed by local policy, a diligent resolver can also emit queries
   via both channels.








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4.  Security Considerations

   There may be concerns on DDoS attack problem due to the fact that the
   ATR introduces multiple responses from authoritative server.  DNS
   cookies [RFC7873] and RRL on authoritative may be possible solutions

5.  Author's Commnets

   REMOVE BEFORE PUBLICATION:

   When drafting this proposal,there is a question in author's mind
   about the benefit of ATR which may be too trivial to implement.
   Resolver can retire many times(12 times for root) to other NS servers
   if one path to particular server failed.  The performance comparison
   between retries with other NS server and ATR is hard to measure.  But
   it is still valuable in two cases:

   1) For those server (like root) implemented or plan to implement
   "always-truncation" for large packets, they can benefit from not
   doing unnecessary TCP fall back.

   2) For those area or countries where only one or two NS servers
   instance are deployed (root in China for example), stick to the local
   root server (with around 10ms latency for UDP and roughly around 30ms
   for TCP) is better than select another NS server far away (with
   around 200ms latency)

6.  IANA considerations

   No IANA registration work is required for the time being

7.  Acknowledgments

8.  References

   [ATR-Github]
              "XML source file and test script of DNS ATR", September
              2017, <https://github.com/songlinjian/DNS_ATR>.

   [I-D.andrews-tcp-and-ipv6-use-minmtu]
              Andrews, M., "TCP Fails To Respect IPV6_USE_MIN_MTU",
              draft-andrews-tcp-and-ipv6-use-minmtu-04 (work in
              progress), October 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-dnsop-respsize]
              Vixie, P., Kato, A., and J. Abley, "DNS Referral Response
              Size Issues", draft-ietf-dnsop-respsize-15 (work in
              progress), February 2014.



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   [I-D.taylor-v6ops-fragdrop]
              Jaeggli, J., Colitti, L., Kumari, W., Vyncke, E., Kaeo,
              M., and T. Taylor, "Why Operators Filter Fragments and
              What It Implies", draft-taylor-v6ops-fragdrop-02 (work in
              progress), December 2013.

   [IPv6-frag-DNS]
              "Dealing with IPv6 fragmentation in the DNS", August 2017,
              <https://blog.apnic.net/2017/08/22/
              dealing-ipv6-fragmentation-dns>.

   [Not-speak-TCP]
              "A Question of DNS Protocols", August 2013,
              <https://labs.ripe.net/Members/gih/
              a-question-of-dns-protocols>.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

   [RFC2671]  Vixie, P., "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)",
              RFC 2671, DOI 10.17487/RFC2671, August 1999,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2671>.

   [RFC6891]  Damas, J., Graff, M., and P. Vixie, "Extension Mechanisms
              for DNS (EDNS(0))", STD 75, RFC 6891,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6891, April 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6891>.

   [RFC7872]  Gont, F., Linkova, J., Chown, T., and W. Liu,
              "Observations on the Dropping of Packets with IPv6
              Extension Headers in the Real World", RFC 7872,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7872, June 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7872>.

   [RFC7873]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and M. Andrews, "Domain Name System (DNS)
              Cookies", RFC 7873, DOI 10.17487/RFC7873, May 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7873>.

   [root-stars]
              "Scoring the DNS Root Server System", November 2016,
              <https://blog.apnic.net/2016/11/15/
              scoring-dns-root-server-system/>.

   [SAC016]   ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee, "Testing
              Firewalls for IPv6 and EDNS0 Support", 2007.





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   [SAC035]   ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee, "DNSSEC
              Impact on Broadband Routers and Firewalls", 2008.

Author's Address

  Linjian Song
  Beijing Internet Institute
  Floor-2, Building-5, Digital Planet, Courtyard-58, Jing Hai Wu Lu, BDA
  Beijing  101111
  P. R. China

  Email: songlinjian@gmail.com
  URI:   http://www.biigroup.com/






































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