Network Working Group F. Templin, Ed.
Internet-Draft Boeing Research & Technology
Obsoletes: rfc5320, rfc5558, rfc5720, May 28, 2020
rfc6179, rfc6706 (if
approved)
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: November 29, 2020
Asymmetric Extended Route Optimization (AERO)
draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-52
Abstract
This document specifies the operation of IP over tunnel virtual links
using Asymmetric Extended Route Optimization (AERO). AERO interfaces
use an IPv6 link-local address format that supports operation of the
IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND) protocol and links ND to IP forwarding.
Prefix delegation/registration services are employed for network
admission and to manage the routing system. Multilink operation,
mobility management, quality of service (QoS) signaling and route
optimization are naturally supported through dynamic neighbor cache
updates. Standard IP multicasting services are also supported. AERO
is a widely-applicable mobile internetworking service especially
well-suited to aviation services, intelligent transportation systems,
mobile Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and many other applications.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 29, 2020.
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Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Asymmetric Extended Route Optimization (AERO) . . . . . . . . 10
3.1. AERO Node Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2. The AERO Link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.1. AERO Link Reference Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.2. AERO Link-Local Addresses (LLAs) . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2.3. AERO Unique Local Addresses (ULAs) . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2.4. AERO Routing System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2.5. AERO Link Encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2.6. Segment Routing Topologies (SRTs) . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2.7. Segment Routing To the AERO Link . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2.8. Segment Routing Within the AERO Link . . . . . . . . 20
3.2.9. Segment Routing Header Compression . . . . . . . . . 22
3.3. AERO Interface Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.4. AERO Interface Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.4.1. AERO Server/Relay Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.4.2. AERO Proxy Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.4.3. AERO Client Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.4.4. AERO Bridge Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.5. AERO Interface Neighbor Cache Maintenance . . . . . . . . 28
3.6. AERO Interface Encapsulation and Re-encapsulation . . . . 30
3.7. AERO Interface Decapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.8. AERO Interface Data Origin Authentication . . . . . . . . 31
3.9. AERO Interface MTU and Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.9.1. Fragmentation Security Implications . . . . . . . . . 34
3.10. AERO Interface Forwarding Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.10.1. Client Forwarding Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.10.2. Proxy Forwarding Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.10.3. Server/Relay Forwarding Algorithm . . . . . . . . . 37
3.10.4. Bridge Forwarding Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
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3.11. AERO Interface Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.12. AERO Router Discovery, Prefix Delegation and
Autoconfiguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.12.1. AERO ND/PD Service Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.12.2. AERO Client Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.12.3. AERO Server Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.13. The AERO Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.13.1. Detecting and Responding to Server Failures . . . . 49
3.13.2. Point-to-Multipoint Server Coordination . . . . . . 50
3.14. AERO Route Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.14.1. Route Optimization Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.14.2. Relaying the NS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.14.3. Processing the NS and Sending the NA . . . . . . . . 51
3.14.4. Relaying the NA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.14.5. Processing the NA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.14.6. Route Optimization Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.15. Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD) . . . . . . . . . 54
3.16. Mobility Management and Quality of Service (QoS) . . . . 55
3.16.1. Mobility Update Messaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.16.2. Announcing Link-Layer Address and/or QoS Preference
Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.16.3. Bringing New Links Into Service . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.16.4. Removing Existing Links from Service . . . . . . . . 57
3.16.5. Moving to a New Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.17. Multicast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.17.1. Source-Specific Multicast (SSM) . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.17.2. Any-Source Multicast (ASM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.17.3. Bi-Directional PIM (BIDIR-PIM) . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.18. Operation over Multiple AERO Links (VLANs) . . . . . . . 61
3.19. DNS Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.20. Transition Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.21. Detecting and Reacting to Server and Bridge Failures . . 63
3.22. AERO Clients on the Open Internet . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.22.1. Use of SEND and CGA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.23. Time-Varying MNPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Appendix A. AERO Alternate Encapsulations . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Appendix B. Non-Normative Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
B.1. Implementation Strategies for Route Optimization . . . . 84
B.2. Implicit Mobility Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
B.3. Direct Underlying Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
B.4. Operation on AERO Links with /64 ASPs . . . . . . . . . . 85
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B.5. AERO Critical Infrastructure Considerations . . . . . . . 86
B.6. AERO Server Failure Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
B.7. AERO Client / Server Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Appendix C. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
1. Introduction
Asymmetric Extended Route Optimization (AERO) fulfills the
requirements of Distributed Mobility Management (DMM) [RFC7333] and
route optimization [RFC5522] for aeronautical networking and other
network mobility use cases such as intelligent transportation
systems. AERO is based on a Non-Broadcast, Multiple Access (NBMA)
virtual link model known as the AERO link. The AERO link is a
virtual overlay configured over one or more underlying Internetworks,
and nodes on the link can exchange IP packets via tunneling.
Multilink operation allows for increased reliability, bandwidth
optimization and traffic path diversity.
The AERO service comprises Clients, Proxys, Servers and Relays that
are seen as AERO link neighbors as well as Bridges that interconnect
AERO link segments. Each node's AERO interface uses an IPv6 link-
local address format that supports operation of the IPv6 Neighbor
Discovery (ND) protocol [RFC4861] and links ND to IP forwarding. A
node's AERO interface can be configured over multiple underlying
interfaces, and may therefore appear as a single interface with
multiple link-layer addresses. Each link-layer address is subject to
change due to mobility and/or QoS fluctuations, and link-layer
address changes are signaled by ND messaging the same as for any IPv6
link.
AERO links provide a cloud-based service where mobile nodes may use
any Server acting as a Mobility Anchor Point (MAP) and fixed nodes
may use any Relay on the link for efficient communications. Fixed
nodes forward packets destined to other AERO nodes to the nearest
Relay, which forwards them through the cloud. A mobile node's
initial packets are forwarded through the Server, while direct
routing is supported through asymmetric extended route optimization
while data packets are flowing. Both unicast and multicast
communications are supported, and mobile nodes may efficiently move
between locations while maintaining continuous communications with
correspondents and without changing their IP Address.
AERO Bridges are interconnected in a secured private BGP overlay
routing instance using encapsulation to provide a hybrid routing/
bridging service that joins the underlying Internetworks of multiple
disjoint administrative domains into a single unified AERO link.
Each AERO link instance is characterized by the set of Mobility
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Service Prefixes (MSPs) common to all mobile nodes. The link extends
to the point where a Relay/Server is on the optimal route from any
correspondent node on the link, and provides a conduit between the
underlying Internetwork and the AERO link. To the underlying
Internetwork, the Relay/Server is the source of a route to the MSP,
and hence uplink traffic to the mobile node is naturally routed to
the nearest Relay/Server.
AERO assumes the use of PIM Sparse Mode in support of multicast
communication. In support of Source Specific Multicast (SSM) when a
Mobile Node is the source, AERO route optimization ensures that a
shortest-path multicast tree is established with provisions for
mobility and multilink operation. In all other multicast scenarios
there are no AERO dependencies.
AERO was designed for aeronautical networking for both manned and
unmanned aircraft, where the aircraft is treated as a mobile node
that can connect an Internet of Things (IoT). AERO is also
applicable to a wide variety of other use cases. For example, it can
be used to coordinate the Virtual Private Network (VPN) links of
mobile nodes (e.g., cellphones, tablets, laptop computers, etc.) that
connect into a home enterprise network via public access networks
using services such as OpenVPN [OVPN]. It can also be used to
facilitate vehicular and pedestrian communications services for
intelligent transportation systems. Other applicable use cases are
also in scope.
The following numbered sections present the AERO specification. The
appendices at the end of the document are non-normative.
2. Terminology
The terminology in the normative references applies; the following
terms are defined within the scope of this document:
IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND)
an IPv6 control message service for coordinating neighbor
relationships between nodes connected to a common link. AERO
interfaces use the ND service specified in [RFC4861].
IPv6 Prefix Delegation (PD)
a networking service for delegating IPv6 prefixes to nodes on the
link. The nominal PD service is DHCPv6 [RFC8415], however
alternate services (e.g., based on ND messaging) are also in scope
[I-D.templin-v6ops-pdhost][I-D.templin-6man-dhcpv6-ndopt]. Most
notably, a minimal form of PD known as "prefix registration" can
be used if the Client knows its prefix in advance and can
represent it in the IPv6 source address of an ND message.
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Access Network (ANET)
a node's first-hop data link service network (e.g., a radio access
network, cellular service provider network, corporate enterprise
network, etc.) that often provides link-layer security services
such as IEEE 802.1X and physical-layer security prevent
unauthorized access internally and with border network-layer
security services such as firewalls and proxies that prevent
unauthorized outside access.
ANET interface
a node's attachment to a link in an ANET.
Internetwork (INET)
a connected IP network topology with a coherent routing and
addressing plan and that provides a transit backbone service for
ANET end systems. INETs also provide an underlay service over
which the AERO virtual link is configured. Example INETs include
corporate enterprise networks, aviation networks, and the public
Internet itself. When there is no administrative boundary between
an ANET and the INET, the ANET and INET are one and the same.
INET Partition
frequently, INETs such as large corporate enterprise networks are
sub-divided internally into separate isolated partitions. Each
partition is fully connected internally but disconnected from
other partitions, and there is no requirement that separate
partitions maintain consistent Internet Protocol and/or addressing
plans. (Each INET partition is seen as a separate AERO link
segment as discussed below.)
INET interface
a node's attachment to a link in an INET.
INET address
an IP address assigned to a node's interface connection to an
INET.
INET encapsulation
the encapsulation of a packet in an outer header or headers that
can be routed within the scope of the local INET partition.
AERO link
a Non-Broadcast, Multiple Access (NBMA) virtual overlay over one
or more underlying INETs manifested by IPv6 encapsulation
[RFC2473]. The AERO link spans underlying INET segments joined by
virtual bridges in a spanning tree the same as a bridged campus
LAN. Nodes on the AERO link appear as single-hop neighbors even
though they may be separated by multiple underlying INET hops, and
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can use Segment Routing [RFC8402] to cause packets to visit
selected waypoints on the link.
AERO interface
a node's attachment to an AERO link. Since the addresses assigned
to an AERO interface are managed for uniqueness, AERO interfaces
do not require Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) and therefore set
the administrative variable 'DupAddrDetectTransmits' to zero
[RFC4862].
underlying interface
an ANET or INET interface over which an AERO interface is
configured.
AERO Link-Local Address (LLA)
a link local IPv6 address per [RFC4291] constructed as specified
in Section 3.2.2.
AERO Unique-Local Address (ULA)
a unique local IPv6 address per [RFC4193] constructed as specified
in Section 3.2.3. AERO ULAs are statelessly derived from AERO
LLAs, and vice-versa.
Mobility Service Prefix (MSP)
an IP prefix assigned to the AERO link and from which more-
specific Mobile Network Prefixes (MNPs) are derived.
Mobile Network Prefix (MNP)
an IP prefix allocated from an MSP and delegated to an AERO Client
or Relay.
AERO node
a node that is connected to an AERO link, or that provides
services to other nodes on an AERO link.
AERO Client ("Client")
an AERO node that connects over one or more underlying interfaces
and requests MNP PDs from AERO Servers. The Client assigns a
Client LLA to the AERO interface for use in ND exchanges with
other AERO nodes and forwards packets to correspondents according
to AERO interface neighbor cache state.
AERO Server ("Server")
an INET node that configures an AERO interface to provide default
forwarding and mobility/multilink services for AERO Clients. The
Server assigns an administratively-provisioned LLA to its AERO
interface to support the operation of the ND/PD services, and
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advertises all of its associated MNPs via BGP peerings with
Bridges.
AERO Relay ("Relay")
an AERO Server that also provides forwarding services between
nodes reached via the AERO link and correspondents on other links.
AERO Relays are provisioned with MNPs (i.e., the same as for an
AERO Client) and run a dynamic routing protocol to discover any
non-MNP IP routes. In both cases, the Relay advertises the MSP(s)
to its downstream networks, and distributes all of its associated
MNPs and non-MNP IP routes via BGP peerings with Bridges (i.e.,
the same as for an AERO Server).
AERO Bridge ("Bridge")
a node that provides hybrid routing/bridging services (as well as
a security trust anchor) for nodes on an AERO link. As a router,
the Bridge forwards packets using standard IP forwarding. As a
bridge, the Bridge forwards packets over the AERO link without
decrementing the IPv6 Hop Limit. AERO Bridges peer with Servers
and other Bridges to discover the full set of MNPs for the link as
well as any non-MNPs that are reachable via Relays.
AERO Proxy ("Proxy")
a node that provides proxying services between Clients in an ANET
and Servers in external INETs. The AERO Proxy is a conduit
between the ANET and external INETs in the same manner as for
common web proxies, and behaves in a similar fashion as for ND
proxies [RFC4389].
ingress tunnel endpoint (ITE)
an AERO interface endpoint that injects encapsulated packets into
an AERO link.
egress tunnel endpoint (ETE)
an AERO interface endpoint that receives encapsulated packets from
an AERO link.
link-layer address
an IP address used as an encapsulation header source or
destination address from the perspective of the AERO interface.
When an upper layer protocol (e.g., UDP) is used as part of the
encapsulation, the port number is also considered as part of the
link-layer address.
network layer address
the source or destination address of an encapsulated IP packet
presented to the AERO interface.
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end user network (EUN)
an internal virtual or external edge IP network that an AERO
Client or Relay connects to the rest of the network via the AERO
interface. The Client/Relay sees each EUN as a "downstream"
network, and sees the AERO interface as the point of attachment to
the "upstream" network.
Mobile Node (MN)
an AERO Client and all of its downstream-attached networks that
move together as a single unit, i.e., an end system that connects
an Internet of Things.
Mobile Router (MR)
a MN's on-board router that forwards packets between any
downstream-attached networks and the AERO link.
Route Optimization Source (ROS)
the AERO node nearest the source that initiates route
optimization. The ROS may be a Server or Proxy acting on behalf
of the source Client.
Route Optimization responder (ROR)
the AERO node nearest the target destination that responds to
route optimization requests. The ROR may be a Server acting on
behalf of a target MNP Client, or a Relay for a non-MNP
destination.
MAP List
a geographically and/or topologically referenced list of addresses
of all Servers within the same AERO link. There is a single MAP
list for the entire AERO link.
Distributed Mobility Management (DMM)
a BGP-based overlay routing service coordinated by Servers and
Bridges that tracks all Server-to-Client associations.
Mobility Service (MS)
the collective set of all Servers, Proxys, Bridges and Relays that
provide the AERO Service to Clients.
Mobility Service Endpoint MSE)
an individual Server, Proxy, Bridge or Relay in the Mobility
Service.
Throughout the document, the simple terms "Client", "Server",
"Bridge", "Proxy" and "Relay" refer to "AERO Client", "AERO Server",
"AERO Bridge", "AERO Proxy" and "AERO Relay", respectively.
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Capitalization is used to distinguish these terms from other common
Internetworking uses in which they appear without capitalization.
The terminology of DHCPv6 [RFC8415] and IPv6 ND [RFC4861] (including
the names of node variables, messages and protocol constants) is used
throughout this document. The terms "All-Routers multicast", "All-
Nodes multicast", "Solicited-Node multicast" and "Subnet-Router
anycast" are defined in [RFC4291] (with Link-Local scope assumed).
Also, the term "IP" is used to generically refer to either Internet
Protocol version, i.e., IPv4 [RFC0791] or IPv6 [RFC8200].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Asymmetric Extended Route Optimization (AERO)
The following sections specify the operation of IP over Asymmetric
Extended Route Optimization (AERO) links:
3.1. AERO Node Types
AERO Bridges provide hybrid routing/bridging services (as well as a
security trust anchor) for nodes on an AERO link. Bridges use
standard IPv6 routing to forward packets both within the same INET
partitions and between disjoint INET partitions based on a mid-layer
IPv6 encapsulation per [RFC2473]. The inner IP layer experiences a
virtual bridging service since the inner IP TTL/Hop Limit is not
decremented during forwarding. Each Bridge also peers with Servers
and other Bridges in a dynamic routing protocol instance to provide a
Distributed Mobility Management (DMM) service for the list of active
MNPs (see Section 3.2.4). Bridges present the AERO link as a set of
one or more Mobility Service Prefixes (MSPs) but as link-layer
devices need not connect directly to the AERO link themselves unless
an administrative interface is desired. Bridges configure secured
tunnels with Servers, Relays, Proxys and other Bridges; they further
maintain IP forwarding table entries for each Mobile Network Prefix
(MNP) and any other reachable non-MNP prefixes.
AERO Servers provide default forwarding and mobility/multilink
services for AERO Client Mobile Nodes (MNs). Each Server also peers
with Bridges in a dynamic routing protocol instance to advertise its
list of associated MNPs (see Section 3.2.4). Servers facilitate PD
exchanges with Clients, where each delegated prefix becomes an MNP
taken from an MSP. Servers forward packets between AERO interface
neighbors and track each Client's mobility profiles.
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AERO Clients register their MNPs through PD exchanges with AERO
Servers over the AERO link, and distribute the MNPs to nodes on EUNs.
A Client may also be co-resident on the same physical or virtual
platform as a Server; in that case, the Client and Server behave as a
single functional unit.
AERO Proxys provide a conduit for ANET Clients to associate with
Servers in external INETs. Client and Servers exchange control plane
messages via the Proxy acting as a bridge between the ANET/INET
boundary. The Proxy forwards data packets between Clients and the
AERO link according to forwarding information in the neighbor cache.
The Proxy function is specified in Section 3.13.
AERO Relays are Servers that provide forwarding services between the
AERO interface and INET/EUN interfaces. Relays are provisioned with
MNPs the same as for an AERO Client, and also run a dynamic routing
protocol to discover any non-MNP IP routes. The Relay advertises the
MSP(s) to its connected networks, and distributes all of its
associated MNPs and non-MNP IP routes via BGP peerings with Bridges.
AERO Bridges, Servers, Proxys and Relays are critical infrastructure
elements in fixed (i.e., non-mobile) INET deployments and hence have
permanent and unchanging INET addresses. AERO Clients are MNs that
connect via underlying interfaces with addresses that may change when
the Client moves to a new network connection point.
3.2. The AERO Link
3.2.1. AERO Link Reference Model
Figure 1 presents the basic AERO link reference model:
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+----------------+
| AERO Bridge B1 |
| Nbr: S1, S2, P1|
|(X1->S1; X2->S2)|
| MSP M1 |
+-+---------+--+-+
+--------------+ | Secured | | +--------------+
|AERO Server S1| | tunnels | | |AERO Server S2|
| Nbr: C1, B1 +-----+ | +-----+ Nbr: C2, B1 |
| default->B1 | | | default->B1 |
| X1->C1 | | | X2->C2 |
+-------+------+ | +------+-------+
| AERO Link | |
X===+===+===================+==)===============+===+===X
| | | |
+-----+--------+ +--------+--+-----+ +--------+-----+
|AERO Client C1| | AERO Proxy P1 | |AERO Client C2|
| Nbr: S1 | |(Proxy Nbr Cache)| | Nbr: S2 |
| default->S1 | +--------+--------+ | default->S2 |
| MNP X1 | | | MNP X2 |
+------+-------+ .--------+------. +-----+--------+
| (- Proxyed Clients -) |
.-. `---------------' .-.
,-( _)-. ,-( _)-.
.-(_ IP )-. +-------+ +-------+ .-(_ IP )-.
(__ EUN )--|Host H1| |Host H2|--(__ EUN )
`-(______)-' +-------+ +-------+ `-(______)-'
Figure 1: AERO Link Reference Model
In this model:
o the AERO link is an overlay network service configured over one or
more underlying INET partitions which may be managed by different
administrative authorities and have incompatible protocols and/or
addressing plans.
o AERO Bridge B1 aggregates Mobility Service Prefix (MSP) M1,
discovers Mobile Network Prefixes (MNPs) X* and advertises the MSP
via BGP peerings over secured tunnels to Servers (S1, S2).
Bridges connect the disjoint segments of a partitioned AERO link.
o AERO Servers/Relays S1 and S2 configure secured tunnels with
Bridge B1 and also provide mobility, multilink and default router
services for their associated Clients C1 and C2.
o AERO Clients C1 and C2 associate with Servers S1 and S2,
respectively. They receive Mobile Network Prefix (MNP)
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delegations X1 and X2, and also act as default routers for their
associated physical or internal virtual EUNs. Simple hosts H1 and
H2 attach to the EUNs served by Clients C1 and C2, respectively.
o AERO Proxy P1 configures a secured tunnel with Bridge B1 and
provides proxy services for AERO Clients in secured enclaves that
cannot associate directly with other AERO link neighbors.
An AERO link configured over a single INET appears as a single
unified link with a consistent underlying network addressing plan.
In that case, all nodes on the link can exchange packets via simple
INET encapsulation, since the underlying INET is connected. In
common practice, however, an AERO link may be partitioned into
multiple "segments", where each segment is a distinct INET
potentially managed under a different administrative authority (e.g.,
as for worldwide aviation service providers such as ARINC, SITA,
Inmarsat, etc.). Individual INETs may also themselves be partitioned
internally, in which case each internal partition is seen as a
separate segment.
The addressing plan of each segment is consistent internally but will
often bear no relation to the addressing plans of other segments.
Each segment is also likely to be separated from others by network
security devices (e.g., firewalls, proxies, packet filtering
gateways, etc.), and in many cases disjoint segments may not even
have any common physical link connections. Therefore, nodes can only
be assured of exchanging packets directly with correspondents in the
same segment, and not with those in other segments. The only means
for joining the segments therefore is through inter-domain peerings
between AERO Bridges.
The same as for traditional campus LANs, multiple AERO link segments
can be joined into a single unified link via a virtual bridging
service using a mid-layer IPv6 encpasulation per [RFC2473] known as
the "SPAN header" that supports inter-segment forwarding (i.e.,
bridging) without decrementing the network-layer TTL/Hop Limit. This
bridging of AERO link segments is shown in Figure 2:
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
. .-(::::::::) .
. .-(::::::::::::)-. +-+ .
. (:::: Segment A :::)--|B|---+ .
. `-(::::::::::::)-' +-+ | .
. `-(::::::)-' | .
. | .
. .-(::::::::) | .
. .-(::::::::::::)-. +-+ | .
. (:::: Segment B :::)--|B|---+ .
. `-(::::::::::::)-' +-+ | .
. `-(::::::)-' | .
. | .
. .-(::::::::) | .
. .-(::::::::::::)-. +-+ | .
. (:::: Segment C :::)--|B|---+ .
. `-(::::::::::::)-' +-+ | .
. `-(::::::)-' | .
. | .
. ..(etc).. x .
. .
. .
. <- AERO Link Bridged by encapsulation -> .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .
Figure 2: Bridging AERO Link Segments
Bridges, Servers, Relays and Proxys connect via secured INET tunnels
over their respecitve segments in a spanning tree topology rooted at
the Bridges. The secured spanning tree supports strong
authentication for IPv6 ND control messages and may also be used to
convey the initial data packets in a flow. Route optimization can
then be employed to cause data packets to take more direct paths
between AERO link neighbors without having to strictly follow the
spanning tree.
3.2.2. AERO Link-Local Addresses (LLAs)
Nodes on AERO links use the Link-Local Address (LLA) prefix fe80::/10
[RFC4193] to assign LLAs used for network-layer addresses in IPv6 ND
and data messages. A Client's LLA is an IPv6 link-local address
formed from the Client's delegated MNP. Bridge, Server, Relay and
Proxy LLAs are assigned from the range fe80::/96 and include an
administratively-provisioned value in the lower 32 bits.
IPv6 Client LLAs encode the Subnet-Router anycast address of a MNP
(or non-MNP globally routable prefix) within the least-significant
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112 bits of the IPv6 link-local prefix fe80::/16. For example, for
the MNP 2001:db8:1000:2000::/56 the corresponding LLA is
fe80:2001:db8:1000:2000::/72.
IPv4-compatible Client LLAs are based on an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address
[RFC4291] formed from an IPv4 MNP and with a prefix length of 96 plus
the MNP prefix length. For example, for the IPv4 MNP 192.0.2.16/28
the IPv4-mapped IPv6 MNP is:
0:0:0:0:0:ffff:192.0.2.16/124 (also written as
0:0:0:0:0:ffff:c000:0210/124)
The Client then constructs its LLA with the prefix fe80::/64 and with
the lower 64 bits of the IPv4-mapped IPv6 address in the interface
identifier as: fe80::ffff:192.0.2.16.
Mobility Service (MS) LLAs (used by Bridges, Servers, Relays and
Proxys) are allocated from the range fe80::/96, and MUST be managed
for uniqueness. The lower 32 bits of the LLA includes a unique
integer value between 1 and 0xfeffffff (e.g., fe80::1, fe80::2,
fe80::3, etc., fe80::feff:ffff) as assigned by the administrative
authority for the link. The address fe80:: is the IPv6 link-local
Subnet-Router anycast address, and the address range
fe80::ff00:0000/104 is reserved for future use.
Finally, the address range fe80::/32 is used as the Teredo service
prefix for AERO according to the format in Section 4 of [RFC4380]
(see Section 3.22 for further discussion).
3.2.3. AERO Unique Local Addresses (ULAs)
Nodes on AERO links use the Unique Local Address (ULA) prefix
fd80::/10 [RFC4193] to form ULAs used for SPAN header source and
desitnation addresses. The prefix length intentionally matches the
IPv6 link-local prefix (fe80::/10), and enables a simple stateless
translation between LLAs and ULAs.
AERO ULAs are formed by simply rewriting the upper bits of the
corresponding LLA as follows:
o the ULA formed from the IPv6 Client LLA fe80:2001:db8:1000:2000::
is simply fd80:2001:db8:1000:2000::
o the ULA formed from the IPv4-compatible Client LLA
fe80::ffff:192.0.2.1 is simply fd80::ffff:192.0.2.1
o the ULA formed from the MS LLA fe80::1001 is simply fd80::1001
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o the ULA prefix fd80::/32 is used as the Teredo service prefix the
same as for LLAs above.
For routing system organization (see Section 3.2.4), MS ULAs are
organized in partition prefixes, e.g., fd80::1000/116. For each such
partition prefix, the Bridge(s) that connect that segment assign the
:: address of the prefix as a Subnet Router Anycast address. For
example, the Subnet Router Anycast address for fd80::1000/116 is
simply fd80::1000.
3.2.4. AERO Routing System
The AERO routing system comprises a private instance of the Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC4271] that is coordinated between Bridges
and Servers and does not interact with either the public Internet BGP
routing system or any underlying INET routing systems.
In a reference deployment, each Server is configured as an Autonomous
System Border Router (ASBR) for a stub Autonomous System (AS) using
an AS Number (ASN) that is unique within the BGP instance, and each
Server further uses eBGP to peer with one or more Bridges but does
not peer with other Servers. Each INET of a multi-segment AERO link
must include one or more Bridges, which peer with the Servers and
Proxys within that INET. All Bridges within the same INET are
members of the same hub AS using a common ASN, and use iBGP to
maintain a consistent view of all active MNPs currently in service.
The Bridges of different INETs peer with one another using eBGP.
Bridges advertise the AERO link's MSPs and any non-MNP routes to each
of their Servers. This means that any aggregated non-MNPs (including
"default") are advertised to all Servers. Each Bridge configures a
black-hole route for each of its MSPs. By black-holing the MSPs, the
Bridge will maintain forwarding table entries only for the MNPs that
are currently active, and packets destined to all other MNPs will
correctly incur Destination Unreachable messages due to the black-
hole route. In this way, Servers have only partial topology
knowledge (i.e., they know only about the MNPs of their directly
associated Clients) and they forward all other packets to Bridges
which have full topology knowledge.
Each AERO link segment assigns a unique sub-prefix of fd80::/96 known
as the ULA partition prefix. For example, a first segment could
assign fd80::1000/116, a second could assign fd80::2000/116, a third
could assign fd80::3000/116, etc. The administrative authorities for
each segment must therefore coordinate to assure mutually-exclusive
partiton prefix assignments, but internal provisioning of each prefix
is an independent local consideration for each administrative
authority.
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ULA partition prefixes are statitcally represented in Bridge
forwarding tables. Bridges join multiple segments into a unified
AERO link over multiple diverse administrative domains. They support
a bridging function by first establishing forwarding table entries
for their partiion prefixes either via standard BGP routing or static
routes. For example, if three Bridges ('A', 'B' and 'C') from
different segments serviced fd80::1000/116, fd80::2000/116 and
fd80::3000/116 respectively, then the forwarding tables in each
Bridge are as follows:
A: fd80::1000/116->local, fd80::2000/116->B, fd80::3000/116->C
B: fd80::1000/116->A, fd80::2000/116->local, fd80::3000/116->C
C: fd80::1000/116->A, fd80::2000/116->B, fd80::3000/116->local
These forwarding table entries are permanent and never change, since
they correspond to fixed infrastructure elements in their respective
segments.
ULA Client prefixes are instead dynamically advertised in the AERO
link routing system by Servers and Relays that provide service for
their corresponding MNPs. For example, if three Servers ('D', 'E'
and 'F') service the MNPs 2001:db8:1000:2000::/56,
2001:db8:3000:4000::/56 and 2001:db8:5000:6000::/56 then the routing
system would include:
D: fd80:2001:db8:1000:2000::/72
E: fd80:2001:db8:3000:4000::/72
F: fd80:2001:db8:5000:6000::/72
A full discussion of the BGP-based routing system used by AERO is
found in [I-D.ietf-rtgwg-atn-bgp]. The system provides for
Distributed Mobility Management (DMM) per the distributed mobility
anchoring architecture [I-D.ietf-dmm-distributed-mobility-anchoring].
3.2.5. AERO Link Encapsulation
With the Client and partition prefixes in place in each Bridge's
forwarding table, control and data packets sent between AERO nodes in
different segments can therefore be carried over the via mid-layer
encapsulation using the SPAN header. For example, when a source AERO
node forwards a packet with IPv6 address 2001:db8:1:2::1 to a target
AERO node with IPv6 address 2001:db8:1000:2000::1, it first
encapsulates the packet in a SPAN header with source address set to
fd80:2001:db8:1:2:: and destination address set to
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fd80:2001:db8:1000:2000::. Next, it encapsulates the resulting SPAN
packet in an INET header with source address set to its own INET
address (e.g., 192.0.2.100) and destination set to the INET address
of a Bridge (e.g., 192.0.2.1).
SPAN encapsulation is based on Generic Packet Tunneling in IPv6
[RFC2473]; the encapsulation format in the above example is shown in
Figure 3:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| INET Header |
| src = 192.0.2.100 |
| dst = 192.0.2.1 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SPAN Header |
| src = fd80:2001:db8:1:2:: |
| dst=fd80:2001:db8:1000:2000:: |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Inner IP Header |
| src = 2001:db8:1:2::1 |
| dst = 2001:db8:1000:2000::1 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ ~
~ Inner Packet Body ~
~ ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3: SPAN Encapsulation
In this format, the inner IP header and packet body are the original
IP packet, the SPAN header is an IPv6 header prepared according to
[RFC2473], and the INET header is prepared as discussed in
Section 3.6.
This gives rise to a routing system that contains both Client prefix
routes that may change dynamically due to regional node mobility and
partion prefix routes that never change. The Bridges can therefore
provide link-layer bridging by sending packets over the SRT instead
of network-layer routing according to MNP routes. As a result,
opportunities for packet loss due to node mobility between different
segments are mitigated.
In normal operations, IPv6 ND messages are conveyed over secured
paths between AERO link neighbors so that specific Proxys, Servers or
Relays can be addressed without being subject to mobility events.
Conversely, only the first few packets destined to Clients need to
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traverse secured paths until route optimization can determine a more
direct path.
3.2.6. Segment Routing Topologies (SRTs)
The 16-bit sub-prefixes of fd80::/10 (e.g., fd80::/16, fd81::/16,
fd82::/16, etc.) identify distinct Segment Routing Topologies (SRTs)
(see: Section 3.2.6). Each SRT is a mutually-exclusive AERO link
overlay instance using a mutually-exclusive set of ULAs, and emulates
a Virtual LAN (VLAN) service for the AERO link. In some cases (e.g.,
when redundant topologies are needed for fault tolerance and
reliability) it may be beneficial to deploy multiple SRTs that act as
independent overlay instances. A communication failure in one
instance therefore will not affect communications in other instances.
Each SRT is identified by a distinct value in bits 10-15 of he SSP
fd80::10, i.e., as fd80::/16, fd81::/16, fd82::/16, etc. This
document asserts that up to four SRTs provide a level of safety
sufficient for critical communications such as civil aviation. Each
SRT is designated with a color that identifies a different AERO link
instance as follows:
o Red - corresponds to the SSP fd80::/16
o Green - corresponds to the SSP fd81::/16
o Blue-1 - corresponds to the SSP fd82::/16
o Blue-2 - corresponds to SSP fd83::/16
o SSPs fd84::/16 through fdbf::/16 are reserved for future use.
Each AERO interface assigns an anycast ULA corresponding to its SRT
prefix. For example, the anycast ULA for the Green SRT is simply
fd81::. The anycast ULA is used for AERO interface determination in
Safety-Based Multilink (SBM) as discussed in
[I-D.templin-6man-omni-interface]. Each AERO interface further
applies Performance-Based Multilink (PBM) internally.
3.2.7. Segment Routing To the AERO Link
An original IPv6 source can direct a packet to a specific SRT ingress
router for the AERO link by including a Segment Routing Header (SRH)
with the anycast ULA for the selected SRT as either the IPv6
destination or as an intermediate segment ID within the SRH. This
allows the original source to determine the specific topology a
packet will traverse when there may be multiple alternatives to
choose from. This form of Segment Routing supports Safety-Based
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Multilink (SBM), and can be exercised through general-purpose SRH
types such as [RFC8754].
3.2.8. Segment Routing Within the AERO Link
AERO nodes that insert a SPAN header can use Segment Routing within
the AERO link when necessary to influence the path of packets
destined to INET Clients without causing all packets to traverse the
Server.
When a Client, Proxy or Server has a packet to send to a target
discovered through route optimization located in the same AERO link
segment, it encapsulates the packet in a SPAN header with the ULA of
the target as the destination address if fragmentation is necessary,
then uses the target's Link Layer Address information for INET
encapsulation without including an SRH.
When a Client, Proxy or Server has a packet to send to a route
optimization target located in a different AERO link segment, it
encapsulates the packet in a SPAN header with its own ULA as the
source address and with destination set according to the target. If
the route optimization target is located behind a Proxy or Server,
the node sets the SPAN destination address to the ULA of the Proxy/
Server and forwards the packet to a Bridge without including an SRH.
If the route optimization target in a foreign segment is an INET
Client, the node instead sets the SPAN destination address to the ULA
Subnet Router Anycast address of the foreign segment. The node also
includes a SRH [RFC8754] with the ULA of the target's Server as the
ultimate Segment ID (SID) and with an AERO Route Optimization
specification in the SRH TLV section as shown in Figure 4:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type=TBD | Length |FMT|V| Preflen | MNP[1] |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MNP[2] | MNP[3] | ... | MNP[i] |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ Link Layer Address ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Port Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4: AERO Route Optimization SRH TLV
In this format:
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o Type is TBD to be assigned according to the Segment Routing Header
TLV registry [RFC8754].
o Length is the length of the body of the TLV in bytes, excluding
the Type and Length fields.
o FMT is a two bit code that determines the format of the Link Layer
Address exactly as specified in Figure 5.
o V indicates the IP protocol version of the MNP that follows. V is
set to 0 for IPv4 or 1 for IPv6.
o Preflen encodes the value 'i' (between 0 and 16) that indicates
the number of bytes of the IPv4/IPv6 MNP prefix that follows.
o MNP{1], MNP[2], etc. up to MNP[i] encode the leading 'i' octets of
the MNP, beginning with the most significant octet followed by the
next most significant octet, etc. The number of MNP octets to be
included is determined by the number of trailing zero octets in
the prefix. For example, for the MNP fd80:2001:db8:1:2::, 'i'
would be 10 and only the leftmost 10 octets of the MNP would be
included.
o Link Layer Address and Port Number are encoded according to FMT
exactly as specified in Figure 5.
The node then forwards the packet via a local Bridge, which will
eventually direct it to a Bridge on the same segment as the target's
Server.
When a Bridge on the same segment as the target's Server receives a
SPAN-encapsulated packet, it examines the SRH. If Segments Left is 1
and the ultimate SID is a Server on the local segment, it checks to
see if there is an AERO Route Optimization TLV. If so, the Bridge
places the MNP into the IPv6 destination address (i.e., as a Subnet
Router Anycast address) and encapsulates the SPAN packet in an INET
header based on the target's Link Layer Address, then forwards the
packet to the target directly while bypassing the target's Server.
In this way, the Bridge participates in route optimization to greatly
reduce traffic load and suboptimal routing through the target's
Server. Note that if the Bridge does not recognize the AERO Route
Optimization TLV, it instead places the Server's address in the IPv6
destination address and forwards to the Server. This is the same
behavior that would occur if the AERO Route Optimization TLV were not
present.
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3.2.9. Segment Routing Header Compression
In the Segment Routing use cases discussed above, the segment routing
headers must be kept to a minimum size since source and target
Clients may be located behind low-end wireless links (e.g., 1Mbps or
less). The Compressed Routing Header (CRH)
[I-D.bonica-6man-comp-rtg-hdr] provides a compact form that reduces
the header size by omitting information that can already be derived
by intermediate Bridges. The CRH Helper
option[I-D.bonica-6man-crh-helper-opt] can be used to encode the AERO
Route Optimization TLV, and the final hop Bridge that performs route
optimization may remove the CRH and its helper before encapsulating
and forwarding to the target Client.
The CRH and its companion helper option are therefore seen as
critical architectural elements that should be quickly progressed
through the standards process. Implementations SHOULD use the CRH
and its companion helper option instead of other Routing Header types
whenever possible to conserve bandwidth.
3.3. AERO Interface Characteristics
AERO interfaces are virtual interfaces configured over one or more
underlying interfaces classified as follows:
o INET interfaces connect to an INET either natively or through one
or several IPv4 Network Address Translators (NATs). Native INET
interfaces have global IP addresses that are reachable from any
INET correspondent. All Server, Relay and Bridge interfaces are
native interfaces, as are INET-facing interfaces of Proxys. NATed
INET interfaces connect to a private network behind one or more
NATs that provide INET access. Clients that are behind a NAT are
required to send periodic keepalive messages to keep NAT state
alive when there are no data packets flowing.
o Proxyed interfaces connect to an ANET that is separated from the
open INET by an AERO Proxy. Proxys can actively issue control
messages over the INET on behalf of the Client to reduce ANET
congestion. Clients connected to Proxyed interfaces receive RAs
with the P flag set to 1.
o VPNed interfaces use security encapsulation over the INET to a
Virtual Private Network (VPN) server that also acts as an AERO
Server. Other than the link-layer encapsulation format, VPNed
interfaces behave the same as Direct interfaces.
o Direct interfaces connect a Client directly to a Server without
crossing any ANET/INET paths. An example is a line-of-sight link
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between a remote pilot and an unmanned aircraft. The same Client
considerations apply as for VPNed interfaces.
AERO interfaces use SPAN encapsulation as necessary as discussed in
Section 3.2.5. AERO interfaces use link-layer encapsulation (see:
Section 3.6) to exchange packets with AERO link neighbors over INET
or VPNed interfaces. AERO interfaces do not use link-layer
encapsulation over Proxyed and Direct underlying interfaces.
AERO interfaces maintain a neighbor cache for tracking per-neighbor
state the same as for any interface. AERO interfaces use ND messages
including Router Solicitation (RS), Router Advertisement (RA),
Neighbor Solicitation (NS) and Neighbor Advertisement (NA) for
neighbor cache management.
AERO interfaces send ND messages with an Overlay Multilink Network
Interface (OMNI) option formatted as specified in
[I-D.templin-6man-omni-interface]. The OMNI option includes prefix
registration information and "ifIndex-tuples" containing link
information parameters for the AERO interface's underlying
interfaces.
When encapsulation is used, AERO interface ND messages MAY also
include an AERO Source/Target Link-Layer Address Option (S/TLLAO)
formatted as shown in Figure 5:
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | ifIndex[1] | SRT | LHS |FMT|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ Segment Routing List [1] ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ Link Layer Address [1] ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Port Number [1] | ifIndex[2] | SRT | LHS |FMT|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ Segment Routing List [2] ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ Link Layer Address [2] ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Port Number [2] | .... ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ~
~ ... ~
~ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ | ifIndex[N] | SRT | LHS |FMT|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ Segment Routing List [N] ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ Link Layer Address [N] ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Port Number [N] | Zero Padding (if necessary) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Figure 5: AERO Source/Target Link-Layer Address Option (S/TLLAO)
Format
In this format, Type and Length are set the same as specified for S/
TLLAOs in [RFC4861], with trailing zero padding octets added as
necessary to produce an integral number of 8 octet blocks. The S/
TLLAO includes N ifIndex-tuples in correspondence to ifIndex-tuples
that appear in the OMNI option. Each ifIndex-tuple includes the
following information:
o ifIndex[i] - the same value as in the corresponding ifIndex-tuple
included in the OMNI option.
o SRT[i] - a 3-bit "Segment Routing Topology" value (see:
Section 3.2.6) coded as follows:
* 000 - Red
* 001 - Green
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* 010 - Blue-1
* 011 - Blue-2
* 100 - 111 - Reserved
o LHS[i] - a 3-bit "LookaHead Segments" value that encodes the
number (from 0 to 7) of entries in Segment Routing List [i].
o FMT[i] - a 2-bit "Format" code. Determines the format of the Link
Layer Address [i] field as follows:
* 00 - Link Layer Address [i] encodes an IPv4 address for a node
behind a NAT.
* 01 - Link Layer Address [i] encodes an IPv4 address for a node
on the open INET.
* 10 - Link Layer Address [i] encodes an IPv6 address for a node
behind a NAT..
* 11 - Link Layer Address [i] encodes an IPv6 address for a node
on the open INET.
o Segment Routing List [i] - Includes LHS[i]-many 4 byte ULA
suffixes from the SRT corresponding to the Segment IDs (SIDs) that
must be visited prior to forwarding to Link Layer Address [i].
The ultimate SID appears first, followed by the penultimate SID
second, etc.
o Link Layer Address [i] - Included according to FMT[i], and
identifies the link-layer address of the source/target. The IP
address is recorded in ones-compliment "obfuscated" form per
[RFC4380].
o Port Number [i] - The field is 2 bytes in length and immediately
follows Link Layer Address [i]. Also recorded in ones-compliment
"obfuscated" form.
If an S/TLLAO is included, any ifIndex-tuples correspond to a proper
subset of the OMNI option ifIndex-tuples. Any S/TLLAO ifIndex-tuple
having an ifIndex value that does not appear in an OMNI option
ifindex-tuple is ignored. If the same ifIndex value appears in
multiple ifIndex-tuples, the first tuple is processed and the
remaining tuples are ignored. Any S/TLLAO ifIndex-tuples can
therefore be viewed as inter-dependent extensions of their
corresponding OMNI option ifIndex-tuples, i.e., the OMNI option and
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S/TLLAO are companions that are interpreted in conjunction with each
other.
A Client's AERO interface may be configured over multiple underlying
interface connections. For example, common mobile handheld devices
have both wireless local area network ("WLAN") and cellular wireless
links. These links are often used "one at a time" with low-cost WLAN
preferred and highly-available cellular wireless as a standby, but a
simultaneous-use capability could provide benefits. In a more
complex example, aircraft frequently have many wireless data link
types (e.g. satellite-based, cellular, terrestrial, air-to-air
directional, etc.) with diverse performance and cost properties.
If a Client's multiple underlying interfaces are used "one at a time"
(i.e., all other interfaces are in standby mode while one interface
is active), then ND message OMNI options include only a single
ifIndex-tuple set to constant values. In that case, the Client would
appear to have a single interface but with a dynamically changing
link-layer address.
If the Client has multiple active underlying interfaces, then from
the perspective of ND it would appear to have multiple link-layer
addresses. In that case, ND message OMNI options MAY include
multiple ifIndex-tuples - each with values that correspond to a
specific interface. Every ND message need not include all OMNI and/
or S/TLLAO ifIndex-tuples; for any ifIndex-tuple not included, the
neighbor considers the status as unchanged.
Bridge, Server and Proxy AERO interfaces may be configured over one
or more secured tunnel interfaces. The AERO interface configures
both an LLA and its corresponding ULA, while the underlying secured
tunnel interfaces are either unnumbered or configure the same ULA.
The AERO interface encapsulates each IP packet in a SPAN header and
presents the packet to the underlying secured tunnel interface. For
Bridges that do not configure an AERO interface, the secured tunnel
interfaces themselves are exposed to the IP layer with each interface
configuring the Bridge's ULA. Routing protocols such as BGP
therefore run directly over the Bridge's secured tunnel interfaces.
For nodes that configure an AERO interface, routing protocols such as
BGP run over the AERO interface but do not employ SPAN encapsulation.
Instead, the AERO interface presents the routing protocol messages
directly to the underlying secured tunnels without applying
encapsulation and while using the ULA as the source address. This
distinction must be honored consistently according to each node's
configuration so that the IP forwarding table will associate
discovered IP routes with the correct interface.
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3.4. AERO Interface Initialization
AERO Servers, Proxys and Clients configure AERO interfaces as their
point of attachment to the AERO link. AERO nodes assign the MSPs for
the link to their AERO interfaces (i.e., as a "route-to-interface")
to ensure that packets with destination addresses covered by an MNP
not explicitly assigned to a non-AERO interface are directed to the
AERO interface.
AERO interface initialization procedures for Servers, Proxys, Clients
and Bridges are discussed in the following sections.
3.4.1. AERO Server/Relay Behavior
When a Server enables an AERO interface, it assigns an LLA/ULA
appropriate for the given AERO link segment. The Server also
configures secured tunnels with one or more neighboring Bridges and
engages in a BGP routing protocol session with each Bridge.
The AERO interface provides a single interface abstraction to the IP
layer, but internally comprises multiple secured tunnels as well as
an NBMA nexus for sending encapsulated data packets to AERO interface
neighbors. The Server further configures a service to facilitate ND/
PD exchanges with AERO Clients and manages per-Client neighbor cache
entries and IP forwarding table entries based on control message
exchanges.
Relays are simply Servers that run a dynamic routing protocol to
redistribute routes between the AERO interface and INET/EUN
interfaces (see: Section 3.2.4). The Relay provisions MNPs to
networks on the INET/EUN interfaces (i.e., the same as a Client would
do) and advertises the MSP(s) for the AERO link over the INET/EUN
interfaces. The Relay further provides an attachment point of the
AERO link to a non-MNP-based global topology.
3.4.2. AERO Proxy Behavior
When a Proxy enables an AERO interface, it assigns an LLA/ULA and
configures permanent neighbor cache entries the same as for Servers.
The Proxy also configures secured tunnels with one or more
neighboring Bridges and maintains per-Client neighbor cache entries
based on control message exchanges.
3.4.3. AERO Client Behavior
When a Client enables an AERO interface, it sends RS messages with
ND/PD parameters over its underlying interfaces to a Server in the
MAP list, which returns an RA message with corresponding parameters.
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(The RS/RA messages may pass through a Proxy in the case of a
Client's Proxyed interface, or through one or more NATs in the case
of a Client's INET interface.)
3.4.4. AERO Bridge Behavior
AERO Bridges configure an AERO interface and assign the ULA Subnet
Router Anycast address for each AERO link segment they connect to.
Bridges configure secured tunnels with Servers, Proxys and other
Bridges; they also configure LLAs/ULAs and permanent neighbor cache
entries the same as Servers. Bridges engage in a BGP routing
protocol session with a subset of the Servers and other Bridges on
the spanning tree (see: Section 3.2.4).
3.5. AERO Interface Neighbor Cache Maintenance
Each AERO interface maintains a conceptual neighbor cache that
includes an entry for each neighbor it communicates with on the AERO
link per [RFC4861]. AERO interface neighbor cache entries are said
to be one of "permanent", "symmetric", "asymmetric" or "proxy".
Permanent neighbor cache entries are created through explicit
administrative action; they have no timeout values and remain in
place until explicitly deleted. AERO Bridges maintain permanent
neighbor cache entries for their associated Proxys and Servers (and
vice-versa). Each entry maintains the mapping between the neighbor's
network-layer LLA and corresponding INET address.
Symmetric neighbor cache entries are created and maintained through
RS/RA exchanges as specified in Section 3.12, and remain in place for
durations bounded by ND/PD lifetimes. AERO Servers maintain
symmetric neighbor cache entries for each of their associated
Clients, and AERO Clients maintain symmetric neighbor cache entries
for each of their associated Servers. The list of all Servers on the
AERO link is maintained in the link's MAP list.
Asymmetric neighbor cache entries are created or updated based on
route optimization messaging as specified in Section 3.14, and are
garbage-collected when keepalive timers expire. AERO ROSs maintain
asymmetric neighbor cache entries for active targets with lifetimes
based on ND messaging constants. Asymmetric neighbor cache entries
are unidirectional since only the ROS (and not the ROR) creates an
entry.
Proxy neighbor cache entries are created and maintained by AERO
Proxys when they process Client/Server ND/PD exchanges, and remain in
place for durations bounded by ND/PD lifetimes. AERO Proxys maintain
proxy neighbor cache entries for each of their associated Clients.
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Proxy neighbor cache entries track the Client state and the address
of the Client's associated Server(s).
To the list of neighbor cache entry states in Section 7.3.2 of
[RFC4861], Proxy and Server AERO interfaces add an additional state
DEPARTED that applies to symmetric and proxy neighbor cache entries
for Clients that have recently departed. The interface sets a
"DepartTime" variable for the neighbor cache entry to "DEPART_TIME"
seconds. DepartTime is decremented unless a new ND message causes
the state to return to REACHABLE. While a neighbor cache entry is in
the DEPARTED state, packets destined to the target Client are
forwarded to the Client's new location instead of being dropped.
When DepartTime decrements to 0, the neighbor cache entry is deleted.
It is RECOMMENDED that DEPART_TIME be set to the default constant
value REACHABLE_TIME plus 10 seconds (40 seconds by default) to allow
a window for packets in flight to be delivered while stale route
optimization state may be present.
When an ROR receives an authentic NS message used for route
optimization, it searches for a symmetric neighbor cache entry for
the target Client. The ROR then returns a solicited NA message
without creating a neighbor cache entry for the ROS, but creates or
updates a target Client "Report List" entry for the ROS and sets a
"ReportTime" variable for the entry to REPORT_TIME seconds. The ROR
resets ReportTime when it receives a new authentic NS message, and
otherwise decrements ReportTime while no authentic NS messages have
been received. It is RECOMMENDED that REPORT_TIME be set to the
default constant value REACHABLE_TIME plus 10 seconds (40 seconds by
default) to allow a window for route optimization to converge before
ReportTime decrements below REACHABLE_TIME.
When the ROS receives a solicited NA message response to its NS
message used for route optimization, it creates or updates an
asymmetric neighbor cache entry for the target network-layer and
link-layer addresses. The ROS then (re)sets ReachableTime for the
neighbor cache entry to REACHABLE_TIME seconds and uses this value to
determine whether packets can be forwarded directly to the target,
i.e., instead of via a default route. The ROS otherwise decrements
ReachableTime while no further solicited NA messages arrive. It is
RECOMMENDED that REACHABLE_TIME be set to the default constant value
30 seconds as specified in [RFC4861].
AERO nodes also use the value MAX_UNICAST_SOLICIT to limit the number
of NS keepalives sent when a correspondent may have gone unreachable,
the value MAX_RTR_SOLICITATIONS to limit the number of RS messages
sent without receiving an RA and the value MAX_NEIGHBOR_ADVERTISEMENT
to limit the number of unsolicited NAs that can be sent based on a
single event. It is RECOMMENDED that MAX_UNICAST_SOLICIT,
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MAX_RTR_SOLICITATIONS and MAX_NEIGHBOR_ADVERTISEMENT be set to 3 the
same as specified in [RFC4861].
Different values for DEPART_TIME, REPORT_TIME, REACHABLE_TIME,
MAX_UNICAST_SOLICIT, MAX_RTR_SOLCITATIONS and
MAX_NEIGHBOR_ADVERTISEMENT MAY be administratively set; however, if
different values are chosen, all nodes on the link MUST consistently
configure the same values. Most importantly, DEPART_TIME and
REPORT_TIME SHOULD be set to a value that is sufficiently longer than
REACHABLE_TIME to avoid packet loss due to stale route optimization
state.
3.6. AERO Interface Encapsulation and Re-encapsulation
In some instances, AERO interfaces insert a mid-layer IPv6 header
known as the SPAN header as discussed in the following sections.
After either inserting or omitting the SPAN header, the AERO
interface inserts an outer encapsulation header as discussed below.
AERO interfaces avoid outer encapsulation over Direct underlying
interfaces and Proxyed underlying interfaces for which the first-hop
access router is AERO-aware. Other AERO interfaces encapsulate
packets according to whether they are entering the AERO interface
from the network layer or if they are being re-admitted into the same
AERO link they arrived on. This latter form of encapsulation is
known as "re-encapsulation".
For packets entering the AERO interface from the network layer, the
AERO interface copies the "TTL/Hop Limit", "Type of Service/Traffic
Class" [RFC2983], "Flow Label"[RFC6438] (for IPv6) and "Congestion
Experienced" [RFC3168] values in the inner packet's IP header into
the corresponding fields in the SPAN and outer encapsulation
header(s).
For packets undergoing re-encapsulation, the AERO interface instead
copies these values from the original encapsulation header into the
new encapsulation header, i.e., the values are transferred between
encapsulation headers and *not* copied from the encapsulated packet's
network-layer header. (Note especially that by copying the TTL/Hop
Limit between encapsulation headers the value will eventually
decrement to 0 if there is a (temporary) routing loop.) For IPv4
encapsulation/re-encapsulation, the AERO interface sets the DF bit as
discussed in Section 3.9.
AERO interfaces configured over INET underlying interfaces
encapsulate packets in INET headers according to the next hop
determined in the forwarding algorithm in Section 3.10. If the next
hop is reached via a secured tunnel, the AERO interface uses an
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encapsulation format specific to the secured tunnel type (see:
Section 6). If the next hop is reached via an unsecured INET
interface, the AERO interface instead uses UDP/IP encapsulation
according to the Teredo format specified in [RFC4380] and as extended
in [RFC6081].
When Teredo encapsulation is used, the AERO interface next sets the
UDP source port to a constant value that it will use in each
successive packet it sends, and sets the UDP length field to the
length of the encapsulated packet plus 8 bytes for the UDP header
itself plus the length of any included Teredo extension headers or
trailers. The encapsulated packet may be either IPv6 or IPv4, as
distinguished by the version number found in the first four bits.
For Teredo-encapsulated packets sent to a Server, Relay or Bridge,
the AERO interface sets the UDP destination port to 8060, i.e., the
IANA-registered port number for AERO. For packets sent to a Client,
the AERO interface sets the UDP destination port to the port value
stored in the neighbor cache entry for this Client. The AERO
interface finally includes/omits the UDP checksum according to
[RFC6935][RFC6936].
AERO interfaces observe the packet sizing and fragmentation
considerations found in Section 3.9.
3.7. AERO Interface Decapsulation
AERO interfaces decapsulate packets destined either to the AERO node
itself or to a destination reached via an interface other than the
AERO interface the packet was received on. When the encapsulated
packet arrives in multiple SPAN fragments, the AERO interface
reassembles as discussed in Section 3.9. Further decapsulation steps
are performed according to the appropriate encapsulation format
specification.
3.8. AERO Interface Data Origin Authentication
AERO nodes employ simple data origin authentication procedures. In
particular:
o AERO Bridges, Servers and Proxys accept encapsulated data packets
and control messages received from the spanning tree.
o AERO Proxys and Clients accept packets that originate from within
the same secured ANET.
o AERO Clients and Relays accept packets from downstream network
correspondents based on ingress filtering.
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o AERO Clients, Relays and Servers verify the outer UDP/IP
encapsulation addresses according to the Teredo specification
[RFC4380].
AERO nodes silently drop any packets that do not satisfy the above
data origin authentication procedures. Further security
considerations are discussed in Section 6.
3.9. AERO Interface MTU and Fragmentation
The AERO interface observes the link nature of tunnels, including the
Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) and the role of fragmentation and
reassembly[I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels]. The AERO interface is
configured over one or more underlying interfaces that may have
diverse MTUs.
IPv6 underlying interfaces are REQUIRED to configure a minimum MTU of
1280 bytes [RFC8200]. The minimum MTU for IPv4 underlying interfaces
is only 68 bytes [RFC1122], meaning that a packet smaller than the
IPv6 minimum MTU may require fragmentation when IPv4 encapsulation is
used. Therefore, the Don't Fragment (DF) bit in the IPv4
encapsulation header MUST be set to 0.
The AERO interface configures an MTU of 9180 bytes [RFC2492]; the
size is therefore not a reflection of the underlying interface MTUs,
but rather determines the largest packet the AERO interface can
forward or reassemble. The AERO interface therefore accommodates
packets as large as the AERO interface MTU while generating IPv6 Path
MTU Discovery (PMTUD) Packet Too Big (PTB) messages [RFC8201] as
necessary (see below). For IPv4 packets with DF=0, the IP layer
applies IPv4 fragmentation if necessary to admit the fragments into
the AERO interface. The interface may then internally apply further
IPv4 fragmentation prior to encapsulation to ensure that the IPv4
fragments are delivered to the final destination.
AERO interfaces internally employ SPAN encapsulation and
fragmentation/reassembly per [RFC2473]. The AERO interface returns
internally-generated PTB messages for packets admitted into the
interface that it deems too large (e.g., according to link
performance characteristics, reassembly cost, etc.) while either
dropping or forwarding the packet as necessary. The AERO interface
performs PMTUD even if the destination appears to be on the same link
since intermediate AERO link nodes may return a PTB. This ensures
that the path MTU is adaptive and reflects the current path used for
a given data flow.
AERO nodes perform SPAN encapsulation and fragmentation/reassembly as
follows:
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o When a node's AERO interface sends a packet over a Proxyed, VPNed
or Direct underlying interface, it sends without SPAN
encapsulation if the packet is no larger than the underlying
interface MTU. Otherwise, it inserts a SPAN header with source
address set to the node's own ULA and destination set to the ULA
of the link-layer peer Proxy, Server or Client on the underlying
interface. The AERO interface then uses IPv6 fragmentation to
break the packet into a minimum number of non-overlapping
fragments, where the largest fragment size is determined by the
underlying interface MTU and the smallest fragment is no smaller
than 640 bytes. The AERO interface then sends the fragments to
the link-layer peer, which reassembles before forwarding toward
the final destination.
o When a node's AERO interface sends a packet over an INET
underlying interface, it sends packets no larger than 1280 bytes
(including any INET headers) without a SPAN header if the
destination is reached via an INET address within the same AERO
link segment. Otherwise, it inserts a SPAN header with source
address set to the node's ULA, destination set to the ULA of the
next hop AERO node toward the final destination and (if necessary)
with a SRH with the remaining Segment IDs on the path to the final
destination. The AERO interface then uses IPv6 fragmentation to
break the encapsulated packet into a minimum number of non-
overlapping fragments, where the largest fragment size (including
both SPAN and INET encapsulation) is 1280 bytes and the smallest
fragment is no smaller than 640 bytes. The AERO interface then
encapsulates the SPAN fragments in INET headers and sends them to
the SPAN destination, which reassembles before forwarding toward
the final destination.
AERO interfaces unconditionally drop all SPAN fragments smaller than
640 bytes. In order to set the correct context for reassembly, the
AERO interface that inserts a SPAN header MUST also be the one that
inserts the IPv6 Fragment Header Identification value. While not
strictly required, sending all fragments of the same fragmented SPAN
packet consecutively over the same underlying interface with minimal
inter-fragment delay can in some cases increase the likelihood of
successful reassembly.
Note that the AERO interface can forward large packets via
encapsulation and fragmentation while at the same time returning
advisory PTB messages, e.g., subject to rate limiting. The receiving
node that performs reassembly can also send advisory PTB messages if
reassembly conditions become unfavorable. The AERO interface can
therefore continuously forward large packets without loss while
returning advisory messages recommending a smaller size (but no
smaller than 1280). Advisory PTB messages are differentiated from
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PTB messages that report loss by setting the Code field in the ICMPv6
message header to the value 1. This document therefore updates
[RFC4443] and [RFC8201].
3.9.1. Fragmentation Security Implications
As discussed in Section 3.7 of [I-D.ietf-intarea-frag-fragile], there
are four basic threats concerning IPv6 fragmentation; each of which
is addressed by a suitable mitigation as follows:
1. Overlapping fragment attacks - reassembly of overlapping
fragments is forbidden by [RFC8200]; therefore, this threat does
not apply to AERO interfaces.
2. Resource exhaustion attacks - this threat is mitigated by
providing a sufficiently large AERO interface reassembly cache
and instituting "fast discard" of incomplete reassemblies that
may be part of a buffer exhaustion attack. The reassembly cache
should be sufficiently large so that a sustained attack does not
cause excessive loss of good reassemblies but not so large that
(timer-based) data structure management becomes computationally
expensive.
3. Attacks based on predictable fragment identification values -
this threat is mitigated by selecting a suitably random ID value
per [RFC7739].
4. Evasion of Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) - this
threat is mitigated by disallowing "tiny fragments" per the AERO
interface fragmentation procedures specified above.
Additionally, IPv4 fragmentation includes a 16-bit Identification (IP
ID) field with only 65535 unique values, meaning that for even
moderately high data rates the field could wrap and apply to new
packets while the fragments of old packets using the same ID are
still alive in the network [RFC4963]. Since IPv6 provides a 32-bit
Identification value, however, this is not a concern for IPv6
fragmentation.
3.10. AERO Interface Forwarding Algorithm
IP packets enter a node's AERO interface either from the network
layer (i.e., from a local application or the IP forwarding system) or
from the link layer (i.e., from an AERO interface neighbor). All
packets entering a node's AERO interface first undergo data origin
authentication as discussed in Section 3.8. Packets that satisfy
data origin authentication are processed further, while all others
are dropped silently.
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Packets that enter the AERO interface from the network layer are
forwarded to an AERO interface neighbor. Packets that enter the AERO
interface from the link layer are either re-admitted into the AERO
link or forwarded to the network layer where they are subject to
either local delivery or IP forwarding. In all cases, the AERO
interface itself MUST NOT decrement the network layer TTL/Hop-count
since its forwarding actions occur below the network layer.
AERO interfaces may have multiple underlying interfaces and/or
neighbor cache entries for neighbors with multiple ifIndex-tuple
registrations (see Section 3.3). The AERO interface uses traffic
classifiers (e.g., DSCP value, port number, etc.) to select an
outgoing underlying interface for each packet based on the node's own
QoS preferences, and also to select a destination link-layer address
based on the neighbor's underlying interface with the highest
preference. AERO implementations SHOULD allow for QoS preference
values to be modified at runtime through network management.
If multiple outgoing interfaces and/or neighbor interfaces have a
preference of "high", the AERO node replicates the packet and sends
one copy via each of the (outgoing / neighbor) interface pairs;
otherwise, the node sends a single copy of the packet via an
interface with the highest preference. AERO nodes keep track of
which underlying interfaces are currently "reachable" or
"unreachable", and only use "reachable" interfaces for forwarding
purposes.
The following sections discuss the AERO interface forwarding
algorithms for Clients, Proxys, Servers and Bridges. In the
following discussion, a packet's destination address is said to
"match" if it is the same as a cached address, or if it is covered by
a cached prefix (which may be encoded in an LLA).
3.10.1. Client Forwarding Algorithm
When an IP packet enters a Client's AERO interface from the network
layer the Client searches for an asymmetric neighbor cache entry that
matches the destination. If there is a match, the Client uses one or
more "reachable" neighbor interfaces in the entry for packet
forwarding. If there is no asymmetric neighbor cache entry, the
Client instead forwards the packet toward a Server (the packet is
intercepted by a Proxy if there is a Proxy on the path). The Client
encapsulates the packet in a SPAN header and fragments if necessary
according to MTU requirements (see: Section 3.9).
When an IP packet enters a Client's AERO interface from the link-
layer, if the destination matches one of the Client's MNPs or link-
local addresses the Client reassembles and decapsulates as necessary
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and delivers the inner packet to the network layer. Otherwise, the
Client drops the packet and MAY return a network-layer ICMP
Destination Unreachable message subject to rate limiting (see:
Section 3.11).
3.10.2. Proxy Forwarding Algorithm
For control messages originating from or destined to a Client, the
Proxy intercepts the message and updates its proxy neighbor cache
entry for the Client. The Proxy then forwards a (proxyed) copy of
the control message. (For example, the Proxy forwards a proxied
version of a Client's NS/RS message to the target neighbor, and
forwards a proxied version of the NA/RA reply to the Client.)
When the Proxy receives a data packet from a Client within the ANET,
the Proxy reassembles and re-fragments if necessary then searches for
an asymmetric neighbor cache entry that matches the destination and
forwards as follows:
o if the destination matches an asymmetric neighbor cache entry, the
Proxy uses one or more "reachable" neighbor interfaces in the
entry for packet forwarding using SPAN encapsulation and including
a SRH if necessary according to the cached TLLAO information. If
the neighbor interface is in the same SPAN segment, the Proxy
forwards the packet directly to the neighbor; otherwise, it
forwards the packet to a Bridge.
o else, the Proxy uses SPAN encapsulation and forwards the packet to
a Bridge while using the ULA corresponding to the packet's
destination as the SPAN destination address.
When the Proxy receives an encapsulated data packet from an INET
neighbor or from a secured tunnel from a Bridge, it accepts the
packet only if data origin authentication succeeds and if there is a
proxy neighbor cache entry that matches the inner destination. Next,
the Proxy reassembles the packet (if necessary) and continues
processing.
Next if reassembly is complete and the neighbor cache state is
REACHABLE, the Proxy returns a PTB if necessary (see: Section 3.9)
then either drops or forwards the packet to the Client while
performing SPAN encapsulation and re-fragmentation to the ANET MTU
size if necessary. If the neighbor cache entry state is DEPARTED,
the Proxy instead changes the SPAN destination address to the address
of the new Server and forwards it to a Bridge while performing re-
fragmentation to 1280 bytes if necessary.
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3.10.3. Server/Relay Forwarding Algorithm
For control messages destined to a target Client's LLA that are
received from a secured tunnel, the Server intercepts the message and
sends an appropriate response on behalf of the Client. (For example,
the Server sends an NA message reply in response to an NS message
directed to one of its associated Clients.) If the Client's neighbor
cache entry is in the DEPARTED state, however, the Server instead
forwards the packet to the Client's new Server as discussed in
Section 3.16.
When the Server receives an encapsulated data packet from an INET
neighbor or from a secured tunnel, it accepts the packet only if data
origin authentication succeeds. If the SPAN destination address is
its own address, the Server continues processing as follows:
o if the destination matches a symmetric neighbor cache entry in the
REACHABLE state the Server prepares the packet for forwarding to
the destination Client. The Server first reassembles (if
necessary) and forwards the packet (while re-fragmenting if
necessary) as specified in Section 3.9.
o else, if the destination matches a symmetric neighbor cache entry
in the DEPARETED state the Server re-encapsulates the packet and
forwards it using the ULA of the Client's new Server as the
destination.
o else, if the destination matches an asymmetric neighbor cache
entry, the Server uses one or more "reachable" neighbor interfaces
in the entry for packet forwarding via the local INET if the
neighbor is in the same AERO link segment or using SPAN
encapsulation and Segment Routing if necessary with the final
destination set to the neighbor's ULA otherwise.
o else, if the destination is an LLA that is not assigned on the
AERO interface the Server drops the packet.
o else, the Server (acting as a Relay) reassembles if necessary,
decapsulates the packet and releases it to the network layer for
local delivery or IP forwarding. Based on the information in the
forwarding table, the network layer may return the packet to the
same AERO interface in which case further processing occurs as
below. (Note that this arrangement accommodates common
implementations in which the IP forwarding table is not accessible
from within the AERO interface. If the AERO interface can
directly access the IP forwarding table (such as for in-kernel
implementations) the forwarding table lookup can instead be
performed internally from within the AERO interface itself.)
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When the Server's AERO interface receives a data packet from the
network layer or from a VPNed or Direct Client, it performs SPAN
encapsulation and fragmentation if necessary, then processes the
packet according to the network-layer destination address as follows:
o if the destination matches a symmetric or asymmetric neighbor
cache entry the Server processes the packet as above.
o else, the Server encapsulates the packet and forwards it to a
Bridge using its own ULA as the source and the ULA corresponding
to the destination as the destination.
3.10.4. Bridge Forwarding Algorithm
Bridges forward SPAN-encapsulated packets over secured tunnels the
same as any IP router. When the Bridge receives a SPAN-encapsulated
packet via a secured tunnel, it removes the outer INET header and
searches for a forwarding table entry that matches the SPAN
destination address. The Bridge then processes the packet as
follows:
o if the destination matches its ULA Subnet Router Anycast address,
the Bridge checks for a SRH. If there is a SRH with Segments
Left=1, with the ULA of a Server on the local segment as the
ultimate segment ID, and with an AERO Route Optimization TLV, the
Bridge examines the FMT to determine if the target is behind a
NAT. If no NAT is indicated, the Bridge copies the MNP Subnet
Router Anycast address into the destination address then forwards
the packet directly to the Link Layer Address using link-layer
(UDP/IP) encapsulation. If a NAT is indicated, the Bridge MAY
perform NAT traversal procedures by sending bubbles per [RFC4380].
The Bridge then either applies AERO route optimization if NAT
traversal procedures have been successfully applied, or forwards
the packet directly to the Server.
o if the destination matches one of the Bridge's own addresses, the
Bridge submits the packet for local delivery.
o else, if the destination matches a forwarding table entry the
Bridge forwards the packet via a secured tunnel to the next hop.
If the destination matches an MSP without matching an MNP,
however, the Bridge instead drops the packet and returns an ICMP
Destination Unreachable message subject to rate limiting (see:
Section 3.11).
o else, the Bridge drops the packet and returns an ICMP Destination
Unreachable as above.
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As for any IP router, the Bridge decrements the TTL/Hop Limit when it
forwards the packet. Therefore, only the Hop Limit in the SPAN
header is decremented, and not the TTL/Hop Limit in the inner packet
header.
3.11. AERO Interface Error Handling
When an AERO node admits a packet into the AERO interface, it may
receive link-layer or network-layer error indications.
A link-layer error indication is an ICMP error message generated by a
router in the INET on the path to the neighbor or by the neighbor
itself. The message includes an IP header with the address of the
node that generated the error as the source address and with the
link-layer address of the AERO node as the destination address.
The IP header is followed by an ICMP header that includes an error
Type, Code and Checksum. Valid type values include "Destination
Unreachable", "Time Exceeded" and "Parameter Problem"
[RFC0792][RFC4443]. (AERO interfaces ignore all link-layer IPv4
"Fragmentation Needed" and IPv6 "Packet Too Big" messages since they
only emit packets that are guaranteed to be no larger than the IP
minimum link MTU as discussed in Section 3.9.)
The ICMP header is followed by the leading portion of the packet that
generated the error, also known as the "packet-in-error". For
ICMPv6, [RFC4443] specifies that the packet-in-error includes: "As
much of invoking packet as possible without the ICMPv6 packet
exceeding the minimum IPv6 MTU" (i.e., no more than 1280 bytes). For
ICMPv4, [RFC0792] specifies that the packet-in-error includes:
"Internet Header + 64 bits of Original Data Datagram", however
[RFC1812] Section 4.3.2.3 updates this specification by stating: "the
ICMP datagram SHOULD contain as much of the original datagram as
possible without the length of the ICMP datagram exceeding 576
bytes".
The link-layer error message format is shown in Figure 6 (where, "L2"
and "L3" refer to link-layer and network-layer, respectively):
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ ~
| L2 IP Header of |
| error message |
~ ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| L2 ICMP Header |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ---
~ ~ P
| IP and other encapsulation | a
| headers of original L3 packet | c
~ ~ k
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ e
~ ~ t
| IP header of |
| original L3 packet | i
~ ~ n
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
~ ~ e
| Upper layer headers and | r
| leading portion of body | r
| of the original L3 packet | o
~ ~ r
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ---
Figure 6: AERO Interface Link-Layer Error Message Format
The AERO node rules for processing these link-layer error messages
are as follows:
o When an AERO node receives a link-layer Parameter Problem message,
it processes the message the same as described as for ordinary
ICMP errors in the normative references [RFC0792][RFC4443].
o When an AERO node receives persistent link-layer Time Exceeded
messages, the IP ID field may be wrapping before earlier fragments
awaiting reassembly have been processed. In that case, the node
should begin including integrity checks and/or institute rate
limits for subsequent packets.
o When an AERO node receives persistent link-layer Destination
Unreachable messages in response to encapsulated packets that it
sends to one of its asymmetric neighbor correspondents, the node
should process the message as an indication that a path may be
failing, and optionally initiate NUD over that path. If it
receives Destination Unreachable messages over multiple paths, the
node should allow future packets destined to the correspondent to
flow through a default route and re-initiate route optimization.
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o When an AERO Client receives persistent link-layer Destination
Unreachable messages in response to encapsulated packets that it
sends to one of its symmetric neighbor Servers, the Client should
mark the path as unusable and use another path. If it receives
Destination Unreachable messages on many or all paths, the Client
should associate with a new Server and release its association
with the old Server as specified in Section 3.16.5.
o When an AERO Server receives persistent link-layer Destination
Unreachable messages in response to encapsulated packets that it
sends to one of its symmetric neighbor Clients, the Server should
mark the underlying path as unusable and use another underlying
path.
o When an AERO Server or Proxy receives link-layer Destination
Unreachable messages in response to an encapsulated packet that it
sends to one of its permanent neighbors, it treats the messages as
an indication that the path to the neighbor may be failing.
However, the dynamic routing protocol should soon reconverge and
correct the temporary outage.
When an AERO Bridge receives a packet for which the network-layer
destination address is covered by an MSP, if there is no more-
specific routing information for the destination the Bridge drops the
packet and returns a network-layer Destination Unreachable message
subject to rate limiting. The Bridge writes the network-layer source
address of the original packet as the destination address and uses
one of its non link-local addresses as the source address of the
message.
When an AERO node receives an encapsulated packet for which the
reassembly buffer it too small, it drops the packet and returns a
network-layer Packet Too Big (PTB) message. The node first writes
the MRU value into the PTB message MTU field, writes the network-
layer source address of the original packet as the destination
address and writes one of its non link-local addresses as the source
address.
3.12. AERO Router Discovery, Prefix Delegation and Autoconfiguration
AERO Router Discovery, Prefix Delegation and Autoconfiguration are
coordinated as discussed in the following Sections.
3.12.1. AERO ND/PD Service Model
Each AERO Server on the link configures a PD service to facilitate
Client requests. Each Server is provisioned with a database of MNP-
to-Client ID mappings for all Clients enrolled in the AERO service,
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as well as any information necessary to authenticate each Client.
The Client database is maintained by a central administrative
authority for the AERO link and securely distributed to all Servers,
e.g., via the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [RFC4511],
via static configuration, etc. Clients receive the same service
regardless of the Servers they select.
AERO Clients and Servers use ND messages to maintain neighbor cache
entries. AERO Servers configure their AERO interfaces as advertising
NBMA interfaces, and therefore send unicast RA messages with a short
Router Lifetime value (e.g., ReachableTime seconds) in response to a
Client's RS message. Thereafter, Clients send additional RS messages
to keep Server state alive.
AERO Clients and Servers include PD parameters in RS/RA messages (see
[I-D.templin-6man-dhcpv6-ndopt] for ND/PD alternatives). The unified
ND/PD messages are exchanged between Client and Server according to
the prefix management schedule required by the PD service. If the
Client knows its MNP in advance, it can instead employ prefix
registration by including its LLA as the source address of an RS
message and with an OMNI option with valid prefix registration
information for the MNP. If the Server (and Proxy) accept the
Client's MNP assertion, they inject the prefix into the routing
system and establish the necessary neighbor cache state.
The following sections specify the Client and Server behavior.
3.12.2. AERO Client Behavior
AERO Clients discover the addresses of Servers in a similar manner as
described in [RFC5214]. Discovery methods include static
configuration (e.g., from a flat-file map of Server addresses and
locations), or through an automated means such as Domain Name System
(DNS) name resolution [RFC1035]. Alternatively, the Client can
discover Server addresses through a layer 2 data link login exchange,
or through a unicast RA response to a multicast/anycast RS as
described below. In the absence of other information, the Client can
resolve the DNS Fully-Qualified Domain Name (FQDN)
"linkupnetworks.[domainname]" where "linkupnetworks" is a constant
text string and "[domainname]" is a DNS suffix for the AERO link
(e.g., "example.com").
To associate with a Server, the Client acts as a requesting router to
request MNPs. The Client prepares an RS message with PD parameters
and includes a Nonce and Timestamp option if the Client needs to
correlate RA replies. If the Client already knows the Server's LLA,
it includes the LLA as the network-layer destination address;
otherwise, it includes the link-scoped All-Routers multicast
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(ff02::2) or Subnet-Router anycast (fe80::) address as the network-
layer destination. If the Client already knows its own LLA, it uses
the LLA as the network-layer source address; otherwise, it uses the
unspecified IPv6 address (::/128) as the network-layer source
address.
The Client next includes an OMNI option in the RS message to register
its link-layer information with the Server. The Client sets the OMNI
option prefix registration information according to the MNP, and
includes an ifIndex-tuple with S set to '1' corresponding to the
underlying interface over which the Client will send the RS message.
The Client MAY include additional ifIndex-tuples specific to other
underlying interfaces. The Client MAY also include an SLLAO
corresponding to the OMNI option ifIndex-tuple with S set to '1'.
The Client then sends the RS message (either directly via Direct
interfaces, via a VPN for VPNed interfaces, via a Proxy for proxyed
interfaces or via INET encapsulation for INET interfaces) and waits
for an RA message reply (see Section 3.12.3). The Client retries up
to MAX_RTR_SOLICITATIONS times until an RA is received. If the
Client receives no RAs, or if it receives an RA with Router Lifetime
set to 0, the Client SHOULD abandon this Server and try another
Server. Otherwise, the Client processes the PD information found in
the RA message.
Next, the Client creates a symmetric neighbor cache entry with the
Server's LLA as the network-layer address and the Server's
encapsulation and/or link-layer addresses as the link-layer address.
The Client records the RA Router Lifetime field value in the neighbor
cache entry as the time for which the Server has committed to
maintaining the MNP in the routing system via this underlying
interface, and caches the other RA configuration information
including Cur Hop Limit, M and O flags, Reachable Time and Retrans
Timer. The Client then autoconfigures LLAs for each of the delegated
MNPs and assigns them to the AERO interface. The Client also caches
any MSPs included in Route Information Options (RIOs) [RFC4191] as
MSPs to associate with the AERO link, and assigns the MTU value in
the MTU option to the underlying interface.
The Client then registers additional underlying interfaces with the
Server by sending RS messages via each additional interface. The RS
messages include the same parameters as for the initial RS/RA
exchange, but with destination address set to the Server's LLA.
Following autoconfiguration, the Client sub-delegates the MNPs to its
attached EUNs and/or the Client's own internal virtual interfaces as
described in [I-D.templin-v6ops-pdhost] to support the Client's
downstream attached "Internet of Things (IoT)". The Client
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subsequently sends additional RS messages over each underlying
interface before the Router Lifetime received for that interface
expires.
After the Client registers its underlying interfaces, it may wish to
change one or more registrations, e.g., if an interface changes
address or becomes unavailable, if QoS preferences change, etc. To
do so, the Client prepares an RS message to send over any available
underlying interface. The RS includes an OMNI option with prefix
registration information specific to its MNP, with an ifIndex-tuple
specific to the selected underlying interface with S set to '1', and
with any additional ifIndex-tuples specific to other underlying
interfaces. The Client includes fresh ifIndex-tuple values to update
the Server's neighbor cache entry. When the Client receives the
Server's RA response, it has assurance that the Server has been
updated with the new information.
If the Client wishes to discontinue use of a Server it issues an RS
message over any underlying interface with an OMNI option with a
prefix release indication. When the Server processes the message, it
releases the MNP, sets the symmetric neighbor cache entry state for
the Client to DEPARTED and returns an RA reply with Router Lifetime
set to 0. After a short delay (e.g., 2 seconds), the Server
withdraws the MNP from the routing system.
3.12.3. AERO Server Behavior
AERO Servers act as IP routers and support a PD service for Clients.
Servers arrange to add their LLAs to a static map of Server addresses
for the link and/or the DNS resource records for the FQDN
"linkupnetworks.[domainname]" before entering service. Server
addresses should be geographically and/or topologically referenced,
and made available for discovery by Clients on the AERO link.
When a Server receives a prospective Client's RS message on its AERO
interface, it SHOULD return an immediate RA reply with Router
Lifetime set to 0 if it is currently too busy or otherwise unable to
service the Client. Otherwise, the Server authenticates the RS
message and processes the PD parameters. The Server first determines
the correct MNPs to delegate to the Client by searching the Client
database. When the Server delegates the MNPs, it also creates a
forwarding table entry for each MNP so that the MNPs are propagated
into the routing system (see: Section 3.2.4). For IPv6, the Server
creates an IPv6 forwarding table entry for each MNP. For IPv4, the
Server creates an IPv6 forwarding table entry with the SPAN
Compatibility Prefix (SCP) corresponding to the IPv4 address.
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The Server next creates a symmetric neighbor cache entry for the
Client using the base LLA as the network-layer address and with
lifetime set to no more than the smallest PD lifetime. Next, the
Server updates the neighbor cache entry by recording the information
in each ifIndex-tuple in the RS OMNI option. The Server also records
the actual SPAN/INET addresses in the neighbor cache entry.
Next, the Server prepares an RA message using its LLA as the network-
layer source address and the network-layer source address of the RS
message as the network-layer destination address. The Server sets
the Router Lifetime to the time for which it will maintain both this
underlying interface individually and the symmetric neighbor cache
entry as a whole. The Server also sets Cur Hop Limit, M and O flags,
Reachable Time and Retrans Timer to values appropriate for the AERO
link. The Server includes the delegated MNPs, any other PD
parameters and an OMNI option with no ifIndex-tuples. The Server
then includes one or more RIOs that encode the MSPs for the AERO
link, plus an MTU option (see Section 3.9). The Server finally
forwards the message to the Client using SPAN/INET, INET, or NULL
encapsulation as necessary.
After the initial RS/RA exchange, the Server maintains a
ReachableTime timer for each of the Client's underlying interfaces
individually (and for the Client's symmetric neighbor cache entry
collectively) set to expire after ReachableTime seconds. If the
Client (or Proxy) issues additional RS messages, the Server sends an
RA response and resets ReachableTime. If the Server receives an ND
message with PD release indication it sets the Client's symmetric
neighbor cache entry to the DEPARTED state and withdraws the MNP from
the routing system after a short delay (e.g., 2 seconds). If
ReachableTime expires before a new RS is received on an individual
underlying interface, the Server marks the interface as DOWN. If
ReachableTime expires before any new RS is received on any individual
underlying interface, the Server sets the symmetric neighbor cache
entry state to STALE and sets a 10 second timer. If the Server has
not received a new RS or ND message with PD release indication before
the 10 second timer expires, it deletes the neighbor cache entry and
withdraws the MNP from the routing system.
The Server processes any ND/PD messages pertaining to the Client and
returns an NA/RA reply in response to solicitations. The Server may
also issue unsolicited RA messages, e.g., with PD reconfigure
parameters to cause the Client to renegotiate its PDs, with Router
Lifetime set to 0 if it can no longer service this Client, etc.
Finally, If the symmetric neighbor cache entry is in the DEPARTED
state, the Server deletes the entry after DepartTime expires.
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Note: Clients SHOULD notify former Servers of their departures, but
Servers are responsible for expiring neighbor cache entries and
withdrawing routes even if no departure notification is received
(e.g., if the Client leaves the network unexpectedly). Servers
SHOULD therefore set Router Lifetime to ReachableTime seconds in
solicited RA messages to minimize persistent stale cache information
in the absence of Client departure notifications. A short Router
Lifetime also ensures that proactive Client/Server RS/RA messaging
will keep any NAT state alive (see above).
Note: All Servers on an AERO link MUST advertise consistent values in
the RA Cur Hop Limit, M and O flags, Reachable Time and Retrans Timer
fields the same as for any link, since unpredictable behavior could
result if different Servers on the same link advertised different
values.
3.12.3.1. Lightweight DHCPv6 Relay Agent (LDRA)
When DHCPv6 is used as the ND/PD service back end, AERO Clients and
Servers are always on the same link (i.e., the AERO link) from the
perspective of DHCPv6. However, in some implementations the DHCPv6
server and ND function may be located in separate modules. In that
case, the Server's AERO interface module can act as a Lightweight
DHCPv6 Relay Agent (LDRA)[RFC6221] to relay PD messages to and from
the DHCPv6 server module.
When the LDRA receives an authentic RS message, it extracts the PD
message parameters and uses them to construct an IPv6/UDP/DHCPv6
message. It sets the IPv6 source address to the source address of
the RS message, sets the IPv6 destination address to
'All_DHCP_Relay_Agents_and_Servers' and sets the UDP fields to values
that will be understood by the DHCPv6 server.
The LDRA then wraps the message in a DHCPv6 'Relay-Forward' message
header and includes an 'Interface-Id' option that includes enough
information to allow the LDRA to forward the resulting Reply message
back to the Client (e.g., the Client's link-layer addresses, a
security association identifier, etc.). The LDRA also wraps the OMNI
option and SLLAO into the Interface-Id option, then forwards the
message to the DHCPv6 server.
When the DHCPv6 server prepares a Reply message, it wraps the message
in a 'Relay-Reply' message and echoes the Interface-Id option. The
DHCPv6 server then delivers the Relay-Reply message to the LDRA,
which discards the Relay-Reply wrapper and IPv6/UDP headers, then
uses the DHCPv6 message to construct an RA response to the Client.
The Server uses the information in the Interface-Id option to prepare
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the RA message and to cache the link-layer addresses taken from the
OMNI option and SLLAO echoed in the Interface-Id option.
3.13. The AERO Proxy
Clients may connect to ANETs that deploy perimeter security services
to facilitate communications to Servers in outside INETs. In that
case, the ANET can employ an AERO Proxy. The Proxy is located at the
ANET/INET border and listens for RS messages originating from or RA
messages destined to ANET Clients. The Proxy acts on these control
messages as follows:
o when the Proxy receives an RS message from a new ANET Client, it
first authenticates the message then examines the network-layer
destination address. If the destination address is a Server's
LLA, the Proxy proceeds to the next step. Otherwise, if the
destination is All-Routers multicast or Subnet-Router anycast, the
Proxy selects a "nearby" Server that is likely to be a good
candidate to serve the Client and replaces the destination address
with the Server's LLA. Next, the Proxy creates a proxy neighbor
cache entry and caches the Client and Server link-layer addresses
along with the OMNI option information and any other identifying
information including Transaction IDs, Client Identifiers, Nonce
values, etc. The Proxy finally encapsulates the (proxyed) RS
message in a SPAN header with source set to the Proxy's ULA and
destination set to the Server's ULA then forwards the message into
the SPAN.
o when the Server receives the RS, it authenticates the message then
creates or updates a symmetric neighbor cache entry for the Client
with the Proxy's ULA as the link-layer address. The Server then
sends an RA message back to the Proxy via the spanning tree.
o when the Proxy receives the RA, it authenticates the message and
matches it with the proxy neighbor cache entry created by the RS.
The Proxy then caches the PD route information as a mapping from
the Client's MNPs to the Client's link-layer address, caches the
Server's advertised Router Lifetime and sets the neighbor cache
entry state to REACHABLE. The Proxy then sets the P bit in the RA
flags field, optionally rewrites the Router Lifetime and forwards
the (proxyed) message to the Client. The Proxy finally includes
an MTU option (if necessary) with an MTU to use for the underlying
ANET interface.
After the initial RS/RA exchange, the Proxy forwards any Client data
packets for which there is no matching asymmetric neighbor cache
entry to a Bridge using SPAN encapsulation with its own ULA as the
source and the ULA corresponding to the Client as the destination.
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The Proxy instead forwards any Client data destined to an asymmetric
neighbor cache target directly to the target according to the SPAN/
link-layer information - the process of establishing asymmetric
neighbor cache entries is specified in Section 3.14.
While the Client is still attached to the ANET, the Proxy sends NS,
RS and/or unsolicited NA messages to update the Server's symmetric
neighbor cache entries on behalf of the Client and/or to convey QoS
updates. This allows for higher-frequency Proxy-initiated RS/RA
messaging over well-connected INET infrastructure supplemented by
lower-frequency Client-initiated RS/RA messaging over constrained
ANET data links.
If the Server ceases to send solicited advertisements, the Proxy
sends unsolicited RAs on the ANET interface with destination set to
All-Nodes multicast (ff02::1) and with Router Lifetime set to zero to
inform Clients that the Server has failed. Although the Proxy
engages in ND exchanges on behalf of the Client, the Client can also
send ND messages on its own behalf, e.g., if it is in a better
position than the Proxy to convey QoS changes, etc. For this reason,
the Proxy marks any Client-originated solicitation messages (e.g. by
inserting a Nonce option) so that it can return the solicited
advertisement to the Client instead of processing it locally.
If the Client becomes unreachable, the Proxy sets the neighbor cache
entry state to DEPARTED and retains the entry for DepartTime seconds.
While the state is DEPARTED, the Proxy forwards any packets destined
to the Client to a Bridge via SPAN encapsulation with the Client's
current Server as the destination. The Bridge in turn forwards the
packets to the Client's current Server. When DepartTime expires, the
Proxy deletes the neighbor cache entry and discards any further
packets destined to this (now forgotten) Client.
In some ANETs that employ a Proxy, the Client's MNP can be injected
into the ANET routing system. In that case, the Client can send data
messages without encapsulation so that the ANET routing system
transports the unencapsulated packets to the Proxy. This can be very
beneficial, e.g., if the Client connects to the ANET via low-end data
links such as some aviation wireless links.
If the first-hop ANET access router is AERO-aware, the Client can
avoid encapsulation for both its control and data messages. When the
Client connects to the link, it can send an unencapsulated RS message
with source address set to its LLA and with destination address set
to the LLA of the Client's selected Server or to All-Routers
multicast or Subnet-Router anycast. The Client includes an OMNI
option formatted as specified in [I-D.templin-6man-omni-interface].
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The Client then sends the unencapsulated RS message, which will be
intercepted by the AERO-Aware access router. The access router then
encapsulates the RS message in an ANET header with its own address as
the source address and the address of a Proxy as the destination
address. The access router further remembers the address of the
Proxy so that it can encapsulate future data packets from the Client
via the same Proxy. If the access router needs to change to a new
Proxy, it simply sends another RS message toward the Server via the
new Proxy on behalf of the Client.
In some cases, the access router and Proxy may be one and the same
node. In that case, the node would be located on the same physical
link as the Client, but its message exchanges with the Server would
need to pass through a security gateway at the ANET/INET border. The
method for deploying access routers and Proxys (i.e. as a single node
or multiple nodes) is an ANET-local administrative consideration.
3.13.1. Detecting and Responding to Server Failures
In environments where fast recovery from Server failure is required,
Proxys SHOULD use proactive Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD)
to track Server reachability in a similar fashion as for
Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) [RFC5880]. Proxys can then
quickly detect and react to failures so that cached information is
re-established through alternate paths. The NUD control messaging is
carried only over well-connected ground domain networks (i.e., and
not low-end aeronautical radio links) and can therefore be tuned for
rapid response.
Proxys perform proactive NUD with Servers for which there are
currently active ANET Clients by sending continuous NS messages in
rapid succession, e.g., one message per second. The Proxy sends the
NS message via the spanning tree with the Proxy's LLA as the source
and the LLA of the Server as the destination. When the Proxy is also
sending RS messages to the Server on behalf of ANET Clients, the
resulting RA responses can be considered as equivalent hints of
forward progress. This means that the Proxy need not also send a
periodic NS if it has already sent an RS within the same period. If
the Server fails (i.e., if the Proxy ceases to receive
advertisements), the Proxy can quickly inform Clients by sending
multicast RA messages on the ANET interface.
The Proxy sends RA messages on the ANET interface with source address
set to the Server's address, destination address set to All-Nodes
multicast, and Router Lifetime set to 0. The Proxy SHOULD send
MAX_FINAL_RTR_ADVERTISEMENTS RA messages separated by small delays
[RFC4861]. Any Clients on the ANET that had been using the failed
Server will receive the RA messages and associate with a new Server.
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3.13.2. Point-to-Multipoint Server Coordination
In environments where Client messaging over ANETs is bandwidth-
limited and/or expensive, Clients can enlist the services of the
Proxy to coordinate with multiple Servers in a single RS/RA message
exchange. The Client can send a single RS message to All-Routers
multicast that includes the ID's of multiple Servers in MS-Register
sub-options of the OMNI option.
When the Proxy receives the RS and processes the OMNI option, it
performs a separate RS/RA exchange with each MS-Register Server.
When it has received the RA messages, it creates an "aggregate" RA
message to return to the Client with an OMNI option with each
responding Server's ID recorded in an MS-Register sub-option.
Clients can thereafter employ efficient point-to-multipoint Server
coordination under the assistance of the Proxy to dramatically reduce
the number of messages sent over the ANET while enlisting the support
of multiple Servers for fault tolerance. Clients can further include
MS-Release suboptions in RS messages to request the Proxy to release
from former Servers via the procedures discussed in Section 3.16.5.
The OMNI interface specification [I-D.templin-6man-omni-interface]
provides further discussion of the Client/Proxy RS/RA messaging
involved in point-to-multipoint coordination.
3.14. AERO Route Optimization
While data packets are flowing between a source and target node,
route optimization SHOULD be used. Route optimization is initiated
by the first eligible Route Optimization Source (ROS) closest to the
source as follows:
o For Clients on VPNed and Direct interfaces, the Server is the ROS.
o For Clients on Proxyed interfaces, the Proxy is the ROS.
o For Clients on INET interfaces, the Client itself is the ROS.
o For correspondent nodes on INET/EUN interfaces serviced by a
Relay, the Relay is the ROS.
The route optimization procedure is conducted between the ROS and the
target Server/Relay acting as a Route Optimization Responder (ROR) in
the same manner as for IPv6 ND Address Resolution and using the same
NS/NA messaging. The target may either be a MNP Client serviced by a
Server, or a non-MNP correspondent reachable via a Relay.
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The procedures are specified in the following sections.
3.14.1. Route Optimization Initiation
While data packets are flowing from the source node toward a target
node, the ROS performs address resolution by sending an NS message
for Address Resolution (NS(AR)) to receive a solicited NA message
from the ROR. When the ROS sends an NS(AR), it includes:
o the LLA of the ROS as the source address.
o the data packet's destination as the Target Address.
o the Solicited-Node multicast address [RFC4291] formed from the
lower 24 bits of the data packet's destination as the destination
address, e.g., for 2001:db8:1:2::10:2000 the NS destination
address is ff02:0:0:0:0:1:ff10:2000.
The NS(AR) message includes an OMNI option with no ifIndex-tuples and
no SLLAO, such that the target will not create a neighbor cache
entry.
The ROS then encapsulates the NS(AR) message in a SPAN header with
source set to its own ULA and destination set to the ULA
corresponding to the packet's final destination, then sends the
message into the spanning tree without decrementing the network-layer
TTL/Hop Limit field.
3.14.2. Relaying the NS
When the Bridge receives the NS(AR) message from the ROS, it discards
the INET header and determines that the ROR is the next hop by
consulting its standard IPv6 forwarding table for the SPAN header
destination address. The Bridge then forwards the message toward the
ROR via the spanning tree the same as for any IPv6 router. The
final-hop Bridge in the spanning tree will deliver the message via a
secured tunnel to the ROR.
3.14.3. Processing the NS and Sending the NA
When the ROR receives the NS(AR) message, it examines the Target
Address to determine whether it has a neighbor cache entry and/or
route that matches the target. If there is no match, the ROR drops
the message. Otherwise, the ROR continues processing as follows:
o if the target belongs to an MNP Client neighbor in the DEPARTED
state the ROR changes the NS(AR) message SPAN destination address
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to the ULA of the Client's new Server, forwards the message into
the spanning tree and returns from processing.
o If the target belongs to an MNP Client neighbor in the REACHABLE
state, the ROR instead adds the AERO source address to the target
Client's Report List with time set to ReportTime.
o If the target belongs to a non-MNP route, the ROR continues
processing without adding an entry to the Report List.
The ROR then prepares a solicited NA message to send back to the ROS
but does not create a neighbor cache entry. The ROR sets the NA
source address to the LLA corresponding to the target, sets the
Target Address to the target of the solicitation, and sets the
destination address to the source of the solicitation.
The ROR then includes an OMNI option with prefix registration length
set to the length of the MNP if the target is an MNP Client;
otherwise, set to the maximum of the non-MNP prefix length and 64.
(Note that a /64 limit is imposed to avoid causing the ROS to set
short prefixes (e.g., "default") that would match destinations for
which the routing system includes more-specific prefixes.)
If the target is an MNP Client, the ROR next includes ifIndex-tuples
in the OMNI option for each of the target Client's underlying
interfaces with current information for each interface and with the S
flag set to 0. The ROR then includes a TLLAO with ifIndex-tuples in
one-to-one correspondence with the tuples that appear in the OMNI
option.
The ROR sets the Link Layer Address and Port Number (if necessary) to
its own INET address for VPNed and Direct interfaces or to the INET
address of the Proxy for Proxyed interface, then includes its own ULA
or the ULA of the Proxy as the ultimate Segment Routing List entry.
For INET interfaces, the ROR instead sets the Link Layer Address and
Port Number (if necessary) to the Client's INET address then sets its
own ULA in the penultimate Segment Routing List entry and sets the
target's ULA in the ultimate Segment Routing List entry.
The ROR then sets the NA message R flag to 1 (as a router), S flag to
1 (as a response to a solicitation), and O flag to 0 (as a proxy).
The ROR finally encapsulates the NA message in a SPAN header with
source set to its own ULA and destination set to the source ULA of
the NS(AR) message, then forwards the message into the spanning tree
without decrementing the network-layer TTL/Hop Limit field.
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3.14.4. Relaying the NA
When the Bridge receives the NA message from the ROR, it discards the
INET header and determines that the ROS is the next hop by consulting
its standard IPv6 forwarding table for the SPAN header destination
address. The Bridge then forwards the SPAN-encapsulated NA message
toward the ROS the same as for any IPv6 router. The final-hop Bridge
in the spanning tree will deliver the message via a secured tunnel to
the ROS.
3.14.5. Processing the NA
When the ROS receives the solicited NA message, it processes the
message the same as for standard IPv6 Address Resolution [RFC4861].
In the process, it caches the source ULA then creates an asymmetric
neighbor cache entry for the ROR and caches all information found in
the OMNI and TLLAO options. The ROS finally sets the asymmetric
neighbor cache entry lifetime to ReachableTime seconds.
3.14.6. Route Optimization Maintenance
Following route optimization, the ROS forwards future data packets
destined to the target via the addresses found in the cached link-
layer information. The route optimization is shared by all sources
that send packets to the target via the ROS, i.e., and not just the
source on behalf of which the route optimization was initiated.
While new data packets destined to the target are flowing through the
ROS, it sends additional NS(AR) messages to the ROR before
ReachableTime expires to receive a fresh solicited NA message the
same as described in the previous sections (route optimization
refreshment strategies are an implementation matter, with a non-
normative example given in Appendix B.1). The ROS uses the cached
ULA of the ROR as the NS(AR) SPAN destination address, and sends up
to MAX_MULTICAST_SOLICIT NS(AR) messages separated by 1 second until
an NA is received. If no NA is received, the ROS assumes that the
current ROR has become unreachable and deletes the neighbor cache
entry. Subsequent data packets will trigger a new route optimization
per Section 3.14.1 to discover a new ROR while initial data packets
travel over a suboptimal route.
If an NA is received, the ROS then updates the asymmetric neighbor
cache entry to refresh ReachableTime, while (for MNP destinations)
the ROR adds or updates the ROS address to the target Client's Report
List and with time set to ReportTime. While no data packets are
flowing, the ROS instead allows ReachableTime for the asymmetric
neighbor cache entry to expire. When ReachableTime expires, the ROS
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deletes the asymmetric neighbor cache entry. Any future data packets
flowing through the ROS will again trigger a new route optimization.
The ROS may also receive unsolicited NA messages from the ROR at any
time (see: Section 3.16). If there is an asymmetric neighbor cache
entry for the target, the ROS updates the link-layer information but
does not update ReachableTime since the receipt of an unsolicited NA
does not confirm that any forward paths are working. If there is no
asymmetric neighbor cache entry, the ROS simply discards the
unsolicited NA.
In this arrangement, the ROS holds an asymmetric neighbor cache entry
for the ROR, but the ROR does not hold an asymmetric neighbor cache
entry for the ROS. The route optimization neighbor relationship is
therefore asymmetric and unidirectional. If the target node also has
packets to send back to the source node, then a separate route
optimization procedure is performed in the reverse direction. But,
there is no requirement that the forward and reverse paths be
symmetric.
3.15. Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD)
AERO nodes perform Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD) per
[RFC4861] either reactively in response to persistent link-layer
errors (see Section 3.11) or proactively to confirm reachability.
The NUD algorithm is based on periodic control message exchanges.
The algorithm may further be seeded by ND hints of forward progress,
but care must be taken to avoid inferring reachability based on
spoofed information. For example, authentic IPv6 ND message
exchanges may be considered as acceptable hints of forward progress,
while spurious data packets should not be.
AERO Servers, Proxys and Relays can use standard NS/NA NUD exchanges
sent over the spanning tree to securely test reachability without
risk of DoS attacks from nodes pretending to be a neighbor; Proxys
can further perform NUD to securely verify Server reachability on
behalf of their proxyed Clients. However, a means for a ROS to test
the unsecured forward directions of target route optimized paths is
also necessary.
When an ROR directs an ROS to a neighbor with one or more target
link-layer addresses, the ROS can proactively test each such
unsecured route optimized path by sending "loopback" NS(NUD)
messages. While testing the paths, the ROS can optionally continue
to send packets via the spanning tree, maintain a small queue of
packets until target reachability is confirmed, or (optimistically)
allow packets to flow via the route optimized paths.
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When the ROS sends a loopback NS(NUD) message, it uses its LLA as
both the IPv6 source and destination address, and the MNP Subnet-
Router anycast address as the Target Address. The ROS includes a
Nonce and Timestamp option, then encapsulates the message in SPAN/
INET headers with its own ULA as the source and the ULA of the route
optimization target as the destination. The ROS then forwards the
message to the target (either directly to the link layer address of
the target if the target is in the same AERO link segment, or via a
Bridge if the target is in a different AERO link segment).
When the route optimization target receives the NS(NUD) message, it
notices that the IPv6 destination address is the same as the source
address. It then reverses the SPAN source and destination addresses
and returns the message to the ROS (either directly or via the
spanning tree). The route optimization target does not decrement the
NS(NUD) message IPv6 Hop-Limit in the process, since the message has
not exited the AERO link.
When the ROS receives the NS(NUD) message, it can determine from the
Nonce, Timestamp and Target Address that the message originated from
itself and that it transited the forward path. The ROS need not
prepare an NA response, since the destination of the response would
be itself and testing the route optimization path again would be
redundant.
The ROS marks route optimization target paths that pass these NUD
tests as "reachable", and those that do not as "unreachable". These
markings inform the AERO interface forwarding algorithm specified in
Section 3.10.
Note that to avoid a DoS vector nodes MUST NOT return loopback
NS(NUD) messages received from an unsecured link-layer source via the
spanning tree.
3.16. Mobility Management and Quality of Service (QoS)
AERO is a Distributed Mobility Management (DMM) service. Each Server
is responsible for only a subset of the Clients on the AERO link, as
opposed to a Centralized Mobility Management (CMM) service where
there is a single network mobility collective entity for all Clients.
Clients coordinate with their associated Servers via RS/RA exchanges
to maintain the DMM profile, and the AERO routing system tracks all
current Client/Server peering relationships.
Servers provide default routing and mobility/multilink services for
their dependent Clients. Clients are responsible for maintaining
neighbor relationships with their Servers through periodic RS/RA
exchanges, which also serves to confirm neighbor reachability. When
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a Client's underlying interface address and/or QoS information
changes, the Client is responsible for updating the Server with this
new information. Note that for Proxyed interfaces, however, the
Proxy can also perform some RS/RA exchanges on the Client's behalf.
Mobility management considerations are specified in the following
sections.
3.16.1. Mobility Update Messaging
Servers accommodate Client mobility/multilink and/or QoS change
events by sending unsolicited NA (uNA) messages to each ROS in the
target Client's Report List. When a Server sends a uNA message, it
sets the IPv6 source address to the Client's LLA, sets the
destination address to All-Nodes multicast and sets the Target
Address to the Client's Subnet-Router anycast address. The Server
also includes an OMNI option with prefix registration information and
with ifIndex-tuples for the target Client's remaining interfaces with
S set to 0. The Server then includes a TLLAO with corresponding
ifIndex-tuples prepared the same as for the initial route
optimization event. The Server sets the NA R flag to 1, the S flag
to 0 and the O flag to 0, then encapsulates the message in a SPAN
header with source set to its own ULA and destination set to the ULA
of the ROS and sends the message into the spanning tree.
As discussed in Section 7.2.6 of [RFC4861], the transmission and
reception of uNA messages is unreliable but provides a useful
optimization. In well-connected Internetworks with robust data links
uNA messages will be delivered with high probability, but in any case
the Server can optionally send up to MAX_NEIGHBOR_ADVERTISEMENT uNAs
to each ROS to increase the likelihood that at least one will be
received.
When the ROS receives a uNA message, it ignores the message if there
is no existing neighbor cache entry for the Client. Otherwise, it
uses the included OMNI option and TLLAO information to update the
neighbor cache entry, but does not reset ReachableTime since the
receipt of an unsolicited NA message from the target Server does not
provide confirmation that any forward paths to the target Client are
working.
If uNA messages are lost, the ROS may be left with stale address and/
or QoS information for the Client for up to ReachableTime seconds.
During this time, the ROS can continue sending packets according to
its stale neighbor cache information. When ReachableTime is close to
expiring, the ROS will re-initiate route optimization and receive
fresh link-layer address information.
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In addition to sending uNA messages to the current set of ROSs for
the Client, the Server also sends uNAs to the former link-layer
address for any ifIndex-tuple for which the link-layer address has
changed. The uNA messages update Proxys that cannot easily detect
(e.g., without active probing) when a formerly-active Client has
departed.
3.16.2. Announcing Link-Layer Address and/or QoS Preference Changes
When a Client needs to change its underlying interface addresses and/
or QoS preferences (e.g., due to a mobility event), either the Client
or its Proxys send RS messages to the Server via the spanning tree
with an OMNI option that includes an ifIndex-tuple with S set to 1
and with the new link quality and address information.
Up to MAX_RTR_SOLICITATIONS RS messages MAY be sent in parallel with
sending actual data packets in case one or more RAs are lost. If all
RAs are lost, the Client SHOULD re-associate with a new Server.
When the Server receives the Client's changes, it sends uNA messages
to all nodes in the Report List the same as described in the previous
section.
3.16.3. Bringing New Links Into Service
When a Client needs to bring new underlying interfaces into service
(e.g., when it activates a new data link), it sends an RS message to
the Server via the underlying interface with an OMNI option that
includes an ifIndex-tuple with S set to 1 and appropriate link
quality values and with link-layer address information for the new
link.
3.16.4. Removing Existing Links from Service
When a Client needs to remove existing underlying interfaces from
service (e.g., when it de-activates an existing data link), it sends
an RS or uNA message to its Server with an OMNI option with
appropriate link quality values.
If the Client needs to send RS/uNA messages over an underlying
interface other than the one being removed from service, it MUST
include ifIndex-tuples with appropriate link quality values for any
underlying interfaces being removed from service.
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3.16.5. Moving to a New Server
When a Client associates with a new Server, it performs the Client
procedures specified in Section 3.12.2. The Client also includes MS-
Release identifiers in the RS message OMNI option per
[I-D.templin-6man-omni-interface] if it wants the new Server to
notify any old Servers from which the Client is departing.
When the new Server receives the Client's RS message, it returns an
RA as specified in Section 3.12.3 and sends up to
MAX_NEIGHBOR_ADVERTIISEMENT uNA messages to any old Servers listed in
OMNI option MS-Release identifiers. Each uNA message includes the
Client's LLA as the source address, the old Server's LLA as the
destination address, and an OMNI option with the Register/Release bit
set to 0. The new Server wraps the uNA in a SPAN header with its own
ULA as the source and the old Server's ULA as the destination, then
sends the message into the spanning tree.
When an old Server receives the uNA, it changes the Client's neighbor
cache entry state to DEPARTED, sets the link-layer address of the
Client to the new Server's ULA, and resets DepartTime. After a short
delay (e.g., 2 seconds) the old Server withdraws the Client's MNP
from the routing system. After DepartTime expires, the old Server
deletes the Client's neighbor cache entry.
The old Server also sends unsolicited NA messages to all ROSs in the
Client's Report List with an OMNI option with a single ifIndex-tuple
with ifIndex set to 0 and S set to '1', and with the ULA of the new
Server in a companion TLLAO. When the ROS receives the NA, it caches
the address of the new Server in the existing asymmetric neighbor
cache entry and marks the entry as STALE for a period of 10 seconds
after which the cache entry is deleted. While in the STALE state,
subsequent data packets flow according to any existing cached link-
layer information and trigger a new NS(AR)/NA exchange via the new
Server.
Clients SHOULD NOT move rapidly between Servers in order to avoid
causing excessive oscillations in the AERO routing system. Examples
of when a Client might wish to change to a different Server include a
Server that has gone unreachable, topological movements of
significant distance, movement to a new geographic region, movement
to a new AERO link segment, etc.
When a Client moves to a new Server, some of the fragments of a
multiple fragment packet may have already arrived at the old Server
while others are en route to the new Server, however no special
attention in the reassembly algorithm is necessary when re-routed
fragments are simply treated as loss.
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3.17. Multicast
The AERO Client provides an IGMP (IPv4) [RFC2236] or MLD (IPv6)
[RFC3810] proxy service for its EUNs and/or hosted applications
[RFC4605]. The Client forwards IGMP/MLD messages over any of its
underlying interfaces for which group membership is required. The
IGMP/MLD messages may be further forwarded by a first-hop ANET access
router acting as an IGMP/MLD-snooping switch [RFC4541], then
ultimately delivered to an AERO Proxy/Server acting as a Protocol
Independent Multicast - Sparse-Mode (PIM-SM, or simply "PIM")
Designated Router (DR) [RFC7761]. AERO Relays also act as PIM
routers (i.e., the same as AERO Proxys/Servers) on behalf of nodes on
INET/EUN networks. The behaviors identified in the following
sections correspond to Source-Specific Multicast (SSM) and Any-Source
Multicast (ASM) operational modes.
3.17.1. Source-Specific Multicast (SSM)
When an ROS (i.e., an AERO Proxy/Server/Relay) "X" acting as PIM
router receives a Join/Prune message from a node on its downstream
interfaces containing one or more ((S)ource, (G)roup) pairs, it
updates its Multicast Routing Information Base (MRIB) accordingly.
For each S belonging to a prefix reachable via X's non-AERO
interfaces, X then forwards the (S, G) Join/Prune to any PIM routers
on those interfaces per [RFC7761].
For each S belonging to a prefix reachable via X's AERO interface, X
originates a separate copy of the Join/Prune for each (S,G) in the
message using its own LLA as the source address and ALL-PIM-ROUTERS
as the destination address. X then encapsulates each message in a
SPAN header with source address set to the ULA of X and destination
address set to S then forwards the message into the spanning tree,
which delivers it to AERO Server/Relay "Y" that services S. At the
same time, if the message was a Join, X sends a route-optimization NS
message toward each S the same as discussed in Section 3.14. The
resulting NAs will return the LLA for the prefix that matches S as
the network-layer source address and TLLAOs with the ULA
corresponding to any ifIndex-tuples that are currently servicing S.
When Y processes the Join/Prune message, if S located behind any
INET, Direct, or VPNed interfaces Y acts as a PIM router and updates
its MRIB to list X as the next hop in the reverse path. If S is
located behind any Proxys "Z"*, Y also forwards the message to each
Z* over the spanning tree while continuing to use the LLA of X as the
source address. Each Z* then updates its MRIB accordingly and
maintains the LLA of X as the next hop in the reverse path. Since
the Bridges do not examine network layer control messages, this means
that the (reverse) multicast tree path is simply from each Z* (and/or
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Y) to X with no other multicast-aware routers in the path. If any Z*
(and/or Y) is located on the same AERO link segment as X, the
multicast data traffic sent to X directly using SPAN/INET
encapsulation instead of via a Bridge.
Following the initial Join/Prune and NS/NA messaging, X maintains an
asymmetric neighbor cache entry for each S the same as if X was
sending unicast data traffic to S. In particular, X performs
additional NS/NA exchanges to keep the neighbor cache entry alive for
up to t_periodic seconds [RFC7761]. If no new Joins are received
within t_periodic seconds, X allows the neighbor cache entry to
expire. Finally, if X receives any additional Join/Prune messages
for (S,G) it forwards the messages to each Y and Z* in the neighbor
cache entry over the spanning tree.
At some later time, Client C that holds an MNP for source S may
depart from a first Proxy Z1 and/or connect via a new Proxy Z2. In
that case, Y sends an unsolicited NA message to X the same as
specified for unicast mobility in Section 3.16. When X receives the
unsolicited NA message, it updates its asymmetric neighbor cache
entry for the LLA for source S and sends new Join messages to any new
Proxys Z2. There is no requirement to send any Prune messages to old
Proxys Z1 since source S will no longer source any multicast data
traffic via Z1. Instead, the multicast state for (S,G) in Proxy Z1
will soon time out since no new Joins will arrive.
After some later time, C may move to a new Server Y2 and depart from
old Sever Y1. In that case, Y1 sends Join messages for any of C's
active (S,G) groups to Y2 while including its own LLA as the source
address. This causes Y2 to include Y1 in the multicast forwarding
tree during the interim time that Y1's symmetric neighbor cache entry
for C is in the DEPARTED state. At the same time, Y1 sends an
unsolicited NA message to X with an OMNI option and TLLAO with
ifIndex-tuple set to 0 and a release indication to cause X to release
its asymmetric neighbor cache entry. X then sends a new Join message
to S via the spanning tree and re-initiates route optimization the
same as if it were receiving a fresh Join message from a node on a
downstream link.
3.17.2. Any-Source Multicast (ASM)
When an ROS X acting as a PIM router receives a Join/Prune from a
node on its downstream interfaces containing one or more (*,G) pairs,
it updates its Multicast Routing Information Base (MRIB) accordingly.
X then forwards a copy of the message to the Rendezvous Point (RP) R
for each G over the spanning tree. X uses its own LLA as the source
address and ALL-PIM-ROUTERS as the destination address, then
encapsulates each message in a SPAN header with source address set to
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the ULA of X and destination address set to R, then sends the message
into the spanning tree. At the same time, if the message was a Join
X initiates NS/NA route optimization the same as for the SSM case
discussed in Section 3.17.1.
For each source S that sends multicast traffic to group G via R, the
Proxy/Server Z* for the Client that aggregates S encapsulates the
packets in PIM Register messages and forwards them to R via the
spanning tree, which may then elect to send a PIM Join to Z*. This
will result in an (S,G) tree rooted at Z* with R as the next hop so
that R will begin to receive two copies of the packet; one native
copy from the (S, G) tree and a second copy from the pre-existing (*,
G) tree that still uses PIM Register encapsulation. R can then issue
a PIM Register-stop message to suppress the Register-encapsulated
stream. At some later time, if C moves to a new Proxy/Server Z*, it
resumes sending packets via PIM Register encapsulation via the new
Z*.
At the same time, as multicast listeners discover individual S's for
a given G, they can initiate an (S,G) Join for each S under the same
procedures discussed in Section 3.17.1. Once the (S,G) tree is
established, the listeners can send (S, G) Prune messages to R so
that multicast packets for group G sourced by S will only be
delivered via the (S, G) tree and not from the (*, G) tree rooted at
R. All mobility considerations discussed for SSM apply.
3.17.3. Bi-Directional PIM (BIDIR-PIM)
Bi-Directional PIM (BIDIR-PIM) [RFC5015] provides an alternate
approach to ASM that treats the Rendezvous Point (RP) as a Designated
Forwarder (DF). Further considerations for BIDIR-PIM are out of
scope.
3.18. Operation over Multiple AERO Links (VLANs)
An AERO Client can connect to multiple AERO links the same as for any
data link service. In that case, the Client maintains a distinct
AERO interface for each link, e.g., 'aero0' for the first link,
'aero1' for the second, 'aero2' for the third, etc. Each AERO link
would include its own distinct set of Bridges, Servers and Proxys,
thereby providing redundancy in case of failures.
The Bridges, Servers and Proxys on each AERO link can assign AERO and
ULAs that use the same or different numberings from those on other
links. Since the links are mutually independent there is no
requirement for avoiding inter-link address duplication, e.g., the
same LLA such as fe80::1000 could be used to number distinct nodes
that connect to different AERO links.
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Each AERO link could utilize the same or different ANET connections.
The links can be distinguished at the link-layer via the SSP in a
similar fashion as for Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) tagging
(e.g., IEEE 802.1Q) and/or through assignment of distinct sets of
MSPs on each link. This gives rise to the opportunity for supporting
multiple redundant networked paths, where each VLAN is distinguished
by a different SRT color (see: Section 3.2.6). In particular, the
Client can tag its RS messages with the appropriate label to cause
the network to select the desired VLAN.
The Client's IP layer can select the outgoing AERO interface
appropriate for a given traffic profile while (in the reverse
direction) correspondent nodes must have some way of steering their
packets destined to a target via the correct AERO link.
In a first alternative, if each AERO link services different MSPs,
then the Client can receive a distinct MNP from each of the links.
IP routing will therefore assure that the correct Red/Green/Blue/etc.
network is used for both outbound and inbound traffic. This can be
accomplished using existing technologies and approaches, and without
requiring any special supporting code in correspondent nodes or
Bridges.
In a second alternative, if each AERO link services the same MSP(s)
then each link could assign a distinct "AERO Link Anycast" address
that is configured by all Bridges on the link. Correspondent nodes
can then perform Segment Routing to select the correct SRT, which
will then direct the packet over multiple hops to the target.
3.19. DNS Considerations
AERO Client MNs and INET correspondent nodes consult the Domain Name
System (DNS) the same as for any Internetworking node. When
correspondent nodes and Client MNs use different IP protocol versions
(e.g., IPv4 correspondents and IPv6 MNs), the INET DNS must maintain
A records for IPv4 address mappings to MNs which must then be
populated in Relay NAT64 mapping caches. In that way, an IPv4
correspondent node can send packets to the IPv4 address mapping of
the target MN, and the Relay will translate the IPv4 header and
destination address into an IPv6 header and IPv6 destination address
of the MN.
When an AERO Client registers with an AERO Server, the Server can
return the address(es) of DNS servers in RDNSS options [RFC6106].
The DNS server provides the IP addresses of other MNs and
correspondent nodes in AAAA records for IPv6 or A records for IPv4.
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3.20. Transition Considerations
SPAN encapsulation ensures that dissimilar INET partitions can be
joined into a single unified AERO link, even though the partitions
themselves may have differing protocol versions and/or incompatible
addressing plans. However, a commonality can be achieved by
incrementally distributing globally routable (i.e., native) IP
prefixes to eventually reach all nodes (both mobile and fixed) in all
AERO link segments. This can be accomplished by incrementally
deploying AERO Relays on each INET partition, with each Relay
distributing its MNPs and/or discovering non-MNP prefixes on its INET
links.
This gives rise to the opportunity to eventually distribute native IP
addresses to all nodes, and to present a unified AERO link view even
if the INET partitions remain in their current protocol and
addressing plans. In that way, the AERO link can serve the dual
purpose of providing a mobility/multilink service and a transition
service. Or, if an INET partition is transitioned to a native IP
protocol version and addressing scheme that is compatible with the
AERO link MNP-based addressing scheme, the partition and AERO link
can be joined by Relays.
Relays that connect INETs/EUNs with dissimilar IP protocol versions
may need to employ a network address and protocol translation
function such as NAT64[RFC6146].
3.21. Detecting and Reacting to Server and Bridge Failures
In environments where rapid failure recovery is required, Servers and
Bridges SHOULD use Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)
[RFC5880]. Nodes that use BFD can quickly detect and react to
failures so that cached information is re-established through
alternate nodes. BFD control messaging is carried only over well-
connected ground domain networks (i.e., and not low-end radio links)
and can therefore be tuned for rapid response.
Servers and Bridges maintain BFD sessions in parallel with their BGP
peerings. If a Server or Bridge fails, BGP peers will quickly re-
establish routes through alternate paths the same as for common BGP
deployments. Similarly, Proxys maintain BFD sessions with their
associated Bridges even though they do not establish BGP peerings
with them.
Proxys SHOULD use proactive NUD for Servers for which there are
currently active ANET Clients in a manner that parallels BFD, i.e.,
by sending unicast NS messages in rapid succession to receive
solicited NA messages. When the Proxy is also sending RS messages on
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behalf of ANET Clients, the RS/RA messaging can be considered as
equivalent hints of forward progress. This means that the Proxy need
not also send a periodic NS if it has already sent an RS within the
same period. If a Server fails, the Proxy will cease to receive
advertisements and can quickly inform Clients of the outage by
sending multicast RA messages on the ANET interface.
The Proxy sends multicast RA messages with source address set to the
Server's address, destination address set to All-Nodes multicast, and
Router Lifetime set to 0. The Proxy SHOULD send
MAX_FINAL_RTR_ADVERTISEMENTS RA messages separated by small delays
[RFC4861]. Any Clients on the ANET interface that have been using
the (now defunct) Server will receive the RA messages and associate
with a new Server.
3.22. AERO Clients on the Open Internet
AERO Clients that connect to the open Internet via INET interfaces
can establish a VPN or direct link to securely connect to a Server in
a "tethered" arrangement with all of the Client's traffic transiting
the Server. Alternatively, the Client can associate with an INET
Server using UDP/IP encapsulation and asymmetric securing services as
discussed in the following sections.
When a Client's AERO interface enables an INET underlying interface,
it first determines whether the interface is likely to be behind a
NAT. For IPv4, the Client might assume it is on the open Internet if
the INET address is not a special-use IPv4 address per [RFC3330].
Similarly for IPv6, the Client might assume it is on the open
Internet if the INET address is not a link-local [RFC4291] or unique-
local [RFC4193] IPv6 address.
The Client then prepares a UDP/IP-encapsulated RS message with IPv6
source address set to its LLA, with IPv6 destination set to All-
Routers multicast and with an OMNI option with underlying interface
parameters. If the Client believes that it is on the open Internet,
it SHOULD also include an SLLAO set according to the address used for
INET encapsulation (otherwise, it MAY omit the SLLAO). If the
underlying address is IPv4, the Client includes a Teredo address
[RFC4380] using the prefix fe80::/32 with the Server's IPv4 address,
and with the IP address and Port Number used for INET encapsulation
written in obfuscated form and with FMT set to '01' (INET) as
discussed in Section 3.3. If the underlying interface address is
IPv6, the Client instead includes the IPv6 address and Port number in
obfuscated form and sets FMT to '11' (INET). The Client finally
includes a Teredo Authentication option per [RFC4380] to provide
message authentication, sets the UDP/IP source to its INET address
and UDP port, sets the UDP/IP destination to the Server's INET
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address and the AERO service port number (8060), then sends the
message to the Server.
When the Server receives the RS, it authenticates the message and
registers the Client's MNP and INET interface information according
to the OMNI option parameters. If the RS message includes an SLLAO,
the Server compares the encapsulation IP address and UDP port number
with the (unobfuscated) SLLAO values. If the values are the same,
the Server caches the Client's information as "INET" addresses
meaning that the Client is likely to accept direct messages without
requiring NAT traversal exchanges. If the values are different (or,
if there was no SLLAO) the Server instead caches the Client's
information as "NAT" addresses meaning that NAT traversal exchanges
may be necessary.
The Server then returns an RA message with IPv6 source and
destination set corresponding to the addresses in the RS, and with a
Teredo Authentication option. For IPv4, the Server also includes an
IPv4 Teredo Origin option per [RFC4380] with the mapped and
obfuscated IPv4 address and port number observed in the encapsulation
headers. For IPv6, the Server instead includes an IPv6 Teredo Origin
option per Figure 7 with the mapped and obfuscated observed IPv6
address and port number (note that the value 0x02 in the second octet
differentiates from other Teredo option types).
+--------+--------+-----------------+
| 0x00 | 0x02 | Origin port # |
+--------+--------+-----------------+
~ Origin IPv6 address ~
+-----------------------------------+
Figure 7: IPv6 Teredo Origin Option
When the Client receives the RA message, it compares the mapped IP
address and port from the Teredo Origin option with its own address.
If the addresses are the same, the Client assumes the open Internet /
Cone NAT principle; if the addresses are different, the Client
instead assumes that further Server qualification procedures are
necessary to detect the type of NAT and proceeds according to
standard Teredo procedures.
After the Client has registered its INET interfaces in such RS/RA
exchanges it sends periodic RS messages to receive fresh RA messages
before the Router Lifetime received on each INET interface expires.
The Client also maintains default routes via its Servers, i.e., the
same as described in earlier sections.
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When the Client sends messages to target IP addresses, it also
invokes route optimization per Section 3.14 using IPv6 ND address
resolution messaging. The Client sends the NS(AR) message to the
Server wrapped in a UDP/IP header with a Teredo Authentication option
with the NS source address set to the Client's LLA and destination
address set to the target solicited node multicast address. The
Server authenticates the message and sends a corresponding NS(AR)
message over the spanning tree the same as if it were the ROS, but
with the SPAN source address set to the Server's ULA and destination
set to the ULA of the target. When the ROR receives the NS(AR), it
adds the Server's ULA and Client's LLA to the target's Report List,
and returns an NA with OMNI and TLLAO information for the target.
The Server then returns a UDP/IP encapsulated NA message with a
Teredo Authentication option to the Client.
Following route optimization, for targets in the same AERO link
segment if the target's TLLAO addresss is on the open INET, the
Client forwards data packets directly to the target INET address. If
the target's TLLAO address is behind a NAT, the Client first
establishes NAT state for the Link Layer Address using the "bubble"
mechanisms specified in [RFC6081][RFC4380]. The Client continues to
send data packets via its Server until NAT state is populated, then
begins forwarding packets via the direct path through the NAT to the
target. For targets in different AERO link segments, the Client
inserts a Segment Routing header and forwards data packets to the
Bridge that returned the NA message.
The ROR may return uNAs via the Server if the target moves, and the
Server will send corresponding Teredo Authentication-protected uNAs
to the Client. The Client can also send "loopback" NS(NUD) messages
to test forward path reachability even though there is no security
association between the Client and the target.
The Client sends Teredo UDP/IP encapsulated IPv6 packets no larger
than 1280 bytes in one piece. In order to accommodate larger IPv6
packets (up to the AERO interface MTU), the Client inserts a SPAN
header with source set to its own ULA and destination set to the ULA
of the target and uses IPv6 fragmentation according to Section 3.9.
The Client then encapsulates each fragment in a UDP/IP header and
sends the fragments to the next hop.
3.22.1. Use of SEND and CGA
In some environments, use of the Teredo Authentication option alone
may be sufficient for assuring IPv6 ND message authentication between
Clients and Servers. When additional protection is necessary, nodes
should employ SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) [RFC3971] with
Cryptographically-Generated Addresses (CGA) [RFC3972].
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When SEND/CGA are used, the Client prepares RS messages with its
link-local CGA as the IPv6 source and All-Routers as the IPv6
Destination, includes any SEND options and wraps the message in a
SPAN header. The Client sets the SPAN source address to its own ULA
and sets the SPAN destination address to the "All-Routers" ULA. The
Client then wraps the RS message in UDP/IP headers according to the
Teredo format and sends the message to the Server.
When the Server receives the message, it first verifies the Teredo
Authentication option (if present) then uses the SPAN source address
to determine the MNP of the Client. The Server then processes the
SEND options to authenticate the RS message and prepares an RA
message response. The Server prepares the RA with its own link-local
CGA and the CGA of the Client as the IPv6 source and destination,
includes any SEND options and wraps the message in a SPAN header.
The Server sets the SPAN source address to its own ULA and sets the
SPAN destination address to the Client's ULA. The Server then wraps
the RA message in UDP/IP headers according to the Teredo format and
sends the message to the Client. Thereafter, the Client/Server send
additional RS/RA messages to maintain their association and any NAT
state.
The Client and Server also may exchange NS/NA messages using their
own CGA as the source and with SPAN encapsulation as above. When a
Client sends an NS(AR), it sets the IPv6 source to its CGA and sets
the IPv6 destination to the Solicited-Node Multicast address of the
target. The Client then wraps the message in a SPAN header with its
own ULA as the source and the ULA of the target as the destination
and sends it to the Server. The Server authenticates the message,
then changes the IPv6 source address to the Client's LLA, removes the
SEND options, and sends a corresponding NS(AR) into the spanning
tree. When the Server receives the corresponding SPAN-encapsulated
NA, it changes the IPv6 destination address to the Client's CGA,
inserts SEND options, then wraps the message in UDP/IP headers and
sends it to the Client.
When a Client sends a uNA, it sets the IPv6 source address to its own
CGA and sets the IPv6 destination address to All-Nodes multicast,
includes SEND options, wraps the message in SPAN and UDP/IP headers
and sends the message to the Server. The Server authenticates the
message, then changes the IPv6 address to the Client's LLA, removes
the SEND options and forwards the message the same as discussed in
Section 3.16.1. In the reverse direction, when the Server forwards a
uNA to the Client, it changes the IPv6 address to its own CGA and
inserts SEND options then forwards the message to the Client.
When a Client sends an NS(NUD), it sets both the IPv6 source and
destination address to its own LLA, wraps the message in a SPAN
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header and UDP/IP headers, then sends the message directly to the
peer which will loop the message back. In this case alone, the
Client does not use the Server as a trust broker for forwarding the
ND message.
3.23. Time-Varying MNPs
In some use cases, it is desirable, beneficial and efficient for the
Client to receive a constant MNP that travels with the Client
wherever it moves. For example, this would allow air traffic
controllers to easily track aircraft, etc. In other cases, however
(e.g., intelligent transportation systems), the MN may be willing to
sacrifice a modicum of efficiency in order to have time-varying MNPs
that can be changed every so often to defeat adversarial tracking.
The DHCPv6-PD service offers a way for Clients that desire time-
varying MNPs to obtain short-lived prefixes (e.g., on the order of a
small number of minutes). In that case, the identity of the Client
would not be bound to the MNP but rather the Client's identity would
be bound to the DHCPv6 Device Unique Identifier (DUID) and used as
the seed for Prefix Delegation. The Client would then be obligated
to renumber its internal networks whenever its MNP (and therefore
also its LLA) changes. This should not present a challenge for
Clients with automated network renumbering services, however presents
limits for the durations of ongoing sessions that would prefer to use
a constant address.
4. Implementation Status
An AERO implementation based on OpenVPN (https://openvpn.net/) was
announced on the v6ops mailing list on January 10, 2018 and an
initial public release of the AERO proof-of-concept source code was
announced on the intarea mailing list on August 21, 2015.
As of 4/1/2020, more recent updated implementations are under
internal development and testing with plans to release in the near
future.
5. IANA Considerations
The IANA has assigned a 4-octet Private Enterprise Number "45282" for
AERO in the "enterprise-numbers" registry.
The IANA has assigned the UDP port number "8060" for an earlier
experimental version of AERO [RFC6706]. This document obsoletes
[RFC6706] and claims the UDP port number "8060" for all future use.
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The IANA is instructed to assign a new type value TBD in the Segment
Routing Header TLV registry [RFC8754].
No further IANA actions are required.
6. Security Considerations
AERO Bridges configure secured tunnels with AERO Servers, Realys and
Proxys within their local AERO link segments. Applicable secured
tunnel alternatives include IPsec [RFC4301], TLS/SSL [RFC8446], DTLS
[RFC6347], WireGuard, etc. The AERO Bridges of all AERO link
segments in turn configure secured tunnels for their neighboring AERO
Bridges in a spanning tree topology. Therefore, control messages
exchanged between any pair of AERO link neighbors on the spanning
tree are already secured.
AERO Servers, Relays and Proxys targeted by a route optimization may
also receive data packets directly from arbitrary nodes in INET
partitions instead of via the spanning tree. For INET partitions
that apply effective ingress filtering to defeat source address
spoofing, the simple data origin authentication procedures in
Section 3.8 can be applied.
For INET partitions that require strong security in the data plane,
two options for securing communications include 1) disable route
optimization so that all traffic is conveyed over secured tunnels, or
2) enable on-demand secure tunnel creation between INET partition
neighbors. Option 1) would result in longer routes than necessary
and traffic concentration on critical infrastructure elements.
Option 2) could be coordinated by establishing a secured tunnel on-
demand instead of performing an NS/NA exchange in the route
optimization procedures. Procedures for establishing on-demand
secured tunnels are out of scope.
AERO Clients that connect to secured ANETs need not apply security to
their ND messages, since the messages will be intercepted by a
perimeter Proxy that applies security on its INET-facing interface as
part of the spanning tree (see above). AERO Clients connected to the
open INET can use symmetric network and/or transport layer security
services such as VPNs or can by some other means establish a direct
link. When a VPN or direct link may be impractical, however, an
asymmetric security service such as SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)
[RFC3971] with Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs) [RFC3972]
and/or the Teredo Authentication option [RFC4380] can be applied.
Application endpoints SHOULD use application-layer security services
such as TLS/SSL, DTLS or SSH [RFC4251] to assure the same level of
protection as for critical secured Internet services. AERO Clients
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that require host-based VPN services SHOULD use symmetric network
and/or transport layer security services such as IPsec, TLS/SSL,
DTLS, etc. AERO Proxys and Servers can also provide a network-based
VPN service on behalf of the Client, e.g., if the Client is located
within a secured enclave and cannot establish a VPN on its own
behalf.
AERO Servers and Bridges present targets for traffic amplification
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. This concern is no different than
for widely-deployed VPN security gateways in the Internet, where
attackers could send spoofed packets to the gateways at high data
rates. This can be mitigated by connecting Servers and Bridges over
dedicated links with no connections to the Internet and/or when
connections to the Internet are only permitted through well-managed
firewalls. Traffic amplification DoS attacks can also target an AERO
Client's low data rate links. This is a concern not only for Clients
located on the open Internet but also for Clients in secured
enclaves. AERO Servers and Proxys can institute rate limits that
protect Clients from receiving packet floods that could DoS low data
rate links.
AERO Relays must implement ingress filtering to avoid a spoofing
attack in which spurious messages with ULA addresses are injected
into an AERO link from an outside attacker. AERO Clients MUST ensure
that their connectivity is not used by unauthorized nodes on their
EUNs to gain access to a protected network, i.e., AERO Clients that
act as routers MUST NOT provide routing services for unauthorized
nodes. (This concern is no different than for ordinary hosts that
receive an IP address delegation but then "share" the address with
other nodes via some form of Internet connection sharing such as
tethering.)
The MAP list MUST be well-managed and secured from unauthorized
tampering, even though the list contains only public information.
The MAP list can be conveyed to the Client in a similar fashion as in
[RFC5214] (e.g., through layer 2 data link login messaging, secure
upload of a static file, DNS lookups, etc.).
Although public domain and commercial SEND implementations exist,
concerns regarding the strength of the cryptographic hash algorithm
have been documented [RFC6273] [RFC4982].
SRH authentication facilities are specified in [RFC8754].
Security considerations for accepting link-layer ICMP messages and
reflected packets are discussed throughout the document.
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Security considerations for IPv6 fragmentation and reassembly are
discussed in Section 3.9.1.
7. Acknowledgements
Discussions in the IETF, aviation standards communities and private
exchanges helped shape some of the concepts in this work.
Individuals who contributed insights include Mikael Abrahamsson, Mark
Andrews, Fred Baker, Bob Braden, Stewart Bryant, Brian Carpenter,
Wojciech Dec, Pavel Drasil, Ralph Droms, Adrian Farrel, Nick Green,
Sri Gundavelli, Brian Haberman, Bernhard Haindl, Joel Halpern, Tom
Herbert, Sascha Hlusiak, Lee Howard, Zdenek Jaron, Andre Kostur,
Hubert Kuenig, Ted Lemon, Andy Malis, Satoru Matsushima, Tomek
Mrugalski, Madhu Niraula, Alexandru Petrescu, Behcet Saikaya, Michal
Skorepa, Joe Touch, Bernie Volz, Ryuji Wakikawa, Tony Whyman, Lloyd
Wood and James Woodyatt. Members of the IESG also provided valuable
input during their review process that greatly improved the document.
Special thanks go to Stewart Bryant, Joel Halpern and Brian Haberman
for their shepherding guidance during the publication of the AERO
first edition.
This work has further been encouraged and supported by Boeing
colleagues including Kyle Bae, M. Wayne Benson, Dave Bernhardt, Cam
Brodie, John Bush, Balaguruna Chidambaram, Irene Chin, Bruce Cornish,
Claudiu Danilov, Don Dillenburg, Joe Dudkowski, Wen Fang, Samad
Farooqui, Anthony Gregory, Jeff Holland, Seth Jahne, Brian Jaury,
Greg Kimberly, Ed King, Madhuri Madhava Badgandi, Laurel Matthew,
Gene MacLean III, Rob Muszkiewicz, Sean O'Sullivan, Vijay
Rajagopalan, Greg Saccone, Rod Santiago, Kent Shuey, Brian Skeen,
Mike Slane, Carrie Spiker, Katie Tran, Brendan Williams, Amelia
Wilson, Julie Wulff, Yueli Yang, Eric Yeh and other members of the
Boeing mobility, networking and autonomy teams. Kyle Bae, Wayne
Benson, Katie Tran and Eric Yeh are especially acknowledged for
implementing the AERO functions as extensions to the public domain
OpenVPN distribution.
Earlier works on NBMA tunneling approaches are found in
[RFC2529][RFC5214][RFC5569].
Many of the constructs presented in this second edition of AERO are
based on the author's earlier works, including:
o The Internet Routing Overlay Network (IRON)
[RFC6179][I-D.templin-ironbis]
o Virtual Enterprise Traversal (VET)
[RFC5558][I-D.templin-intarea-vet]
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o The Subnetwork Encapsulation and Adaptation Layer (SEAL)
[RFC5320][I-D.templin-intarea-seal]
o AERO, First Edition [RFC6706]
Note that these works cite numerous earlier efforts that are not also
cited here due to space limitations. The authors of those earlier
works are acknowledged for their insights.
This work is aligned with the NASA Safe Autonomous Systems Operation
(SASO) program under NASA contract number NNA16BD84C.
This work is aligned with the FAA as per the SE2025 contract number
DTFAWA-15-D-00030.
This work is aligned with the Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA)
Internet of Things (IoT) and autonomy programs.
This work is aligned with the Boeing Information Technology (BIT)
MobileNet program.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[I-D.templin-6man-omni-interface]
Templin, F. and T. Whyman, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets
over Overlay Multilink Network (OMNI) Interfaces", draft-
templin-6man-omni-interface-22 (work in progress), May
2020.
[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>.
[RFC0792] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5,
RFC 792, DOI 10.17487/RFC0792, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc792>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2473] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Generic Packet Tunneling in
IPv6 Specification", RFC 2473, DOI 10.17487/RFC2473,
December 1998, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2473>.
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[RFC2474] Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F., and D. Black,
"Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS
Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers", RFC 2474,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2474, December 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2474>.
[RFC3971] Arkko, J., Ed., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander,
"SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3971, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3971>.
[RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
RFC 3972, DOI 10.17487/RFC3972, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3972>.
[RFC4191] Draves, R. and D. Thaler, "Default Router Preferences and
More-Specific Routes", RFC 4191, DOI 10.17487/RFC4191,
November 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4191>.
[RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>.
[RFC4380] Huitema, C., "Teredo: Tunneling IPv6 over UDP through
Network Address Translations (NATs)", RFC 4380,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4380, February 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4380>.
[RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
"Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.
[RFC4862] Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4862, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4862>.
[RFC5175] Haberman, B., Ed. and R. Hinden, "IPv6 Router
Advertisement Flags Option", RFC 5175,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5175, March 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5175>.
[RFC6081] Thaler, D., "Teredo Extensions", RFC 6081,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6081, January 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6081>.
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[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.
[RFC8415] Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Volz, B., Yourtchenko, A.,
Richardson, M., Jiang, S., Lemon, T., and T. Winters,
"Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)",
RFC 8415, DOI 10.17487/RFC8415, November 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8415>.
8.2. Informative References
[BGP] Huston, G., "BGP in 2015, http://potaroo.net", January
2016.
[I-D.bonica-6man-comp-rtg-hdr]
Bonica, R., Kamite, Y., Niwa, T., Alston, A., and L.
Jalil, "The IPv6 Compact Routing Header (CRH)", draft-
bonica-6man-comp-rtg-hdr-22 (work in progress), May 2020.
[I-D.bonica-6man-crh-helper-opt]
Li, X., Bao, C., Ruan, E., and R. Bonica, "Compressed
Routing Header (CRH) Helper Option", draft-bonica-6man-
crh-helper-opt-01 (work in progress), May 2020.
[I-D.ietf-dmm-distributed-mobility-anchoring]
Chan, A., Wei, X., Lee, J., Jeon, S., and C. Bernardos,
"Distributed Mobility Anchoring", draft-ietf-dmm-
distributed-mobility-anchoring-15 (work in progress),
March 2020.
[I-D.ietf-intarea-frag-fragile]
Bonica, R., Baker, F., Huston, G., Hinden, R., Troan, O.,
and F. Gont, "IP Fragmentation Considered Fragile", draft-
ietf-intarea-frag-fragile-17 (work in progress), September
2019.
[I-D.ietf-intarea-gue]
Herbert, T., Yong, L., and O. Zia, "Generic UDP
Encapsulation", draft-ietf-intarea-gue-09 (work in
progress), October 2019.
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[I-D.ietf-intarea-gue-extensions]
Herbert, T., Yong, L., and F. Templin, "Extensions for
Generic UDP Encapsulation", draft-ietf-intarea-gue-
extensions-06 (work in progress), March 2019.
[I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels]
Touch, J. and M. Townsley, "IP Tunnels in the Internet
Architecture", draft-ietf-intarea-tunnels-10 (work in
progress), September 2019.
[I-D.ietf-rtgwg-atn-bgp]
Templin, F., Saccone, G., Dawra, G., Lindem, A., and V.
Moreno, "A Simple BGP-based Mobile Routing System for the
Aeronautical Telecommunications Network", draft-ietf-
rtgwg-atn-bgp-05 (work in progress), January 2020.
[I-D.templin-6man-dhcpv6-ndopt]
Templin, F., "A Unified Stateful/Stateless Configuration
Service for IPv6", draft-templin-6man-dhcpv6-ndopt-09
(work in progress), January 2020.
[I-D.templin-intarea-grefrag]
Templin, F., "GRE Tunnel Level Fragmentation", draft-
templin-intarea-grefrag-04 (work in progress), July 2016.
[I-D.templin-intarea-seal]
Templin, F., "The Subnetwork Encapsulation and Adaptation
Layer (SEAL)", draft-templin-intarea-seal-68 (work in
progress), January 2014.
[I-D.templin-intarea-vet]
Templin, F., "Virtual Enterprise Traversal (VET)", draft-
templin-intarea-vet-40 (work in progress), May 2013.
[I-D.templin-ironbis]
Templin, F., "The Interior Routing Overlay Network
(IRON)", draft-templin-ironbis-16 (work in progress),
March 2014.
[I-D.templin-v6ops-pdhost]
Templin, F., "IPv6 Prefix Delegation and Multi-Addressing
Models", draft-templin-v6ops-pdhost-25 (work in progress),
January 2020.
[OVPN] OpenVPN, O., "http://openvpn.net", October 2016.
Templin Expires November 29, 2020 [Page 75]
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[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.
[RFC1122] Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
Communication Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1122, October 1989,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1122>.
[RFC1191] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1191, November 1990,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1191>.
[RFC1812] Baker, F., Ed., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers",
RFC 1812, DOI 10.17487/RFC1812, June 1995,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1812>.
[RFC2003] Perkins, C., "IP Encapsulation within IP", RFC 2003,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2003, October 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2003>.
[RFC2236] Fenner, W., "Internet Group Management Protocol, Version
2", RFC 2236, DOI 10.17487/RFC2236, November 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2236>.
[RFC2492] Armitage, G., Schulter, P., and M. Jork, "IPv6 over ATM
Networks", RFC 2492, DOI 10.17487/RFC2492, January 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2492>.
[RFC2529] Carpenter, B. and C. Jung, "Transmission of IPv6 over IPv4
Domains without Explicit Tunnels", RFC 2529,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2529, March 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2529>.
[RFC2764] Gleeson, B., Lin, A., Heinanen, J., Armitage, G., and A.
Malis, "A Framework for IP Based Virtual Private
Networks", RFC 2764, DOI 10.17487/RFC2764, February 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2764>.
[RFC2784] Farinacci, D., Li, T., Hanks, S., Meyer, D., and P.
Traina, "Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)", RFC 2784,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2784, March 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2784>.
[RFC2890] Dommety, G., "Key and Sequence Number Extensions to GRE",
RFC 2890, DOI 10.17487/RFC2890, September 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2890>.
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[RFC2923] Lahey, K., "TCP Problems with Path MTU Discovery",
RFC 2923, DOI 10.17487/RFC2923, September 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2923>.
[RFC2983] Black, D., "Differentiated Services and Tunnels",
RFC 2983, DOI 10.17487/RFC2983, October 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2983>.
[RFC3168] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition
of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP",
RFC 3168, DOI 10.17487/RFC3168, September 2001,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3168>.
[RFC3330] IANA, "Special-Use IPv4 Addresses", RFC 3330,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3330, September 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3330>.
[RFC3810] Vida, R., Ed. and L. Costa, Ed., "Multicast Listener
Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6", RFC 3810,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3810, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3810>.
[RFC3819] Karn, P., Ed., Bormann, C., Fairhurst, G., Grossman, D.,
Ludwig, R., Mahdavi, J., Montenegro, G., Touch, J., and L.
Wood, "Advice for Internet Subnetwork Designers", BCP 89,
RFC 3819, DOI 10.17487/RFC3819, July 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3819>.
[RFC4213] Nordmark, E. and R. Gilligan, "Basic Transition Mechanisms
for IPv6 Hosts and Routers", RFC 4213,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4213, October 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4213>.
[RFC4251] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Protocol Architecture", RFC 4251, DOI 10.17487/RFC4251,
January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4251>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, February
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291>.
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[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
December 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.
[RFC4389] Thaler, D., Talwar, M., and C. Patel, "Neighbor Discovery
Proxies (ND Proxy)", RFC 4389, DOI 10.17487/RFC4389, April
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4389>.
[RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet
Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet
Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89,
RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4443>.
[RFC4511] Sermersheim, J., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP): The Protocol", RFC 4511,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4511, June 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4511>.
[RFC4541] Christensen, M., Kimball, K., and F. Solensky,
"Considerations for Internet Group Management Protocol
(IGMP) and Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) Snooping
Switches", RFC 4541, DOI 10.17487/RFC4541, May 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4541>.
[RFC4605] Fenner, B., He, H., Haberman, B., and H. Sandick,
"Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) / Multicast
Listener Discovery (MLD)-Based Multicast Forwarding
("IGMP/MLD Proxying")", RFC 4605, DOI 10.17487/RFC4605,
August 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4605>.
[RFC4607] Holbrook, H. and B. Cain, "Source-Specific Multicast for
IP", RFC 4607, DOI 10.17487/RFC4607, August 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4607>.
[RFC4963] Heffner, J., Mathis, M., and B. Chandler, "IPv4 Reassembly
Errors at High Data Rates", RFC 4963,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4963, July 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4963>.
[RFC4982] Bagnulo, M. and J. Arkko, "Support for Multiple Hash
Algorithms in Cryptographically Generated Addresses
(CGAs)", RFC 4982, DOI 10.17487/RFC4982, July 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4982>.
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[RFC5015] Handley, M., Kouvelas, I., Speakman, T., and L. Vicisano,
"Bidirectional Protocol Independent Multicast (BIDIR-
PIM)", RFC 5015, DOI 10.17487/RFC5015, October 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5015>.
[RFC5214] Templin, F., Gleeson, T., and D. Thaler, "Intra-Site
Automatic Tunnel Addressing Protocol (ISATAP)", RFC 5214,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5214, March 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5214>.
[RFC5320] Templin, F., Ed., "The Subnetwork Encapsulation and
Adaptation Layer (SEAL)", RFC 5320, DOI 10.17487/RFC5320,
February 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5320>.
[RFC5522] Eddy, W., Ivancic, W., and T. Davis, "Network Mobility
Route Optimization Requirements for Operational Use in
Aeronautics and Space Exploration Mobile Networks",
RFC 5522, DOI 10.17487/RFC5522, October 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5522>.
[RFC5558] Templin, F., Ed., "Virtual Enterprise Traversal (VET)",
RFC 5558, DOI 10.17487/RFC5558, February 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5558>.
[RFC5569] Despres, R., "IPv6 Rapid Deployment on IPv4
Infrastructures (6rd)", RFC 5569, DOI 10.17487/RFC5569,
January 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5569>.
[RFC5871] Arkko, J. and S. Bradner, "IANA Allocation Guidelines for
the IPv6 Routing Header", RFC 5871, DOI 10.17487/RFC5871,
May 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5871>.
[RFC5880] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(BFD)", RFC 5880, DOI 10.17487/RFC5880, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880>.
[RFC5991] Thaler, D., Krishnan, S., and J. Hoagland, "Teredo
Security Updates", RFC 5991, DOI 10.17487/RFC5991,
September 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5991>.
[RFC6106] Jeong, J., Park, S., Beloeil, L., and S. Madanapalli,
"IPv6 Router Advertisement Options for DNS Configuration",
RFC 6106, DOI 10.17487/RFC6106, November 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6106>.
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[RFC6146] Bagnulo, M., Matthews, P., and I. van Beijnum, "Stateful
NAT64: Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6
Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6146, DOI 10.17487/RFC6146,
April 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6146>.
[RFC6179] Templin, F., Ed., "The Internet Routing Overlay Network
(IRON)", RFC 6179, DOI 10.17487/RFC6179, March 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6179>.
[RFC6221] Miles, D., Ed., Ooghe, S., Dec, W., Krishnan, S., and A.
Kavanagh, "Lightweight DHCPv6 Relay Agent", RFC 6221,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6221, May 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6221>.
[RFC6273] Kukec, A., Krishnan, S., and S. Jiang, "The Secure
Neighbor Discovery (SEND) Hash Threat Analysis", RFC 6273,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6273, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6273>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
[RFC6438] Carpenter, B. and S. Amante, "Using the IPv6 Flow Label
for Equal Cost Multipath Routing and Link Aggregation in
Tunnels", RFC 6438, DOI 10.17487/RFC6438, November 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6438>.
[RFC6706] Templin, F., Ed., "Asymmetric Extended Route Optimization
(AERO)", RFC 6706, DOI 10.17487/RFC6706, August 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6706>.
[RFC6864] Touch, J., "Updated Specification of the IPv4 ID Field",
RFC 6864, DOI 10.17487/RFC6864, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6864>.
[RFC6935] Eubanks, M., Chimento, P., and M. Westerlund, "IPv6 and
UDP Checksums for Tunneled Packets", RFC 6935,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6935, April 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6935>.
[RFC6936] Fairhurst, G. and M. Westerlund, "Applicability Statement
for the Use of IPv6 UDP Datagrams with Zero Checksums",
RFC 6936, DOI 10.17487/RFC6936, April 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6936>.
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[RFC7269] Chen, G., Cao, Z., Xie, C., and D. Binet, "NAT64
Deployment Options and Experience", RFC 7269,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7269, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7269>.
[RFC7333] Chan, H., Ed., Liu, D., Seite, P., Yokota, H., and J.
Korhonen, "Requirements for Distributed Mobility
Management", RFC 7333, DOI 10.17487/RFC7333, August 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7333>.
[RFC7421] Carpenter, B., Ed., Chown, T., Gont, F., Jiang, S.,
Petrescu, A., and A. Yourtchenko, "Analysis of the 64-bit
Boundary in IPv6 Addressing", RFC 7421,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7421, January 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7421>.
[RFC7739] Gont, F., "Security Implications of Predictable Fragment
Identification Values", RFC 7739, DOI 10.17487/RFC7739,
February 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7739>.
[RFC7761] Fenner, B., Handley, M., Holbrook, H., Kouvelas, I.,
Parekh, R., Zhang, Z., and L. Zheng, "Protocol Independent
Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM): Protocol Specification
(Revised)", STD 83, RFC 7761, DOI 10.17487/RFC7761, March
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7761>.
[RFC8086] Yong, L., Ed., Crabbe, E., Xu, X., and T. Herbert, "GRE-
in-UDP Encapsulation", RFC 8086, DOI 10.17487/RFC8086,
March 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8086>.
[RFC8138] Thubert, P., Ed., Bormann, C., Toutain, L., and R. Cragie,
"IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Network
(6LoWPAN) Routing Header", RFC 8138, DOI 10.17487/RFC8138,
April 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8138>.
[RFC8201] McCann, J., Deering, S., Mogul, J., and R. Hinden, Ed.,
"Path MTU Discovery for IP version 6", STD 87, RFC 8201,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8201, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8201>.
[RFC8402] Filsfils, C., Ed., Previdi, S., Ed., Ginsberg, L.,
Decraene, B., Litkowski, S., and R. Shakir, "Segment
Routing Architecture", RFC 8402, DOI 10.17487/RFC8402,
July 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8402>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
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[RFC8754] Filsfils, C., Ed., Dukes, D., Ed., Previdi, S., Leddy, J.,
Matsushima, S., and D. Voyer, "IPv6 Segment Routing Header
(SRH)", RFC 8754, DOI 10.17487/RFC8754, March 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8754>.
Appendix A. AERO Alternate Encapsulations
When GUE encapsulation is not needed, AERO can use common
encapsulations such as IP-in-IP [RFC2003][RFC2473][RFC4213], Generic
Routing Encapsulation (GRE) [RFC2784][RFC2890] and others. The
encapsulation is therefore only differentiated from non-AERO tunnels
through the application of AERO control messaging and not through,
e.g., a well-known UDP port number.
As for GUE encapsulation, alternate AERO encapsulation formats may
require encapsulation layer fragmentation. For simple IP-in-IP
encapsulation, an IPv6 fragment header is inserted directly between
the inner and outer IP headers when needed, i.e., even if the outer
header is IPv4. The IPv6 Fragment Header is identified to the outer
IP layer by its IP protocol number, and the Next Header field in the
IPv6 Fragment Header identifies the inner IP header version. For GRE
encapsulation, a GRE fragment header is inserted within the GRE
header [I-D.templin-intarea-grefrag].
Figure 8 shows the AERO IP-in-IP encapsulation format before any
fragmentation is applied:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Outer IPv4 Header | | Outer IPv6 Header |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|IPv6 Frag Header (optional)| |IPv6 Frag Header (optional)|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Inner IP Header | | Inner IP Header |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
~ ~ ~ ~
~ Inner Packet Body ~ ~ Inner Packet Body ~
~ ~ ~ ~
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Minimal Encapsulation in IPv4 Minimal Encapsulation in IPv6
Figure 8: Minimal Encapsulation Format using IP-in-IP
Figure 9 shows the AERO GRE encapsulation format before any
fragmentation is applied:
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Outer IP Header |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| GRE Header |
| (with checksum, key, etc..) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| GRE Fragment Header (optional)|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Inner IP Header |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ ~
~ Inner Packet Body ~
~ ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 9: Minimal Encapsulation Using GRE
Alternate encapsulation may be preferred in environments where GUE
encapsulation would add unnecessary overhead. For example, certain
low-bandwidth wireless data links may benefit from a reduced
encapsulation overhead.
GUE encapsulation can traverse network paths that are inaccessible to
non-UDP encapsulations, e.g., for crossing Network Address
Translators (NATs). More and more, network middleboxes are also
being configured to discard packets that include anything other than
a well-known IP protocol such as UDP and TCP. It may therefore be
necessary to determine the potential for middlebox filtering before
enabling alternate encapsulation in a given environment.
In addition to IP-in-IP, GRE and GUE, AERO can also use security
encapsulations such as IPsec, TLS/SSL, DTLS, etc. In that case, AERO
control messaging and route determination occur before security
encapsulation is applied for outgoing packets and after security
decapsulation is applied for incoming packets.
AERO is especially well suited for use with VPN system encapsulations
such as OpenVPN [OVPN].
Appendix B. Non-Normative Considerations
AERO can be applied to a multitude of Internetworking scenarios, with
each having its own adaptations. The following considerations are
provided as non-normative guidance:
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B.1. Implementation Strategies for Route Optimization
Route optimization as discussed in Section 3.14 results in the route
optimization source (ROS) creating an asymmetric neighbor cache entry
for the target neighbor. The neighbor cache entry is maintained for
at most ReachableTime seconds and then deleted unless updated. In
order to refresh the neighbor cache entry lifetime before the
ReachableTime timer expires, the specification requires
implementations to issue a new NS/NA exchange to reset ReachableTime
while data packets are still flowing. However, the decision of when
to initiate a new NS/NA exchange and to perpetuate the process is
left as an implementation detail.
One possible strategy may be to monitor the neighbor cache entry
watching for data packets for (ReachableTime - 5) seconds. If any
data packets have been sent to the neighbor within this timeframe,
then send an NS to receive a new NA. If no data packets have been
sent, wait for 5 additional seconds and send an immediate NS if any
data packets are sent within this "expiration pending" 5 second
window. If no additional data packets are sent within the 5 second
window, delete the neighbor cache entry.
The monitoring of the neighbor data packet traffic therefore becomes
an asymmetric ongoing process during the neighbor cache entry
lifetime. If the neighbor cache entry expires, future data packets
will trigger a new NS/NA exchange while the packets themselves are
delivered over a longer path until route optimization state is re-
established.
B.2. Implicit Mobility Management
AERO interface neighbors MAY provide a configuration option that
allows them to perform implicit mobility management in which no ND
messaging is used. In that case, the Client only transmits packets
over a single interface at a time, and the neighbor always observes
packets arriving from the Client from the same link-layer source
address.
If the Client's underlying interface address changes (either due to a
readdressing of the original interface or switching to a new
interface) the neighbor immediately updates the neighbor cache entry
for the Client and begins accepting and sending packets according to
the Client's new address. This implicit mobility method applies to
use cases such as cellphones with both WiFi and Cellular interfaces
where only one of the interfaces is active at a given time, and the
Client automatically switches over to the backup interface if the
primary interface fails.
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B.3. Direct Underlying Interfaces
When a Client's AERO interface is configured over a Direct interface,
the neighbor at the other end of the Direct link can receive packets
without any encapsulation. In that case, the Client sends packets
over the Direct link according to QoS preferences. If the Direct
interface has the highest QoS preference, then the Client's IP
packets are transmitted directly to the peer without going through an
ANET/INET. If other interfaces have higher QoS preferences, then the
Client's IP packets are transmitted via a different interface, which
may result in the inclusion of Proxys, Servers and Bridges in the
communications path. Direct interfaces must be tested periodically
for reachability, e.g., via NUD.
B.4. Operation on AERO Links with /64 ASPs
IPv6 AERO links typically have MSPs that aggregate many candidate
MNPs of length /64 or shorter. However, in some cases it may be
desirable to use AERO over links that have only a /64 MSP. This can
be accommodated by treating all Clients on the AERO link as simple
hosts that receive /128 prefix delegations.
In that case, the Client sends an RS message to the Server the same
as for ordinary AERO links. The Server responds with an RA message
that includes one or more /128 prefixes (i.e., singleton addresses)
that include the /64 MSP prefix along with an interface identifier
portion to be assigned to the Client. The Client and Server then
configure their LLAs based on the interface identifier portions of
the /128s (i.e., the lower 64 bits) and not based on the /64 prefix
(i.e., the upper 64 bits).
For example, if the MSP for the host-only IPv6 AERO link is
2001:db8:1000:2000::/64, each Client will receive one or more /128
IPv6 prefix delegations such as 2001:db8:1000:2000::1/128,
2001:db8:1000:2000::2/128, etc. When the Client receives the prefix
delegations, it assigns the LLAs fe80::1, fe80::2, etc. to the AERO
interface, and assigns the global IPv6 addresses (i.e., the /128s) to
either the AERO interface or an internal virtual interface such as a
loopback. In this arrangement, the Client conducts route
optimization in the same sense as discussed in Section 3.14.
This specification has applicability for nodes that act as a Client
on an "upstream" AERO link, but also act as a Server on "downstream"
AERO links. More specifically, if the node acts as a Client to
receive a /64 prefix from the upstream AERO link it can then act as a
Server to provision /128s to Clients on downstream AERO links.
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B.5. AERO Critical Infrastructure Considerations
AERO Bridges can be either Commercial off-the Shelf (COTS) standard
IP routers or virtual machines in the cloud. Bridges must be
provisioned, supported and managed by the INET administrative
authority, and connected to the Bridges of other INETs via inter-
domain peerings. Cost for purchasing, configuring and managing
Bridges is nominal even for very large AERO links.
AERO Servers can be standard dedicated server platforms, but most
often will be deployed as virtual machines in the cloud. The only
requirements for Servers are that they can run the AERO user-level
code and have at least one network interface connection to the INET.
As with Bridges, Servers must be provisioned, supported and managed
by the INET administrative authority. Cost for purchasing,
configuring and managing Servers is nominal especially for virtual
Servers hosted in the cloud.
AERO Proxys are most often standard dedicated server platforms with
one network interface connected to the ANET and a second interface
connected to an INET. As with Servers, the only requirements are
that they can run the AERO user-level code and have at least one
interface connection to the INET. Proxys must be provisioned,
supported and managed by the ANET administrative authority. Cost for
purchasing, configuring and managing Proxys is nominal, and borne by
the ANET administrative authority.
AERO Relays can be any dedicated server or COTS router platform
connected to INETs and/or EUNs. The Relay connects to the AERO link
and engages in eBGP peering with one or more Bridges as a stub AS.
The Relay then injects its MNPs and/or non-MNP prefixes into the BGP
routing system, and provisions the prefixes to its downstream-
attached networks. The Relay can perform ROS/ROR services the same
as for any Server, and can route between the MNP and non-MNP address
spaces.
B.6. AERO Server Failure Implications
AERO Servers may appear as a single point of failure in the
architecture, but such is not the case since all Servers on the link
provide identical services and loss of a Server does not imply
immediate and/or comprehensive communication failures. Although
Clients typically associate with a single Server at a time, Server
failure is quickly detected and conveyed by Bidirectional Forward
Detection (BFD) and/or proactive NUD allowing Clients to migrate to
new Servers.
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If a Server fails, ongoing packet forwarding to Clients will continue
by virtue of the asymmetric neighbor cache entries that have already
been established in route optimization sources (ROSs). If a Client
also experiences mobility events at roughly the same time the Server
fails, unsolicited NA messages may be lost but proxy neighbor cache
entries in the DEPARTED state will ensure that packet forwarding to
the Client's new locations will continue for up to DepartTime
seconds.
If a Client is left without a Server for an extended timeframe (e.g.,
greater than ReachableTime seconds) then existing asymmetric neighbor
cache entries will eventually expire and both ongoing and new
communications will fail. The original source will continue to
retransmit until the Client has established a new Server
relationship, after which time continuous communications will resume.
Therefore, providing many Servers on the link with high availability
profiles provides resilience against loss of individual Servers and
assurance that Clients can establish new Server relationships quickly
in event of a Server failure.
B.7. AERO Client / Server Architecture
The AERO architectural model is client / server in the control plane,
with route optimization in the data plane. The same as for common
Internet services, the AERO Client discovers the addresses of AERO
Servers and selects one Server to connect to. The AERO service is
analogous to common Internet services such as google.com, yahoo.com,
cnn.com, etc. However, there is only one AERO service for the link
and all Servers provide identical services.
Common Internet services provide differing strategies for advertising
server addresses to clients. The strategy is conveyed through the
DNS resource records returned in response to name resolution queries.
As of January 2020 Internet-based 'nslookup' services were used to
determine the following:
o When a client resolves the domainname "google.com", the DNS always
returns one A record (i.e., an IPv4 address) and one AAAA record
(i.e., an IPv6 address). The client receives the same addresses
each time it resolves the domainname via the same DNS resolver,
but may receive different addresses when it resolves the
domainname via different DNS resolvers. But, in each case,
exactly one A and one AAAA record are returned.
o When a client resolves the domainname "ietf.org", the DNS always
returns one A record and one AAAA record with the same addresses
regardless of which DNS resolver is used.
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o When a client resolves the domainname "yahoo.com", the DNS always
returns a list of 4 A records and 4 AAAA records. Each time the
client resolves the domainname via the same DNS resolver, the same
list of addresses are returned but in randomized order (i.e.,
consistent with a DNS round-robin strategy). But, interestingly,
the same addresses are returned (albeit in randomized order) when
the domainname is resolved via different DNS resolvers.
o When a client resolves the domainname "amazon.com", the DNS always
returns a list of 3 A records and no AAAA records. As with
"yahoo.com", the same three A records are returned from any
worldwide Internet connection point in randomized order.
The above example strategies show differing approaches to Internet
resilience and service distribution offered by major Internet
services. The Google approach exposes only a single IPv4 and a
single IPv6 address to clients. Clients can then select whichever IP
protocol version offers the best response, but will always use the
same IP address according to the current Internet connection point.
This means that the IP address offered by the network must lead to a
highly-available server and/or service distribution point. In other
words, resilience is predicated on high availability within the
network and with no client-initiated failovers expected (i.e., it is
all-or-nothing from the client's perspective). However, Google does
provide for worldwide distributed service distribution by virtue of
the fact that each Internet connection point responds with a
different IPv6 and IPv4 address. The IETF approach is like google
(all-or-nothing from the client's perspective), but provides only a
single IPv4 or IPv6 address on a worldwide basis. This means that
the addresses must be made highly-available at the network level with
no client failover possibility, and if there is any worldwide service
distribution it would need to be conducted by a network element that
is reached via the IP address acting as a service distribution point.
In contrast to the Google and IETF philosophies, Yahoo and Amazon
both provide clients with a (short) list of IP addresses with Yahoo
providing both IP protocol versions and Amazon as IPv4-only. The
order of the list is randomized with each name service query
response, with the effect of round-robin load balancing for service
distribution. With a short list of addresses, there is still
expectation that the network will implement high availability for
each address but in case any single address fails the client can
switch over to using a different address. The balance then becomes
one of function in the network vs function in the end system.
The same implications observed for common highly-available services
in the Internet apply also to the AERO client/server architecture.
When an AERO Client connects to one or more ANETs, it discovers one
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or more AERO Server addresses through the mechanisms discussed in
earlier sections. Each Server address presumably leads to a fault-
tolerant clustering arrangement such as supported by Linux-HA,
Extended Virtual Synchrony or Paxos. Such an arrangement has
precedence in common Internet service deployments in lightweight
virtual machines without requiring expensive hardware deployment.
Similarly, common Internet service deployments set service IP
addresses on service distribution points that may relay requests to
many different servers.
For AERO, the expectation is that a combination of the Google/IETF
and Yahoo/Amazon philosophies would be employed. The AERO Client
connects to different ANET access points and can receive 1-2 Server
LLAs at each point. It then selects one AERO Server address, and
engages in RS/RA exchanges with the same Server from all ANET
connections. The Client remains with this Server unless or until the
Server fails, in which case it can switch over to an alternate
Server. The Client can likewise switch over to a different Server at
any time if there is some reason for it to do so. So, the AERO
expectation is for a balance of function in the network and end
system, with fault tolerance and resilience at both levels.
Appendix C. Change Log
<< RFC Editor - remove prior to publication >>
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-48 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-49:
o SPAN Anycast address and SBM/PBM concepts introduced.
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-47 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-48:
o SEND/CGA.
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-46 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-47:
o Major changes to align with Teredo, including changed AERO "Relay"
to "Bridge", and changed AERO "Gateway" to "Relay". The term
"[Rr]elay" now refers to exactly the same thing in both AERO and
Teredo.
o Changed to use Teredo message authentication instead of SEND.
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-42 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-43:
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o Segment Routing.
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-39 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-40:
o Teredo.
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-38 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-39:
o Major clarifications and simplifications of SPAN fragmentation/
reassembly.
o Revised AERO address format to support prefix lengths up to 112.
o New method for forming SPAN Client Prefixes and population in the
routing system.
o Updates RFC4443 to set a new value in the ICMP PTB Code field.
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-35 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-36:
o Clients in the open Internet secured using SEND/CGA.
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-32 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-33:
o Updated Proxy discussion with "point-to-multipoint" server
coordination
o Significant updates to Address Resolution and NUD to include
correct addresses in messages
o Differentiate between NS(AR) and NS(NUD) as their addresses and
use cases differ.
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-30 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-31:
o Added "advisory PTB messages" under FAA SE2025 contract number
DTFAWA-15-D-00030.
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-29 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-30:
o Deprecate "primary" concept. Now, RS/RA keepalives are maintained
over *all* underlying interfaces (i.e., and not just one primary).
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Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-28 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-29:
o Changed OMNI interface citation to "draft-templin-6man-omni-
interface"
o Changed SPAN Service Prefix to fd80::/10.
o Changed S/TLLAO format to include 'S' bit for ifIndex
corresponding to the underlying interface that is Source of ND
message.
o Updated Path MTU
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-27 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-28:
o MTU and fragmentation.
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-26 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-27:
o MTU and fragmentation.
o SPAN Service Prefix set to fd00::/10
o Client SPAN addresses defined.
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-25 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-26:
o MTU and RA configuration information updated.
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-24 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-25:
o Added concept of "primary" to allow for proxyed RS/RA over only
selected underlying interfaces.
o General Cleanup.
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-23 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-24:
o OMNI interface spec now a normative reference.
o Use REACHABLE_TIME as the nominal Router Lifetime to return in
RAs.
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o General cleanup.
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-22 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-23:
o Choice of using either RS/RA or unsolicited NA for old Server
notification.
o General cleanup.
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-21 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-22:
o Tightened up text on Proxy.
o Removed unnecessarily restrictive texts.
o General cleanup.
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-20 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-21:
o Clarified relationship between OMNI and S/TLLAO ifIndex-tuples.
o Important text in Section 13.15.3 on Servers timing out Clients
that have gone silent without sending a departure notification.
o New text on RS/RA as "hints of forward progress" for proactive
NUD.
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-19 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-20:
o Included new route optimization source and destination addressing
strategy. Now, route optimization maintenance uses the address of
the existing Server instead of the data packet destination address
so that less pressure is placed on the BGP routing system
convergence time and Server constancy is supported.
o Included new method for releasing from old MSE without requiring
Client messaging.
o Included references to new OMNI interface spec (including the OMNI
option).
o New appendix on AERO Client/Server architecture.
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Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-18 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-19:
o Changed Proxy/Server keepalives to use "proactive NUD" in a manner
that parallels BFD
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-17 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-18:
o Discuss how AERO option is used in relation to S/TLLAOs
o New text on Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)
o Cleaned up usage (and non-usage) of unsolicited NAs
o New appendix on Server failures
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-15 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-17:
o S/TLLAO now includes multiple link-layer addresses within a single
option instead of requiring multiple options
o New unsolicited NA message to inform the old link that a Client
has moved to a new link
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-14 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-15:
o MTU and fragmentation
o New details in movement to new Server
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-13 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-14:
o Security based on secured tunnels, ingress filtering, MAP list and
ROS list
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-12 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-13:
o New paragraph in Section 3.6 on AERO interface layering over
secured tunnels
o Removed extraneous text in Section 3.7
o Added new detail to the forwarding algorithm in Section 3.9
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o Clarified use of fragmentation
o Route optimization now supported for both MNP and non-MNP-based
prefixes
o Relays are now seen as link-layer elements in the architecture.
o Built out multicast section in detail.
o New Appendix on implementation considerations for route
optimization.
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-11 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-12:
o Introduced Gateways as a new AERO element for connecting
Correspondent Nodes on INET links
o Introduced terms "Access Network (ANET)" and "Internetwork (INET)"
o Changed "ASP" to "MSP", and "ACP" to "MNP"
o New figure on the relation of Segments to the SPAN and AERO link
o New "S" bit in S/TLLAO to indicate the "Source" S/TLLAO as opposed
to additional S/TLLAOs
o Changed Interface ID for Servers from 255 to 0xffff
o Significant updates to Route Optimization, NUD, and Mobility
Management
o New Section on Multicast
o New Section on AERO Clients in the open Internetwork
o New Section on Operation over multiple AERO links (VLANs over the
SPAN)
o New Sections on DNS considerations and Transition considerations
o
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-10 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-11:
o Added The SPAN
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Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-09 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-10:
o Orphaned packets in flight (e.g., when a neighbor cache entry is
in the DEPARTED state) are now forwarded at the link layer instead
of at the network layer. Forwarding at the network layer can
result in routing loops and/or excessive delays of forwarded
packets while the routing system is still reconverging.
o Update route optimization to clarify the unsecured nature of the
first NS used for route discovery
o Many cleanups and clarifications on ND messaging parameters
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-08 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-09:
o Changed PRL to "MAP list"
o For neighbor cache entries, changed "static" to "symmetric", and
"dynamic" to "asymmetric"
o Specified Proxy RS/RA exchanges with Servers on behalf of Clients
o Added discussion of unsolicited NAs in Section 3.16, and included
forward reference to Section 3.18
o Added discussion of AERO Clients used as critical infrastructure
elements to connect fixed networks.
o Added network-based VPN under security considerations
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-07 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-08:
o New section on AERO-Aware Access Router
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-06 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-07:
o Added "R" bit for release of PDs. Now have a full RS/RA service
that can do PD without requiring DHCPv6 messaging over-the-air
o Clarifications on solicited vs unsolicited NAs
o Clarified use of MAX_NEIGHBOR_ADVERTISEMENT for the purpose of
increase reliability
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Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-05 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-06:
o Major re-work and simplification of Route Optimization function
o Added Distributed Mobility Management (DMM) and Mobility Anchor
Point (MAP) terminology
o New section on "AERO Critical Infrastructure Element
Considerations" demonstrating low overall cost for the service
o minor text revisions and deletions
o removed extraneous appendices
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-04 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-05:
o New Appendix E on S/TLLAO Extensions for special-purpose links.
Discussed ATN/IPS as example.
o New sentence in introduction to declare appendices as non-
normative.
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-03 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-04:
o Added definitions for Potential Router List (PRL) and secure
enclave
o Included text on mapping transport layer port numbers to network
layer DSCP values
o Added reference to DTLS and DMM Distributed Mobility Anchoring
working group document
o Reworked Security Considerations
o Updated references.
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-02 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-03:
o Added new section on SEND.
o Clarifications on "AERO Address" section.
o Updated references and added new reference for RFC8086.
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o Security considerations updates.
o General text clarifications and cleanup.
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-01 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-02:
o Note on encapsulation avoidance in Section 4.
Changes from draft-templin-intarea-6706bis-00 to draft-templin-
intrea-6706bis-01:
o Remove DHCPv6 Server Release procedures that leveraged the old way
Relays used to "route" between Server link-local addresses
o Remove all text relating to Relays needing to do any AERO-specific
operations
o Proxy sends RS and receives RA from Server using SEND. Use CGAs
as source addresses, and destination address of RA reply is to the
AERO address corresponding to the Client's ACP.
o Proxy uses SEND to protect RS and authenticate RA (Client does not
use SEND, but rather relies on subnetwork security. When the
Proxy receives an RS from the Client, it creates a new RS using
its own addresses as the source and uses SEND with CGAs to send a
new RS to the Server.
o Emphasize distributed mobility management
o AERO address-based RS injection of ACP into underlying routing
system.
Changes from draft-templin-aerolink-82 to draft-templin-intarea-
6706bis-00:
o Document use of NUD (NS/NA) for reliable link-layer address
updates as an alternative to unreliable unsolicited NA.
Consistent with Section 7.2.6 of RFC4861.
o Server adds additional layer of encapsulation between outer and
inner headers of NS/NA messages for transmission through Relays
that act as vanilla IPv6 routers. The messages include the AERO
Server Subnet Router Anycast address as the source and the Subnet
Router Anycast address corresponding to the Client's ACP as the
destination.
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o Clients use Subnet Router Anycast address as the encapsulation
source address when the access network does not provide a
topologically-fixed address.
Author's Address
Fred L. Templin (editor)
Boeing Research & Technology
P.O. Box 3707
Seattle, WA 98124
USA
Email: fltemplin@acm.org
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