Network Working Group F. Templin, Ed.
Internet-Draft Boeing Research & Technology
Intended status: Standards Track February 08, 2011
Expires: August 12, 2011
The Subnetwork Encapsulation and Adaptation Layer (SEAL)
draft-templin-intarea-seal-28.txt
Abstract
For the purpose of this document, a subnetwork is defined as a
virtual topology configured over a connected IP network routing
region and bounded by encapsulating border nodes. These virtual
topologies are manifested by tunnels that may span multiple IP and/or
sub-IP layer forwarding hops, and can introduce failure modes due to
packet duplication and/or links with diverse Maximum Transmission
Units (MTUs). This document specifies a Subnetwork Encapsulation and
Adaptation Layer (SEAL) that accommodates such virtual topologies
over diverse underlying link technologies.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 12, 2011.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Terminology and Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. SEAL Protocol Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1. VET Interface Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2. SEAL Model of Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3. SEAL Header Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.4. ITE Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.4.1. Tunnel Interface MTU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.4.2. Tunnel Interface Soft State . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.4.3. Submitting Packets for Encapsulation . . . . . . . . . 17
4.4.4. Mid-Layer Encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.4.5. SEAL Segmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.4.6. SEAL Encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.4.7. Outer Encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.4.8. Sending SEAL Protocol Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.4.9. Probing Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.4.10. Processing ICMP Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.4.11. Black Hole Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.5. ETE Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.5.1. Reassembly Buffer Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.5.2. Tunnel Interface Soft State . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.5.3. IP-Layer Reassembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.5.4. SEAL-Layer Reassembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.5.5. Decapsulation and Delivery to Upper Layers . . . . . . 24
4.6. The SEAL Control Message Protocol (SCMP) . . . . . . . . . 24
4.6.1. Generating SCMP Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.6.2. Processing SCMP Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.7. Tunnel Endpoint Synchronization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5. Link Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6. End System Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7. Router Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
10. Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
11. SEAL Advantages over Classical Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
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13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Appendix A. Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Appendix B. Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Appendix C. Transport Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Appendix D. Historic Evolution of PMTUD . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
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1. Introduction
As Internet technology and communication has grown and matured, many
techniques have developed that use virtual topologies (including
tunnels of one form or another) over an actual network that supports
the Internet Protocol (IP) [RFC0791][RFC2460]. Those virtual
topologies have elements that appear as one hop in the virtual
topology, but are actually multiple IP or sub-IP layer hops. These
multiple hops often have quite diverse properties that are often not
even visible to the endpoints of the virtual hop. This introduces
failure modes that are not dealt with well in current approaches.
The use of IP encapsulation (also known as "tunneling") has long been
considered as the means for creating such virtual topologies.
However, the insertion of an outer IP header reduces the effective
path MTU visible to the inner network layer. When IPv4 is used, this
reduced MTU can be accommodated through the use of IPv4
fragmentation, but unmitigated in-the-network fragmentation has been
found to be harmful through operational experience and studies
conducted over the course of many years [FRAG][FOLK][RFC4963].
Additionally, classical path MTU discovery [RFC1191] has known
operational issues that are exacerbated by in-the-network tunnels
[RFC2923][RFC4459]. The following subsections present further
details on the motivation and approach for addressing these issues.
1.1. Motivation
Before discussing the approach, it is necessary to first understand
the problems. In both the Internet and private-use networks today,
IPv4 is ubiquitously deployed as the Layer 3 protocol. The two
primary functions of IPv4 are to provide for 1) addressing, and 2) a
fragmentation and reassembly capability used to accommodate links
with diverse MTUs. While it is well known that the IPv4 address
space is rapidly becoming depleted, there is a lesser-known but
growing consensus that other IPv4 protocol limitations have already
or may soon become problematic.
First, the IPv4 header Identification field is only 16 bits in
length, meaning that at most 2^16 unique packets with the same
(source, destination, protocol)-tuple may be active in the Internet
at a given time [I-D.ietf-intarea-ipv4-id-update]. Due to the
escalating deployment of high-speed links (e.g., 1Gbps Ethernet),
however, this number may soon become too small by several orders of
magnitude for high data rate packet sources such as tunnel endpoints
[RFC4963]. Furthermore, there are many well-known limitations
pertaining to IPv4 fragmentation and reassembly - even to the point
that it has been deemed "harmful" in both classic and modern-day
studies (see above). In particular, IPv4 fragmentation raises issues
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ranging from minor annoyances (e.g., in-the-network router
fragmentation [RFC1981]) to the potential for major integrity issues
(e.g., mis-association of the fragments of multiple IP packets during
reassembly [RFC4963]).
As a result of these perceived limitations, a fragmentation-avoiding
technique for discovering the MTU of the forward path from a source
to a destination node was devised through the deliberations of the
Path MTU Discovery Working Group (PMTUDWG) during the late 1980's
through early 1990's (see Appendix D). In this method, the source
node provides explicit instructions to routers in the path to discard
the packet and return an ICMP error message if an MTU restriction is
encountered. However, this approach has several serious shortcomings
that lead to an overall "brittleness" [RFC2923].
In particular, site border routers in the Internet are being
configured more and more to discard ICMP error messages coming from
the outside world. This is due in large part to the fact that
malicious spoofing of error messages in the Internet is trivial since
there is no way to authenticate the source of the messages [RFC5927].
Furthermore, when a source node that requires ICMP error message
feedback when a packet is dropped due to an MTU restriction does not
receive the messages, a path MTU-related black hole occurs. This
means that the source will continue to send packets that are too
large and never receive an indication from the network that they are
being discarded. This behavior has been confirmed through documented
studies showing clear evidence of path MTU discovery failures in the
Internet today [TBIT][WAND][SIGCOMM].
The issues with both IPv4 fragmentation and this "classical" method
of path MTU discovery are exacerbated further when IP tunneling is
used [RFC4459]. For example, ingress tunnel endpoints (ITEs) may be
required to forward encapsulated packets into the subnetwork on
behalf of hundreds, thousands, or even more original sources in the
end site. If the ITE allows IPv4 fragmentation on the encapsulated
packets, persistent fragmentation could lead to undetected data
corruption due to Identification field wrapping. If the ITE instead
uses classical IPv4 path MTU discovery, it may be inconvenienced by
excessive ICMP error messages coming from the subnetwork that may be
either suspect or contain insufficient information for translation
into error messages to be returned to the original sources.
Although recent works have led to the development of a robust end-to-
end MTU determination scheme [RFC4821], this approach requires
tunnels to present a consistent MTU the same as for ordinary links on
the end-to-end path. Moreover, in current practice existing
tunneling protocols mask the MTU issues by selecting a "lowest common
denominator" MTU that may be much smaller than necessary for most
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paths and difficult to change at a later date. Due to these many
consideration, a new approach to accommodate tunnels over links with
diverse MTUs is necessary.
1.2. Approach
For the purpose of this document, a subnetwork is defined as a
virtual topology configured over a connected network routing region
and bounded by encapsulating border nodes. Example connected network
routing regions include Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs), enterprise
networks and the global public Internet itself. Subnetwork border
nodes forward unicast and multicast packets over the virtual topology
across multiple IP and/or sub-IP layer forwarding hops that may
introduce packet duplication and/or traverse links with diverse
Maximum Transmission Units (MTUs).
This document introduces a Subnetwork Encapsulation and Adaptation
Layer (SEAL) for tunneling network layer protocols (e.g., IP, OSI,
etc.) over IP subnetworks that connect Ingress and Egress Tunnel
Endpoints (ITEs/ETEs) of border nodes. It provides a modular
specification designed to be tailored to specific associated
tunneling protocols. A transport-mode of operation is also possible,
and described in Appendix C. SEAL accommodates links with diverse
MTUs, protects against off-path denial-of-service attacks, and can be
configured to enable efficient duplicate packet detection through the
use of a minimal mid-layer encapsulation.
SEAL specifically treats tunnels that traverse the subnetwork as
ordinary links that must support network layer services. As for any
link, tunnels that use SEAL must provide suitable networking services
including best-effort datagram delivery, integrity and consistent
handling of packets of various sizes. As for any link whose media
cannot provide suitable services natively, tunnels that use SEAL
employ link-level adaptation functions to meet the legitimate
expectations of the network layer service. As this is essentially a
link level adaptation, SEAL is therefore permitted to alter packets
within the subnetwork as long as it restores them to their original
form when they exit the subnetwork. The mechanisms described within
this document are designed precisely for this purpose.
SEAL encapsulation provides extended identification fields as well as
a mid-layer segmentation and reassembly capability that allows
simplified cutting and pasting of packets. Moreover, SEAL engages
both tunnel endpoints in ensuring a functional path MTU on the path
from the ITE to the ETE. This is in contrast to "stateless"
approaches which seek to avoid MTU issues by selecting a lowest
common denominator MTU value that may be overly conservative for the
vast majority of tunnel paths and difficult to change even when
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larger MTUs become available.
The following sections provide the SEAL normative specifications,
while the appendices present non-normative additional considerations.
2. Terminology and Requirements
The following terms are defined within the scope of this document:
subnetwork
a virtual topology configured over a connected network routing
region and bounded by encapsulating border nodes.
Ingress Tunnel Endpoint
a virtual interface over which an encapsulating border node (host
or router) sends encapsulated packets into the subnetwork.
Egress Tunnel Endpoint
a virtual interface over which an encapsulating border node (host
or router) receives encapsulated packets from the subnetwork.
inner packet
an unencapsulated network layer protocol packet (e.g., IPv6
[RFC2460], IPv4 [RFC0791], OSI/CLNP [RFC1070], etc.) before any
mid-layer or outer encapsulations are added. Internet protocol
numbers that identify inner packets are found in the IANA Internet
Protocol registry [RFC3232].
mid-layer packet
a packet resulting from adding mid-layer encapsulating headers to
an inner packet.
outer IP packet
a packet resulting from adding an outer IP header (and possibly
other outer headers) to a mid-layer packet.
packet-in-error
the leading portion of an invoking data packet encapsulated in the
body of an error control message (e.g., an ICMPv4 [RFC0792] error
message, an ICMPv6 [RFC4443] error message, etc.).
Packet Too Big (PTB)
a control plane message indicating an MTU restriction, e.g., an
ICMPv6 "Packet Too Big" message [RFC4443], an ICMPv4
"Fragmentation Needed" message [RFC0792], an SCMP "Packet Too Big"
message (see: Section 4.5), etc.
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IP, IPvX, IPvY
used to generically refer to either IP protocol version, i.e.,
IPv4 or IPv6.
The following abbreviations correspond to terms used within this
document and elsewhere in common Internetworking nomenclature:
DF - the IPv4 header "Don't Fragment" flag [RFC0791]
ETE - Egress Tunnel Endpoint
HLEN - the sum of MHLEN and OHLEN
ITE - Ingress Tunnel Endpoint
LINK_ID - a short integer that identifies an ITE's underlying link
MHLEN - the length of any mid-layer headers and trailers
MRU - Maximum Reassembly Unit
MTU - Maximum Transmission Unit
NBR_ID - a neighbor identification value (i.e., a per-neighbor
nonce)
OHLEN - the length of any outer encapsulating headers and trailers
PKT_ID - a packet identification value
S_IFT - SEAL Inner Fragmentation Threshold
S_MRU - SEAL Maximum Reassembly Unit
S_MSS - SEAL Maximum Segment Size
SCMP - the SEAL Control Message Protocol
SEAL - Subnetwork Encapsulation and Adaptation Layer
SEAL_PORT - a TCP/UDP service port number used for SEAL
SEAL_PROTO - an IPv4 protocol number used for SEAL
TE - Tunnel Endpoint (i.e., either ingress or egress)
VET - Virtual Enterprise Traversal
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. When used
in lower case (e.g., must, must not, etc.), these words MUST NOT be
interpreted as described in [RFC2119], but are rather interpreted as
they would be in common English.
3. Applicability Statement
SEAL was originally motivated by the specific case of subnetwork
abstraction for Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs), however it soon
became apparent that the domain of applicability also extends to
subnetwork abstractions over enterprise networks, ISP networks, SOHO
networks, the global public Internet itself, and any other connected
network routing region. SEAL along with the Virtual Enterprise
Traversal (VET) [I-D.templin-intarea-vet] tunnel virtual interface
abstraction are the functional building blocks for a new
Internetworking architecture based on Routing and Addressing in
Networks with Global Enterprise Recursion (RANGER)
[RFC5720][I-D.russert-rangers] and the Internet Routing Overlay
Network (IRON) [I-D.templin-iron].
SEAL provides a network sublayer for encapsulation of an inner
network layer packet within outer encapsulating headers. For
example, for IPvX in IPvY encapsulation (e.g., as IPv4/SEAL/IPv6),
the SEAL header appears as a subnetwork encapsulation as seen by the
inner IP layer. SEAL can also be used as a sublayer within a UDP
data payload (e.g., as IPv4/UDP/SEAL/IPv6 similar to Teredo
[RFC4380]), where UDP encapsulation is typically used for Network
Address Translator (NAT) traversal as well as operation over
subnetworks that give preferential treatment to the "core" Internet
protocols (i.e., TCP and UDP). The SEAL header is processed the same
as for IPv6 extension headers, i.e., it is not part of the outer IP
header but rather allows for the creation of an arbitrarily
extensible chain of headers in the same way that IPv6 does.
SEAL supports a segmentation and reassembly capability for adapting
the network layer to the underlying subnetwork characteristics, where
the Egress Tunnel Endpoint (ETE) determines how much or how little
reassembly it is willing to support. In the limiting case, the ETE
can avoid reassembly altogether and act as a passive observer that
simply informs the Ingress Tunnel Endpoint (ITE) of any MTU
limitations and otherwise discards all packets that arrive as
multiple fragments. This mode is useful for determining an
appropriate MTU for tunneling between performance-critical routers
connected to high data rate subnetworks such as the Internet DFZ, for
unidirectional tunneling in which the ETE is stateless, and for other
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uses in which reassembly would present too great of a burden for the
routers or end systems.
When the ETE supports reassembly, the tunnel can be used to transport
packets that are too large to traverse the path without
fragmentation. In this mode, the ITE determines the tunnel MTU based
on the largest packet the ETE is capable of reassembling rather than
on the MTU of the smallest link in the path. Therefore, tunnel
endpoints that use SEAL can transport packets that are much larger
than the underlying subnetwork links themselves can carry in a single
piece.
SEAL tunnels may be configured over paths that include not only
ordinary physical links, but also virtual links that may include
other tunnels. An example application would be linking two
geographically remote supercomputer centers with large MTU links by
configuring a SEAL tunnel across the Internet. A second example
would be support for sub-IP segmentation over low-end links, i.e.,
especially over wireless transmission media such as IEEE 802.15.4,
broadcast radio links in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs), Very High
Frequency (VHF) civil aviation data links, etc.
Many other use case examples are anticipated, and will be identified
as further experience is gained.
4. SEAL Protocol Specification
The following sections specify the operation of the SEAL protocol.
4.1. VET Interface Model
SEAL is an encapsulation sublayer used within VET non-broadcast,
multiple access (NBMA) tunnel virtual interfaces. Each VET interface
connects an ITE to one or more ETE "neighbors" via tunneling across
an underlying enterprise network, or "subnetwork". The tunnel
neighbor relationship between the ITE and each ETE may be either
unidirectional or bidirectional.
A unidirectional tunnel neighbor relationship requires no prior
coordination between the ITE and ETE; it allows the ITE to send both
data and control messages forward to the ETE, while the ETE only
returns control messages when necessary. A bidirectional tunnel
neighbor relationship requires prior coordination between the TEs
(see: Section 4.7), and is one over which both TEs can exchange both
data and control messages.
Implications of the VET unidirectional and bidirectional models for
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SEAL will be discussed further throughout the remainder of the
document.
4.2. SEAL Model of Operation
SEAL supports a multi-level segmentation and reassembly capability
for the transmission of unicast and multicast packets across an
underlying IP subnetwork with heterogeneous links. First, the ITE
can use IPv4 fragmentation to fragment inner IPv4 packets before SEAL
encapsulation if necessary. Secondly, the SEAL layer itself provides
a simple cutting-and-pasting capability for mid-layer packets that
can be used to avoid IP fragmentation on the outer packet. Finally,
ordinary IP fragmentation is permitted on the outer packet after SEAL
encapsulation and allows the TEs to detect and tune out any in-the-
network fragmentation.
SEAL-enabled ITEs encapsulate each inner packet in any mid-layer
headers and trailers, segment the resulting mid-layer packet into
multiple segments if necessary, then append a SEAL header and any
outer encapsulations to each segment. As an example, for IPv6 within
IPv4 encapsulation a single-segment inner IPv6 packet encapsulated in
any mid-layer headers and trailers, followed by the SEAL header,
followed by any outer headers and trailers, followed by an outer IPv4
header would appear as shown in Figure 1:
+--------------------+
~ outer IPv4 header ~
+--------------------+
I ~ other outer hdrs ~
n +--------------------+
n ~ SEAL Header ~
e +--------------------+ +--------------------+
r ~ mid-layer headers ~ ~ mid-layer headers ~
+--------------------+ +--------------------+
I --> | | --> | |
P --> ~ inner IPv6 ~ --> ~ inner IPv6 ~
v --> ~ Packet ~ --> ~ Packet ~
6 --> | | --> | |
+--------------------+ +--------------------+
P ~ mid-layer trailers ~ ~ mid-layer trailers ~
a +--------------------+ +--------------------+
c ~ outer trailers ~
k Mid-layer packet +--------------------+
e after mid-layer encaps.
t Outer IPv4 packet
after SEAL and outer encaps.
Figure 1: SEAL Encapsulation - Single Segment
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As a second example, for IPv4 within IPv6 encapsulation an inner IPv4
packet requiring three SEAL segments would appear as three separate
outer IPv6 packets, where the mid-layer headers are carried only in
segment 0 and the mid-layer trailers are carried in segment 2 as
shown in Figure 2:
+------------------+ +------------------+ +------------------+
~ outer IPv6 hdr ~ ~ outer IPv6 hdr ~ ~ outer IPv6 hdr ~
+------------------+ +------------------+ +------------------+
~ other outer hdrs ~ ~ other outer hdrs ~ ~ other outer hdrs ~
+------------------+ +------------------+ +------------------+
~ SEAL hdr (SEG=0) ~ ~ SEAL hdr (SEG=1) ~ ~ SEAL hdr (SEG=2) ~
+------------------+ +------------------+ +------------------+
~ mid-layer hdrs ~ | | | inner IPv4 |
+------------------+ | inner IPv4 | ~ Packet Segment ~
| inner IPv4 | ~ Packet Segment ~ | (Len may be != L)|
~ Packet Segment ~ | (Length = L) | +------------------+
| (Length = L) | | | ~ mid-layer trails ~
+------------------+ +------------------+ +------------------+
~ outer trailers ~ ~ outer trailers ~ ~ outer trailers ~
+------------------+ +------------------+ +------------------+
Segment 0 (includes Segment 1 (no mid- Segment 2 (includes
mid-layer hdrs) layer encaps) mid-layer trails)
Figure 2: SEAL Encapsulation - Multiple Segments
The ITE inserts the SEAL header according to the specific tunneling
protocol. Examples include the following:
o For simple encapsulation of an inner network layer packet within
an outer IPvX header (e.g., [RFC1070][RFC2003][RFC2473][RFC4213],
etc.), the ITE inserts the SEAL header between the inner packet
and outer IPvX headers as: IPvX/SEAL/{inner packet}.
o For encapsulations over transports such as UDP (e.g., [RFC4380]),
the ITE inserts the SEAL header between the outer transport layer
header and the mid-layer packet, e.g., as IPvX/UDP/SEAL/{mid-layer
packet}. Here, the UDP header is seen as an "other outer header".
The SEAL header includes LINK_ID and NBR_ID values that the ITE
maintains as per-ETE identifying information. The ITE can also
include a packet identification field ("PKT_ID") in the SEAL header
when necessary, which routers within the subnetwork can use for
duplicate packet detection and both TEs can use for SEAL
segmentation/reassembly.
The following sections specify the SEAL header format and SEAL-
related operations of the ITE and ETE.
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4.3. SEAL Header Format
The SEAL header is formatted as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|VER|C|A|I|R|F|M| NEXTHDR/SEG | LINK_ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| NBR_ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| PKT_ID (when necessary) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3: SEAL Header Format
where the header fields are defined as:
VER (2)
a 2-bit version field. This document specifies Version 0 of the
SEAL protocol, i.e., the VER field encodes the value 0.
C (1)
the "Control/Data" bit. Set to 1 by the ITE in SEAL Control
Message Protocol (SCMP) control messages, and set to 0 in ordinary
data packets.
A (1)
the "Acknowledgement Requested" bit. Set to 1 by the ITE in data
packets for which it wishes to receive an explicit acknowledgement
from the ETE.
I (1)
the "PKT_ID Field Included" bit. Set to 1 if the SEAL header
includes a 32-bit packet Identification field (see below); set to
0 otherwise.
R (1)
the "Redirects Permitted" bit. Set to 1 if the ITE is willing to
accept SCMP redirects (see: Section 4.6); set to 0 otherwise.
F (1)
the "First Segment" bit. Set to 1 if this SEAL protocol packet
contains the first segment (i.e., Segment #0) of a mid-layer
packet.
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M (1)
the "More Segments" bit. Set to 1 if this SEAL protocol packet
contains a non-final segment of a multi-segment mid-layer packet.
NEXTHDR/SEG (8) an 8-bit field. When 'F'=1, encodes the next header
Internet Protocol number the same as for the IPv4 protocol and
IPv6 next header fields. When 'F'=0, encodes a segment number of
a multi-segment mid-layer packet. (The segment number 0 is
reserved.)
LINK_ID (16)
a 16-bit link identifier. An integer value between 0 and 65535
used by the ITE to identify the underlying link selected for
tunneling the current packet to a specific ETE.
NBR_ID (32)
a 32-bit tunnel neighbor identification field used to identify the
ETE. Set to a random value when a new ETE tunnel neighbor is
established, and thereafter included in the SEAL header of all
packets sent to the ETE.
PKT_ID (32)
a 32-bit per-packet identification field. Present only when the I
bit is set to 1 (see above).
Setting of the various bits and fields of the SEAL header is
specified in the following sections.
4.4. ITE Specification
4.4.1. Tunnel Interface MTU
The tunnel interface must present a fixed MTU to the inner network
layer as the size for admission of inner packets into the interface.
Since VET NBMA tunnel virtual interfaces may support a large set of
ETEs that accept widely varying maximum packet sizes, however, a
number of factors should be taken into consideration when selecting a
tunnel interface MTU.
Due to the ubiquitous deployment of standard Ethernet and similar
networking gear, the nominal Internet cell size has become 1500
bytes; this is the de facto size that end systems have come to expect
will either be delivered by the network without loss due to an MTU
restriction on the path or a suitable ICMP Packet Too Big (PTB)
message returned. When large packets sent by end systems incur
additional encapsulation at an ITE, however, they may be dropped
silently within the tunnel since the network may not always deliver
the necessary PTBs [RFC2923].
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The ITE should therefore set a tunnel interface MTU of at least 1500
bytes plus extra room to accommodate any additional encapsulations
that may occur on the path from the original source. The ITE can
also set smaller MTU values; however, care must be taken not to set
so small a value that original sources would experience an MTU
underflow. In particular, IPv6 sources must see a minimum path MTU
of 1280 bytes, and IPv4 sources should see a minimum path MTU of 576
bytes.
The ITE can alternatively set an indefinite MTU on the tunnel
interface such that all inner packets are admitted into the interface
without regard to size. For ITEs that host applications that use the
tunnel interface directly, this option must be carefully coordinated
with protocol stack upper layers since some upper layer protocols
(e.g., TCP) derive their packet sizing parameters from the MTU of the
outgoing interface and as such may select too large an initial size.
This is not a problem for upper layers that use conservative initial
maximum segment size estimates and/or when the tunnel interface can
reduce the upper layer's maximum segment size, e.g., by reducing the
size advertised in the MSS option of outgoing TCP messages.
The inner network layer protocol consults the tunnel interface MTU
when admitting a packet into the interface. For non-SEAL inner IPv4
packets with the IPv4 Don't Fragment (DF) bit set to 0, if the packet
is larger than the tunnel interface MTU the inner IPv4 layer uses
IPv4 fragmentation to break the packet into fragments no larger than
the tunnel interface MTU. The ITE then admits each fragment into the
interface as an independent packet.
For all other inner packets, the inner network layer admits the
packet if it is no larger than the tunnel interface MTU; otherwise,
it drops the packet and sends a PTB error message to the source with
the MTU value set to the tunnel interface MTU. The message must
contain as much of the invoking packet as possible without the entire
message exceeding the network layer minimum MTU (e.g., 576 bytes for
IPv4, 1280 bytes for IPv6, etc.). For SEAL packets that would
undergo recursive encapsulation, however, the inner layer must send a
SEAL PTB message instead of a PTB of the inner network layer (see:
Section 4.4.3).
In light of the above considerations, the ITE SHOULD configure an
indefinite MTU on tunnel *router* interfaces, since these may be
required to carry recursively-nested SEAL encapsulations. The ITE
MAY instead set a finite MTU on tunnel *host* interfaces. Any
necessary tunnel adaptations are then performed by the SEAL layer
within the tunnel interface as described in the following sections.
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4.4.2. Tunnel Interface Soft State
The ITE maintains per-ETE soft state within the tunnel interface,
e.g., in a neighbor cache. (The ITE can instead maintain only per-
tunnel interface instead of per-ETE state if it is willing to use
lowest-common-denominator values that are acceptable for all ETEs.)
The soft state includes the following:
o a Mid-layer Header Length (MHLEN); set to the length of any mid-
layer encapsulation headers and trailers that must be added before
SEAL segmentation.
o an Outer Header Length (OHLEN); set to the length of the outer IP,
SEAL and other outer encapsulation headers and trailers.
o a total Header Length (HLEN); set to MHLEN plus OHLEN.
o a SEAL Maximum Segment Size (S_MSS). The ITE initializes S_MSS to
the minimum MTU of the underlying interfaces if the underlying
interface MTUs can be determined (otherwise, the ITE initializes
S_MSS to "infinity"). The ITE decreases or increased S_MSS based
on any SCMP "Packet Too Big (PTB)" messages received (see Section
4.6).
o a SEAL Maximum Reassembly Unit (S_MRU). If the ITE is not
configured to use SEAL segmentation, it initializes S_MRU to the
constant value 0 and ignores any S_MRU values reported by the ETE.
Otherwise, the ITE initializes S_MRU to "infinity" (i.e., the
largest possible inner packet size) and decreases or increases
S_MRU based on any SCMP PTB messages received from the ETE (see
Section 4.6). When (S_MRU>(S_MSS*256)), the ITE uses (S_MSS*256)
as the effective S_MRU value.
o a SEAL Inner Fragmentation Threshold (S_IFT); used to determine a
maximum fragment size for fragmentable IPv4 packets. Required
only for tunnels that support encapsulation with IPv4 as the inner
network layer protocol. The ITE should use a "safe" estimate for
S_IFT that would be highly unlikely to trigger additional
fragmentation on the path to the ETE. This estimate SHOULD be
selected such that S_IFT <= MAX(S_MSS, MS_MRU); more specifically,
it is RECOMMENDED that the ITE set S_IFT to 512 unless it can
determine a more accurate safe value (e.g., via probing).
o a set of 16 bit LINK_IDs that identify the ITE's underlying links
and are used to fill the SEAL header field of the same name for
packets sent to this ETE. The ITE selects a separate randomly-
initialized LINK_ID for each underlying link, and the ETE uses the
LINK_ID to identify the ITE's underlying link of origin.
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o a 32 bit NBR_ID that is a randomly-initialized constant ETE
identifier selected by the ITE and used to fill the SEAL header
field of the same name for packets sent to this ETE.
o When necessary, a 32 bit PKT_ID value that is randomly-initialized
and maintained as a monotonically-increasing packet identifier.
Note that S_MSS and S_MRU include the length of the outer and mid-
layer encapsulating headers and trailers (i.e., HLEN), since the ETE
must retain the headers and trailers during reassembly. Note also
that the ITE maintains S_MSS and S_MRU as 32-bit values such that
inner packets larger than 64KB (e.g., IPv6 jumbograms [RFC2675]) can
be accommodated when appropriate for a given subnetwork.
4.4.3. Submitting Packets for Encapsulation
Once an inner packet/fragment has been admitted into the tunnel
interface, it transitions from the inner network layer and becomes
subject to SEAL layer processing. The ITE then examines each packet
to determine whether it is too large for SEAL encapsulation, then
submits the packet for encapsulation according to whether it is
"fragmentable" (discussed in the next paragraph) or "unfragmentable"
(discussed in the following paragraph).
For IPv4 packets with DF=0 in the IPv4 header, if the packet is no
larger than S_IFT the ITE submits the packet for encapsulation.
Otherwise, the ITE uses inner IPv4 fragmentation to break the packet
into IPv4 fragments no larger than S_IFT bytes. For non-SEAL IPv4
packets, the ITE then submits each fragment for encapsulation
separately. For SEAL IPv4 packets, the ITE instead uses the first
fragment to prepare an SCMP PTB message with Code=0 to return to the
source (see: Section 4.6.1.1) then discards each fragment.
For all other packets, if the packet is larger than (MAX(S_MRU,
S_MSS) - HLEN), the ITE discards it and sends a PTB message to the
source with an MTU value of (MAX(S_MRU, S_MSS) - HLEN); otherwise,
the ITE submits the packet for encapsulation. The ITE must include
the length of the uncompressed headers and trailers when calculating
HLEN even if the tunnel is using header compression. The ITE is also
permitted to submit inner packets for encapsulation if they can be
accommodated in a single SEAL segment (i.e., no larger than S_MSS)
even if they are larger than the ETE would be willing to reassemble
if fragmented (i.e., larger than S_MRU) - see: Section 4.5.1.
4.4.4. Mid-Layer Encapsulation
After inner IP fragmentation (if necessary), the ITE next
encapsulates each inner packet/fragment in the MHLEN bytes of any
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mid-layer headers and trailers. The ITE then submits the mid-layer
packet for SEAL segmentation and encapsulation.
4.4.5. SEAL Segmentation
If the ITE is configured to use SEAL segmentation, it checks the
length of the resulting packet after mid-layer encapsulation to
determine whether segmentation is needed. If the length of the
resulting mid-layer packet plus OHLEN is larger than S_MSS but no
larger than S_MRU the ITE performs SEAL segmentation by breaking the
mid-layer packet into N segments (N <= 256) that are no larger than
(S_MSS - OHLEN) bytes each. Each segment, except the final one, MUST
be of equal length. The first byte of each segment MUST begin
immediately after the final byte of the previous segment, i.e., the
segments MUST NOT overlap. The ITE SHOULD generate the smallest
number of segments possible, e.g., it SHOULD NOT generate 6 smaller
segments when the packet could be accommodated with 4 larger
segments.
This SEAL segmentation process ignores the fact that the mid-layer
packet may be unfragmentable outside of the subnetwork. The process
is a mid-layer (not an IP layer) operation employed by the ITE to
adapt the mid-layer packet to the subnetwork path characteristics,
and the ETE will restore the packet to its original form during
reassembly. Therefore, the fact that the packet may have been
segmented within the subnetwork is not observable outside of the
subnetwork.
4.4.6. SEAL Encapsulation
Following SEAL segmentation, the ITE next encapsulates each segment
in a SEAL header formatted as specified in Section 4.3.
For the first segment, the ITE then sets F=1, and sets M=1 if there
are more segments or sets M=0 otherwise. The ITE then sets NEXTHDR
to the Internet Protocol number corresponding to the encapsulated
inner packet. For example, the ITE sets NEXTHDR to the value '4' for
encapsulated IPv4 packets [RFC2003], the value '41' for encapsulated
IPv6 packets [RFC2473][RFC4213], the value '50' for encapsulated
IPsec/ESP payloads [RFC4301][RFC4303], the value '80' for
encapsulated OSI packets [RFC1070], etc.
For each non-initial segment of an N-segment mid-layer packet (N <=
256), the ITE instead sets (F=0; M=1; SEG=1) in the SEAL header of
the first non-initial segment, sets (F=0; M=1; SEG=2) in the next
non-initial segment, etc., and sets (F=0; M=0; SEG=N-1) in the final
segment. (Note that the value SEG=0 is not used, since the initial
segment encodes a NEXTHDR value and not a SEG value.)
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For each segment (i.e., both initial and non-initial), the ITE then
sets C=0, sets R=1 if it is willing to accept SCMP redirects (see
Section 4.6) and sets A=1 if an explicit acknowledgement is required
(see Section 4.4.9). The ITE then sets the LINK_ID field to a
randomly-initialized constant value that identifies the underlying
link over which the segment will be tunneled, and sets the NBR_ID
field to a randomly-initialized constant value that identifies the
neighboring ETE.
Finally, the ITE maintains a randomly-initialized packet
identification value as additional per-ETE soft state. For each SEAL
segment of a multi-segment SEAL packet, the ITE sets I=1 and includes
the current identification value in a trailing 32-bit PKT_ID field in
the SEAL header of each segment. For each SEAL packet that will be
sent as a single segment, however, the ITE MAY set I=0 and omit the
trailing PKT_ID field. Whether or not the PKT_ID field was included,
the ITE then monotonically increments the identification value
(modulo 2^32) for the next SEAL packet to be sent to the ETE.
4.4.7. Outer Encapsulation
Following SEAL encapsulation, the ITE next encapsulates each SEAL
segment in the requisite outer headers and trailers according to the
specific encapsulation format (e.g., [RFC1070], [RFC2003], [RFC2473],
[RFC4213], etc.), except that it writes 'SEAL_PROTO' in the protocol
field of the outer IP header (when simple IP encapsulation is used)
or writes 'SEAL_PORT' in the outer destination service port field
(e.g., when IP/UDP encapsulation is used).
When IPv4 is used as the outer encapsulation layer, the ITE finally
sets the DF flag in the IPv4 header of each segment. If the path to
the ETE correctly implements IP fragmentation (see: Section 4.4.9),
the ITE sets DF=0; otherwise, it sets DF=1.
When IPv6 is used as the outer encapsulation layer, the "DF" flag is
absent but implicitly set to 1. The packet therefore will not be
fragmented within the subnetwork, since IPv6 deprecates in-the-
network fragmentation.
4.4.8. Sending SEAL Protocol Packets
Following outer encapsulation, the ITE sends each outer packet that
encapsulates a segment of the same mid-layer packet over the same
underlying link in canonical order, i.e., segment 0 first, followed
by segment 1, etc., and finally segment N-1.
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4.4.9. Probing Strategy
When IPv4 is used as the outer encapsulation layer, the ITE should
perform a qualification exchange over each underlying link to
determine whether each subnetwork path to the ETE correctly
implements IPv4 fragmentation. The qualification exchange can be
performed either as an initial probe or in-band with real data
packets, and should be repeated periodically since the subnetwork
paths may change due to dynamic routing.
To perform this qualification, the ITE prepares a probe packet that
is no larger than 576 bytes (e.g., a NULL packet with A=1 and
NEXTHDR="No Next Header" [RFC2460] in the SEAL header), then splits
the packet into two outer IPv4 fragments and sends both fragments to
the ETE over the same underlying link. If the ETE returns an SCMP
PTB message with Code=0 (see Section 4.6.1.1), then the subnetwork
path correctly implements IPv4 fragmentation and subsequent data
packets can be sent with DF=0 in the outer header to enable the
preferred method of probing. If the ETE returns an SCMP PTB message
with Code=2, however, the ITE is obliged to set DF=1 for future
packets sent over that underlying link since a middlebox in the
network is reassembling the IPv4 fragments before they are delivered
to the ETE.
In addition to any control plane probing, all SEAL encapsulated data
packets sent by the ITE are considered implicit probes. SEAL
encapsulated packets that use IPv4 as the outer layer of
encapsulation with DF=0 will elicit SCMP PTB messages from the ETE if
any IPv4 fragmentation occurs in the path. SEAL encapsulated packets
that use either IPv6 or IPv4 with DF=1 as the outer layer of
encapsulation may be dropped by a router on the path to the ETE which
will also return an ICMP PTB message to the ITE. If the message
includes enough information (see Section 4.4.10), the ITE can then
use the (LINK_ID, NBR_ID, PKT_ID)-tuple within the packet-in-error to
determine whether the PTB message corresponds to one of its recent
packet transmissions.
The ITE should also send explicit probes, periodically, to verify
that the ETE is still reachable. The ITE sets A=1 in the SEAL header
of a segment to be used as an explicit probe, where the probe can be
either an ordinary data packet segment or a NULL packet (see above).
The probe will elicit an SCMP PTB message with Code=2 from the ETE as
an acknowledgement (see Section 4.6.1.1).
4.4.10. Processing ICMP Messages
When the ITE sends outer IP packets, it may receive ICMP error
messages [RFC0792][RFC4443] from either the ETE or routers within the
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subnetwork. The ICMP messages include an outer IP header, followed
by an ICMP header, followed by a portion of the outer IP packet that
generated the error (also known as the "packet-in-error"). The ITE
can use the (LINK_ID, NBR_ID, PKT_ID)-tuple encoded in the SEAL
header within the packet-in-error to confirm that the ICMP message
came from either the ETE or an on-path router, and can use any
additional information to determine whether to accept or discard the
message.
The ITE should specifically process raw ICMPv4 Protocol Unreachable
messages and ICMPv6 Parameter Problem messages with Code
"Unrecognized Next Header type encountered" as a hint that the ETE
does not implement the SEAL protocol; specific actions that the ITE
may take in this case are out of scope.
4.4.11. Black Hole Detection
In some subnetwork paths, ICMP error messages may be lost due to
filtering or may not contain enough information due to a router in
the path not observing the recommendations of [RFC1812]. The ITE can
use explicit probing as described in Section 4.4.9 to determine
whether the path to the ETE is silently dropping packets (also known
as a "black hole"). For example, when the ITE is obliged to set DF=1
in the outer headers of data packets it should send explicit probe
packets, periodically, in order to detect path MTU increases or
decreases.
4.5. ETE Specification
4.5.1. Reassembly Buffer Requirements
The ETE SHOULD support the minimum IP-layer reassembly requirements
specified for IPv4 (i.e., 576 bytes [RFC1812]) and IPv6 (i.e., 1500
bytes [RFC2460]). The ETE SHOULD also support SEAL-layer reassembly
for inner packets of at least 1280 bytes in length and MAY support
reassembly for larger inner packets. The ETE records the SEAL-layer
reassembly buffer size in a soft-state variable "S_MRU" (see: Section
4.5.2).
The ETE may instead omit the reassembly function altogether and set
S_MRU=0, but this may cause tunnel MTU underruns in some environments
resulting in an unusable link. When reassembly is supported, the ETE
must retain the outer IP, SEAL and other outer headers and trailers
during both IP-layer and SEAL-layer reassembly for the purpose of
associating the fragments/segments of the same packet, and must also
configure a SEAL-layer reassembly buffer that is no smaller than the
IP-layer reassembly buffer. Hence, the ETE:
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o SHOULD configure an outer IP-layer reassembly buffer of at least
the minimum specified for the outer IP protocol version.
o SHOULD configure a SEAL-layer reassembly buffer S_MRU size of at
least (1280 + HELN) bytes, and
o MUST be capable of discarding inner packets that require IP-layer
and/or SEAL-layer reassembly and that are larger than (S_MRU -
HLEN).
The ETE is permitted to accept inner packets that did not undergo IP-
layer and/or SEAL-layer reassembly even if they are larger than
(S_MRU - HELN) bytes. Hence, S_MRU is a maximum *reassembly* size,
and may be less than the largest packet size the ETE is able to
receive when no reassembly is required.
4.5.2. Tunnel Interface Soft State
The ETE maintains a single per-interface S_MRU value to be applied
for all unidirectional tunnel neighbors, and can also maintain per-
ITE S_MRU values, e.g., for any bidirectional tunnel neighbors (see:
Section 4.7). For each bidirectional neighbor, the ETE also
maintains per-ITE soft state to track the LINK_ID and NBR_ID values
used by the ITE.
For each bidirectional tunnel neighbor, the ETE also tracks the outer
IP source addresses (and also port numbers when outer UDP
encapsulation is used) of packets received from the ITE and
associates the most recent values received with the corresponding
(LINK_ID, NBR_ID, PKT_ID)-tuple. In this way, the tuple provides a
stable handle for the ETE to use for return traffic to the ITE even
if the outer IP source address and port numbers in packets received
from the ITE change.
4.5.3. IP-Layer Reassembly
The ETE submits unfragmented SEAL protocol IP packets for SEAL-layer
reassembly as specified in Section 4.5.4. The ETE instead performs
standard IP-layer reassembly for multi-fragment SEAL protocol IP
packets as follows.
The ETE should maintain conservative IP-layer reassembly cache high-
and low-water marks. When the size of the reassembly cache exceeds
this high-water mark, the ETE should actively discard incomplete
reassemblies (e.g., using an Active Queue Management (AQM) strategy)
until the size falls below the low-water mark. The ETE should also
actively discard any pending reassemblies that clearly have no
opportunity for completion, e.g., when a considerable number of new
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fragments have been received before a fragment that completes a
pending reassembly has arrived. Following successful IP-layer
reassembly, the ETE submits the reassembled packet for SEAL-layer
reassembly as specified in Section 4.5.4.
When the ETE processes the IP first fragment (i.e., one with MF=1 and
Offset=0 in the IP header) of a fragmented SEAL packet, it sends an
SCMP PTB message with Code=0 back to the ITE (see Section 4.6.1.1).
When the ETE processes an IP fragment that would cause the
reassembled outer packet to be larger than the IP-layer reassembly
buffer following reassembly, it discontinues the reassembly and
discards any further fragments of the same packet.
4.5.4. SEAL-Layer Reassembly
Following IP reassembly (if necessary), the ETE examines each mid-
layer data packet (i.e., those with C=0 in the SEAL header) packet)
to determine whether an SCMP error message is required. If the mid-
layer data packet has an incorrect value in the SEAL header the ETE
discards the packet and returns an SCMP "Parameter Problem" message
(see Section 4.6.1.4). Next, if the SEAL header has A=1 and the
packet did not arrive as multiple outer IP fragments, the ETE sends
an SCMP PTB message with Code=2 back to the ITE (see Section
4.6.1.1). The ETE next submits single-segment mid-layer packets for
decapsulation and delivery to upper layers (see Section 4.5.5). The
ETE instead performs SEAL-layer reassembly for multi-segment mid-
layer packets with I=1 in the SEAL header as follows.
The ETE adds each segment of a multi-segment mid-layer packet with
I=1 in the SEAL header to a SEAL-layer pending-reassembly queue
according to the (LINK_ID, NBR_ID, PKT_ID)-tuple found in the SEAL
header. The ETE performs SEAL-layer reassembly through simple in-
order concatenation of the encapsulated segments of the same mid-
layer packet from N consecutive SEAL segments. SEAL-layer reassembly
requires the ETE to maintain a cache of recently received segments
for a hold time that would allow for nominal inter-segment delays.
When a SEAL reassembly times out, the ETE discards the incomplete
reassembly and returns an SCMP "Time Exceeded" message to the ITE
(see Section 4.6.1.4). As for IP-layer reassembly, the ETE should
also maintain a conservative reassembly cache high- and low-water
mark and should actively discard any pending reassemblies that
clearly have no opportunity for completion, e.g., when a considerable
number of new SEAL packets have been received before a packet that
completes a pending reassembly has arrived.
If the ETE receives a SEAL packet for which a segment with the same
(LINK_ID, NBR_ID, PKT_ID)-tuple is already in the queue, it must
determine whether to accept the new segment and release the old, or
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drop the new segment. If accepting the new segment would cause an
inconsistency with other segments already in the queue (e.g.,
differing segment lengths), the ETE drops the segment that is least
likely to complete the reassembly. When the ETE has already received
the SEAL first segment (i.e., one with F=1 and M=1 in the SEAL
header) of a SEAL protocol packet that arrived as multiple SEAL
segments, and accepting the current segment would cause the size of
the reassembled packet to exceed S_MRU, the ETE schedules the
reassembly resources for garbage collection and sends an SCMP PTB
message with Code=1 back to the ITE (see Section 4.6.1.1).
After all segments are gathered, the ETE reassembles the packet by
concatenating the segments encapsulated in the N consecutive SEAL
packets beginning with the initial segment (i.e., SEG=0) and followed
by any non-initial segments 1 through N-1. That is, for an N-segment
mid-layer packet, reassembly entails the concatenation of the SEAL-
encapsulated packet segments with the same value in the PKT_ID field
and with (F=1, M=1) in the first SEAL header, followed by (F=0, M=1,
SEG=1) in the next SEAL header, followed by (F=0, M=1, SEG=2), etc.,
up to (F=0, M=0, SEG=(N-1)) in the final SEAL header. Following
successful SEAL-layer reassembly, the ETE submits the reassembled
mid-layer packet for decapsulation and delivery to upper layers as
specified in Section 4.5.5.
The ETE must not perform SEAL-layer reassembly for multi-segment mid-
layer packets with I=0 in the SEAL header. The ETE instead silently
drops all segments with I=0 and either F=0 or (F=1; M=1) in the SEAL
header and sends an SCMP Parameter Problem message back to the ITE.
4.5.5. Decapsulation and Delivery to Upper Layers
Following any necessary IP- and SEAL-layer reassembly, the ETE
discards the outer headers and trailers and performs any mid-layer
transformations on the mid-layer packet. The ETE next discards the
mid-layer headers and trailers, and delivers the inner packet to the
upper-layer protocol indicated either in the SEAL NEXTHDR field or
the next header field of the mid-layer packet (i.e., if the packet
included mid-layer encapsulations). The ETE instead silently
discards the inner packet if it was a NULL packet (see Section
4.4.9).
4.6. The SEAL Control Message Protocol (SCMP)
SEAL uses a companion SEAL Control Message Protocol (SCMP) based on
the same message format as the Internet Control Message Protocol for
IPv6 (ICMPv6) [RFC4443]. Each SCMP message is embedded within an
SCMP packet which begins with the same outer header format as would
be used for outer encapsulation of a SEAL data packet (see: Section
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4.4.7). The following sections specify the generation and processing
of SCMP messages:
4.6.1. Generating SCMP Messages
SCMP messages may be generated by either ITEs or ETEs (i.e., by any
TE) using the same message Type and Code values specified for
ordinary ICMPv6 messages in [RFC4443]. SCMP is also used to carry
other ICMPv6 message types and their associated options as specified
in other documents (e.g., [RFC4191][RFC4861], etc.). The general
format for SCMP messages is shown in Figure 4:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Message Body ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| As much of invoking SEAL data |
~ packet as possible without the SCMP ~
| packet exceeding 576 bytes (*) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
(*) also known as the "packet-in-error"
Figure 4: SCMP Message Format
TEs generate solicitation messages (e.g., an SCMP echo request, an
SCMP router/neighbor solicitation, a SEAL data packet with A=1, etc.)
for the purpose of triggering an SCMP response. TEs generate
solicited SCMP messages (e.g., an SCMP echo reply, an SCMP router/
neighbor advertisement, an SCMP PTB message, etc.) in response to
explicit solicitations, and also generate SCMP error messages in
response to errored SEAL data packets. As for ICMP, TEs must not
generate SCMP error message in response to other SCMP messages.
As for ordinary ICMPv6 messages, the SCMP message begins with a 4
byte header that includes 8-bit Type and Code fields followed by a
16-bit Checksum field followed by a variable-length Message Body.
The TE sets the Type and Code fields to the same values that would
appear in the corresponding ICMPv6 message and also formats the
Message Body the same as for the corresponding ICMPv6 message.
The Message Body is followed by the leading portion of the invoking
SEAL data packet (i.e., the "packet-in-error") IFF the packet-in-
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error would also be included in the corresponding ICMPv6 message. If
the SCMP message will include a packet-in-error, the TE includes as
much of the leading portion of the invoking SEAL data packet as
possible beginning with the outer IP header and extending to a length
that would not cause the entire SCMP packet following outer
encapsulation to exceed 576 bytes (see: Figure 5).
The TE then calculates the SCMP message Checksum the same as
specified for ICMPv6 messages except that it does not prepend a
pseudo-header of the outer IP header since the (LINK_ID, NBR_ID,
PKT_ID)-tuple already gives sufficient assurance against mis-
delivery. (The Checksum calculation procedure is therefore identical
to that used for ICMPv4 [RFC0792].) The TE then encapsulates the
SCMP message in the outer headers as shown in Figure 5:
+--------------------+
~ outer IPv4 header ~
+--------------------+
~ other outer hdrs ~
+--------------------+
~ SEAL Header ~
+--------------------+ +--------------------+
~ SCMP message header~ --> ~ SCMP message header~
+--------------------+ --> +--------------------+
~ SCMP message body ~ --> ~ SCMP message body ~
+--------------------+ --> +--------------------+
~ packet-in-error ~ --> ~ packet-in-error ~
+--------------------+ +--------------------+
~ outer trailers ~
SCMP Message +--------------------+
before encapsulation
SCMP Packet
after encapsulation
Figure 5: SCMP Message Encapsulation
When a TE generates an SCMP message in response to an SCMP
solicitation or an ordinary SEAL data packet (i.e., a "solicitation
packet"), it sets the outer IP destination and source addresses of
the SCMP packet to the solicitation's source and destination
addresses (respectively). (If the destination address in the
solicitation was multicast, the TE instead sets the outer IP source
address of the SCMP packet to an address assigned to the underlying
IP interface.) The TE then sets the LINK_ID, NBR_ID and I flag in
the SEAL header of the SCMP packet to the same values that appeared
in the solicitation. If the I flag is set to 1, the TE also includes
the PKT_ID field that it received in the solicitation.
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When a TE generates an unsolicited SCMP message, it sets the outer IP
destination and source addresses of the SCMP packet the same as it
would for ordinary SEAL data packets. The TE then sets the LINK_ID,
NBR_ID and I flag in the SEAL header of the SCMP packet to the same
values that it would use to send an ordinary SEAL data packet. If
the I flag is set to 1, the TE also includes the PKT_ID field that it
received in the solicitation.
For all SCMP messages, the TE then sets the other flag bits in the
SEAL header to C=1, A=0, R=0, F=1, and M=0. It next sets the
NEXTHDR/SEG field to 0 and sends the SCMP packet to the tunnel
neighbor.
4.6.1.1. Generating SCMP Packet Too Big (PTB) Messages
An ETE generates an SCMP "Packet Too Big" (PTB) message under one of
the following cases:
o Case 0: when it receives the IP first fragment (i.e., one with
MF=1 and Offset=0 in the outer IP header) of a SEAL protocol
packet that arrived as multiple IP fragments, or:
o Case 1: when it has already received the SEAL first segment (i.e.,
one with F=1 and M=1 in the SEAL header) of a SEAL protocol packet
that arrived as multiple SEAL segments, and accepting the current
segment would cause the size of the reassembled packet to exceed
S_MRU, or:
o Case 2: when it receives a SEAL protocol data packet with A=1 in
the SEAL header that did not arrive as multiple IP fragments
(i.e., one that does not also match Case 0).
The ETE prepares an SCMP PTB message the same as for the
corresponding ICMPv6 PTB message, except that it writes the S_MRU
value for this ITE in the MTU field (i.e., even if the S_MRU value is
0). For cases 0 and 2 above, the packet-in-error field includes the
leading portion of the IP packet or fragment that triggered the
condition. For case 1 above, the packet-in-error field includes the
leading portion of the SEAL first segment, beginning with the
encapsulating outer IP header.
Finally, the ETE writes the value 0, 1 or 2 in the Code field of the
PTB message according to whether the reason for generating the
message was due to the corresponding case number from the list of
cases above.
NOTE CAREFULLY that, unlike cases 0 and 1 above, case 2 is not an
error condition and does not necessarily signify packet loss.
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Instead, it is a control plane acknowledgement of a data plane probe.
NOTE ALSO that if the ETE generates a Case 0 SCMP PTB message, then
it MUST NOT also generate a Case 2 PTB message on behalf of the same
SEAL segment.
4.6.1.2. Generating SCMP Neighbor Discovery Messages
An ITE generates an SCMP "Neighbor Solicitation" (SNS) or "Router
Solicitation" (SRS) message when it needs to solicit a response from
an ETE. An ETE generates a solicited SCMP "Neighbor Advertisement"
(SNA) or "Router Advertisement" (SRA) message when it receives an
SNS/SRS message. Any TE may also generate unsolicited SNA/SRA
messages that are not triggered by a specific solicitation event.
The TE generates SNS, SNA, SRS and SRA messages the same as described
for the corresponding IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND) messages (see:
[RFC4861]).
4.6.1.3. Generating SCMP Redirect Messages
An ETE generates an SCMP "Redirect" message when it receives a SEAL
data packet with R=1 in the SEAL header and needs to inform the ITE
of a better next hop. The ETE generates SCMP Redirect messages the
same as described for IPv6 ND Redirects in [RFC4861], except that it
includes Route Information Options (RIOs) [RFC4191] to inform the ITE
of a better next hop for an entire IP prefix instead of only a single
destination. The SCMP Redirect message therefore supports both
network and host redirection instead of only host redirection.
4.6.1.4. Generating Other SCMP Messages
An ETE generates an SCMP "Destination Unreachable - Communication
with Destination Administratively Prohibited" message when its
association with the ITE is bidirectional and it receives a SEAL
packet with a (LINK_ID, NBR_ID, PKT_ID)-tuple that does not
correspond to this ITE (see: Section 4.7).
An ETE generates an SCMP "Destination Unreachable" message with an
appropriate code under the same circumstances that an IPv6 system
would generate an ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable message using the
same code. The SCMP Destination Unreachable message is formatted the
same as for ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable messages.
An ETE generates an SCMP "Parameter Problem" message when it receives
a SEAL packet with an incorrect value in the SEAL header, and
generates an SCMP "Time Exceeded" message when it garbage collects an
incomplete SEAL data packet reassembly. The message formats used are
the same as for the corresponding ICMPv6 messages.
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Generation of all other SCMP message types is outside the scope of
this document.
4.6.2. Processing SCMP Messages
An ITE processes any solicited and error SCMP message it receives as
long as it can verify that the corresponding SCMP packet was sent
from an on-path ETE. The ITE can verify that the SCMP packet came
from an on-path ETE by checking that the (LINK_ID, NBR_ID, PKT_ID)-
tuple in the SEAL header of the packet corresponds to one of its
recently-sent SEAL data packets or SCMP solicitation packets.
For each solicited and error SCMP message it receives, the ITE first
verifies that the identifying information is acceptable, then
verifies that the Checksum in the SCMP message header is correct. If
the identifying information and/or checksum are incorrect, the ITE
discards the message; otherwise, it processes the message the same as
for ordinary ICMPv6 messages.
Any TE may also receive unsolicited SCMP messages (e.g., SNS, SRS,
SNA, SRA, etc.) from the tunnel neighbor. The TE sends SCMP response
messages in response to solicitations, but does not otherwise process
the unsolicited SCMP messages as an indication of tunnel neighbor
liveness.
Finally, TEs process solicited and error SCMP messages as an
indication that the tunnel neighbor is responsive, i.e., in the same
manner implied for IPv6 Neighbor Unreachability Detection "hints of
forward progress" (see: [RFC4861]).
4.6.2.1. Processing SCMP PTB Messages
An ITE may receive an SCMP PTB message after it sends a SEAL data
packet to an ETE (see: Section 4.6.1.1). The packet-in-error within
the PTB message consists of the encapsulating IP/*/SEAL headers
followed by the inner packet in the form in which the ITE received it
prior to SEAL encapsulation.
If the PTB message has Code=2 in the SCMP header the ITE processes
the message as a response to an explicit probe request then discards
the message. If the PTB has Code=0 or Code=1 in the SCMP header,
however, the ITE processes the message as an indication of an MTU
limitation.
if the PTB has Code =0, the ITE first verifies that the outer IP
header in the packet-in-error encodes an IP first fragment, then
examines the outer IP header length field to determine a new S_MSS
value as follows:
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o If the length is no less than 1280, the ITE records the length as
the new S_MSS value.
o If the length is less than the current S_MSS value and also less
than 1280, the ITE can discern that IP fragmentation is occurring
but it cannot determine the true MTU of the restricting link due
to the possibility that a router on the path is generating runt
first fragments.
In this latter case, the ITE may need to search for a reduced S_MSS
value through an iterative searching strategy that parallels the IPv4
Path MTU Discovery "plateau table" procedure in a similar fashion as
described in Section 5 of [RFC1191]. This searching strategy may
entail multiple iterations in which the ITE sends additional SEAL
data packets using a reduced S_MSS and receives additional SCMP PTB
messages, but the process should quickly converge. During this
process, it is essential that the ITE reduce S_MSS based on the first
SCMP PTB message received under the current S_MSS size, and refrain
from further reducing S_MSS until SCMP PTB messages pertaining to
packets sent under the new S_MSS are received.
For both Code=0 and Code=1 PTB messages, the ITE next records the
value in the MTU field of the SCMP PTB message as the new S_MRU value
for this ETE and examines the inner packet within the packet-in-
error. If the inner packet was unfragmentable (see: Section 4.4.3)
and larger than (MAX(S_MRU, S_MSS) - HLEN), the ITE then sends a
transcribed PTB message appropriate for the inner packet to the
original source with MTU set to (MAX(S_MRU, S_MSS) - HLEN). (In the
case of nested SEAL encapsulations, the transcribed PTB message will
itself be an SCMP PTB message). If the inner packet is fragmentable,
however, the ITE instead reduces its inner fragmentation S_IFT
estimate to a size no larger than S_MSS for this ETE (see: Section
4.4.3) and does not send a transcribed PTB. In that case, some
fragmentable packets may be silently discarded but future
fragmentable packets will subsequently undergo inner fragmentation
based on this new S_IFT estimate.
The ITE may alternatively ignore the S_MSS and S_MRU values, thus
disabling SEAL-layer segmentation. In that case, the ITE sends all
SEAL-encapsulated packets as single segments and implements stateless
MTU discovery. In that case, if the ITE receives an SCMP PTB message
from the ETE with Code=0 and with a degenerate length value in the
outer IP header, it can send a translated PTB message back to the
source listing a slightly smaller MTU size than the length value in
the inner IP header. For example, if the ITE receives an SCMP PTB
message with Code=0, outer IP length 256 and inner IP length 1500, it
can send a PTB message listing an MTU of 1400 back to the source. If
the ITE subsequently receives an SCMP PTB message with Code=0, outer
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IP length 256 and inner IP length 1400, it can send a PTB message
listing an MTU of 1300 back to the source, etc.
Actual plateau table values for this "step-down" MTU determination
procedure are up to the implementation, which may consult Section 7
of [RFC1191] for non-normative example guidance.
4.6.2.2. Processing SCMP Neighbor Discovery Messages
An ETE may receive SNS/SRS messages from an ITE as the initial leg in
a neighbor discovery exchange. An ITE may also receive both
solicited and unsolicited SNA/SRA messages from an ETE.
The TE processes SNS/SRS and SNA/SRA messages the same as described
for the corresponding IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND) messages (see:
[RFC4861]).
4.6.2.3. Processing SCMP Redirect Messages
An ITE may receive SCMP Redirect messages after sending a SEAL data
packet with R=1 in the SEAL header to an ETE. The ITE processes any
RIO options in the SCMP redirect message and updates its Forwarding
Information Base (FIB) accordingly.
4.6.2.4. Processing Other SCMP Messages
An ITE may receive an SCMP "Destination Unreachable - Communication
with Destination Administratively Prohibited" message after it sends
a SEAL data packet to a bidirectional neighbor. The ITE processes
the message as an indication that it needs to (re)synchronize with
the ETE (see: Section 4.7).
An ITE may receive other SCMP "Destination Unreachable" messages with
an appropriate code under the same circumstances that an IPv6 node
would receive an ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable message. The ITE
processes the message the same as for the corresponding ICMPv6
Destination Unreachable messages.
An ITE may receive an SCMP "Parameter Problem" message when the ETE
receives a SEAL packet with an incorrect value in the SEAL header.
The ITE should examine the incorrect SEAL header field setting to
determine whether a different setting should be used in subsequent
packets.
.An ITE may receive an SCMP "Time Exceeded" message when the ETE
garbage collects an incomplete SEAL data packet reassembly. The ITE
should consider the message as an indication of congestion.
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Processing of all other SCMP message types is outside the scope of
this document.
4.7. Tunnel Endpoint Synchronization
When there is no prior coordination between SEAL TEs, the ITE
establishes tunnel neighbor soft state for the ETE but the ETE does
not establish soft state for the ITE. In that case, the tunnel
neighbor relationship is said to be unidirectional and the ETE
unconditionally accepts any packets coming from the ITE. When a pair
of TEs need to maintain a closer coordination with one another,
however, they can establish a bidirectional tunnel neighbor
relationship in which both TEs retain soft state.
In order to establish a bidirectional tunnel neighbor relationship,
the initiating TE (call it "A") performs a short transaction with the
responding TE (call it "B") via a reliable transport protocol such as
TCP run directly over the outer network layer protocol. The
application layer details of the transaction are out of scope for
this document, and indeed need not be standardized as long as both
TEs observe the same specifications. (Note that a short transaction
instead of a persistent connection is advised if the outer network
layer protocol addresses may change, e.g., due to a mobility event.
If there is assurance that the outer network layer protocol addresses
will not change, then a persistent connection may be used.)
During the transaction, "A" and "B" first authenticate themselves to
each other, then "A" registers a randomly-generated NBR_ID value with
"B". Both TEs then select one or more randomly-generated LINK_IDs,
where each LINK_ID corresponds to a different underlying link over
which TE's tunnel interface is configured. Both TEs then register
their LINK_IDs with each other to establish the appropriate
bidirectional tunnel neighbor soft state (see Sections 4.4.2 and
4.5.2).
Following this bidirectional tunnel neighbor establishment, the TEs
monitor the soft state for liveness, e.g., using Neighbor
Unreachability Detection hints of forward progress. When one of the
TEs wishes to terminate the neighbor relationship, it performs
another short transaction to request the termination, then both TEs
delete their respective neighbor soft state.
Outbound and inbound traffic engineering between bidirectional tunnel
neighbors is then coordinated by a link management agent that
monitors the underlying link paths over which the tunnel is
configured, and can remain continuous even if the paths through one
or more of the underlying links has failed. When one TE detects that
most/all underlying link paths to the other TE have failed, however,
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it terminates the tunnel neighbor relationship.
This bidirectional tunnel neighbor establishment is most commonly
initiated by a client TE in establishing a connection with a serving
TE, e.g., when a customer router within a home network establishes a
connection with a serving router in a provider network, when a mobile
handset connects with a serving router in a cellular operator
network, etc.
5. Link Requirements
Subnetwork designers are expected to follow the recommendations in
Section 2 of [RFC3819] when configuring link MTUs.
6. End System Requirements
SEAL provides robust mechanisms for returning PTB messages; however,
end systems that send unfragmentable IP packets larger than 1500
bytes are strongly encouraged to implement their own end-to-end MTU
assurance, e.g., using Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery per
[RFC4821].
7. Router Requirements
IPv4 routers within the subnetwork are strongly encouraged to
implement IPv4 fragmentation such that the first fragment is the
largest and approximately the size of the underlying link MTU, i.e.,
they should avoid generating runt first fragments.
IPv6 routers within the subnetwork are required to generate the
necessary PTB messages when they drop outer IPv6 packets due to an
MTU restriction.
8. IANA Considerations
The IANA is instructed to allocate an IP protocol number for
'SEAL_PROTO' in the 'protocol-numbers' registry.
The IANA is instructed to allocate a Well-Known Port number for
'SEAL_PORT' in the 'port-numbers' registry.
The IANA is instructed to establish a "SEAL Protocol" registry to
record SEAL Version values. This registry should be initialized to
include the initial SEAL Version number, i.e., Version 0.
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9. Security Considerations
Unlike IPv4 fragmentation, overlapping fragment attacks are not
possible due to the requirement that SEAL segments be non-
overlapping. This condition is naturally enforced due to the fact
that each consecutive SEAL segment begins at offset 0 with respect to
the previous SEAL segment.
An amplification/reflection attack is possible when an attacker sends
IP first fragments with spoofed source addresses to an ETE, resulting
in a stream of SCMP messages returned to a victim ITE. The (LINK_ID,
NBR_ID, PKT_ID)-tuple in the encapsulated segment of the spoofed IP
first fragment provides mitigation for the ITE to detect and discard
spurious SCMP messages.
The SEAL header is sent in-the-clear (outside of any IPsec/ESP
encapsulations) the same as for the outer IP and other outer headers.
In this respect, the threat model is no different than for IPv6
extension headers. As for IPv6 extension headers, the SEAL header is
protected only by L2 integrity checks and is not covered under any L3
integrity checks.
SCMP messages carry the (LINK_ID, NBR_ID, PKT_ID)-tuple of the
packet-in-error. Therefore, when an ITE receives an SCMP message it
can unambiguously associate it with the SEAL data packet that
triggered the error. When the TEs are synchronized, the ETE can also
detect off-path spoofing attacks.
Security issues that apply to tunneling in general are discussed in
[I-D.ietf-v6ops-tunnel-security-concerns].
10. Related Work
Section 3.1.7 of [RFC2764] provides a high-level sketch for
supporting large tunnel MTUs via a tunnel-level segmentation and
reassembly capability to avoid IP level fragmentation, which is in
part the same approach used by SEAL. SEAL could therefore be
considered as a fully functioned manifestation of the method
postulated by that informational reference.
Section 3 of [RFC4459] describes inner and outer fragmentation at the
tunnel endpoints as alternatives for accommodating the tunnel MTU;
however, the SEAL protocol specifies a mid-layer segmentation and
reassembly capability that is distinct from both inner and outer
fragmentation.
Section 4 of [RFC2460] specifies a method for inserting and
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processing extension headers between the base IPv6 header and
transport layer protocol data. The SEAL header is inserted and
processed in exactly the same manner.
The concepts of path MTU determination through the report of
fragmentation and extending the IP Identification field were first
proposed in deliberations of the TCP-IP mailing list and the Path MTU
Discovery Working Group (MTUDWG) during the late 1980's and early
1990's. SEAL supports a report fragmentation capability using bits
in an extension header (the original proposal used a spare bit in the
IP header) and supports ID extension through a 16-bit field in an
extension header (the original proposal used a new IP option). A
historical analysis of the evolution of these concepts, as well as
the development of the eventual path MTU discovery mechanism for IP,
appears in Appendix D of this document.
11. SEAL Advantages over Classical Methods
The SEAL approach offers a number of distinct advantages over the
classical path MTU discovery methods [RFC1191] [RFC1981]:
1. Classical path MTU discovery always results in packet loss when
an MTU restriction is encountered. Using SEAL, IP fragmentation
provides a short-term interim mechanism for ensuring that packets
are delivered while SEAL adjusts its packet sizing parameters.
2. Classical path MTU may require several iterations of dropping
packets and returning PTB messages until an acceptable path MTU
value is determined. Under normal circumstances, SEAL determines
the correct packet sizing parameters in a single iteration.
3. Using SEAL, ordinary packets serve as implicit probes without
exposing data to unnecessary loss. SEAL also provides an
explicit probing mode not available in the classic methods.
4. Using SEAL, ETEs encapsulate SCMP error messages in outer and
mid-layer headers such that packet-filtering network middleboxes
will not filter them the same as for "raw" ICMP messages that may
be generated by an attacker.
5. The SEAL approach ensures that the tunnel either delivers or
deterministically drops packets according to their size, which is
a required characteristic of any IP link.
6. Most importantly, all SEAL packets have Identification values
that are sufficiently long to be used for duplicate packet
detection purposes and to associate ICMP error messages with
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actual packets sent without requiring per-packet state; hence,
SEAL avoids certain denial-of-service attack vectors open to the
classical methods.
12. Acknowledgments
The following individuals are acknowledged for helpful comments and
suggestions: Jari Arkko, Fred Baker, Iljitsch van Beijnum, Oliver
Bonaventure, Teco Boot, Bob Braden, Brian Carpenter, Steve Casner,
Ian Chakeres, Noel Chiappa, Remi Denis-Courmont, Remi Despres, Ralph
Droms, Aurnaud Ebalard, Gorry Fairhurst, Washam Fan, Dino Farinacci,
Joel Halpern, Sam Hartman, John Heffner, Thomas Henderson, Bob
Hinden, Christian Huitema, Eliot Lear, Darrel Lewis, Joe Macker, Matt
Mathis, Erik Nordmark, Dan Romascanu, Dave Thaler, Joe Touch, Mark
Townsley, Ole Troan, Margaret Wasserman, Magnus Westerlund, Robin
Whittle, James Woodyatt, and members of the Boeing Research &
Technology NST DC&NT group.
Path MTU determination through the report of fragmentation was first
proposed by Charles Lynn on the TCP-IP mailing list in 1987.
Extending the IP identification field was first proposed by Steve
Deering on the MTUDWG mailing list in 1989.
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
September 1981.
[RFC0792] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5,
RFC 792, September 1981.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.
[RFC3971] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.
[RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, "Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol
Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 4443, March 2006.
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[RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
"Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
September 2007.
13.2. Informative References
[FOLK] Shannon, C., Moore, D., and k. claffy, "Beyond Folklore:
Observations on Fragmented Traffic", December 2002.
[FRAG] Kent, C. and J. Mogul, "Fragmentation Considered Harmful",
October 1987.
[I-D.ietf-intarea-ipv4-id-update]
Touch, J., "Updated Specification of the IPv4 ID Field",
draft-ietf-intarea-ipv4-id-update-01 (work in progress),
October 2010.
[I-D.ietf-v6ops-tunnel-security-concerns]
Krishnan, S., Thaler, D., and J. Hoagland, "Security
Concerns With IP Tunneling",
draft-ietf-v6ops-tunnel-security-concerns-04 (work in
progress), October 2010.
[I-D.russert-rangers]
Russert, S., Fleischman, E., and F. Templin, "RANGER
Scenarios", draft-russert-rangers-05 (work in progress),
July 2010.
[I-D.templin-intarea-vet]
Templin, F., "Virtual Enterprise Traversal (VET)",
draft-templin-intarea-vet-23 (work in progress),
January 2011.
[I-D.templin-iron]
Templin, F., "The Internet Routing Overlay Network
(IRON)", draft-templin-iron-17 (work in progress),
January 2011.
[MTUDWG] "IETF MTU Discovery Working Group mailing list,
gatekeeper.dec.com/pub/DEC/WRL/mogul/mtudwg-log, November
1989 - February 1995.".
[RFC1063] Mogul, J., Kent, C., Partridge, C., and K. McCloghrie, "IP
MTU discovery options", RFC 1063, July 1988.
[RFC1070] Hagens, R., Hall, N., and M. Rose, "Use of the Internet as
a subnetwork for experimentation with the OSI network
layer", RFC 1070, February 1989.
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[RFC1191] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
November 1990.
[RFC1812] Baker, F., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers",
RFC 1812, June 1995.
[RFC1981] McCann, J., Deering, S., and J. Mogul, "Path MTU Discovery
for IP version 6", RFC 1981, August 1996.
[RFC2003] Perkins, C., "IP Encapsulation within IP", RFC 2003,
October 1996.
[RFC2473] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Generic Packet Tunneling in
IPv6 Specification", RFC 2473, December 1998.
[RFC2675] Borman, D., Deering, S., and R. Hinden, "IPv6 Jumbograms",
RFC 2675, August 1999.
[RFC2764] Gleeson, B., Heinanen, J., Lin, A., Armitage, G., and A.
Malis, "A Framework for IP Based Virtual Private
Networks", RFC 2764, February 2000.
[RFC2923] Lahey, K., "TCP Problems with Path MTU Discovery",
RFC 2923, September 2000.
[RFC3232] Reynolds, J., "Assigned Numbers: RFC 1700 is Replaced by
an On-line Database", RFC 3232, January 2002.
[RFC3366] Fairhurst, G. and L. Wood, "Advice to link designers on
link Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ)", BCP 62, RFC 3366,
August 2002.
[RFC3819] Karn, P., Bormann, C., Fairhurst, G., Grossman, D.,
Ludwig, R., Mahdavi, J., Montenegro, G., Touch, J., and L.
Wood, "Advice for Internet Subnetwork Designers", BCP 89,
RFC 3819, July 2004.
[RFC4191] Draves, R. and D. Thaler, "Default Router Preferences and
More-Specific Routes", RFC 4191, November 2005.
[RFC4213] Nordmark, E. and R. Gilligan, "Basic Transition Mechanisms
for IPv6 Hosts and Routers", RFC 4213, October 2005.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, December 2005.
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[RFC4380] Huitema, C., "Teredo: Tunneling IPv6 over UDP through
Network Address Translations (NATs)", RFC 4380,
February 2006.
[RFC4459] Savola, P., "MTU and Fragmentation Issues with In-the-
Network Tunneling", RFC 4459, April 2006.
[RFC4821] Mathis, M. and J. Heffner, "Packetization Layer Path MTU
Discovery", RFC 4821, March 2007.
[RFC4963] Heffner, J., Mathis, M., and B. Chandler, "IPv4 Reassembly
Errors at High Data Rates", RFC 4963, July 2007.
[RFC4987] Eddy, W., "TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common
Mitigations", RFC 4987, August 2007.
[RFC5445] Watson, M., "Basic Forward Error Correction (FEC)
Schemes", RFC 5445, March 2009.
[RFC5720] Templin, F., "Routing and Addressing in Networks with
Global Enterprise Recursion (RANGER)", RFC 5720,
February 2010.
[RFC5927] Gont, F., "ICMP Attacks against TCP", RFC 5927, July 2010.
[SIGCOMM] Luckie, M. and B. Stasiewicz, "Measuring Path MTU
Discovery Behavior", November 2010.
[TBIT] Medina, A., Allman, M., and S. Floyd, "Measuring
Interactions Between Transport Protocols and Middleboxes",
October 2004.
[TCP-IP] "Archive/Hypermail of Early TCP-IP Mail List,
http://www-mice.cs.ucl.ac.uk/multimedia/misc/tcp_ip/, May
1987 - May 1990.".
[WAND] Luckie, M., Cho, K., and B. Owens, "Inferring and
Debugging Path MTU Discovery Failures", October 2005.
Appendix A. Reliability
Although a SEAL tunnel may span an arbitrarily-large subnetwork
expanse, the IP layer sees the tunnel as a simple link that supports
the IP service model. Since SEAL supports segmentation at a layer
below IP, SEAL therefore presents a case in which the link unit of
loss (i.e., a SEAL segment) is smaller than the end-to-end
retransmission unit (e.g., a TCP segment).
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Links with high bit error rates (BERs) (e.g., IEEE 802.11) use
Automatic Repeat-ReQuest (ARQ) mechanisms [RFC3366] to increase
packet delivery ratios, while links with much lower BERs typically
omit such mechanisms. Since SEAL tunnels may traverse arbitrarily-
long paths over links of various types that are already either
performing or omitting ARQ as appropriate, it would therefore often
be inefficient to also require the tunnel to perform ARQ.
When the SEAL ITE has knowledge that the tunnel will traverse a
subnetwork with non-negligible loss due to, e.g., interference, link
errors, congestion, etc., it can solicit Segment Reports from the ETE
periodically to discover missing segments for retransmission within a
single round-trip time. However, retransmission of missing segments
may require the ITE to maintain considerable state and may also
result in considerable delay variance and packet reordering.
SEAL may also use alternate reliability mechanisms such as Forward
Error Correction (FEC). A simple FEC mechanism may merely entail
gratuitous retransmissions of duplicate data, however more efficient
alternatives are also possible. Basic FEC schemes are discussed in
[RFC5445].
The use of ARQ and FEC mechanisms for improved reliability are for
further study.
Appendix B. Integrity
Each link in the path over which a SEAL tunnel is configured is
responsible for link layer integrity verification for packets that
traverse the link. As such, when a multi-segment SEAL packet with N
segments is reassembled, its segments will have been inspected by N
independent link layer integrity check streams instead of a single
stream that a single segment SEAL packet of the same size would have
received. Intuitively, a reassembled packet subjected to N
independent integrity check streams of shorter-length segments would
seem to have integrity assurance that is no worse than a single-
segment packet subjected to only a single integrity check steam,
since the integrity check strength diminishes in inverse proportion
with segment length. In any case, the link-layer integrity assurance
for a multi-segment SEAL packet is no different than for a multi-
fragment IPv6 packet.
Fragmentation and reassembly schemes must also consider packet-
splicing errors, e.g., when two segments from the same packet are
concatenated incorrectly, when a segment from packet X is reassembled
with segments from packet Y, etc. The primary sources of such errors
include implementation bugs and wrapping IP ID fields. In terms of
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implementation bugs, the SEAL segmentation and reassembly algorithm
is much simpler than IP fragmentation resulting in simplified
implementations. In terms of wrapping ID fields, when IPv4 is used
as the outer IP protocol, the 16-bit IP ID field can wrap with only
64K packets with the same (src, dst, protocol)-tuple alive in the
system at a given time [RFC4963] increasing the likelihood of
reassembly mis-associations. However, SEAL ensures that any outer
IPv4 fragmentation and reassembly will be short-lived and tuned out
as soon as the ITE receives an SCMP PTB mesage, and SEAL segmentation
and reassembly uses a much longer Identification field. Therefore,
reassembly mis-associations of IP fragments nor of SEAL segments
should be prohibitively rare.
Appendix C. Transport Mode
SEAL can also be used in "transport-mode", e.g., when the inner layer
comprises upper-layer protocol data rather than an encapsulated IP
packet. For instance, TCP peers can negotiate the use of SEAL (e.g.,
by inserting a 'SEAL_OPTION' TCP option during connection
establishment) for the carriage of protocol data encapsulated as
IPv4/SEAL/TCP. In this sense, the "subnetwork" becomes the entire
end-to-end path between the TCP peers and may potentially span the
entire Internet.
If both TCPs agree on the use of SEAL, their protocol messages will
be carried as IPv4/SEAL/TCP and the connection will be serviced by
the SEAL protocol using TCP (instead of an encapsulating tunnel
endpoint) as the transport layer protocol. The SEAL protocol for
transport mode otherwise observes the same specifications as for
Section 4.
Appendix D. Historic Evolution of PMTUD
The topic of Path MTU discovery (PMTUD) saw a flurry of discussion
and numerous proposals in the late 1980's through early 1990. The
initial problem was posed by Art Berggreen on May 22, 1987 in a
message to the TCP-IP discussion group [TCP-IP]. The discussion that
followed provided significant reference material for [FRAG]. An IETF
Path MTU Discovery Working Group [MTUDWG] was formed in late 1989
with charter to produce an RFC. Several variations on a very few
basic proposals were entertained, including:
1. Routers record the PMTUD estimate in ICMP-like path probe
messages (proposed in [FRAG] and later [RFC1063])
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2. The destination reports any fragmentation that occurs for packets
received with the "RF" (Report Fragmentation) bit set (Steve
Deering's 1989 adaptation of Charles Lynn's Nov. 1987 proposal)
3. A hybrid combination of 1) and Charles Lynn's Nov. 1987 (straw
RFC draft by McCloughrie, Fox and Mogul on Jan 12, 1990)
4. Combination of the Lynn proposal with TCP (Fred Bohle, Jan 30,
1990)
5. Fragmentation avoidance by setting "IP_DF" flag on all packets
and retransmitting if ICMPv4 "fragmentation needed" messages
occur (Geof Cooper's 1987 proposal; later adapted into [RFC1191]
by Mogul and Deering).
Option 1) seemed attractive to the group at the time, since it was
believed that routers would migrate more quickly than hosts. Option
2) was a strong contender, but repeated attempts to secure an "RF"
bit in the IPv4 header from the IESG failed and the proponents became
discouraged. 3) was abandoned because it was perceived as too
complicated, and 4) never received any apparent serious
consideration. Proposal 5) was a late entry into the discussion from
Steve Deering on Feb. 24th, 1990. The discussion group soon
thereafter seemingly lost track of all other proposals and adopted
5), which eventually evolved into [RFC1191] and later [RFC1981].
In retrospect, the "RF" bit postulated in 2) is not needed if a
"contract" is first established between the peers, as in proposal 4)
and a message to the MTUDWG mailing list from jrd@PTT.LCS.MIT.EDU on
Feb 19. 1990. These proposals saw little discussion or rebuttal, and
were dismissed based on the following the assertions:
o routers upgrade their software faster than hosts
o PCs could not reassemble fragmented packets
o Proteon and Wellfleet routers did not reproduce the "RF" bit
properly in fragmented packets
o Ethernet-FDDI bridges would need to perform fragmentation (i.e.,
"translucent" not "transparent" bridging)
o the 16-bit IP_ID field could wrap around and disrupt reassembly at
high packet arrival rates
The first four assertions, although perhaps valid at the time, have
been overcome by historical events. The final assertion is addressed
by the mechanisms specified in SEAL.
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Author's Address
Fred L. Templin (editor)
Boeing Research & Technology
P.O. Box 3707
Seattle, WA 98124
USA
Email: fltemplin@acm.org
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