Human Rights Protocol Considerations Research Group N. ten Oever
Internet-Draft ARTICLE 19
Intended status: Informational A. Sullivan
Expires: April 25, 2018 Oracle
A. Andersdotter
ARTICLE 19
October 22, 2017
On the Politics of Standards
draft-tenoever-hrpc-political-02
Abstract
This document aims to outline different views on the relation between
protocols and politics and seeks to answer the question whether
protocols are political.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Vocabulary Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Literature and Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Technology is value neutral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. Some protocols are political some times . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. The network has its own logic and values . . . . . . . . 4
3.4. Protocols are inherently political . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Examples and approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Competition and collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. More legacy, more politics? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Layers of politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. How voluntary are open standards? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. The need for a positioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. The way forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
14. Research Group Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
15.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
15.2. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
"we shape our tools and thereafter they shape us"
-John Culkin
The design of the Internet through protocols and standards is a
technical issue with great political and economic impacts [RFC0613].
The early Internet community already realized that it needed to make
decisions on political issues such as Intellectual Property,
Internationzalization [BramanI], diversity, access [RFC0101] privacy
and security [RFC0049], and the military [RFC0164] [RFC0316],
governmental [RFC0144] [RFC0286] [RFC0313] [RFC0542] [RFC0549] and
non-governmental [RFC0196] uses, which has been clearly pointed out
by Braman [BramanII].
Recently there has been an increased discussion on the relation
between Internet protocols and human rights [hrpc] which spurred the
discussion on the political nature of protocols. The network
infrastructure is on the one hand designed, described, developed,
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standardized and implemented by the Internet community, but the
Internet community and Internet users are also shaped by the
affordances of the technology. Companies, citizens, governments,
standards developing bodies, public opinion and public interest
groups all play a part in these discussions. In this document we aim
to outline different views on the relation between protocols and
politics and seek to answer the question whether protocols are
political, and if so, how.
2. Vocabulary Used
Politics (from Greek: Politika: Politika, definition "affairs of the
commons") is the process of making decisions applying to all
members of a group. More narrowly, it refers to achieving and
exercising positions of governance or organized control over a
community. Furthermore, politics is the study or practice of the
distribution of power and resources within a given community as
well as the interrelationship(s) between communities. (adapted
from )
3. Literature and Positions
While discussion the impact of protocols on human rights different
positions could be differentiated. Without judging them on their
internal of external consistency they are represented here.
3.1. Technology is value neutral
This position starts from the premise that the technical and poltical
are differentiated fields and that technology is 'value free'. This
is also put more explicitly by Carey: "electronics is neither the
arrival of apocalypse nor the dispensation of grace. Technology is
technology; it is a means for communication and transportation over
space, and nothing more." [Carey] In this view technology only
become political when it is actually being used by humans. So the
technology itself is not political, the use of the technology is.
This is view sees technology as instrument; "technologies are 'tools'
standing ready to serve the purposes of their users. Technology is
deemed 'neutral,' without valuative content of its own.'" [Feenberg].
Feenberg continues: "technology is not inherently good or bad, and
can be used to whatever political or social ends desired by the
person or institution in control. Technology is a 'rational entity'
and universally applicable. One may make exceptions on moral
grounds, but one must also understand that the "price for the
achievement of environmental, ethical, or religious goals...is
reduced efficiency." [Feenberg]
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3.2. Some protocols are political some times
This stance is a pragmatic approach to the problem. It states that
some protocols under certain conditions can themselves have a
political dimension. This is different from the claim that a
protocol might sometimes be used in a political way; that view is
consistent with the idea of the technology being neutral (for the
human action using the technology is where the politics lies).
Instead, this position requires that each protocol and use be
evaluated for its political dimension, in order to understand the
extent to which it is political.
3.3. The network has its own logic and values
While humans create techologies, that does not mean that they are
forever under human control. A technology, once created, has its own
logic that is independent of the human actors that either create or
use the technology.
Consider, for instance, the way that the very existence of the
automobile imposes physical forms on the world different from those
that come from the electric tram or the horse-cart. The logic of the
automobile means speed and the rapid covering of distance, which
encourages suburban development and a tendency toward conurbation.
But even if that did not happen, widespread automotobile use requires
paved roads, and parking lots and structures. These are pressures
that come from the automotive technology itself, and would not arise
without that technology.
Certain kinds of technology shape the world in this sense. As Martin
Heidegger says, "The hydroelectric plant is not built into the Rhine
River as was the old wooden bridge that joined bank with bank for
hundreds of years. Rather the river is dammed up into the power
plant. What the river is now, namely, a water power supplier,
derives from out of the essence of the power station." [Heidegger]
(p 16) The dam in the river changes the world in a way the bridge
does not, because the dam alters the nature of the river.
In much same way, then, networking technology once created makes its
own demands. One of the most important conditions for protocol
success is that the protocol is incremental deployability [RFC5218].
This means that the network already deployed constrains what can be
delployed into it. Moreover, one interpretation of [RFC7258] is that
pervasive monitoring is an "attack" in the narrow sense precisely
because of the network's need not to leak traces of online exchanges.
A different network with a different design might not have been
subject to this kind of attack.
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3.4. Protocols are inherently political
On the other side of the spectrum there are the ones who insist that
technology is non-neutral. This is for instance made explicit by
Postman where he writes: 'the uses made of technology are largely
determined by the structure of the technology itself' [Postman]. He
states that the medium itself 'contains an ideological bias'. He
continues to argue that technology is non-neutral:
(1) because of the symbolic forms in which information is encoded,
different media have different intellectual and emotional biases; (2)
because of the accessibility and speed of their information,
different media have different political biases; (3) because of their
physical form, different media have different sensory biases; (4)
because of the conditions in which we attend to them, different media
have different social biases; (5) because of their technical and
economic structure, different media have different content biases.
[Postman]
More recent scholars of Internet infrastructure and governance have
also pointed out that Internet processes and protocols have become
part and parcel of political processes and public policies: one only
has to look at the IANA transition or global innovation policy for
concrete examples [DeNardis]. Similarly one can look at the Raven
process in which the IETF after a long discussion refused to
standardize wiretapping (which resulted in [RFC2804]. That was an
instance where the IETF took a position that was largely political,
although driven by a technical argument. It was similar to the
process that led to [RFC6973], in which something that occurred in
the political space (Snowden disclosures) engendered the IETF to act.
This is summarized in [Abbate] who says: "protocols are politics by
other means". This emphasises the interests that are at play in the
process of designing standards. This position holds further that
protocols can never be understood without their contextual
embeddedness: protocols do not exist solely by themselves but always
are to be understood in a more complex context - the stack, hardware,
or nation-state interests and their impact on civil rights. Finally,
this view is that that protocols are political because they affect or
sometimes effect the socio-technical ordering of reality. The latter
observation leads Winner to conclude that the reality of
technological progress has too often been a scenario where the
innovation has dictated change for society. Those who had the power
to introduce a new technology also had the power to create a consumer
class to use the technology, 'with new practices, relationships, and
identities supplanting the old, --and those who had the wherewithal
to implement new technologies often molded society to match the needs
of emerging technologies and organizations.' [Winner].
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4. Examples and approaches
5. Competition and collaboration
Standards exist for nearly everything: processes, technologies,
safety, hiring, elections, and training. Standards provide blue-
prints for how to accomplish a particular task in a similar way to
others trying to accomplish the same thing, while reducing overhead
and inefficiencies. Formal technical standardisation, then, is the
process whereby the expected features or functionalities of a
particular technology are codified in writing. It is a way of
ensuring that different technological systems can interoperate, or
work in tandem and exchange functionality.
A formalised standard does not stop competition between entities
working to realise those standards in practical implementations of
that technological base. If the standard is well-crafted, it will
even help entities cooperate and construct products and services on
top of the commonly shared technological base. In these
circumstances, standardisation is seen as beneficient for competition
in downstream markets, meaning those markets making used of the
standardised technologies. Standards have long been used as a tool
to lay groundworks, a certain minimal commonality, that helps
countries, companies or individuals cooperate to reach the next level
of technological advancements more quickly.
Standards may not only exist in the form of a formal document laid
down by an organisation gathering many different parties of different
backgrounds behind a single, converging process. We also speak of de
facto standards: the rules governing a technological base used by
downstream market actors, such that, even if the rules have not been
decided by many different entities they still constitute the
effective boundary within which downstream innovation and development
occurs. De facto standards can arise in market situations where one
entity is particularly dominant, and may or may not lead to technical
difficulties in challenging the dominant entity's technological base
[Ahlborn]. Under EU anti-trust law, de facto standards have been
found to be able to restrict competition for downstream services for
PC software products [CJEU2007], as well as downstream services
dependent on health information [CJEU2004]. If such restrictions are
found to apply, the resolution may entail obligations on the
restrictive party to grant a license (if a failure to grant a license
to the standard was the cause of the restriction) or arrange the
technical solution in such a way that restrictions do not arise.
Standards development faces a number of economic and organisational
challenges that are well-studied: the cost and difficulty of
organising many entities around a mutual goal, as well as the cost of
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research and development leading up to a mutually beneficial
technological platform. The first problem may, on the one hand, be
described as just the sheer organisational costs: how do you create
platforms, especially global platforms, that are accessible in terms
of price and time, when implementors affected by the standards
produced may include any range of entities with different economic
means and resources (in the specific context of the IETF some issues
of this nature are considered in [draft-finance-thoughts] and its
references, but challenges are clearly universal in nature). It also
incorporates the problem of too many cooks spoiling the broth: if the
interests of a large number of entities need to converge around a
single solution, by which mechnism does one mitigate the
inconvenience of differing opinions or preferences between the
parties reducing the over-all utility of the final compromise
[xkcd927].
The standards enabling interoperating networks, what we think of
today as the Internet, were created as open, formal and voluntary
standards. With openness, we understand that the standards were
available at no cost to anyone around the world. Internet
standardisation set itself apart from traditional standard bodies by
not requiring implementors to pay a subscription fee to have access
to the texts of codified standards. A platform for internet
standardisation, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), was
created in 1992 to enable the continuation of such standardisation
work.
On the one hand, this enables anyone willing and able to fulfill any
standard requirement produced in the IETF. On the other hand, the
costs and difficulties of organising many different entities in the
standardisation process itself do not disappear only by making
standards open and accessible to anyone seeking to implement them.
The IETF has sought to make the standards process transparent (by
ensuring everyone can access standards, mailing-lists and meetings),
predictable (by having clear procedures and reviews) and of high
quality (by having draft documents reviewed by members from its own
epistemic community). This is all aimed at increasing the
accountability of the process and the quality of the standard. The
IETF implements what has been referred to as an "informal ex ante
disclosure policy" for patents [Contreras], which includes the
possibility for participants to disclose the existence of a patent
relevant for the standard, royalty-terms which would apply to the
implementors of that standard should it enter into effect, as well as
other licensing terms that may be interesting for implementors to
know. The community ethos in the IETF seems to lead to 100% royalty-
free disclosures of prior patents [Contreras] which is a record
number, even among other comparable standard organisations.
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In spite of a strong community ethos and transparent procedures, the
IETF is not immune to externalities. Sponsorship to the IETF is
varied, but is also of the nature that ongoing projects that are in
the specific interest of one or some group of corporations may be
given more funding than other projects (see
[draft-finance-thoughts]).
6. More legacy, more politics?
Roman engineers complained about inadequate legacy standards they
needed to comply with, which hampered them in their engineering
excellence. In that sense not much has changed in the last 2100
years. When starting from a tabula rasa, one does not need to take
other systems, layers or standards into account. The need for
interoperability, and backward compatability makes engineering work
harder. And once a standard is designed, it does not automatically
means it will be broadly adopted at as fast pace. Examples of this
are IPv6, DNSSEC, DKIM, etc. The need for interoperability means
that a new protocol needs to take into account a much more diverse
environment than early protocols, and also be amendable to different
needs: protocols needs to relate and negotiate in a busy agora, as do
the protocol developers. This means that some might get priority,
whereas others get dropped. Thus with the
7. Layers of politics
There is a competition between layers, and even contestation about
what the borders of different layers are. This leads to competition
between layers and different solutions for similar problems on
different layers, which in its turn leads to further ossification,
which leads to more contestation.
8. How voluntary are open standards?
Coordinating transnational stakeholders in a process of negotiation
and agreement through the development of common rules is a form of
global governance [Nadvi]. Standards are among the mechanisms by
which this governance is achieved. Conformance to certain standards
is often a basic condition of participation in international trade
and communication, so there are strong economic and political
incentives to conform, even in the absence of legal requirements
[Russell]. [RogersEden] argue: As unequal participants compete to
define standards, technological compromises emerge, which add
complexity to standards. For instance, when working group
participants propose competing solutions, it may be easier for them
to agree on a standard that combines all the proposals rather than
choosing any single proposal. This shifts the responsibility for
selecting a solution onto those who implement the standard, which can
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lead to complex implementations that may not be interoperable. On
its face this appears to be a failure of the standardization process,
but this outcome may benefit certain participants-- for example, by
allowing an implementer with large market share to establish a de
facto standard within the scope of the documented standard.
9. The need for a positioning
It is indisputable that the Internet plays an increasingly important
role in the lives of individuals. The community that procuces
standards for the Internet therefore also has an increasing impact on
society. The IETF cannot ordain what standards are to be used on the
networks, but it does set open standards for interoperarability on
the Internet, and has does so since the inception of the Internet.
Therefore the standardization process of the IETF has influence and
power. Because of the impact Internet standards have on society, the
IETF should take into account the political aspects and implications
of its work.
The risk of not doing this is threefold: (1) the IETF might make
decisions which have a political impact that was not intended by the
community, (2) other bodies or entities might make the decisions for
the IETF because the IETF does not have an explicit stance, (3) other
bodies that do take these issues into account might increase in
importance on behest of the influence of the IETF.
This does not mean the IETF does not have a position on particular
political issues. The policies for open and diverse participation
[RFC7704], the anti-harassment policy [RFC7776], as well as the
Guidelines for Privacy Considerations [RFC6973] are testament of
this. But these are all examples of positions about the IETF's work
processes or product. What is absent is a way for IETF participants
to evaluate their role with respect to the wider implications of that
IETF work.
10. The way forward
There are instruments that can help the IETF develop an approach to
address the politics of protocols. Part of this can be found in
draft-irtf-hrpc-research as well as the United National Guiding
Principles for Business and Human Rights [UNGP]. But there is not a
one-size-fits-all solution. The IETF is a particular organization,
with a particular mandate, and even if a policy is in place, its
success depends on the implementation of the policy by the community.
Since 'de facto standardization is reliant on market forces'
[Hanseth] we need to live with the fact standards bodies have a
political nature [Webster]. This does not need to be problematic as
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long as there are sufficient accountability and transparency
mecahnisms in place. The importance of these mechanisms increases
with the importance of the standards and their implementations. The
complexity of the work inscribes a requirement of competence in the
work in the IETF, which forms an inherent barrier for end-user
involvement. Even though this might not be intentional, it is a
result of the interplay between the characteristics of the epistemic
community in the IETF and the nature of the standard setting process.
Rather than arguing for the fairly general blanket statement that
'standards are poltiical' [Winner] [Woolgar] we argue that we need to
look at the politics of individual standards and invite document
authorts and reviewers to take these dynamics into account.
11. Security Considerations
As this draft concerns a research document, there are no security
considerations.
12. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA.
13. Acknowledgements
14. Research Group Information
The discussion list for the IRTF Human Rights Protocol Considerations
working group is located at the e-mail address hrpc@ietf.org [1].
Information on the group and information on how to subscribe to the
list is at: https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc
Archives of the list can be found at: https://www.irtf.org/mail-
archive/web/hrpc/current/index.html
15. References
15.1. Informative References
[Abbate] Abbate, J., "Inventing the Internet", MIT Press , 2000,
<https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/inventing-internet>.
[Ahlborn] Ahlborn, C., Denicolo, V., Geradin, D., and A. Padilla,
"Implications of the Proposed Framework and Antitrust
Rules for Dynamically Competitive Industries", DG Comp's
Discussion Paper on Article 82, DG COMP, European
Commission , 2006,
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=T-201/04>.
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[BramanI] Braman, S., "Internationalization of the Internet by
design: The first decade", Global Media and Communication,
Vol 8, Issue 1, pp. 27 - 45 , 2012, <http://dx.doi.org.pro
xy.uba.uva.nl:2048/10.1177%2F1742766511434731>.
[BramanII]
Braman, S., "The Framing Years: Policy Fundamentals in the
Internet Design Process, 1969-1979", The Information
Society Vol. 27, Issue 5, 2011 , 2010, <http://dx.doi.org.
proxy.uba.uva.nl:2048/10.1080/01972243.2011.607027>.
[Carey] Carey, J., "Communication As Culture", p. 139 , 1992.
[CJEU2004]
Court of Justice of the European Union, .,
"ECLI:EU:C:2004:257, C-418/01 IMS Health", Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press , 2004,
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-418/01>.
[CJEU2007]
Court of Justice of the European Union, .,
"ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, T-201/04 Microsoft Corp.", Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press , 2007,
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=T-201/04>.
[Contreras]
Contreras, J., "Technical Standards and Ex Ante
Disclosure: Results and Analysis of an Empirical Study",
Jurimetrics: The Journal of Law, Science & Technology,
vol. 53, p. 163-211 , 2013.
[DeNardis]
Denardis, L., "The Internet Design Tension between
Surveillance and Security", IEEE Annals of the History of
Computing (volume 37-2) , 2015, <http://is.gd/7GAnFy>.
[draft-finance-thoughts]
Arkko, J., "Thoughts on IETF Finance Arrangements", 2017,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-arkko-ietf-
finance-thoughts>.
[Feenberg]
Feenberg, A., "Critical Theory of Technology", p.5-6 ,
1991.
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[Hanseth] Hanseth, O. and E. Monteiro, "Insribing Behaviour in
Information Infrastructure Standards", Accounting,
Management and Infomation Technology 7 (14) p.183-211 ,
1997.
[Heidegger]
Heidegger, M., "The Question Concerning Technology and
Other Essays", Garland: New York, 1977 , 1977,
<http://ssbothwell.com/documents/ebooksclub.org__The_Quest
ion_Concerning_Technology_and_Other_Essays.pdf>.
[hrpc] ten Oever, N. and C. Cath, "Research into Human Rights
Protocol Considerations", 2017,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-hrpc-research-13>.
[Nadvi] Nadvi, K. and F. Waeltring, "Making sense of global
standards", In: H. Schmitz (Ed.), Local enterprises in the
global economy (pp. 53-94). Cheltenham, UK: Edward
Elgar. , 2004.
[Postman] Postman, N., "Technopoly: the Surrender of Culture to
Technology", Vintage: New York. pp. 3-20. , 1992.
[RFC0049] Meyer, E., "Conversations with S. Crocker (UCLA)", RFC 49,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0049, April 1970, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc49>.
[RFC0101] Watson, R., "Notes on the Network Working Group meeting,
Urbana, Illinois, February 17, 1971", RFC 101,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0101, February 1971, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc101>.
[RFC0144] Shoshani, A., "Data sharing on computer networks",
RFC 144, DOI 10.17487/RFC0144, April 1971,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc144>.
[RFC0164] Heafner, J., "Minutes of Network Working Group meeting,
5/16 through 5/19/71", RFC 164, DOI 10.17487/RFC0164, May
1971, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc164>.
[RFC0196] Watson, R., "Mail Box Protocol", RFC 196,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0196, July 1971, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc196>.
[RFC0286] Forman, E., "Network Library Information System", RFC 286,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0286, December 1971, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc286>.
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[RFC0313] O'Sullivan, T., "Computer based instruction", RFC 313,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0313, March 1972, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc313>.
[RFC0316] McKay, D. and A. Mullery, "ARPA Network Data Management
Working Group", RFC 316, DOI 10.17487/RFC0316, February
1972, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc316>.
[RFC0542] Neigus, N., "File Transfer Protocol", RFC 542,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0542, August 1973, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc542>.
[RFC0549] Michener, J., "Minutes of Network Graphics Group meeting,
15-17 July 1973", RFC 549, DOI 10.17487/RFC0549, July
1973, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc549>.
[RFC0613] McKenzie, A., "Network connectivity: A response to RFC
603", RFC 613, DOI 10.17487/RFC0613, January 1974,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc613>.
[RFC2804] IAB and IESG, "IETF Policy on Wiretapping", RFC 2804,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2804, May 2000, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc2804>.
[RFC5218] Thaler, D. and B. Aboba, "What Makes for a Successful
Protocol?", RFC 5218, DOI 10.17487/RFC5218, July 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5218>.
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
[RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.
[RFC7704] Crocker, D. and N. Clark, "An IETF with Much Diversity and
Professional Conduct", RFC 7704, DOI 10.17487/RFC7704,
November 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7704>.
[RFC7776] Resnick, P. and A. Farrel, "IETF Anti-Harassment
Procedures", BCP 25, RFC 7776, DOI 10.17487/RFC7776, March
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7776>.
ten Oever, et al. Expires April 25, 2018 [Page 13]
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[RogersEden]
Rogers, M. and G. Eden, "The Snowden Disclosures,
Technical Standards, and the Making of Surveillance
Infrastructures", International Journal of Communication
11(2017), 802-823 , 2017,
<http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/5525/1941>.
[Russell] Russell, A., "Open standards and the digital age: History,
ideology, and networks", Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press , 2014.
[UNGP] Ruggie, J. and United Nations, "United Nations Guiding
Principles for Business and Human Rights", 2011,
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf>.
[Webster] Webster, J., "Networks of Collaboration or Conflict? The
Development of EDI", The social shaping of inter-
organizational IT systems and data interchange, eds: I.
McLougling & D. Mason, European Commission PICT/COST A4 ,
1995.
[Winner] Winner, L., "Upon openig the black box and finding it
empty: Social constructivism and the philosophy of
technology", Science, Technology, and Human Values 18 (3)
p. 362-378 , 1993.
[Woolgar] Woolgar, S., "Configuring the user: the case of usability
trials", A sociology of monsters. Essays on power,
technology and dominatior, ed: J. Law, Routeledge p.
57-102. , 1991.
[xkcd927] Randall Munroe, ., "Standards", xkcd.com, a web comic ,
2011, <https://xkcd.com/927/>.
15.2. URIs
[1] mailto:hrpc@ietf.org
Authors' Addresses
Niels ten Oever
ARTICLE 19
EMail: niels@article19.org
ten Oever, et al. Expires April 25, 2018 [Page 14]
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Andrew Sullivan
Oracle
EMail: andrew.s.sullivan@oracle.com
Amelia Andersdotter
ARTICLE 19
EMail: amelia@article19.org
ten Oever, et al. Expires April 25, 2018 [Page 15]