CoRE Working Group M. Tiloca
Internet-Draft R. Höglund
Updates: 8613 (if approved) RISE AB
Intended status: Standards Track 7 March 2022
Expires: 8 September 2022
OSCORE-capable Proxies
draft-tiloca-core-oscore-capable-proxies-02
Abstract
Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) can be
used to protect CoAP messages end-to-end between two endpoints at the
application layer, also in the presence of intermediaries such as
proxies. This document defines how to use OSCORE for protecting CoAP
messages also between an origin application endpoint and an
intermediary, or between two intermediaries. Also, it defines how to
secure a CoAP message by applying multiple, nested OSCORE
protections, e.g., both end-to-end between origin application
endpoints, as well as between an application endpoint and an
intermediary or between two intermediaries. Thus, this document
updates RFC 8613. The same approach can be seamlessly used with
Group OSCORE, for protecting CoAP messages when group communication
with intermediaries is used.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Constrained RESTful
Environments Working Group mailing list (core@ietf.org), which is
archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/core/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://gitlab.com/crimson84/draft-tiloca-core-oscore-to-proxies.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Tiloca & Höglund Expires 8 September 2022 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft OSCORE-capable Proxies March 2022
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 September 2022.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. CoAP Group Communication with Proxies . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. CoAP Observe Notifications over Multicast . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. LwM2M Client and External Application Server . . . . . . 6
2.4. Further Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Message Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1. General Rules on Protecting Options . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Processing an Outgoing Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3. Processing an Incoming Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.4. Processing an Outgoing Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.5. Processing an Incoming Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Caching of OSCORE-Protected Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. OSCORE-protected Onion Forwarding . . . . . . . . . 15
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Tiloca & Höglund Expires 8 September 2022 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft OSCORE-capable Proxies March 2022
1. Introduction
The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] supports the
presence of intermediaries, such as forward-proxies and reverse-
proxies, which assist origin clients by performing requests to origin
servers on their behalf, and forwarding back the related responses.
CoAP supports also group communication scenarios
[I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis], where clients can send a one-to-many
request targeting all the servers in the group, e.g., by using IP
multicast. Like for one-to-one communication, group settings can
also rely on intermediaries [I-D.tiloca-core-groupcomm-proxy].
The protocol Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
(OSCORE) [RFC8613] can be used to protect CoAP messages between two
endpoints at the application layer, especially achieving end-to-end
security in the presence of (non-trusted) intermediaries. When CoAP
group communication is used, the same can be achieved by means of the
protocol Group OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].
For a number of use cases (see Section 2), it is required and/or
beneficial that communications are secured also between an
application endpoint (i.e., a CoAP origin client/server) and an
intermediary, as well as between two adjacent intermediaries in a
chain. This especially applies to the communication leg between the
CoAP origin client and the adjacent intermediary acting as next hop
towards the CoAP origin server.
In such cases, and especially if the origin client already uses
OSCORE to achieve end-to-end security with the origin server, it
would be convenient that OSCORE is used also to secure communications
between the origin client and its next hop. However, the original
specification [RFC8613] does not define how OSCORE can be used to
protect CoAP messages in such communication leg, which would require
to consider also the intermediary as an "OSCORE endpoint".
This document fills this gap, and updates [RFC8613] as follows.
* It defines how to use OSCORE for protecting a CoAP message in the
communication leg between: i) an origin client/server and an
intermediary; or ii) two adjacent intermediaries in an
intermediary chain. That is, besides origin clients/servers, it
allows also intermediaries to be possible "OSCORE endpoints".
* It admits a CoAP message to be secured by multiple, nested OSCORE
protections applied in sequence, as an "OSCORE-in-OSCORE" process.
For instance, this is the case when the message is OSCORE-
protected end-to-end between the origin client and origin server,
Tiloca & Höglund Expires 8 September 2022 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft OSCORE-capable Proxies March 2022
and the result is further OSCORE-protected over the leg between
the current and next hop (e.g., the origin client and the adjacent
intermediary acting as next hop towards the origin server).
This document does not specify any new signaling method to guide the
message processing on the different endpoints. In particular, every
endpoint is always able to understand what steps to take on an
incoming message depending on the presence of the OSCORE Option, as
exclusively included or instead combined together with CoAP options
intended for an intermediary.
The approach defined in this document can be seamlessly adopted also
when Group OSCORE is used, for protecting CoAP messages in group
communication scenarios that rely on intermediaries.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts
related to CoAP [RFC7252]; OSCORE [RFC8613] and Group OSCORE
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]. This document especially builds on
concepts and mechanics related to intermediaries such as CoAP
forward-proxies.
In addition, this document uses the following terms.
* Source application endpoint: an origin client producing a request,
or an origin server producing a response.
* Destination application endpoint: an origin server intended to
consume a request, or an origin client intended to consume a
response.
* Application endpoint: a source or destination application
endpoint.
* Source OSCORE endpoint: an endpoint protecting a message with
OSCORE or Group OSCORE.
* Destination OSCORE endpoint: an endpoint unprotecting a message
with OSCORE or Group OSCORE.
Tiloca & Höglund Expires 8 September 2022 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft OSCORE-capable Proxies March 2022
* OSCORE endpoint: a source/destination OSCORE endpoint. An OSCORE
endpoint is not necessarily also an application endpoint with
respect to a certain message.
* Proxy-related option: the Proxy-URI Option, the Proxy-Scheme
Option, or any of the Uri-* Options.
* OSCORE-in-OSCORE: the process by which a message protected with
(Group) OSCORE is further protected with (Group) OSCORE. This
means that, if such a process is used, a successful decryption/
verification of an OSCORE-protected message might yield an OSCORE-
protected message.
2. Use Cases
The approach proposed in this document has been motivated by a number
of use cases, which are summarized below.
2.1. CoAP Group Communication with Proxies
CoAP supports also one-to-many group communication, e.g., over IP
multicast [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis], which can be protected end-
to-end between origin client and origin servers by using Group OSCORE
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].
This communication model can be assisted by intermediaries such as a
CoAP forward-proxy or reverse-proxy, which relays a group request to
the origin servers. If Group OSCORE is used, the proxy is
intentionally not a member of the OSCORE group. Furthermore,
[I-D.tiloca-core-groupcomm-proxy] defines a signaling protocol
between origin client and proxy, to ensure that responses from the
different origin servers are forwarded back to the origin client
within a time interval set by the client, and that they can be
distinguished from one another.
In particular, it is required that the proxy identifies the origin
client as allowed-listed, before forwarding a group request to the
servers (see Section 4 of [I-D.tiloca-core-groupcomm-proxy]). This
requires a security association between the origin client and the
proxy, which would be convenient to provide with a dedicated OSCORE
Security Context between the two, since the client is possibly using
also Group OSCORE with the origin servers.
Tiloca & Höglund Expires 8 September 2022 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft OSCORE-capable Proxies March 2022
2.2. CoAP Observe Notifications over Multicast
The Observe extension for CoAP [RFC7641] allows a client to register
its interest in "observing" a resource at a server. The server can
then send back notification responses upon changes to the resource
representation, all matching with the original observation request.
In some applications, such as pub-sub [I-D.ietf-core-coap-pubsub],
multiple clients are interested to observe the same resource at the
same server. Hence, [I-D.ietf-core-observe-multicast-notifications]
defines a method that allows the server to send a multicast
notification to all the observer clients at once, e.g., over IP
multicast. To this end, the server synchronizes the clients by
providing them with a common "phantom observation request", against
which the following multicast notifications will match.
In case the clients and the server use Group OSCORE for end-to-end
security and a proxy is also involved, an additional step is required
(see Section 10 of [I-D.ietf-core-observe-multicast-notifications]).
That is, clients are in turn required to provide the proxy with the
obtained "phantom observation request", thus enabling the proxy to
receive the multicast notifications from the server.
Therefore, it is preferable to have a security associations also
between each client and the proxy, to especially ensure the integrity
of that information provided to the proxy (see Section 13.3 of
[I-D.ietf-core-observe-multicast-notifications]). Like for the use
case in Section 2.1, this would be conveniently achieved with a
dedicated OSCORE Security Context between a client and the proxy,
since the client is also using Group OSCORE with the origin server.
2.3. LwM2M Client and External Application Server
The Lightweight Machine-to-Machine (LwM2M) protocol [LwM2M-Core]
enables a LwM2M Client device to securely bootstrap and then register
at a LwM2M Server, with which it will perform most of its following
communication exchanges. As per the transport bindings specification
of LwM2M [LwM2M-Transport], the LwM2M Client and LwM2M Server can use
CoAP and OSCORE to secure their communications at the application
layer, including during the device registration process.
Furthermore, Section 5.5.1 of [LwM2M-Transport] specifies that:
"OSCORE MAY also be used between LwM2M endpoint and non-LwM2M
endpoint, e.g., between an Application Server and a LwM2M Client via
a LwM2M server. Both the LwM2M endpoint and non-LwM2M endpoint MUST
implement OSCORE and be provisioned with an OSCORE Security Context."
Tiloca & Höglund Expires 8 September 2022 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft OSCORE-capable Proxies March 2022
In such a case, the LwM2M Server can practically act as forward-proxy
between the LwM2M Client and the external Application Server. At the
same time, the LwM2M Client and LwM2M Server must continue protecting
communications on their leg using their Security Context. Like for
the use case in Section 2.1, this also allows the LwM2M Server to
identify the LwM2M Client, before forwarding its request outside the
LwM2M domain and towards the external Application Server.
2.4. Further Use Cases
The approach proposed in this document can be useful also in the
following use cases relying on a proxy.
* A server aware of a suitable cross proxy can rely on it as a
third-party service, in order to indicate transports for CoAP
available to that server (see see Section 4 of
[I-D.amsuess-core-transport-indication]).
From a security point of view, it would be convenient if the proxy
could provide suitable credentials to the client, as a general
trusted proxy for the system. However, in order for OSCORE to be
an applicable security mechanism for this, it has to be terminated
at the proxy. That is, it would be required for the client and
the proxy to share a dedicated OSCORE Security Context and to use
it for protecting their communication leg.
* A proxy may be deployed to act as an entry point to a firewalled
network, which only authenticated clients can join. In
particular, authentication can rely on the used secure
communication association between a client and the proxy. If the
proxy could share a dedicated OSCORE Security Context with each
client, the proxy can rely on it to identify the client, before
forwarding its messages to any other member of the firewalled
network.
* The approach proposed in this document does not pose a limit to
the number of OSCORE protections applied to the same CoAP message.
This enables more privacy-oriented scenarios based on proxy
chains, where the origin endpoint protects a message using first
the OSCORE Security Context shared with the origin server, and
then the dedicated OSCORE Security Context shared with each of the
different chain hops. Once received at a chain hop, a message
would be stripped of the OSCORE protection associated with that
hop before being forwarded to the next one.
Tiloca & Höglund Expires 8 September 2022 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft OSCORE-capable Proxies March 2022
3. Message Processing
As mentioned in Section 1, this document introduces the following two
main deviations from the original OSCORE specification [RFC8613].
1. An "OSCORE endpoint", i.e., a producer/consumer of an OSCORE
Option can be not only an application endpoint (i.e., an origin
client or server), but also an intermediary such as a proxy.
Hence, OSCORE can also be used between an origin client/server
and a proxy, as well as between two proxies in an intermediary
chain.
2. A CoAP message can be secured by multiple OSCORE protections
applied in sequence. Therefore, the final result is a message
with nested OSCORE protections, as the output of an "OSCORE-in-
OSCORE" process. Hence, following a decryption, the resulting
message might legitimately include an OSCORE Option, and thus
have in turn to be decrypted.
The most common case is expected to consider a message protected
with up to two OSCORE layers, i.e.: i) an inner layer, protecting
the message end-to-end between the origin client and the origin
server acting as application endpoints; and ii) an outer layer,
protecting the message between a certain OSCORE endpoint and the
other OSCORE endpoint adjacent in the intermediary chain.
However, a message can also be protected with a higher arbitrary
number of nested OSCORE layers, e.g., in scenarios relying on a
longer chain of intermediaries. For instance, the origin client
can sequentially apply multiple OSCORE layers to a request, each
of which to be consumed and removed by one of the intermediaries
in the chain, until the origin server is reached and it consumes
the innermost OSCORE layer.
3.1. General Rules on Protecting Options
When a sender endpoint protects an outgoing message by applying the
i-th OSCORE layer in sequence, the following CoAP options are also
protected, in addition to those already specified as class I or class
E in the document defining them.
* An OSCORE Option which is present as the result of the j-th OSCORE
layer immediately previously applied, i.e., j = (i-1). Such an
OSCORE Option is protected like an option of class E.
* Any option such that both the following conditions hold.
Tiloca & Höglund Expires 8 September 2022 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft OSCORE-capable Proxies March 2022
1. The option is intended to be consumed by the other OSCORE
endpoint X sharing the OSCORE Security Context used for
applying the i-th OSCORE layer.
2. The option does not play a role at the other OSCORE endpoint X
for correctly processing the message before having removed the
i-th OSCORE layer.
Examples of such options are:
- The proxy-related options Proxy-Uri, Proxy-Scheme and Uri-*
defined in [RFC7252].
- Listen-To-Multicast-Notifications defined in
[I-D.ietf-core-observe-multicast-notifications].
- Multicast-Timeout, Response-Forwarding and Group-ETag defined
in [I-D.tiloca-core-groupcomm-proxy].
One the other hand, when applying the i-th OSCORE layer, an option
intended to the endpoint X is not protected if it plays a role for
removing the i-th OSCORE layer at that endpoint. Examples of such
options are:
* Clearly, and consistently with [RFC8613], the OSCORE option added
to the outgoing message as a result of applying the i-th OSCORE
layer.
* The EDHOC option defined in [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-edhoc], to
signal to the endpoint X that part of the message payload has to
be extracted and used to complete an ongoing execution of the
EDHOC key establishment protocol [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc], before the
i-th OSCORE layer can be removed.
3.2. Processing an Outgoing Request
The rules from Section 3.1 apply when processing an outgoing request
message, with the following addition.
When an application endpoint applies multiple OSCORE layers in
sequence to protect an outgoing request, and it uses an OSCORE
Security Context shared with the other application endpoint, then the
first OSCORE layer MUST be applied by using that Security Context.
Tiloca & Höglund Expires 8 September 2022 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft OSCORE-capable Proxies March 2022
3.3. Processing an Incoming Request
The recipient endpoint performs the following actions on the received
request REQ, depending on which of the following three conditions
apply.
* A - REQ includes visible proxy-related options.
If the endpoint is not configured to be a proxy, it MUST stop
processing the request and MUST respond with a 5.05 (Proxying Not
Supported) error response to (the previous hop towards) the origin
client, as per Section 5.10.2 of [RFC7252]. This may result in
protecting the error response over that communication leg, as per
Section 3.4.
Otherwise, the endpoint consumes the proxy-related options and
forwards REQ to (the next hop towards) the origin server. This
may result in (further) protecting REQ over that communication
leg, as per Section 3.2.
* B - REQ does not include proxy-related options and does not
include an OSCORE Option.
If the endpoint does not have an application to handle REQ, it
MUST stop processing the request and MAY respond with a 4.00 (Bad
Request) error response to (the previous hop towards) the origin
client. This may result in protecting the error response over
that communication leg, as per Section 3.4.
Otherwise, the endpoint delivers REQ to the application.
* C - REQ does not include proxy-related options and includes an
OSCORE Option.
The endpoint decrypts REQ using the OSCORE Security Context
indicated by the OSCORE Option, i.e., REQ* = dec(REQ). After
that, the possible presence of an OSCORE Option in the decrypted
request REQ* is not treated as an error situation.
If the OSCORE processing results in an error, the endpoint MUST
stop processing the request and performs error handling as per
Section 8.2 of [RFC8613] or Sections 8.2 and 9.4 of
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], in case OSCORE or Group OSCORE
is used, respectively. In case the endpoint sends an error
response to (the previous hop towards) the origin client, this may
result in protecting the error response over that communication
leg, as per Section 3.4.
Tiloca & Höglund Expires 8 September 2022 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft OSCORE-capable Proxies March 2022
Otherwise, REQ takes REQ*, and the endpoint evaluates which of the
three conditions (A, B, C) applies to REQ, thus performing again
the algorithm defined in this section.
3.4. Processing an Outgoing Response
The rules from Section 3.1 apply when processing an outgoing response
message, with the following additions.
When an application endpoint applies multiple OSCORE layers in
sequence to protect an outgoing response, and it uses an OSCORE
Security Context shared with the other application endpoint, then the
first OSCORE layer MUST be applied by using that Security Context.
The sender endpoint protects the response by applying the same OSCORE
layers that it removed from the corresponding incoming request, but
in the reverse order than the one they were removed.
In case the response is an error response, the sender endpoint
protects it by applying the same OSCORE layers that it successfully
removed from the corresponding incoming request, but in the reverse
order than the one they were removed.
3.5. Processing an Incoming Response
The recipient endpoint removes the same OSCORE layers that it added
when protecting the corresponding outgoing request, but in the
reverse order than the one they were removed.
When doing so, the possible presence of an OSCORE Option in the
decrypted response following the removal of an OSCORE layer is not
treated as an error situation, unless it occurs after having removed
as many OSCORE layers as were added in the outgoing request. In such
a case, the endpoint MUST stop processing the response.
4. Example
TODO: add example with message exchange.
5. Caching of OSCORE-Protected Responses
Although not possible as per the original OSCORE specification
[RFC8613], cacheability of OSCORE-protected responses at proxies can
be achieved. To this end, the approach defined in
[I-D.amsuess-core-cachable-oscore] can be used, as based on
Deterministic Requests protected with the pairwise mode of Group
OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] used end-to-end between an
origin client and an origin server. The applicability of this
Tiloca & Höglund Expires 8 September 2022 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft OSCORE-capable Proxies March 2022
approach is limited to requests that are safe (in the RESTful sense)
to process and do not yield side effects at the origin server.
In particular, both the origin client and the origin server are
required to have already joined the correct OSCORE group. Then,
starting from the same plain CoAP request, different clients in the
OSCORE group are able to deterministically generate a same request
protected with Group OSCORE, which is sent to a proxy for being
forwarded to the origin server. The proxy can now effectively cache
the resulting OSCORE-protected response from the server, since the
same plain CoAP request will result again in the same Deterministic
Request and thus will produce a cache hit.
If the approach defined in [I-D.amsuess-core-cachable-oscore] is
used, the following also applies in addition to what is defined in
Section 3, when processing incoming messages at a proxy that
implements caching of responses.
* Upon receiving a request from (the previous hop towards) the
origin client, the proxy checks if specifically the message
available during the execution of alternative A in Section 3.3
produces a cache hit.
That is, such a message: i) is exactly the one to be forwarded to
(the next hop towards) the origin server if no cache hit is made;
and ii) is the result of an OSCORE decryption at the proxy, if
OSCORE is used on the communication leg between the proxy and (the
previous hop towards) the origin client.
* Upon receiving a response from (the next hop towards) the origin
server, the proxy first removes the same OSCORE layers that it
added when protecting the corresponding outgoing request, as
defined in Section 3.5.
Then, the proxy stores specifically that resulting response
message in its cache. That is, such a message is exactly the one
to be forwarded to (the previous hop towards) the origin client.
The specific rules about serving a request with a cached response are
defined in Section 5.6 of [RFC7252], as well as in Section 7 of
[I-D.tiloca-core-groupcomm-proxy] for group communication scenarios.
6. Security Considerations
TODO
Tiloca & Höglund Expires 8 September 2022 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft OSCORE-capable Proxies March 2022
7. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]
Tiloca, M., Selander, G., Palombini, F., Mattsson, J. P.,
and J. Park, "Group OSCORE - Secure Group Communication
for CoAP", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
core-oscore-groupcomm-14, 7 March 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-core-oscore-
groupcomm-14.txt>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8613] Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
"Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
(OSCORE)", RFC 8613, DOI 10.17487/RFC8613, July 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8613>.
8.2. Informative References
[I-D.amsuess-core-cachable-oscore]
Amsüss, C. and M. Tiloca, "Cacheable OSCORE", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-amsuess-core-cachable-
oscore-04, 6 March 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/
draft-amsuess-core-cachable-oscore-04.txt>.
[I-D.amsuess-core-transport-indication]
Amsüss, C., "CoAP Protocol Indication", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-amsuess-core-transport-indication-
03, 3 March 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
amsuess-core-transport-indication-03.txt>.
Tiloca & Höglund Expires 8 September 2022 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft OSCORE-capable Proxies March 2022
[I-D.ietf-core-coap-pubsub]
Koster, M., Keranen, A., and J. Jimenez, "Publish-
Subscribe Broker for the Constrained Application Protocol
(CoAP)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
core-coap-pubsub-09, 30 September 2019,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-core-coap-
pubsub-09.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis]
Dijk, E., Wang, C., and M. Tiloca, "Group Communication
for the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis-
06, 7 March 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
ietf-core-groupcomm-bis-06.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-core-observe-multicast-notifications]
Tiloca, M., Höglund, R., Amsüss, C., and F. Palombini,
"Observe Notifications as CoAP Multicast Responses", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-core-observe-
multicast-notifications-03, 7 March 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-core-observe-
multicast-notifications-03.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-edhoc]
Palombini, F., Tiloca, M., Hoeglund, R., Hristozov, S.,
and G. Selander, "Profiling EDHOC for CoAP and OSCORE",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-core-oscore-
edhoc-03, 7 March 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/
draft-ietf-core-oscore-edhoc-03.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc]
Selander, G., Mattsson, J. P., and F. Palombini,
"Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lake-edhoc-12, 20
October 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-
lake-edhoc-12.txt>.
[I-D.tiloca-core-groupcomm-proxy]
Tiloca, M. and E. Dijk, "Proxy Operations for CoAP Group
Communication", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
tiloca-core-groupcomm-proxy-06, 7 March 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tiloca-core-
groupcomm-proxy-06.txt>.
[LwM2M-Core]
Open Mobile Alliance, "Lightweight Machine to Machine
Technical Specification - Core, Approved Version 1.2, OMA-
TS-LightweightM2M_Core-V1_2-20201110-A", November 2020,
Tiloca & Höglund Expires 8 September 2022 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft OSCORE-capable Proxies March 2022
<http://www.openmobilealliance.org/release/LightweightM2M/
V1_2-20201110-A/OMA-TS-LightweightM2M_Core-
V1_2-20201110-A.pdf>.
[LwM2M-Transport]
Open Mobile Alliance, "Lightweight Machine to Machine
Technical Specification - Transport Bindings, Approved
Version 1.2, OMA-TS-LightweightM2M_Transport-
V1_2-20201110-A", November 2020,
<http://www.openmobilealliance.org/release/LightweightM2M/
V1_2-20201110-A/OMA-TS-LightweightM2M_Transport-
V1_2-20201110-A.pdf>.
[RFC7641] Hartke, K., "Observing Resources in the Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7641,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7641, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7641>.
Appendix A. OSCORE-protected Onion Forwarding
TODO: better elaborate on the listed points below.
* The client can hide its position in the network from the origin
server, while still possibly protecting communications end-to-end
with OSCORE.
* Use the method defined in Section 3 to achieve OSCORE-protected
onion forwarding, through a chain of proxies (at least three are
expected). Every message generated by or intended to the origin
client must traverse the whole chain of proxies until the intended
other endpoint (typically, the origin server). The chain of
proxies has to be known in advance by the client, i.e., the exact
proxies and their order in the chain.
* The typical case addressed in this document considers an origin
client that, at most, shares one OSCORE Security Context with the
origin server and one OSCORE Security Context with the first proxy
in the chain.
If onion forwarding is used, the origin client shares an OSCORE
Security Context with the origin server, and a dedicated OSCORE
Security Context with each of the proxies in the chain.
Tiloca & Höglund Expires 8 September 2022 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft OSCORE-capable Proxies March 2022
* The origin client protects a request by applying first the OSCORE
layer intended to the origin server, then the OSCORE layer
intended to the last proxy in the chain, then the OSCORE layer
intended to the second from last proxy in the chain and so on,
until it applies the OSCORE layer intended to the first proxy in
the chain.
Before protecting a request with the OSCORE layer to be consumed
by a certain proxy in the chain, the origin client also adds
proxy-related options intended to that proxy, as indications to
forward the request to (the next hop towards) the origin server.
Other than the actions above from the client, there should be no
difference from the basic approach defined in Section 3. Each
proxy in the chain would process and remove one OSCORE layer from
the received request and then forward it to (the next hop towards)
the origin server.
* The exact way used by the client to establish OSCORE Security
Contexts with the proxies and the origin server is out of scope.
However, if EDHOC is used, it is most convenient for the client to
run it with the first proxy in the chain, then with the second
proxy in the chain through the first one and so on, and finally
with the origin server by traversing the whole chain of proxies.
Then, it is especially convenient to use the optimized workflow
defined in [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-edhoc] and based on the EDHOC +
OSCORE request. This would basically allow the client to complete
the EDHOC execution with an endpoint and start the EDHOC execution
with the next endpoint in the chain, by means of a single message
sent on the wire.
* Hop-by-hop security has to also be achieved between each pair of
proxies in the chain. To this end, two adjacent proxies would
better use TLS over TCP than OSCORE between one another (this
should be acceptable for non-constrained proxies). This takes
advantage of the TCP packet aggregation policies, and thus:
- As request forwarding occurs in MTU-size bundles, the length of
the origin request can be hidden as well.
- Requests and responses traversing the proxy chain cannot be
correlated, e.g., by externally monitoring the timing of
message forwarding (which would jeopardize the client's wish to
hide itself from anything but the first proxy in the chain).
Tiloca & Höglund Expires 8 September 2022 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft OSCORE-capable Proxies March 2022
* Cacheability of responses can still happen, as per Section 5 and
using the approach defined in [I-D.amsuess-core-cachable-oscore].
The last proxy in the chain would be the only proxy actually
seeing the Deterministic Request originated by the client and then
caching the corresponding responses from the origin server. It is
good that other proxies are not able to do the same, thus
preventing what might lead to request-response correlation, again
opening for localization of the origin client.
* Possible optimizations along the proxy chains
- In particular settings involving additional configuration on
the client, some proxy in the chain might be a reverse-proxy.
Then, such a proxy can be configured to map on one hand the
OSCORE Security Context shared with the origin client (and used
to remove a corresponding OSCORE layer from a received request
to forward) and, on the other hand, the addressing information
of the next hop in the chain where to forward the received
request to. This would spare the origin client to add a set of
proxy-related options for every single proxy in the chain.
- It is mentioned above to additionally use TLS over TCP hop-by-
hop between every two adjacent proxies in the chain. That
said:
o The OSCORE protection of the request has certainly to rely
on authenticated encryption algorithms (as usual), when
applying the OSCORE layer intended to the origin server (the
first one applied by the origin client) and the OSCORE layer
intended to the first proxy in the chain (the last one
applied by the origin client).
o For any other OSCORE layer applied by the origin client
(i.e., intended for any proxy in the chain but the first
one), the OSCORE protection can better rely on an
encryption-only algorithm not providing an authentication
tag (as admitted in the group mode of Group OSCORE
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm] and assuming the
registration of such algorithms in COSE).
o This would be secure to do, since every pair of adjacent
proxies in the chain relies on its TLS connection for the
respective hop-by-hop communication anyway. The benefit is
that it avoids transmitting several unneeded authentication
tags from OSCORE.
Tiloca & Höglund Expires 8 September 2022 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft OSCORE-capable Proxies March 2022
Acknowledgments
The authors sincerely thank Christian Amsuess, Peter Blomqvist and
Goeran Selander for their comments and feedback.
The work on this document has been partly supported by VINNOVA and
the Celtic-Next project CRITISEC; and by the H2020 project SIFIS-Home
(Grant agreement 952652).
Authors' Addresses
Marco Tiloca
RISE AB
Isafjordsgatan 22
SE-16440 Kista
Sweden
Email: marco.tiloca@ri.se
Rikard Höglund
RISE AB
Isafjordsgatan 22
SE-16440 Kista
Sweden
Email: rikard.hoglund@ri.se
Tiloca & Höglund Expires 8 September 2022 [Page 18]