NETWORK WG                                            Sean Turner, IECA
Internet Draft                             Russ Housley, Vigil Security
Intended Status: Standards Track                       December 7, 2009
Expires: June 7, 2010



               Additional CMS Revocation Information Choices
               draft-turner-additional-cms-ri-choices-03.txt


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Abstract

   The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) allows revocation information
   to be conveyed as part of the SignedData, EnvelopedData,
   AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData content types.  The
   preferred format for revocation information is the Certificate
   Revocation List (CRL), but an extension mechanism supports other
   revocation information choices.  This document defines two additional
   revocation information formats for Online Certificate Status Protocol
   (OCSP) responses and Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
   (SCVP).

1. Introduction

   The RevocationInfoChoices type defined in [CMS] provides a set of
   revocation status information alternatives, which allows revocation
   information to be conveyed as part of the SignedData, EnvelopedData,
   AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData content types.  The intent
   is to provide information sufficient to determine whether the
   certificates and attribute certificates carried elsewhere in the CMS
   protecting content are revoked.  However, there MAY be more
   revocation status information than necessary or there MAY be less
   revocation status information than necessary.

   X.509 Certificate revocation lists (CRLs) [PROFILE] are the primary
   source of revocation status information, but any other revocation
   information formats can be supported.  This document specifies two
   other formats: Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responses
   [OCSP] and Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)
   responses [SCVP].

1.1. Requirements Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [WORDS].

2. Revocation Information

   For convenience, the ASN.1 definition of the RevocationInfoChoices
   type from [CMS] is repeated here:

   RevocationInfoChoices ::= SET OF RevocationInfoChoice

     RevocationInfoChoice ::= CHOICE {
     crl        CertificateList,
     other  [1] IMPLICIT OtherRevocationInfoFormat }


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   OtherRevocationInfoFormat ::= SEQUENCE {
     otherRevInfoFormat  OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
     otherRevInfo        ANY DEFINED BY otherRevInfoFormat }

   The other CHOICE MUST be used to convey OCSP responses, SCVP
   requests, and SCVP responses.

   The revocation information choices are defined under the following
   object identifier arc:

   id-ri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
     dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) ri(16) }

3. OCSP Response

   To carry an OCSP response, the otherRevInfoFormat is set to
   id-ri-ocsp-response, which has the following ASN.1 definition:

   id-ri-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 2 }

   In this case, otherRevInfo MUST carry the OCSP response using the
   OCSPResponse type defined in [OCSP].  The responseStatus field MUST
   be successful and the responseBytes field MUST be present.

4. SCVP Request and Response

   Unlike OSCP, SCVP permits unprotected and protected responses, where
   protected responses can be digitally signed or include message
   authentication codes.  While this provides more flexibility, it
   complicates when an SCVP response can be validated by entities other
   than the entity that generated the SCVP request.  If a lower layer
   provides authentication and integrity for the client-server
   interaction and the response is not protected, then a third party
   cannot validate the response because there is no way to know that the
   response was returned over a protected connection.  If a message
   authentication code is used, then the third party will be unable to
   validate the message authentication code because it does not posses
   the necessary private key.  For these reasons, SCVP responses sent to
   a third party MUST be signed by the SCVP server so that the third
   party can validate them.

   SCVP response validation requires matching it to the SCVP request.
   This means that the SCVP request MUST always be included with the
   response.  SCVP permits the client can retain the response, and SCVP
   permits the request to be returned in the response (in the requestReq
   field).  The request need not be protected for matching to be
   performed; nonces and certIds can be checked.


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   To carry the SCVP request and response, the otherRevInfoFormat is set
   to id-ri-scvp, which has the following ASN.1 definition:

   id-ri-scvp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 4 }

   In this case, the otherRevInfo MUST carry both the SCVP request and
   response with the following structure:

   SCVPReqRes ::= SEQUENCE {
     request  [0] EXPLICIT ContentInfo OPTIONAL,
     response     ContentInfo }

   The SCVPReqRes has the following fields:

   o request contains the SCVP request.  It contains the unprotected
     request, authenticated request, or the signed request.  The
     request MUST be present if the response does not include the
     requestRef fullRequest field.

   o response contains the SCVP response.  It MUST contain the signed
     response.  Additionally, the responseStatus MUST be okay.
     Unprotected and authenticated responses MUST NOT be included.

5. Security Considerations

   The security considerations of [CMS], [CMS-ASN], [OCSP], [SCVP], and
   [PROFILE-ASN] apply.

   To locally store unprotected or authenticated SCVP responses, an
   entity can encapsulate the unprotected or authenticated SCVP response
   in a SignedData.  It is a matter of local policy whether these
   encapsulated SCVP responses are considered valid by another entity.

6. IANA Considerations

   This document makes use of object identifiers.  These object
   identifiers are defined in an arc delegated by IANA to the PKIX
   Working Group.  No further action by IANA is necessary for this
   document or any anticipated updates.

7. References

7.1. Normative References

   [CMS]         Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 5652,
                 September 2009.



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   [OCSP]        Meyers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and
                 C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure
                 Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560,
                 June 1999.

   [SCVP]        Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and
                 W. Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
                 (SCVP)", RFC 5055, December 2007.

   [WORDS]       Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
                 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [X.680]       ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
                 1:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
                 Notation One.

   [X.681]       ITU-T Recommendation X.681 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
                 2:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
                 Notation One: Information Object Specification.

   [X.682]       ITU-T Recommendation X.682 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
                 3:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
                 Notation One: Constraint Specification.

   [X.683]       ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
                 4:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
                 Notation One: Parameterization of ASN.1
                 Specifications, 2002.

7.2. Informative References

   [CMS-ASN]     Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
                 CMS", draft-ietf-smime-new-asn1, work-in-progress.

   [PROFILE-ASN] Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
                 PKIX", draft-ietf-pkix-new-asn1, work-in-progress.

   [PROFILE]     Cooper, D. et. al., "Internet X.509 Public Key
                 Infrastructure Certificate and Certification
                 Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules

   Appendix A.1 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the
   structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
   [X.680] for compilers that support the 1988 ASN.1.



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   Appendix A.2 provides informative ASN.1 definitions for the
   structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
   [X.680], [X.681], [X.682], and [X.683] for compilers that support the
   2002 ASN.1. This appendix contains the same information as Appendix
   A.1 in a more recent (and precise) ASN.1 notation, however Appendix
   A.1 takes precedence in case of conflict.

A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module

   CMS-Other-RIs-2009-88
     { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-cms-otherRIs-2009-88(63)
     }

   DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=

   BEGIN

   -- EXPORTS ALL

   IMPORTS

   -- FROM CMS [CMS]

   ContentInfo
     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004
     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
       smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }

   ;

   id-ri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
     dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) ri(16) }

   -- RevocationInfoChoice for OCSP response
   -- OID included in otherRevInfoFormat
   -- signed OCSP response included in otherRevInfo

   id-ri-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 2 }

   -- RevocationInfoChoice for SCVP response
   -- OID included in otherRevInfoFormat
   -- SCVPReqRes included in otherRevInfo

   id-ri-scvp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 4 }




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   SCVPReqRes ::= SEQUENCE {
     request  [0] EXPLICIT ContentInfo OPTIONAL,
     response     ContentInfo }

   END

A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module

   CMS-Other-RIs-2009-02
     { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-cms-otherRIs-2009-93(64)
     }

   DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=

   BEGIN

   -- EXPORT ALL

   IMPORTS

   -- FROM [PROFILE-ASN]

   OCSPResponse
     FROM OCSP-2009
     { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-ocsp-02(48) }

   -- FROM [CMS-ASN]

   ContentInfo, OTHER-REVOK-INFO
     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
         smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41) }

   ;

   -- Defines OCSP and SCVP choices for RevocationInfoChoice

   SupportedOtherRevokInfo OTHER-REVOK-INFO ::= {
     ri-ocsp-response |
     ri-scvp,
     ... }

   ri-ocsp OTHER-REVOK-INFO ::= {
     OCSPResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-ri-ocsp-response }



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   id-ri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
     dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) ri(16) }

   id-ri-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 2 }

   ri-scvp OTHER-REVOK-INFO ::= {
     SCVPReqRes IDENTIFIED BY id-ri-scvp }

   id-ri-scvp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 4 }

   SCVPReqRes ::= SEQUENCE {
     request  [0] EXPLICIT ContentInfo OPTIONAL,
     response     ContentInfo }

   END

Authors' Addresses

   Sean Turner
   IECA, Inc.
   3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
   Fairfax, VA 22031
   USA

   EMail: turners@ieca.com

   Russ Housley
   Vigil Security, LLC
   918 Spring Knoll Drive
   Herndon, VA 20170
   USA

   EMail: housley@vigilsec.com
















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