Network Working Group Sean Turner, IECA
Internet Draft Dan Brown, Certicom
Intended Status: Informational December 4, 2009
Expires: June 4, 2010
Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure
draft-turner-ecprivatekey-02.txt
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Abstract
This document specifies the syntax and semantics for conveying
Elliptic Curve (EC) private key information. This syntax and
semantics defined herein are based on a similar syntax and semantics
defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG).
1. Introduction
This document specifies a syntax and semantics for Elliptic Curve
(EC) private key information. EC private key information includes a
private key and optionally parameters. Additionally, it may include
the corresponding public key. The syntax and semantics defined
herein are based on a similar syntax and semantics defined in
Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG) [SECG1].
Most Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) mandate local key generation;
however, there are some PKIs that also support centralized key
generation (e.g., the public-private key pair is generated by a CA).
The structure defined in this document allows the entity that
generates the private and public keys to distribute the key pair and
optionally the associated domain parameters.
A scenario in which this syntax is useful distributes EC private keys
using PrivateKeyInfo, as defined in PKCS #8 [RFC5208]. Distributing
an EC private key with PKCS#8 [RFC5208] involves including:
a) id-ecPublicKey, id-ecDH, or id-ecMQV (from [RFC5480]) with the
namedCurve as the parameters in the privateKeyAlgorithm field
b) ECPrivateKey in the PrivateKey field, which is an OCTET STRING.
When the public key is included, it is present in the ECPrivateKey
publicKey field not in the PKCS#8 publicKey field.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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3. Elliptic Curve Private Key Format
This section gives the syntax for an EC private key. Computationally
an EC private key is an unsigned integer, but for representation, EC
private key information SHALL have ASN.1 type ECPrivateKey:
ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) } (ecPrivkeyVer1),
privateKey OCTET STRING,
parameters [0] ECParameters {{ NamedCurve }} OPTIONAL,
publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL
}
The fields of type ECPrivateKey have the following meanings:
o version specifies the syntax version number of the elliptic curve
private key structure. For this version of the document, it SHALL
be set to ecPrivkeyVer1, which is of type INTEGER and whose value
is one (1).
o privateKey is the private key. It is an octet string of length
ceiling (log2(n/8)) (where n is the order of the curve) obtained
from the unsigned integer via the Integer-to-Octet-String-
Primitive (I2OSP) defined in [RFC3447].
o parameters specifies the elliptic curve domain parameters
associated to the private key. The type ECParameters are discussed
in [RFC5480]. As specified in [RFC5480], only the namedCurve
CHOICE, which is an object identifier that fully identifies the
required values for a particular set of elliptic curve domain
parameters, is permitted. Though the ASN.1 indicates parameters is
OPTIONAL, implementations that conform to this document MUST
always include the parameters field.
o publicKey contains the elliptic curve public key associated with
the private key in question. The format of the public key is
specified in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480]. Though the ASN.1 indicates
publicKey is OPTIONAL, implementations that conform to this
document SHOULD always include the publicKey field. The publicKey
field can be omitted when the public key has been distributed via
another mechanism, which is beyond the scope of this document.
Given the private key and the parameters the public key can always
be recomputed, this field exists as a convenience to the consumer.
4. Other Considerations
When generating a transfer encoding, generators SHOULD use DER
[X.690] and receivers SHOULD be prepared to handle BER [X.690] and
DER [X.690].
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Local storage of an unencrypted ECPrivateKey object is out of scope
of this document. However, one popular format uses the .pem file
extension. It is a PEM encoding, which is the Base64 encoding
[RFC4648], of the DER encoded ECPrivateKey object sandwiched between:
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
Another local storage format uses the .der file extension. In this
case, it is a DER [X.609] encoding of the ECPrivateKey object.
Local storage of an encrypted ECPrivateKey object is out of scope of
this document. However, ECPrivateKey should be the format for the
plaintext key being encrypted, and DER encoding it will promote
interoperability if the key is encrypted for transport to another
party. See [RFC5208].
5. Security Considerations
This structure does not protect the EC private key information in any
way. This structure should be combined with a security protocol to
protect it.
Protection of the private-key information is vital to public-key
cryptography. Disclosure of the private-key material to another
entity can lead to masquerades. The encryption algorithm used in the
encryption process must be as 'strong' as the key it is protecting.
6. IANA Considerations
None: All identifiers are already registered. Please remove this
section prior to publication as an RFC.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3447] Kaliski, B., and J. Jonsson, "Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.
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[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and W. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, March 2009.
[RFCXXXX] Schaad, J., and P. Hoffman, "New ASN.1 Modules for PKIX",
draft-ietf-pkix-new-asn1-07.txt, work-in-progress.
/**
RFC Editor: Please replace "RFCXXXX" with "RFC####" where ###
is the number of the published RFC.
**/
[SECG1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG), "SEC
1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Version 2.0, May 2009.
[X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002.
Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One.
[X.681] ITU-T Recommendation X.681 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-2:2002.
Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:
Information Object Specification.
[X.682] ITU-T Recommendation X.682 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-3:2002.
Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:
Constraint Specification.
[X.683] ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-4:2002.
Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:
Parameterization of ASN.1 Specifications, 2002.
7.2. Informative References
[RFC5208] Kaliski, B., "Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS)
#8: Private-Key Information Syntax Specification Version
1.2, RFC 5208, May 2008.
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Appendix A ASN.1 Module
This appendix provides informative ASN.1 definitions for the
structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
[X.680], [X.681], [X.682], and [X.683] for compilers that support the
2002 ASN.1.
ECPrivateKey-2009-02 { id-tbd }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL;
IMPORTS
-- FROM [RFCXXXX]
ECParameters, NamedCurve
FROM PKIXAlgs-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) }
;
ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) } (ecPrivkeyVer1),
privateKey OCTET STRING,
parameters [0] ECParameters {{ NamedCurve }} OPTIONAL,
publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL
}
END
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Simon Blake-Wilson and John O. Goyo
for their work on defining the structure in [SECG1]. The authors
would also like to thank Pasi Eronen, Alfred Hoenes, Russ Housley,
and Jim Schaad for their comments.
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Authors' Addresses
Sean Turner
IECA, Inc.
3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
Fairfax, VA 22031
USA
EMail: turners@ieca.com
Daniel R. L. Brown
Certicom Corp
5520 Explorer Drive #400
Mississauga, ON L4W 5L1
CANADA
Email: dbrown@certicom.com
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