Internet Draft P.Urien Document: draft-urien-eap-smartcard-05.txt A.J. Farrugia M.Groot G.Pujolle J.Abellan Expires: October 2004 EAP-Support in smartcard Status This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsolete by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 1 Abstract This document will describe the interface to the EAP protocol in smartcards, which could store multiple identities associated to Network Access Identifiers. Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 1 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 Table of Contents 1 Abstract.........................................................1 2 Overview.........................................................3 3 Terms............................................................4 4 Relationship with RFC 2284.......................................4 4.1 EAP multiplexing model......................................4 4.2 EAP smartcards..............................................5 5 Identification label.............................................6 6 UserID Coding Rules..............................................6 7 Mandatory and optional services..................................7 7.1 Add-Identity................................................7 7.2 Delete-Identity.............................................7 7.3 Get-Preferred-Identity......................................7 7.4 Get-Current-Identity........................................7 7.5 Get-Next-Identity...........................................7 7.6 Get-Profile-Data............................................8 7.7 Set-Identity................................................8 7.8 Process-EAP.................................................8 7.9 Get-Session-Key (SK)........................................9 7.10 Get-802.1X-State...........................................9 7.11 Reset-801.1X-State.........................................9 7.12 Method Functions...........................................9 7.13 Relationship with the 802.1X supplicant state machine......9 7.14 Authentication-Status.....................................10 7.15 Multiple EAP Identity selections..........................10 8 Relationships with the Authentication Agent.....................11 9 ISO 7816-4 APDUs................................................11 9.1 ISO 7816 Status Word.......................................11 9.2 PIN Management.............................................12 9.2.1 Verify PIN...........................................12 9.2.2 Change PIN...........................................12 9.2.3 Enable PIN...........................................13 9.2.4 Disable PIN..........................................13 9.2.5 Unblock PIN..........................................13 9.3 Multi-Applications smartcard considerations................13 9.4 Add-Identity...............................................14 9.5 Delete-Identity............................................14 9.6 Get-Preferred-Identity.....................................14 9.7 Get-Current-Identity.......................................15 9.8 Get-Next-Identity..........................................15 9.9 Get-Profile-Data...........................................15 9.10 Set-Identity..............................................16 9.11 Set-Multiple-Identity.....................................16 9.12 Process-EAP...............................................16 9.13 Method Functions..........................................18 9.14 Get-Session-Key...........................................19 9.15 Get-Current-Version.......................................19 9.16 Get-802.1X-State..........................................20 9.17 Reset-802.1X-State........................................20 9.18 Commands summary..........................................21 Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 2 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 10 State Machine Sequence.........................................21 10.1 Supplicant software state machine sequence................21 10.2 Smartcard EAP framework state machine sequence............22 11 Security Considerations........................................22 11.1 General Considerations....................................22 11.2 PEAP Consideration........................................23 12 Intellectual Property Right Notice.............................23 13 Annex 1 (Informative) - EAP/SIM packet detail..................23 14 Annex 2 (Informative) - EAP/MD5 packet details.................27 15 Annex 3 (Informative) TLS support..............................29 15.1 Unix time issue...........................................29 15.2 Fragment maximum size.....................................30 15.3 EAP/TLS messages format...................................30 15.4 Example of EAP/TLS Authentication.........................31 16 Annex 4 (Normative) ASN.1 BER Tag coding for the subscriber profile information...............................................32 16.1 ASN.1 Subscriber Profile Encoding.........................32 16.1.1 EapID...............................................32 16.1.2 EapType.............................................32 16.1.3 Version.............................................32 16.1.4 User Credential.....................................32 16.1.5 UserProfile.........................................33 16.1.6 UserProfile encoding example........................33 17 Annex 5 (Informative) APDUs exchange example...................34 18 Annex 6, EAP-TLS ISO7816 APDUs Trace (T=0 Protocol)............35 18.1 EAP-TLS session parameters................................35 18.1.2 CA Public Key (2048 bits)...........................35 18.1.3 Server Public Key (1024 bits).......................35 18.1.4 Client Private Key (1024 bits)......................35 18.2 Full EAP-TLS trace (mode 2)...............................36 18.3 EAP-TLS mode1 ISO7816 trace (T=0 protocol)................43 19 References.....................................................45 20 Author's Addresses.............................................46 2 Overview All technologies derived from 802.11 specifications such as 802.11a, 802.11b, 802.11g need strong security protocols for data privacy, integrity and network access. The 802.1X [8] specification describes the risks and the protocols for the protection of the exchanged data during the network connection. 802.1X specification requires the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) to be used as the framework for application dependent authentication processes with a mutual authentication between the supplicant and the authenticator. It is obvious that the role of the supplicant in this specification could partly be implemented in the smartcard as an authentication processing mean. The flexibility of EAP (RFC 2284) specification does not provide a Mandatory-to- implement solution. The structure of the EAP frames allows the applications to identify the EAP type of consequently to operate the appropriate authentication. Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 3 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 This draft describes a standard interface to EAP implementation embedded in a smartcard. This device is generally considered as the most secure computing platform. 3 Terms The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119. Authentication Agent: A piece of software implemented in the supplicant that processes the authentication sequence. AS Authentication Server Authenticator: See the IEEE 802.1X specification for a definition of this concept. EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol GSM Global System for Mobile communications IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identifier, used in GSM to identify subscribers. NAI Network Access Identifier PIN Personal Identification Number SK Session Key SIM Subscriber Identity Mobile Supplicant: an IEEE 802.1X concept, which in the context of IEEE 802.11 represents a STA (station) seeking to attach to an IEEE 802 LAN via an IEEE 802.1X Port. See the IEEE 802.1X specification for a complete definition. 4 Relationship with RFC 2284 4.1 EAP multiplexing model Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 4 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 According to [14], EAP implementations conceptually consist of the three following components: [a] Lower layer. The lower layer is responsible for transmitting and receiving EAP frames between the peer and authenticator. EAP has been run over a variety of lower layers including - PPP; - Wired IEEE 802 LANs [IEEE-802.1X]; - IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs [IEEE-802.11]; - UDP (L2TP [RFC2661] and ISAKMP [PIC]); - and TCP [PIC]. [b] EAP layer. The EAP layer receives and transmits EAP packets via the lower layer, implements duplicate detection and retransmission, and delivers and receives EAP messages to and from EAP methods. [c] EAP method. EAP methods implement the authentication algorithms and receive and transmit EAP messages via the EAP layer. Since fragmentation support is not provided by EAP itself, this is the responsibility of EAP methods. 4.2 EAP smartcards An EAP smartcard implements an EAP method and works in cooperation with a smartcard interface entity, that sends and receives EAP messages to/from this component. The simplest form of this interface is a software bridge that forwards EAP messages to smartcard. According to EAP methods complexity and smartcard computing capacities, protocols sub-sets, that donÂ’t deal with security features may be computed by the smartcard interface entity. +-+-+-+-+-+-+ | EAP method| | Smartcard | +-+-+-+-+-+-+ ! +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Smartcard | | | | | | Interface | EAP method| | EAP method| EAP method| | Type = X | Type = Y | | Type = X | Type = Y | | V | | | ^ | | +-+-+-+-!-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-!-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | ! | | ! | | EAP ! Layer | | EAP ! Layer | | ! | | ! | +-+-+-+-!-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-!-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | ! | | ! | | Lower ! Layer | | Lower ! Layer | | ! | | ! | +-+-+-+-!-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-!-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ! ! ! Peer ! Authenticator +------------>-------------+ Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 5 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 5 Identification label 802.1X specification [5] requires an authentication between the authentication server (AS) and the supplicant. The authentication is embedded in the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) RFC2284 [1] specification. The authentication consists of a challenge response between both parties without consideration of the involved crypto- suite. Before starting the mutual authentication, the AS needs the supplicant identity to establish the session. The AS or the authenticator sends an EAP Request Identity to the supplicant that returns its system identity. A user may own several identities associated to corporate networks or operatorsÂ’ networks. The identification label is a pointer to a system identity (the EAP- ID value returned in the EAP-Identity.response message) stored in smartcard; it may be of various types: 1. A network SSID as described in the 802.11 standard [4]. 2. A user's identification (userid) e.g. an ASCII string. A network access identifier, NAI [6] may be used as userid. 3. A pseudonym, e.g. a friendly name. According to the network environment, the supplicant software needs to set the appropriate identity and verifies if the smartcard is able to mirror the authenticator. If the smartcard is not able to process the authentication related to the identity then any setting process is rejected by the NAK code. The subsequent sections give the description of the methods used by a supplicant for processing an 802.1X authentication using the smartcard. Annex one provides a reference implementation example for a SIM based authentication. Annex two provides a reference implementation example for a MD5 based authentication. Annex three provides a reference implementation for a TLS based authentication. Annex four describes the user's profile according to the ASN.1 [9] syntax. Annex five illustrates an MD5 authentication scenario that works with an EAP smartcard. Annex six shows ISO 7816 data exchanges with EAP-TLS smartcards. 6 UserID Coding Rules This section describes the structure and the architecture of the userid. A userid consists of 2 fields separated by the Internet symbol "@". The right hand side of the "@" symbol is the userid realms while the left hand side is an application dependent and unique identification Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 6 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 number. EAP/SIM has defined the userid where the application identification is "1IMSI". Other userid such as email address can be used by the application. 7 Mandatory and optional services Mandatory services MUST be implemented in any smartcard that claims conformance with this draft. Optional services are not required by basic authentication operations. 7.1 Add-Identity Status: Optional. This command and the Delete-Identity are part of the user's identity management protocols. The smartcard is initially manufactured without any identification label. The personalization or the supplicant software adds in the smartcard user's identification label that can be retrieved by other smartcard command. 7.2 Delete-Identity Status: Optional This command and the add-Identity are part of the user's identity management protocols. The smartcard contains a list of one or several identification labels that can be retrieved by the supplication software. The command deletes one entry of the smartcard list. 7.3 Get-Preferred-Identity Status: Optional The smartcard contains at least one user's identity related to the user's network subscription. The supplicant software gets from the smartcard the initial and preferred identification label. If the user has more than one identity the supplicant software uses the Get-Next-Identity to read all the available other user's identities. 7.4 Get-Current-Identity Status: Mandatory The smartcard contains at least one user's identity related to the user's network subscription. The supplicant software gets from the smartcard its current identification label. 7.5 Get-Next-Identity Status: Mandatory The smartcard may contain one or more user's identities according to the user's network subscriptions. The supplicant software should prompt the user's identity and a subsequent selection allows the smartcard to process the appropriate EAP authentication type. The method Get-Next-Identity allows the supplicant software to read all the available user's identities. The Get-Next-Identity method may inform the supplicant software when all user's identities have been read. Otherwise the supplicant Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 7 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 software detects the identity list end when it gets again the first identity. 7.6 Get-Profile-Data Status: Optional The Authentication Agent or the authenticator may request the subscriber profile information. The Get-Profile-Data returns all related information available in the smartcard. Details of the subscriber profile information are given in annex 4. The implementation of the information may be ruled but ASN.1 BER coding specification [9] or by an XML dialect [10]. 7.7 Set-Identity Status: Mandatory Once the Identity selection is processed, the supplicant software needs to set the smartcard EAP framework according to the selected user's identity. The Set-Identity sets or restarts the smartcard EAP framework state machine for further processing using the EAP-Packets method. 7.8 Process-EAP Status: Mandatory The EAP process is described in the RFC 2284 specification [1] and involves several EAP requests and responses packets, 1) EAP request/response Identity; 2) A suite of EAP request/response related to a particular authentication scenario; and 3) EAP success or failure. The Set-Identity restarts the smartcard EAP framework state machine for further processing using the EAP-Packets method. An incoming EAP/Request/Identity restarts the smartcard EAP framework state machine for further processing using other EAP- Packets methods. The smartcard receives the RFC 2284 frames. It retrieves the appropriate EAP authentication type in the frame and the identifier. The smartcard maintains the EAP state machine and returns an EAP NAK packet if the state sequence is broken. In that case it restarts the AUTHENTICATING state. Any EAP request is silently ignored if the state machine was not started. The last step of the protocol retrieves the session Key from the smartcard. Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 8 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 7.9 Get-Session-Key (SK) Status: Mandatory. At the end of a successful authentication the supplicant needs to update the appropriate crypto suite (if any) using the session key. The Get-Session-Key returns to the supplicant software the key to initialize radio security protocols like TKIP, or CCMP. In an 801.1X [5] context, SK should be interpreted as the unicast key. In an 802.11i or WPA context SK should be interpreted as the PMK (Pairwise Master Key). 7.10 Get-802.1X-State. Status: Optional. This command returns the current smartcard 802.1X state. 7.11 Reset-801.1X-State. Status: Mandatory. This command forces the EAP smartcard in the AUTHENTICATING state. See section -Relationship with the 802.1X supplicant state machine-. 7.12 Method Functions Status: Optional. EAP smartcards that are not able to completely process an EAP method MAY support some essential security procedures, like for example, -X509 Certificate storage -Random generator -Private key encryption -Private key decryption -Public key encryption -Public key decryption -Symmetric key encryption -Symmetric key decryption 7.13 Relationship with the 802.1X supplicant state machine The supplicant state machine, as described in 802.1x standard is split between the terminal and the smartcard. The smartcard only implements the AUTHENTICATING state. Upon reception of the Set- Identity command smartcard unconditionally transits in the AUTHENTICATING state. Upon reception of the EAP Identity-Request message, smartcard unconditionally moves in the ACQUIRED state, delivers an Identity response message and re-enters the AUTHENTICATING state. In agreement with the 802.1x state machine all EAP requests are processed in the AUTHENTICATING state. The final EAP notification message (either success or failure) indicates the end of the authentication process. If any error occurs during the Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 9 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 authentication procedure (reception of NAK or failure messages ...) the smartcard restarts at the AUTHENTICATING state where it will wait for an identity request or the first EAP-Type request. If the EAP smartcard support security features like PIN code or biometric identification, all EAP messages will be silently discard before the occurrence of a successful bearer authentication. reset +-------------------+ +------>+----------------------+ +-->| ACQUIRED | | +-->| AUTHENTICATING |<-+ | +-------------------+ | | +----------------------+ | | | txRspId(reveiveId,| | | | txRspAuth(receivedId,| | | | previousId)| | | | previousId) | | | | previousId= | | | | previousId= | | | | receivedId | | | | reveivedId | | | +-------------------+ | | +--+---+----------+----+ | | | | | | | reqId | | | +----------------+ +--<---+ | +---->--+ | reqAuth | error +--------------------<------------------------+ 7.14 Authentication-Status At any time, the smartcard may return the authentication status. This status may reveal the following situations: 1) No authentication identity has been selected. 2) Authenticating 3) Authentication Success, AUTHENTICATING state restarted. 4) Authentication failure, AUTHENTICATING state restarted. 7.15 Multiple EAP Identity selections Multiple EAP authentications may be processed simultaneously in the same smartcard. If this capability is supported, the following rules apply: 1) Multiple EAP Identities may be selected at the same time. 2) The supplicant software shall indicate in the Set-Identity command short identifier to be associated with the selected EAP identity. Note: If another EAP identity was associated with the same short identity this EAP identity becomes necessarily unlinked and is no longer more possible to accessible to it unless a new set-identity command is processed (in this case the state machine is reset) or unless a different short identity has been also associated with it. The supplicant software shall include this short identifier within the EAP-Packets, Authentication-Status and Get-Session-Key commands Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 10 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 to inform which of the selected EAP identities the command is targeted to. The smartcard and the supplicant software shall maintain a separate EAP state machine for each of the different selected EAP identities. Note: the EAP state machine is associated with each EAP identity: whether two or more different short identities are associated to the same EAP identity, the results of EAP-Packets, Authentication-Status and Get-Session-Key commands do not depend on the short identifier used to refer the EAP identity. In other words, there is only one state machine for selected EAP Identity dependently of the short identities associated with it. 8 Relationships with the Authentication Agent The authentication agent is a piece of software implemented in the supplicant that processes the authentication method. This component must be able to detect a smartcard. If this device is not present, or if it silently discards an EAP.request message, then authentication agent must reject all incoming request messages by the NAK code. 9 ISO 7816-4 APDUs This section of the document provides an implementation of the previous descriptions for an ISO 78176-4 compatible smartcard. The section does not preclude of the transport protocol used between the smartcard and the reader. Thus, this specification does not mandate- to-implement any transport protocol such as T=0 or T=1, which are not in the scope of this document. It should be noted that all values are in hex representation. The restriction and security related descriptions are not present in the document. Annexes of this document give implementation examples. Note: Class byte value defined in this section ('A0') shall be interpreted as an implementation example. Other values may be used respecting conventions defined in ISO 78176-4. 9.1 ISO 7816 Status Word According to ISO 7816, the status word SW1,SW2 is a two bytes word, giving information about current operation either success or failure. '90' '00' indicates an operation success '98' '04' indicates one of the following events, - Access Condition not fulfilled, e.g. a pin code presentation is required. - Unsuccessful user PIN verification, at least one attempt left. Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 11 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 '98' '40' indicate one of the following events - Unsuccessful user PIN verification, no attempt left - Smartcard blocked '67' 'XX' - Incorrect parameter P3 '6B' 'XX' - Incorrect parameter P1 or P2 '6D' 'XX' - Unknown instruction code (INS) given in the command '6E' 'XX' - Wrong instruction class (CLA) given in the command '6F' 'XX' - Technical problem, not implemented... '61 ''XX' - Operation result MUST be fetched by the ISO Get Response APDU (CLA = 'C0', P3= 'XX') '6C ''XX' - Operation must be performed again, with the LE parameter value sets to 'XX'. '70' '00' - Packet silently discarded. '70' '01' - Authentication failure 9.2 PIN Management Some services may require that the smartcardÂ’s bearer presents its PIN code. Smartcard returns the '98' '04' status word when itÂ’s necessary to check the PIN code, before accessing to a particular service (see previous section). A PIN code is typically a four digits decimal number, ASCII encoded, and ranging between '0000' and '9999'. 9.2.1 Verify PIN +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Verify | A0 | 20 | 00 | 00 | 08 | 00 | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ The ISO APDU Verify is used when a PIN code presentation is required Lc is the PIN code length, typically height ASCII encoded bytes. 9.2.2 Change PIN This APDU modifies the user PIN code. Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 12 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Change | A0 | 24 | 00 | 00 | 10 | 00 | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ The old PIN (8 bytes) and new PIN (8 bytes) are presented 9.2.3 Enable PIN This APDU enables the user PIN function. +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Enable | A0 | 26 | 00 | 00 | 08 | 00 | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ The user PIN code (8 bytes) is presented. 9.2.4 Disable PIN This APDU disables the user PIN function. +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Disable| A0 | 28 | 00 | 00 | 08 | 00 | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ The user PIN code is presented. 9.2.5 Unblock PIN This APDU unblocks a smartcard, blocked after three wrong PIN code presentations. +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Unblock| A0 | 2C | 00 | 00 | 10 | 00 | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ The user PIN code (8 bytes) and an unblock code (8 bytes) are presented. 9.3 Multi-Applications smartcard considerations A smartcard may store several applications, each of them being identified by a set of bytes referred as the Application IDentifier (AID). Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 13 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 The ISO APDU Select is used when it's necessary to select an application, able to process one or more EAP authentication scenarios. +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Select | 00 | A4 | 04 | 00 | XX | 00 | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ Le is the AID length. According to ISO 7816-7 AID is made of two parts -RID, a mandatory 5 bytes field that identifies a company or a standardization body. -PIX, up to 11 bytes, which identifies an application. 9.4 Add-Identity This command adds an identification label as described in the section: Identification Label Coding Rules. The smartcard list is managed by the smartcard. The identification label is appended as the last element of the list. Identity coding guidelines are not yet specified. +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | | A0 | 17 | 00 | 81 | xx | 00 | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ 9.5 Delete-Identity This command deletes the identification label as described in the section: Identification Label Coding Rules. The command parameter gives the identification label to be deleted. +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | | A0 | 17 | 00 | 82 | xx | 00 | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ 9.6 Get-Preferred-Identity This command returns the user's preferred identification label as described in the section: Identification Label Coding Rules +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 14 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | | A0 | 17 | 00 | 02 | 00 | XX | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ 9.7 Get-Current-Identity This command returns user's current identification label as described in the section: Identification Label Coding Rules. +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | | A0 | 18 | 00 | AA | 00 | XX | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is not supported, P2 (AA value) shall be set to '00'. If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is supported, P2 (AA value) shall indicate the short identifier associated with the selected EAP identity to which the command is targeted. These short identifiers are coded as described in Set-Identity command. 9.8 Get-Next-Identity This command returns a user identification label as described in the section: Identification Label Coding Rules. +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | | A0 | 17 | 00 | 01 | 00 | XX | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ 9.9 Get-Profile-Data The command returns the related subscriber profile information according to the application requirements and format. Profile coding rules are defined in annex 4. +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | | A0 | 1A | 00 | AA | 00 | YY | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is not supported, P2 (AA value) shall be set to '00'. If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is supported, P2 (AA value) shall indicate the short identifier associated with the selected EAP identity to which the command is targeted. These short identifiers are coded as described Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 15 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 9.10 Set-Identity The command resets and initializes the state machine for processing the EAP Packets. The first step after this command is an EAP request identity packet. If a different EAP packet is sent to the smartcard the smartcard returns an EAP NAK response. +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | | A0 | 16 | 00 | 80 | XX | 00 | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ 9.11 Set-Multiple-Identity +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | | A0 | 16 | 00 | 83 | XX | 00 | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ The command resets and initializes the state machine for processing the EAP Packets. The first step after this command is an EAP request identity packet. If a different EAP packet is sent to the smartcard the smartcard returns an EAP NAK response. When "multiple EAP Identity selection" is supported, then the first status byte is '90' and the second one indicates the short identifier (coded in 1 byte) to be associated with the selected identity. 9.12 Process-EAP The command is the method for EAP packet management. The smartcard identifies the EAP packet type and processes the EAP authentication according to current state machine. The state machine sequences have to be respected and the smartcard enforces the EAP sequence processing. +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | | A0 | 80 | 00 | AA | XX | YY | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ The EAP request or response packet lengths are represented by the unknown value XX and YY. The supplicant software should set these elements in accordance with the EAP packet types. Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 16 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is not supported, P2 (AA value) shall be set to '00'. If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is supported, P2 (AA value) shall indicate the short identifier associated with the selected EAP identity to which the command is targeted. These short identifiers are coded as described in Set-Identity command. Most EAP request packets will produce an EAP response packet from the smartcard. If no response is to be produced (e.g. packet silently discard because invalid sequence) the smartcard shall inform the client software with an alert status word (70 00). Success and failure packets do not require any response from the EAP client. A "successfully ending of command (90 00)" status word shall be send from the smartcard once a success EAP packet is processed. An alert status word (70 00) shall be send from the smartcard once a failure EAP packet is received. EAP Identity packets are independent of the authentication type; this section of the document provides the packet details. The rest of the EAP packet being authentication protocol dependent, they are detailed in the informative annex of this document. The description of the EAP/Request/Identity is detailed according to the IETF RFC 2284 [1]. 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Request | Identifier | Length = 5 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type = 01 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ The description of the EAP/Response/identity is detailed according to the IETF RFC 2284 [1]. 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Response | Identifier | Length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type = 01 | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | User Identity | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Note : Command chaining and extended length Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 17 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 1) When an incoming EAP packet exceeds 255 bytes, the transport mechanisms for Extended APDU described in ISO/IEC 7816-3 for T=0 and T=1 may be used For T=0 the APDU Command (APDU-C) is split into data strings of at most 255 bytes and transported in the Data Field of a series of consecutive APDU ENVELOPE For T=1 the APDU-C is split into data strings of at most 254 bytes and transported in the Information Field of chained I-blocks. In both cases, on reception of the TPDU the smartcard has to concatenate the successive data strings in order to obtain the original APDU. 2) When an outgoing EAP packet exceeds 256 bytes, the smartcard may use the mechanisms described in ISO/IEC 7816-4, i.e. extended length field (ISO/IEC 7816-4 2002) for T=0 and T=1. For T=0 the APDU response (APDU-R) is split into successive data strings of at most 256 bytes by the card. The Terminal can retrieve them by a series of consecutive GET RESPONSE APDU. For T=1 the APDU-R is split into data strings of at most 254 bytes by the card and transported in the Information Field of chained I- blocks. On reception, the Terminal performs the concatenation of the Information Field of the successive I-blocks to get the APDU-R. The supplicant software shall then reassemble the complete EAP packet before sending it to the authenticator. 9.13 Method Functions. EAP smartcards that are not able to process a specific full EAP method may support some essential security procedures. +------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Method-FCT | A0 | 60 | zz | AA | xx | yy | +------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is not supported, P2 (AA value) shall be set to '00'. If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is supported, P2 (AA value) shall indicate the short identifier associated with the selected EAP identity to which the command is targeted. These short identifiers are coded as described in Set-Identity Command. xx is the length of the input value. yy is the length of the returned value. P1 identifies a particular function, and is organized according to the following scheme: Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 18 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 b7b6 00-Do.Final, 01-Initialize 10-More 11-Reserved b5b4 Function index b3b2b1 Function type 0 X509 Certificate reading 1 Random Number Generator 2 Private key encrypt 3 Private key decrypt 4 Public key encrypt 5 Public key decrypt 6 Symmetric key encrypt 7 Symmetric key decrypt b0 reserved 9.14 Get-Session-Key Once the state machine has received the EAP Success packet the smartcard process is able to send the Session Key used by the 802.1X specification for the crypto-suite. As an illustration the EAP SIM authentication [2] specifies the Session Key usage according to the system cryptographic suite. +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | | A0 | A6 | 00 | AA | 00 | 20 | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is not supported, P2 (AA value) shall be set to '00'. If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is supported, P2 (AA value) shall indicate the short identifier associated with the selected EAP identity to which the command is targeted. These short identifiers are coded as described in Set-Identity Command. 9.15 Get-Current-Version This command returns the EAP-Type protocol version and the WLAN-SCC version. +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | | A0 | 18 | xx | yy | 00 | 02 | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ P1=00, Reserved P1 is the current EAP-Type Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 19 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 P2=0, gets the EAP-Type version P2=1, gets the WLAN-SCC version 9.16 Get-802.1X-State This command returns the current smartcard 802.1X state. +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | | A0 | 19 | 00 | AA | 00 | 01 | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is not supported, P2 (AA value) shall be set to '00'. If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is supported, P2 (AA value) shall indicate the short identifier associated with the selected EAP identity to which the command is targeted. These short identifiers are coded as described in Set-Identity Command. Returned values: 01 No Identity set, EAP messages silently discarded. 02 EAP/Request/Identity received, AUTHENTICATING state. 03 Authentication in progress, AUTHENTICATING state. 04 Success, AUTHENTICATING state, waiting for an EAP/Request 05 Failure, AUTHENTICATING state, waiting for an EAP/Request 06 Error, AUTHENTICATING state, waiting for an EAP/Request 9.17 Reset-802.1X-State This command forces the EAP smartcard to the 802.1X AUTHENTICATING state +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | | A0 | 19 | 10 | AA | 00 | 01 | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is not supported, P2 (AA value) shall be set to '00'. If "multiple EAP Identity selection" is supported, P2 (AA value) shall indicate the short identifier associated with the selected EAP identity to which the command is targeted. These short identifiers are coded as described in Set-Identity Command. Returned values: 01 No Identity set, EAP messages are silently discarded. 04 Success, AUTHENTICATING state, waiting for an EAP/Request Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 20 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 9.18 Commands summary. +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Process-EAP | A0 | 80 | 00 | ii | xx | yy | +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Method-FCT | A0 | 60 | zz | ii | xx | yy | +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Get-802.1X-State | A0 | 19 | 00 | ii | 00 | 01 | +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Reset-802.1X-State | A0 | 19 | 10 | ii | 00 | 01 | +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Get-Session-Key | A0 | A6 | 00 | ii | 00 | xx | +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Get-Profile-Data | A0 | 1A | 00 | ii | 00 | yy | +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Get-Current-Identity | A0 | 18 | 00 | ii | 00 | yy | +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Get-Next-Identity | A0 | 17 | 00 | 01 | 00 | yy | +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Get-Preferred-Identity | A0 | 17 | 00 | 02 | 00 | yy | +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Set-Identity | A0 | 16 | 00 | 80 | xx | 00 | +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Set-Multiple-Identity | A0 | 16 | 00 | 83 | xx | 00 | +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Add-Identity | A0 | 17 | 00 | 81 | xx | 00 | +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Delete-Identity | A0 | 17 | 00 | 82 | xx | 00 | +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Get-Current-Version | A0 | 18 | xx | yy | 00 | 02 | +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Verify-PIN | A0 | 20 | 00 | 00 | 08 | 00 | +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Change-PIN | A0 | 24 | 00 | 00 | 10 | 00 | +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Enable-PIN | A0 | 26 | 00 | 00 | 08 | 00 | +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Disable-PIN | A0 | 28 | 00 | 00 | 08 | 00 | +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Unblock-PIN | A0 | 2C | 00 | 00 | 10 | 00 | +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | Select-AID | A0 | A4 | 04 | 00 | xx | 00 | +------------------------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ 10 State Machine Sequence 10.1 Supplicant software state machine sequence Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 21 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 +-----------------------+ +-----------------------+ |A-Get user's identity |>>>|B-Set user's identity |>>> +-----------------------+ +-----------------------+ +---------------------------+ +---------------------------+ |C-send/receive EAP packets |>>>|D-Get-Session-Key | +---------------------------+ +---------------------------+ Transitions: A-B : All available identities received by Get-Next-Identity commands B-C : Set-Identity command successfully performed C-D : Successful ending of EAP-Packets command with no outgoing packet(Status word of the command equals '9000'). This can be also detected by 'authenticated' status following the Authentication- Status command. D-C : An incoming EAP packet 10.2 Smartcard EAP framework state machine sequence +----------------------+ +----------------------+ | Z-Identity not set |>>>| Y-Authenticating |>>> +----------------------+ +----------------------+ +----------------------+ +----------------------+ | X-Authenticated | | W- Not authenticated | | /Authenticating | | /Authenticating | +----------------------+ +----------------------+ Transitions: Z-Y : An available identity successfully set Y-X : EAP success packet received Y-W : EAP failure packet received X-Y : EAP Request identity packet received W-Y : EAP Request identity packet received 11 Security Considerations 11.1 General Considerations As a reference implementation the previous section provides the details of the EAP authentication using the GSM SIM. This section of the document highlights the new potential risks providers of application may face by re-using deployed networks for other purposes. From the document [7] fatal flaw does exist when have physical access to the smartcard. The nature of the Internet network does no longer require getting physical access to the smartcard. Worms, Trojan horses or viruses can move to the computing platforms and performs the jobs. It is Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 22 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 important for a reference implementation to provide the relevant level of protection for the new applications but not to create other flaws. Other consideration have been introduced in [2] to protect the smartcard against crypto attack and recommends the authentication should take place in a PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT. 11.2 PEAP Consideration Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP) [12] is a pre- processing protocol that allows the privacy of data when processing EAP [1] protocol. EAP protocol, as defined in [1], starts by an EAP packet request/Identity. The EAP packet response Identity returns the user's identification label with no privacy being not part of [1]. PEAP protocol allows both part of the EAP packet exchange creating a session key that can be for privacy over the subsequent execution of the EAP protocol. This implementation of EAP in the smartcard shall allow performing a PEAP tunnel for privacy. Once PEAP first phase has been successfully preformed, the EAP protocol (or other protocol) has defined shall be performed according the EAP smartcard requirements. 12 Intellectual Property Right Notice To be specify according to the author and participant. 13 Annex 1 (Informative) - EAP/SIM packet detail. The protocol implementation is out of the scope of this document but as a reference implementation this section gives details using the SIM as specified by [3]. Other protocol can be implemented using ISO 7816-3 TPDU. This section of the document gives the APDU syntax and coding which makes the specification protocol free. The first EAP packet is the EAP Request Identity. This initial packet format complies with [1]. The smartcard returns an EAP response identity according to the IMSI length and the supported version according to [2]. +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | | A0 | 80 | 00 | 00 | 05 | YY | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 23 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 The description of the EAP/Request/identity is detailed according to the IETF RFC 2284 [1]. This EAP packet doesnÂ’t respect the EAP/SIM format since it is only part of [1]. 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Request | Identifier | Length = 5 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type = 01 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ The description of the EAP/Response/identity is detailed according to the IETF RFC 2284 [1]. 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Response | Identifier | Length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type = 01 | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | | User Identity | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Note the EAP/Response/Identity when returning the user's identity that includes the IMSI includes the real coded IMSI in the EAP packet and not the IMSI coded for GSM network. Further information can be retrieved in [3] for the IMSI coding in the SIM during the SIM setting. The user Identity field can contains the user's permanent pseudonym or re-authentication identity. The second EAP Packet is the EAP request SIM start as represented in the IETF draft document [2]. +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | | A0 | 80 | 00 | 00 | XX | YY | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ The description of the EAP/Request/SIM/Start is detailed according to [2] incoming SIM data where further information can be retrieved. 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 24 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Request | Identifier | Length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type = 18 | Subtype = 10 | Reserved | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |AT_PERM..._REQ | Length = 1 | Reserved | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |AT_FULL..._RES | Length = 1 | Reserved | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |AT_ANY_ID_REQ | Length = 1 | Reserved | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |AT_VERSION_L...| Length | Actual Version List Length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Supported version 1 | Supported version 2 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Supported version 3 | Padding | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ The description of the EAP/Response/SIM/Start is detailed according to [2] outgoing SIM data where further information can be retrieved. 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Response | Identifier | Length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type = 18 | Subtype = 10 | Reserved | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |AT_NONCE_MT | Length = 5 | Reserved | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | NONCE_MT | | | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | AT_SELECTED | Length = 1 | Select Version | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | AT_IDENTITY | Length | Actual Identity Length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | User Identity (Optional) | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ The description of the EAP/Response/SIM/Start is detailed according to [2] outgoing SIM data where further information can be retrieved. The third EAP Packet is the EAP request SIM Challenge as represented in the IETF draft document [2]. Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 25 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | | A0 | 80 | 00 | 00 | XX | 1C | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ The description of the EAP/Request/SIM/Challenge is detailed according to [2] incoming SIM data where further information can be retrieved. 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Request | Identifier | Length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type = 18 | Subtype = 11 | Reserved | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | AT_RAND | Length | Reserved | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | n*RAND | | | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | AT_MAC | Length = 5 | Reserved | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | MAC | | | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | AT_IV | Length = 5 | Reserved | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | Initialization Vector (Optional) | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | AT_ENCR_DATA | Length | Reserved | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | Encrypted Data (Optional) | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ The description of the EAP/Response/SIM/Challenge is detailed according to [2] outgoing SIM data where further information can be retrieved. Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 26 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Response | Identifier | Length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type = 18 | Subtype = 11 | Reserved | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | AT_MAC | Length = 5 | Reserved | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | MAC | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ The last EAP Packet is the EAP success notification as represented in the IETF RFC 2284 [2]. +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | | A0 | 80 | 00 | 00 | 04 | 00 | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+-- -+----+ 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Success | Identifier | Length = 04 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 14 Annex 2 (Informative) - EAP/MD5 packet details The first EAP packet is the EAP Request Identity. This initial packet format complies with the RFC 2284. The smartcard returns an EAP response identity according to the NAI length. +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | | A0 | 80 | 00 | 00 | 05 | YY | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ The description of the EAP/Request/identity is detailed according to the IETF RFC 2284 [1]. 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Request | Identifier | Length = 5 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type = 01 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 27 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 The description of the EAP/Response/identity is detailed according to the IETF RFC 2284 [1]. 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Response | Identifier | Length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type = 01 | | |-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Identity Value | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ The second EAP Packet is the EAP/request/MD5/challenge as represented in the IETF RFC 2284 [1]. +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | | A0 | 80 | 00 | 00 | XX | 16 | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ The description of the EAP/Request/MD5/challenge is detailed according to the IETF RFC 2284 [1]. 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Request | Identifier | Length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type = 04 | | |-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ MD5-Challenge.Value | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ The description of the EAP/Response/MD5/challenge is detailed according to the IETF RFC 2284 [1]. 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Response | Identifier | Length = 16 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type = 04 | Type_Size=10 | | |-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+---------------+ MD5 Digest Value | | | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 28 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 The third EAP Packet is the EAP success notification as represented in the IETF RFC 2284 [1]. +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | | A0 | 80 | 00 | 00 | 04 | 00 | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+-- -+----+ 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Success | Identifier | Length = 04 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Further information can be retrieved from the IETF draft document [2]. 15 Annex 3 (Informative) TLS support. EAP-TLS smartcards securely store at least the following items - Client X509 certificate - Client Private RSA Key - Certification Authority Public Key According to the smartcard computing capacities, two mode are defined in this draft (see details in annex 6) - Mode 1: smartcard supports five functions : - Public Key Encryption, with the server public key - Private Key Encryption, with the client private key - Public Key decryption, with the Certification Authority (CA) public key - Reading of the client's certificate - Random Number Generator - Mode 2: smartcard fully processes the EAP-TLS protocol 15.1 Unix time issue. As mentioned in [15] TLS RFC the client hello message includes a 32 byte random number, whose first 4 bytes are interpreted as the Unix time. As smartcard is not able to maintain a clock, this parameter MUST be added to the EAP-TLS Start message. +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ |Command |Class| INS | P1 | P2 | Lc | Le | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ | | A0 | 80 | 00 | 00 | 0A | YY | +--------+-----+-----+----+----+----+----+ Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 29 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Code=01 | Identifier | Length = 6 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type = 13 | Flag=20 | Unix Time | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Unix Time | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 15.2 Fragment maximum size. A single TLS record may be up to 16384 octets in length, but a TLS message may span multiple TLS records, and a TLS certificate message may in principle be as long as 16MB. The group of EAP-TLS messages sent in a single round may thus be larger than the maximum RADIUS packet size of 4096 octets, or the maximum 802 LAN frame size. The chaining and extended length mechanisms identified in this document provide enough extension to manage incoming and outgoing EAP-TLS packets. Then, authenticator shall not necessary follow a specific fragment policy regarding whether EAP-TLS is provided by the smartcard or not. However, in order to prevent multiple segmentation and re-assembly operations, the maximum EAP message length of a no fragmented packet shall be set to 240 bytes. For a fragmented EAP message, the maximum length value shall be 240 bytes. As defined in EAP-TLS, when the smartcard receives an EAP-Request packet with the M bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Response with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data. This serves as a fragment ACK. 15.3 EAP/TLS messages format. 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Code | Identifier | Length <= 240 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type = 13 | Flag | TLS Message Length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | TLS Message Length | TLS DATA | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 30 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 Flags 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |L M S R R R R R| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ L = Length included. M = More fragments S = EAP-TLS start, set in an EAP-TLS Start message. R = Reserved 15.4 Example of EAP/TLS Authentication Smartcard Authentication Server <- EAP-Request/ Identity EAP-Response/ Identity (MyID) -> <- EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS Start) EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS TLS client_hello)-> <- EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS server_hello, TLS certificate, TLS certificate_request, TLS server_hello_done) (Fragment 1: L, M bits set) EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS -> <- PPP EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (Fragment 2) EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS certificate, TLS client_key_exchange, TLS certificate_verify, TLS change_cipher_spec, TLS finished) -> <- EAP-Request/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS (TLS change_cipher_spec, TLS finished) EAP-Response/ EAP-Type=EAP-TLS -> <- EAP-Success Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 31 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 16 Annex 4 (Normative) ASN.1 BER Tag coding for the subscriber profile information The subscriber profile is a collection of data associated to every identity. It can be used be the operating system of a wireless terminal in order to get information about user credentials. Various information (photos...) MAY be also available. 16.1 ASN.1 Subscriber Profile Encoding 16.1.1 EapID EapID ::= OCTET STRING The EAP-ID associated to the current identity. 16.1.2 EapType EapType ::= INTEGER The EAP type associated to the current identity. 16.1.3 Version Version ::= INTEGER The protocol version associated to an EAP type. 16.1.4 User Credential UserCredential ::= SEQUENCE OF CredentialObject CredentialObject ::= SEQUENCE { ObjectValue SubscriberInformation } SubscriberInformation ::= CHOICE { SSIDList [0] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE OF { SSIDName OCTET STRING }, SubscriberCertificate [1] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE OF { Certificate X509Certificate }, RootCertificate [2] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE OF { Certificate X509Certificate } Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 32 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 UserData [3] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE OF { { SubscriberFile UserFile } UserFile SEQUENCE OF { Name OCTET STRING, Value BIT STRING Value } X509Certificate an ASN.1 definition, as described in [13]. 16.1.5 UserProfile UserProfile ::= SEQUENCE { ThisEapID EapID, ThisEapType EapType, ThisVersion Version, ThisCredential UserCredential } 16.1.6 UserProfile encoding example 30 82 xx yy 04 05 31 32 33 34 35 EapID = 1235 02 01 0D EapType = EAP-TLS 02 01 01 Version = 1 30 xx A0 0E 04 05 61 62 63 64 65 SSID = abcde 04 05 66 67 68 69 6A SSID = fghij A1 82 xx yy First X509Certificate Second X509Certificate A2 82 xx yy First Root X509Certificate Second Root X509Certificate A3 82 xx yy 30 82 zz tt 04 05 61 62 63 64 65 // Name = abcde 03 82 zz tt File content Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 33 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 17 Annex 5 (Informative) APDUs exchange example This annex shows ISO 7816 (T=0) TPDUs exchanged between the smartcard and the authentication agent // Select EAP application (AID= 11 22 33 44 55 66 01) Select.request: 00 A4 04 00 07 11 22 33 44 55 66 01 Select.response: 90 00 // Get current identity Get-Current-Identity.request: A0 18 00 00 00 Get-Current-Identity.response 98 04 // !Pin code is requested // PIN code verification (0000) Verify.request: A0 20 00 00 08 30 30 30 30 FF FF FF FF Verify.response: 90 00 // Try again Get-Current-Identity.request: A0 18 00 00 00 Get-Current-Identity.response: 6C 04 Get-Current-Identity.request A0 18 00 00 04 Get-Current-Identity.response: 61 62 63 64 90 00 // Get-Next-Identity() Get-Next-Identity.request: A0 17 00 01 00 Get-Next-Identity.response: 6C 04 Get-Next-Identity.request: A0 17 00 01 04 Get-Next-Identity.response: 61 62 63 64 90 00 // Set-Identity() Set-Identity.request: A0 16 00 80 04 61 62 63 64 Set-Identity.response: 90 00 // Process EAP-Packets() EAP-Packet.request: A0 80 00 00 05 01 A5 00 05 01 EAP-Packet.response: 61 09 GetResponse.request: A0 C0 00 00 09 GetResponse.response: 02 A5 00 09 01 61 62 63 64 90 00 EAP-Packet.request A0 80 00 00 08 01 A6 00 08 04 02 12 34 EAP-Packet.response: 61 16 GetResponse.request: A0 C0 00 00 16 GetResponse.response: 02 A6 00 16 04 10 CF A5 2D CD 63 5F 5C 6D 55 B8 09 FD B7 BB EC 3C 90 00 Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 34 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 18 Annex 6, EAP-TLS ISO7816 APDUs Trace (T=0 Protocol) 18.1 EAP-TLS session parameters 18.1.2 CA Public Key (2048 bits) modulus: 00:a5:62:a0:41:52:9a:ec:8e:27:24:a1:0c:a2:45: 68:e3:ed:bd:3d:64:9a:7c:c2:74:5a:e2:60:fa:ac: 6d:0f:dd:4c:45:ce:9d:b9:74:4e:35:fd:74:cd:13: 63:dd:dc:ce:19:25:b9:d7:06:31:13:d7:ea:1e:54: 1a:07:36:eb:97:2f:88:19:58:c5:76:ec:f9:b3:71: 66:fa:3a:4e:94:f9:04:98:ff:b0:7f:b0:dc:af:c3: c8:a6:35:3d:ab:d4:67:07:ff:c6:e8:f0:03:a5:f1: 5b:00:c8:8f:36:a1:f3:88:e8:23:f1:04:c6:d4:26: af:37:ad:a2:54:83:ab:13:56:83:8e:6f:b4:3a:d3: 63:95:00:ad:ec:57:5d:95:2d:01:f5:7b:ae:6c:b6: 43:4b:da:2b:e1:ed:f4:ab:e1:75:27:0f:2e:06:5c: 42:30:b4:5e:06:59:58:e4:4b:b6:0e:ba:71:d6:1c: a0:70:ac:b1:2c:b2:fe:6b:7d:d8:42:1d:45:9d:d5: 4a:62:06:2e:e2:dc:88:5b:8b:72:45:ac:e1:24:ea: 08:66:30:5f:8c:e6:52:12:37:70:04:b0:37:5c:09: 1e:3b:d4:97:0c:9b:41:3f:86:08:d7:db:19:cb:07: a3:b9:cb:75:49:99:dc:20:cd:f0:db:52:19:4b:15: f1:6d publicExponent: 65537 (0x10001) 18.1.3 Server Public Key (1024 bits) modulus: 00:bc:67:01:3c:b9:15:ec:12:81:e6:5a:4d:af:49: 80:1d:db:6d:5c:f3:0c:fd:2f:f6:3f:5d:37:79:29: c7:39:1b:fd:76:6f:67:dd:0f:e9:e8:42:51:43:ba: 46:ae:95:ff:76:91:9f:30:a3:9c:45:9a:22:f2:2b: 75:66:52:97:95:c3:2f:ee:7d:cf:c9:dc:de:11:69: a3:46:ef:e8:25:24:62:14:df:02:2b:ad:f9:83:b9: 3c:bb:a8:1c:44:c1:5a:11:39:70:1b:69:f9:95:4c: 9b:d2:fd:fa:1a:e4:01:e3:bd:6f:d0:6c:f5:85:41: 3c:28:ae:80:2b:46:70:a8:f3 publicExponent: 65537 (0x10001) 18.1.4 Client Private Key (1024 bits) modulus: // N 00:de:7d:0e:f5:1d:17:16:c0:6f:51:b0:4c:ef:2e: c6:ca:f4:d8:66:01:bc:7b:21:12:37:ce:dc:61:72: f3:c8:ff:83:5c:2f:f5:2b:f8:f0:0f:bd:89:86:6a: 3f:c2:8b:3b:bd:c7:98:fd:4b:1d:67:8f:85:66:12: 74:6f:64:74:d0:31:07:46:04:ba:b1:74:70:b1:fc: d9:42:44:f8:97:c2:74:b9:45:5c:84:15:33:ec:4a: cb:41:d2:6e:7c:6d:bd:bc:cd:3e:64:ff:8f:33:63: fe:06:55:69:96:c6:96:fa:17:db:f8:7f:eb:5b:fe: 00:3e:d1:8e:42:83:62:be:c3 Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 35 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 publicExponent: 65537 (0x10001) privateExponent: 00:9f:ad:4b:5d:d9:79:e7:a7:46:7d:6f:35:57:f7: cf:4e:7b:f9:0f:04:b1:fc:00:99:2d:9a:76:0a:2e: 51:0e:71:6b:1a:6f:84:db:01:37:71:64:8b:5d:ff: c5:30:df:72:89:da:c5:4f:0c:68:d7:19:67:19:01: a7:b5:06:78:da:57:2f:2f:f6:c5:ce:75:b7:ca:9d: b2:f8:5a:62:27:40:b2:5c:42:f3:78:fd:42:f6:1a: 56:44:a3:42:94:24:f6:37:53:fc:78:42:06:8a:1a: 0b:43:cf:f8:92:60:8d:10:61:2c:ff:d3:79:ba:78: ed:f7:28:fb:61:dc:88:37:91 prime1: // P 00:fc:30:c8:10:41:80:f7:f2:1a:0c:28:2b:58:a0: 44:3e:01:13:91:66:4f:96:27:0e:c3:0a:4f:58:b5: 73:9a:3c:7a:fa:b9:19:8f:2b:32:8b:c8:bf:6c:77: b3:4d:e5:71:80:e5:74:9a:76:a5:c0:41:14:81:76: e0:9b:46:bd:db prime2: // Q 00:e1:d9:6b:5e:41:2d:3e:b9:2a:a8:6b:6e:d0:fc: aa:b1:df:a7:4e:90:8d:11:54:7c:0d:ea:64:d5:f5: c1:d1:2b:02:77:b2:d2:6e:d8:93:56:ad:ee:ca:5a: c0:92:64:4b:b8:d8:f4:a2:8c:f0:18:17:64:51:0b: db:04:f3:3b:39 exponent1: // DP1 00:db:27:a9:34:37:38:54:3f:d7:d2:e8:b5:82:77: 03:d6:be:28:bb:1a:25:df:5e:61:bd:ac:9f:f7:7e: f7:ce:f8:f0:06:22:04:cc:1d:c5:f7:23:a4:f6:25: af:73:ea:08:10:f3:55:b9:45:92:14:d8:79:71:68: 55:17:9b:0a:31 exponent2: // DQ1 37:87:0e:27:d9:5c:77:6c:6d:39:85:58:74:97:7a: 9c:4b:01:c6:86:31:b8:ce:0d:c6:1a:17:fa:a6:f6: a5:27:ae:ee:a1:0f:ad:e3:1f:ae:93:0a:ff:c3:7a: 4f:43:cb:7e:42:11:3b:99:ed:39:ef:1e:61:f2:c9: 41:99:4f:b9 coefficient: //PQ 5f:88:21:11:1f:0d:f0:cd:56:47:4f:1f:64:81:0e: d1:02:eb:39:42:01:c7:e4:4b:b6:31:65:2a:fd:51: 11:1f:cd:3a:68:d4:e8:3c:4e:47:c1:ce:76:6b:2b: 52:bd:76:dd:71:81:76:0f:69:9a:94:c3:41:3a:2e: c9:47:3c:e5 18.2 Full EAP-TLS trace (mode 2) // Set-Identity (abc) type=TLS Tx: A016800003616263 Rx: 9000 // TLS-START + GMT-UNIX-TIME Tx: A080000000A 011400060D20 3FAA2B6A Rx: 6150 Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 36 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 Tx: A0C0000050 // Client Hello Rx: 021400500D000000004616030100410100003D03013FAA2B6A08BDD285B43D1F 3BC9715FC9F85FC453FE58F3A9E07FF397CD65392200001600040005000A0009 006400620003000600130012006301009000 // Server_Hello fragment#1 1396 octets size = 4710 octets Tx: A0800100F0011505740DC00000126616030112610200004603013FAA2B9BCC3D 6179E2D7E78460A2596342C5014289B753209CA02A31DEDB9142206124000089 2B16D27FEBD10B93D1EFC224C322B69B994C1A8FB2B5BD4094861A0004000B00 05A80005A50005A23082059E30820486A003020102020A613116E50000000000 03300D06092A864886F70D0101050500305231123010060A0992268993F22C64 01191602667231143012060A0992268993F22C6401191604656E737431153013 060A0992268993F22C64011916056261647261310F300D060355040313066361 77696669301E170D3033313030323135323331345A Rx: 9000 Tx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x: 9000 Tx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x: 9000 Tx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x: 9000 Tx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rien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 37 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 Rx: 9000 Tx: A0800000C46B6B6172312E62616472612E656E73742E66725F6361776966692E 637274302106092B060104018237140204141E12005700650062005300650072 007600650072300D06092A864886F70D01010505000382010100946E33F7044A 18F16E18337D8A22A230415DF07766ED94835E8A1FCBB7B16571D6EC6A9564AA C163383D17B223C29AB57825AE36156083249AA0A8EABED8C880D7E1EE58A301 9D04D935EA3C6427052FDE1CCB60681691436C3580439F4C592ABA6489D43ABF EF9660EF60DA97FDA9 Rx: 6106 Tx: A0C0000006 Rx: 021500060D009000 // EAP-ACK fragment#1 // server hello fragment#2 1396 octets Tx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x: 9000 Tx: A0800100F074696669636174696F6E20417574686F72697479202D204732313A 3038060355040B1331286329203139393820566572695369676E2C20496E632E 202D20466F7220617574686F72697A656420757365206F6E6C79311F301D0603 55040B1316566572695369676E205472757374204E6574776F726B00C43081C1 310B300906035504061302555331173015060355040A130E566572695369676E 2C20496E632E313C303A060355040B1333436C6173732034205075626C696320 5072696D6172792043657274696669636174696F6E20417574686F7269747920 2D204732313A3038060355040B1331286329203139 Rx: 9000 Tx: A0800100F0393820566572695369676E2C20496E632E202D20466F7220617574 686F72697A656420757365206F6E6C79311F301D060355040B13165665726953 69676E205472757374204E6574776F726B00D43081D1310B3009060355040613 025A41311530130603550408130C5765737465726E2043617065311230100603 55040713094361706520546F776E311A3018060355040A131154686177746520 436F6E73756C74696E6731283026060355040B131F4365727469666963617469 6F6E205365727669636573204469766973696F6E312430220603550403131B54 686177746520506572736F6E616C20467265656D61 Rx: 9000 Tx: A0800100F0696C204341312B302906092A864886F70D010901161C706572736F 6E616C2D667265656D61696C407468617774652E636F6D00D23081CF310B3009 060355040613025A41311530130603550408130C5765737465726E2043617065 31123010060355040713094361706520546F776E311A3018060355040A131154 686177746520436F6E73756C74696E6731283026060355040B131F4365727469 6669636174696F6E205365727669636573204469766973696F6E312330210603 550403131A54686177746520506572736F6E616C205072656D69756D20434131 2A302806092A864886F70D010901161B706572736F Rx: 9000 Tx: A0800100F06E616C2D7072656D69756D407468617774652E636F6D0086308183 310B3009060355040613025553312D302B060355040A13244669727374204461 Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 38 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 7461204469676974616C2043657274696669636174657320496E632E31453043 0603550403133C46697273742044617461204469676974616C20436572746966 69636174657320496E632E2043657274696669636174696F6E20417574686F72 69747900CE3081CB310B3009060355040613025A41311530130603550408130C 5765737465726E204361706531123010060355040713094361706520546F776E 311A3018060355040A131154686177746520436F6E Rx: 9000 Tx: A0800000C473756C74696E6731283026060355040B131F436572746966696361 74696F6E205365727669636573204469766973696F6E3121301F060355040313 1854686177746520506572736F6E616C2042617369632043413128302606092A 864886F70D0109011619706572736F6E616C2D6261736963407468617774652E 636F6D0061305F310B300906035504061302555331173015060355040A130E56 6572695369676E2C20496E632E31373035060355040B132E436C617373203320 5075626C6963205072 Rx: 6106 Tx: A0C0000006 Rx: 021600060D009000 // EAP-ACK fragment#2 // server hello fragment#3 1396 octets Tx: A0800100F0011705740D40696D6172792043657274696669636174696F6E2041 7574686F726974790061305F310B300906035504061302555331173015060355 040A130E566572695369676E2C20496E632E31373035060355040B132E436C61 73732032205075626C6963205072696D6172792043657274696669636174696F 6E20417574686F726974790061305F310B300906035504061302555331173015 060355040A130E566572695369676E2C20496E632E31373035060355040B132E 436C6173732031205075626C6963205072696D61727920436572746966696361 74696F6E20417574686F7269747900C43081C1310B Rx: 9000 Tx: A0800100F0300906035504061302555331173015060355040A130E5665726953 69676E2C20496E632E313C303A060355040B1333436C6173732033205075626C 6963205072696D6172792043657274696669636174696F6E20417574686F7269 7479202D204732313A3038060355040B13312863292031393938205665726953 69676E2C20496E632E202D20466F7220617574686F72697A656420757365206F 6E6C79311F301D060355040B1316566572695369676E205472757374204E6574 776F726B009C308199310B30090603550406130248553111300F060355040713 08427564617065737431273025060355040A131E4E Rx: 9000 Tx: A0800100F065744C6F636B2048616C6F7A617462697A746F6E73616769204B66 742E311A3018060355040B131154616E7573697476616E796B6961646F6B3132 3030060355040313294E65744C6F636B20557A6C6574692028436C6173732042 292054616E7573697476616E796B6961646F00473045310B3009060355040613 02555331183016060355040A130F47544520436F72706F726174696F6E311C30 1A06035504031313475445204379626572547275737420526F6F740077307531 0B300906035504061302555331183016060355040A130F47544520436F72706F 726174696F6E31273025060355040B131E47544520 Rx: 9000 Tx: A0800100F04379626572547275737420536F6C7574696F6E732C20496E632E31 2330210603550403131A475445204379626572547275737420476C6F62616C20 526F6F7400C63081C3310B300906035504061302555331143012060355040A13 0B456E74727573742E6E6574313B3039060355040B13327777772E656E747275 73742E6E65742F43505320696E636F72702E206279207265662E20286C696D69 Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 39 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 7473206C6961622E2931253023060355040B131C286329203139393920456E74 727573742E6E6574204C696D69746564313A303806035504031331456E747275 73742E6E6574205365637572652053657276657220 Rx: 9000 Tx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x: 9000 Tx: A0800000C42C20496E632E313C303A060355040B1333436C6173732032205075 626C6963205072696D6172792043657274696669636174696F6E20417574686F 72697479202D204732313A3038060355040B1331286329203139393820566572 695369676E2C20496E632E202D20466F7220617574686F72697A656420757365 206F6E6C79311F301D060355040B1316566572695369676E205472757374204E 6574776F726B0070306E310B300906035504061302555331183016060355040A 130F47544520436F72 Rx: 6106 Tx: A0C0000006 Rx: 021700060D009000 // EAP-ACK fragment#3 // Server hello fragment#4 550 octets Tx: A0800100F0011802260D00706F726174696F6E31273025060355040B131E4754 45204379626572547275737420536F6C7574696F6E732C20496E632E311C301A 06035504031313475445204379626572547275737420526F6F74009E30819B31 0B30090603550406130248553111300F06035504071308427564617065737431 273025060355040A131E4E65744C6F636B2048616C6F7A617462697A746F6E73 616769204B66742E311A3018060355040B131154616E7573697476616E796B69 61646F6B313430320603550403132B4E65744C6F636B20457870726573737A20 28436C6173732043292054616E7573697476616E79 Rx: 9000 Tx: A0800100F06B6961646F0054305231123010060A0992268993F22C6401191602 667231143012060A0992268993F22C6401191604656E737431153013060A0992 268993F22C64011916056261647261310F300D06035504031306636177696669 00723070312B3029060355040B1322436F707972696768742028632920313939 37204D6963726F736F667420436F72702E311E301C060355040B13154D696372 6F736F667420436F72706F726174696F6E3121301F060355040313184D696372 6F736F667420526F6F7420417574686F726974790061305F31133011060A0992 268993F22C6401191603636F6D31193017060A0992 Rx: 9000 Tx: A080000046268993F22C64011916096D6963726F736F6674312D302B06035504 0313244D6963726F736F667420526F6F74204365727469666963617465204175 74686F726974790E000000 // Client Response Rx: 61FA // = 240 + 6 + 4 Tx: A0C00000FA // fragment#1 Rx: 021700FA0D4000000721160301071C0B0005E10005DE0005DB308205D7308204 Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 40 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 BFA003020102020A61253DFF000000000006300D06092A864886F70D01010505 00305231123010060A0992268993F22C6401191602667231143012060A099226 8993F22C6401191604656E737431153013060A0992268993F22C640119160562 61647261310F300D06035504031306636177696669301E170D30333131303630 39333635395A170D3034313130353039333635395A306231123010060A099226 8993F22C6401191602667231143012060A0992268993F22C6401191604656E73 7431153013060A0992268993F22C64011916056261647261310E9000 Tx: A080000006011800060D00 // EAP-ACK fragment#1 Rx: 61F6 Tx: A0C00000F6 // fragment#2 Rx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x: A080000006011900060D00 // EAP-ACK fragment#2 Rx: 61F6 Tx: A0C00000F6 // fragment#3 Rx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x: A080000006011A00060D00 // EAP-ACK fragment#3 Rx: 61F6 Tx: A0C00000F6 // fragment#4 Rx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x: A080000006011B00060D00// EAP-ACK fragment#4 Rx: 61F6 Tx: A0C00000F6 // fragment#5 Rx: 021700F60D4053657276696365732C434E3D436F6E66696775726174696F6E2C 44433D62616472612C44433D656E73742C44433D66723F634143657274696669 636174653F626173653F6F626A656374436C6173733D63657274696669636174 696F6E417574686F72697479305206082B060105050730028646687474703A2F Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 41 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 2F616B6B6172312E62616472612E656E73742E66722F43657274456E726F6C6C 2F616B6B6172312E62616472612E656E73742E66725F6361776966692E637274 30290603551D2504223020060A2B0601040182370A030406082B060105050703 0406082B06010505070302302F0603551D11042830269000 Tx: A080000006011C00060D00 // EAP-ACK fragment#5 Rx: 61F6 Tx: A0C00000F6 // fragment#6 Rx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x: A080000006011D00060D00 // EAP-ACK fragment#6 Rx: 61F6 Tx: A0C00000F6 // fragment#7 Rx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x: A080000006011E00060D00 // EAP-ACK fragment#7 Rx: 6197 Tx: ACC00000F6 // fragment#8 Rx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x: A080000006011F00060D00 // EAP-ACK fragment#8 Rx: 6197 Tx: A0C0000097 // fragment#9 Rx: 021700970D00CC014BAFE24BB98550AF86E13B6D8D371E5A922D20DD338B563B 7E9C9AF0EF9110C77B468A651915575D348A7D29B89CC5A8D4B8AA715D53E340 E6E7AD6B6E3438F358B870C5DA5E61C45EE5E3F9454219F48A34CC9810A946F0 C652675E3CA81ABA229309B71403010001011603010020C97EBCFF0C20271CAE 21FAA80898278660D393CB4C640390CDEB14592A0392F79000 // Server Finished Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 42 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 Tx: A080000035012A00350D800000002B14030100010116030100209255D2089E41 30B5984AF43B604A108AA11376F368E71BCF81EEFEBC00289C1C Rx: 6106 Tx: ACC0000006 Rx: 022A00060D009000 // EAP-ACK Server-Finished // Get PMK Tx: A0A6000040 Rx: B7CD0C7DCBD83D45B2DB1D6598FE696A10176E21B62D8A33AD2970A560CE5E84 8F0A6773E9C0264015861CE712C9A692844A28B6D5641E4D90D38994A94A2C6D 9000 18.3 EAP-TLS mode1 ISO7816 trace (T=0 protocol) The EAP-TLS smartcard mode1, supports five functions - Public Key Encryption, with the server public key - Private Key Encryption, with the client private key - Public Key decryption, with the Certification Authority (CA) public key - Reading of the client's certificate - Random Number Generator In this mode the EAP-TLS smartcard interface doesn't provide RSA functions. Furthermore all client's parameters (RSA keys and certificate) are stored in the smartcard. // Set-Identity (abc TLS) type=TLS Tx: A016800003616263 Rx: 9000 // RANDOM Number Generator Tx: A060 0200 1C // 28 bytes Rx: 08BDD285B43D1F3BC9715FC9F85FC453FE58F3A9E07FF397CD653922 // Set Server Public KEY (FCT = Initialize + Public-Encrypt) Tx: A0604800870080bc67013cb915ec1281e65a4daf49801ddb6d5cf30cfd2ff63f 5d377929c7391bfd766f67dd0fe9e8425143ba46ae95ff76919f30a39c459a22 ....f22b7566529795c32fee7dcfc9dcde1169a346efe825246214df022badf983b9 ....cbba81c44c15a1139701b69f9954c9bd2fdfa1ae401e3bd6fd06cf585413c28a ....e802b4670a8f30003010001 // Pre-Master Secret Encryption with the Server Public Key // FCT = Do-Final + Public-Encrypt Tx: A0600800300301c5a68fb75123308e2ddbb27b63fe021e8724e7bc5c17078b3b ....3f90ba00d128f80b07ad786b6de36e5f94ffdfeb49 RX: 6180 TX: 8fd83c571fe7d71e76a86405bdbc95ba4bd67a48f4bd8084f4f944c1acdf1fac f85ffc111be3ce8affb48f6da6c5477761a34c7889cb148da42141bbc1e942ba c8752b7fd255574f654dbed3def89ee0f79beebf43dc737f158f99c17a2461b2 c5d5e2a75fcbbd7f5275ad781127300e46ec61408ef2babc200f85363926301e Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 43 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 // Private Encrypt with Client Private Key // FCT = Do-Final + Private-Encrypt // (Client Certificate Verify) Tx: A0604002249c0326e6d899fa802cc981b86e9b65f41234db8e2456e5f3dccd68 a34f25b4e72153f50e Rx: 6180 Tx: A0C0000080 Rx: bdd2429d21dae14d9727d2f715bf30a65e61c7608d5c0b6035bccc014bafe24b b98550af86e13b6d8d371e5a922d20dd338b563b7e9c9af0ef9110c77b468a65 1915575d348a7d29b89cc5a8d4b8aa715d53e340e6e7ad6b6e3438f358b870c5 da5e61c45ee5e3f9454219f48a34cc9810a946f0c652675e3ca81aba229309b7 // Public Decrypt#1 with CA public key, first byte // FCT = Do-Final + Index#1 + Public-Decrypt // Checking of server certificate Tx: A061 1B 00 01 13 Rx: 9000 // Public Decrypt#1 (with CA public key, 255 bytes) Tx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x: 6123 Tx: A0C0000023 // Certificate Hash Rx: 3021300906052B0E03021A0500041429A563710F25832AFB692E44F4B9AFF36F BE91A79000 // Read Client Certificate // Certificate Init // FCT = INIT + Certificate Tx: A060 4000 00 // Certificate fragment#1 Rx: 308205D7308204BFA003020102020A61253DFF000000000006300D06092A8648 86F70D0101050500305231123010060A0992268993F22C640119160266723114 3012060A0992268993F22C6401191604656E737431153013060A0992268993F2 2C64011916056261647261310F300D06035504031306636177696669301E170D 3033313130363039333635395A170D3034313130353039333635395A30623112 3010060A0992268993F22C6401191602667231143012060A0992268993F22C64 01191604656E737431153013060A0992268993F22C6401191605626164726131 0E300C060355040313055573657273310F300D0603550403130668616A6A6568 9000 Tx: A060 0000 00 // Certificate fragment#2 Rx: 30819F300D06092A864886F70D010101050003818D0030818902818100DE7D0E F51D1716C06F51B04CEF2EC6CAF4D86601BC7B211237CEDC6172F3C8FF835C2F F52BF8F00FBD89866A3FC28B3BBDC798FD4B1D678F856612746F6474D0310746 04BAB17470B1FCD94244F897C274B9455C841533EC4ACB41D26E7C6DBDBCCD3E 64FF8F3363FE06556996C696FA17DBF87FEB5BFE003ED18E428362BEC3020301 Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 44 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 0001A38203213082031D300B0603551D0F0404030205A0304406092A864886F7 0D01090F04373035300E06082A864886F70D030202020080300E06082A864886 F70D030402020080300706052B0E030207300A06082A864886F70D0307301D06 9000 Tx: A060 0000 00 // Certificate fragment#3 Rx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x: A060 0000 00 // Certificate fragment#4 Rx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x: A060 0000 00 // Certificate fragment#5 Rx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x: A060 0000 00 // Certificate fragment#6 Rx: 6CDB Tx: A060 0000 DB // Certificate fragment#6 Rx: 853DEE845CC33D0E9D8ECC7514295F854D16F6409DFEB61A60C9A1EF0BC09AD3 C1A93BEE546B2DF9DBAB8AD9A90AAB5CEE35FF6751275873D1C5093339B4ADEA 0F40C54754DAE7461966322B5772B460B7FA2F5985D496C52CAF7456DF2D78E4 DE9B1C48F2ACB987BA9BDE3D1624645330F0FBF0103C547DA547C1F03B1C2BB5 CDD06D38D2ABFAFD06387235E8E49DEDCB7E2B7E80A15B1317A04ECF1ADBF475 AC82D67514A6EF5EBFFAD40D5D5F7395179677703BFC3A9D34623BD28EC9186A 1078130652552D5CFEF1B6CDBA5197910A4C87CAD1F92FA7EB7A0B9000 19 References [1] L. Blunk, J. Vollbrecht, "PPP Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 2284, March 1998. (NORMATIVE) [2] EAP SIM Authentication, draft-haverinen-pppext-eap-sim-13.txt. Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 45 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 [3] GSM Technical Specification GSM 11.11. Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Specification of the Subscriber Identity Module - Mobile Equipment (SIM - ME) [4] Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications [5] Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Standard for Port based Network Access Control. [6] "The Network Access Identifier" RFC 2486 [7] "Can you Clone a GSM Smartcard (SIM)? " From Charles Brookson Chairman GSM Association Security Group [8] Part 11: Wireless Medium Access Control (MAC) and physical layer (PHY) specifications: Specification for Enhanced Security [9] ASN.1 standard 2002 edition ISO/IEC 8825.1. http://asn1.elibel.tm.fr/en/standards/index.htm [10] Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Second Edition), W3C Recommendation 6 October 2000 [11] B. Aboba, D. Simon, EAP TLS Authentication Protocol RFC 2716, October 1999. [12] H. Andersson, S. Josefsson, G. Zorn, D. Simon, A. Palekar, "Protected EAP Protocol (PEAP)", draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap- 05.txt, work-in-progress, September 2002. (INFORMATIVE) [13] PKCS #6: Extended-Certificate Syntax Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note, Version 1.5, Revised November 1, 1993. [14] RFC 2284 bis, draft-ietf-eap-rfc2284bis-08.txt [15] T.Dierks, C.Allen, RFC 2246, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", January 1999. 20 Author's Addresses Pascal Urien ENST 46 rue Barrault 75013 Paris Phone: NA France Email: Pascal.Urien@enst.fr Augustin J. Farrugia Impasse des CAMEGIERS Phone: NA Ceyreste, 13600 France Email: afarrugia@csi.com Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 46 Integrating EAP in smartcards May 2004 Max de Groot Gemplus Avenue du Pic de Bertagne BP 100, 13881 Gemenos Phone: NA France Email: max.de-groot@gemplus.com Guy Pujolle LIP6 - University Paris 6 8 rue Capitaine Scott Phone: NA Paris 75015 France Email: Guy.Pujolle@lip6.fr Jorge Abellan Axalto. 50, Av Jean Jaures Phone: +33 1 46 00 59 33 Montrouge 92542 France Email: Jorge.abellan@slb.com Urien & All Informational - Expires October 2004 47