Internet Engineering Task Force                                 A. Vives
Internet-Draft                                                  J. Palet
Expires: August 24, 2005                                     Consulintel
                                                               P. Savola
                                                       February 20, 2005

                    IPv6 Security Problem Statement

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
   of Section 3 of RFC 3667.  By submitting this Internet-Draft, each
   author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of
   which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of
   which he or she become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with
   RFC 3668.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 24, 2005.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).


   Today, each network is often secured by a unique device (i.e.
   security gateway or firewall) that becomes a bottleneck for the
   end-to-end security model with IPv6.  The deployment of IPv6 enabled
   devices and networks bring some issues, which must be addressed by

Vives, et al.            Expires August 24, 2005                [Page 1]

Internet-Draft       IPv6 Security Problem Statement       February 2005

   security administrators in order to guarantee at least the same level
   of security that is obtained nowadays with IPv4 and network-based
   (including perimeter-based) security schemes, allowing at the same
   time all the IPv6 advantages.

   The most important issues are the rediscovery of end-to-end
   communications, the availability of IPsec in all IPv6 stacks, the
   increase in the number and type of IP devices and also the increase
   in the number of nomadic devices, connecting to different networks
   that could have different security policies.

   The security policies and architectures currently applied in Internet
   with IPv4 do no longer apply for end-to-end security models which
   IPv6 will need.  This document outlines the advantages and drawbacks
   of both security schemes: network/perimeter-based and distributed.

   This document aims to identify IPv6 issues that justify the need of a
   distributed security model for IPv6, that is, simply to show that a
   security problem will arise with the deployment of IPv6 networks if
   nothing is done.

Vives, et al.            Expires August 24, 2005                [Page 2]

Internet-Draft       IPv6 Security Problem Statement       February 2005

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Network-based versus Host-based Security . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.1   Network-based Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.2   Host-based Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   3.  IPv6 Issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     3.1   End-to-End . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     3.2   IPsec-encrypted ESP-traffic in transport mode  . . . . . . 11
     3.3   Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     3.4   Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       3.4.1   Link-local addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       3.4.2   New Multicast addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     3.5   Multihoming  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     3.6   Randomly Generated Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     3.7   Neighbor Discovery Weakness  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     3.8   Routing Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     3.9   Home Address Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     3.10  Embedded Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   4.  Other Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   6.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     7.1   Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     7.2   Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
       Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
       Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 19

Vives, et al.            Expires August 24, 2005                [Page 3]

Internet-Draft       IPv6 Security Problem Statement       February 2005

1.  Introduction

   This document will cope only with IPv6 issues related to security,
   i.e., it will try to answer the following question: How would the
   deployment of IPv6 affect the security of a network? This network
   could be a dual-stack network with IPv6 traffic from IPv6 capable
   nodes, or an IPv6 only network.

   The deployment of IPv6 enabled devices and networks forces the
   security administrator to consider several issues:

   o  The rediscovery of end-to-end communications.

   o  The availability of IPsec in all IPv6 stacks.

   o  The increase in the number and type of IP devices.

   o  The increase in the number of nomadic devices, connecting and
      moving between different networks.

   The security policies and architectures currently applied in Internet
   with IPv4 no longer apply for end-to-end security models which IPv6
   will enable.  This document outlines the advantages and drawbacks of
   both the security schemes: network/perimeter-based and distributed.

   Also IPv6 issues will be identified that justify the need of
   distributed security for IPv6, that is, simply to show that a
   security problem will arise with the deployment of IPv6 networks if
   traditional schemes are used.

   The following issues are out of scope of this document and will be
   addressed elsewhere:

   o  State the security requirements for the described IPv6 scenarios.

   o  Propose a solution or architecture to address the problem stated
      in this document.

   o  To address security problems derived from the use of transition

   Last but not least, this document contains a brief definition of what
   we understand by "security".  We use security in the "big scope" of
   the word, trying to include as much as possible.  In other words, a
   host, a network or some information, will be secure when no attacks
   could succeed against them.  A success will mean compromise of
   availability, integrity, confidentiality or authenticity.  The
   realistic objective is to be as much secure as possible in a precise

Vives, et al.            Expires August 24, 2005                [Page 4]

Internet-Draft       IPv6 Security Problem Statement       February 2005

   moment.  It will be part of the requirements to establish which kind
   of security is given using a number of mechanisms.

   For clarity, in the rest of this document, network-based security
   includes also the perimeter-based model.

2.  Network-based versus Host-based Security

   In this section two different approaches are analyzed to be used
   later in the rationale about the security problems that IPv6 could

2.1  Network-based Security

   This is the most used scheme, where the security of a host depends on
   the point of the network it is connected to.

   The perimeter scheme is the simplest one (see Fig.  1) and is based
   in the topology of the network.  The security policy is enforced in a
   central host or firewall (FW), which provides secure network
   connectivity to one or more network segments.  The FW will be what an
   "outside" host sees when tries to attack the network.  Attacks coming
   from the same LAN segment are not protected by the FW.  Different
   nodes (even different addresses in the same node) may have different

   In a more advanced form of perimeter security, the different networks
   could be protected from each other, or a number of internal firewalls
   could be used as well.  This way some networks could be protected
   from hosts in other internal network

Vives, et al.            Expires August 24, 2005                [Page 5]

Internet-Draft       IPv6 Security Problem Statement       February 2005

                       /         \
                      |  Internet |
                       \         /
                            | Policy Enforcement Point
            LAN-1       |       |     DMZ-1
          ----+---------+  FW   +-------+----
              |         |       |       |
            +-+--+      +---+---+    +--+-+
            | H1 |          |        | S1 |
            +----+          |LAN-2   +----+
                    +----+  |
                    | H2 +--+
                    +----+  |

   Figure 1: Perimeter Security

   This model is based on the following assumptions:

   o  The threats come from "outside" the FW, basically the Internet.

   o  Everybody from the same LAN segment is trusted.

   o  The protected nodes won't go "outside" where FW won't be able to
      protect them.

   o  There are no backdoors on the network (modem, WLAN, other

   o  The hosts will not need to be accessed directly from outside (at
      least in a general manner, i.e., potentially all ports on all

   The main advantage of this scheme is its simplicity and easiness as
   the elements and points of configuration are reduced to the minimum,
   requiring few/no protocols and mechanisms to implement the security.

   In case of a more complex configuration, where multiple FW are
   deployed within an organization network, the complexity will

   The drawbacks of this model are:

   o  This is a centralized model: Single point of failure for both

Vives, et al.            Expires August 24, 2005                [Page 6]

Internet-Draft       IPv6 Security Problem Statement       February 2005

      performance and availability.  If the FW fails, then all the
      networks connected to it loose network connectivity unless
      specific fail-over techniques are applied.

   o  A big percentage of the threats come from inside the FW, and are
      not addressed by this security model, especially when internal
      firewalls are not deployed.

   o  The most dangerous threats, in the sense that one may not be able
      to protect from them, come from inside the FW.

   o  The FW usually acts as NAT and/or proxy box, interfering or even
      disallowing end-to-end communications.  In complex configurations,
      even more than one level of NAT/proxy could appear.

   o  Transport mode secured communications (using IPsec ESP for
      example) need special solutions ([1]).

   o  The same security policy may be enforced for all the nodes of each
      network connected to the FW, but it is also possible to have
      separate policies for all hosts.  In any case, an error in the FW
      will equally expose all hosts in a network.

   o  Virtual organizations, for example those using GRID models, don't
      work with traditional centralized security models.

   o  The lack of secure end-to-end prevents innovation.

2.2  Host-based Security

   Host based security model, already introduced by [2], is based on the
   idea of enforcing the security policy in each network host from a
   central control point.

   The three main elements identified in the distributed security model

   o  Policy Specification Language.

   o  Policy Exchange Protocol.

   o  Authentication of Entities.

   The basic idea is simple: the Security Policy is centrally defined
   using the Policy Specification Language and distributed to each host
   by means of the Policy Exchange Protocol.  The Network Entities need
   to be authenticated in order to be trusted, for example to allow an

Vives, et al.            Expires August 24, 2005                [Page 7]

Internet-Draft       IPv6 Security Problem Statement       February 2005

   incoming connection or to trust the received Security Policy.

   The biggest challenge, however, is trusting that the hosts comply to
   the rules they've received, for example that the user can't just
   disable the firewall if (s)he dislike the policy; of course, this
   only can happen in the case (s)he has administrative rights for that
   (often not the case in non-personal systems, those not owned by the
   end user).  It seems that one ore more network entities would have to
   keep watch over the hosts in order to detect if they are not
   following the received policy.  At first look the more appropriated
   entity seems to be one that knows the security policy, for example
   the one that distributes it.

   From a security point of view this model somehow eases the work to
   the "enemies", putting the Policy Enforcement Point in their hands.
   So not only mechanisms to prevent direct attacks to the security
   solution must be developed but mechanisms to minimize the

                       /         \
                      |  Internet |
           +------+    \         /
           |Sec.  |     \---+---/
           |Policy|         |
           +--+---+         |
              |           /-+-\
              |          | \ / | LAN-3
             -+---+------+  x  +-------+--
            LAN-1 | (*)  | / \ |       | (*)Policy Enforcement Point
               +--+-+     \-+-/      +-+--+
               | H1 |       | LAN-2  | H3 |
               +----+       |        +----+
                            | (*)
                         | H2 |

   Figure 2: Host-based Security

   This model is based on the following assumptions:

   o  Each host can be uniquely and securely identified.

   o  The security policy could be applied in one or more of the
      following levels: network, transport and application.

Vives, et al.            Expires August 24, 2005                [Page 8]

Internet-Draft       IPv6 Security Problem Statement       February 2005

   o  The threat comes from anywhere in the network.

   o  The intruder has no physical access to the protected network hosts
      (what about malicious users? See other topics section).

   o  "Outside" hosts may be able to access all hosts "Inside",
      depending on the policies.

   The advantages of this model are:

   o  The security policy can be host-specific.

   o  A host can take better decisions as it knows what it is doing or
      trying to do, that means it can better detect strange packets.
      For example, it could allow mail traffic to only one application
      on the system.

   o  Enables the usage of end-to-end applications level security (e.g.,
      web services security standards).

   o  Enables better protection from attacks by the "internal" users,
      and possibly even to a degree from those in the local segment.
      For example address spoofing can be detected and avoided coming
      from the same LAN segment, without router participation.

   o  Can protect a host independent of the topology, i.e., wherever the
      host is connected.

   o  Does not need specific devices to secure a host (consider the case
      of a single host with a CPE (Customer Premises Equipment), if the
      CPE has no (user-controllable) firewall functions).

   o  Can control the outgoing attempts from each host, avoiding local
      network misbehavior or malicious practices.

   o  The collection of audit information could be more complete in a
      distributed model, despite the processing of that information is
      done in a distributed or centralized fashion.

   o  It maintains the centralized control of the security policies,
      from where they are distributed to each host (central decisions,
      local enforcement).

   The drawbacks of this model are:

   o  It is more complex than the perimeter one.

   o  The uniqueness and secured identification of hosts is not trivial,

Vives, et al.            Expires August 24, 2005                [Page 9]

Internet-Draft       IPv6 Security Problem Statement       February 2005

      for example using certificates [2].

   o  The hosts must be trusted (or designed appropriately) so that they
      will operate according to the policy.  For example, it must be
      impossible to disable the firewall functions or if the policy is
      not followed network communication is not allowed.

   o  A host that becomes compromised or infected with a worm or virus
      in any case can't be trusted to operate according to the policies,
      as the worms/viruses probably first create holes or disable the
      protections if they can.

   o  It may be challenging to design the system so that policy updates
      are made available to the nodes which may not be network-reachable
      all the time.

   o  It may be difficult to distinguish a misbehaving application from
      a legitimate application (for example, many email worms may be
      channeled through the MUA which must be authorized to send the
      mails to operate correctly).

   o  Because of having a centralized Policy Decision Point (PDP) from
      where the Security Policies are distributed a weakness is
      introduced in form of a central point of failure unless more
      complexity is added, for example with a distributed/replicated

   o  The host security is in some sense 'server-dependant'.  It must be
      able to detect the lost of connectivity with the PDP and act in
      consequence.  It also seems that being disconnected from the PDP
      for a long period could be dangerous.

3.  IPv6 Issues

   When IPv6 is deployed, either in an existing IPv4 network or in a new
   IPv6-only network, the security administrator must take into account
   that IPv6 traffic will be different from the IPv4.

   IPv6 enabled nodes will likely have global addresses, which means
   they may be reachable from any other IPv6 node in the Internet.  A
   security administrator can prevent this by using local addressing
   and/or firewalls, but the benefits of IPv6 may not be fully realized
   if so.

   The differences between IPv4 and IPv6 change the type of attacks
   which IPv6 networks are likely to see.

Vives, et al.            Expires August 24, 2005               [Page 10]

Internet-Draft       IPv6 Security Problem Statement       February 2005

   Also mention that there are studies that conclude that the rollout of
   dedicated IPv4 firewalls in the internal network to regulate internal
   network communication causes the same work that dedicated firewalling
   on hosts.

3.1  End-to-End

   The global availability of end-to-end communication is one of the
   benefits of IPv6, and provides the required framework for further
   innovation, where technologies like P2P and GRID, among others, can
   be widely spread with no problems in a seamless way.  However,
   end-to-end communication also means that every host should be
   reachable from any other host, including the ones from "outside".  It
   can lead to an increase in the possibility of being attacked, such as
   cracking, DoS, etc.

   In the network-based security model, these threats are normally
   solved by disabling every end-to-end communications between inside
   and outside, but this is not a solution for those who want to use
   end-to-end communications.

   Some possible solutions to cracking are outlined in [3], one of them
   being a host firewall.

   Several researches are ongoing regarding DoS prevention, and some of
   these solutions need to be adopted to provide security for such
   end-to-end communications.

3.2  IPsec-encrypted ESP-traffic in transport mode

   As stated in [3], section 5, there is a problem with the IPv6
   encrypted traffic (IPsec ESP mechanism in transport mode, for
   example) and the network-based security model.

   The idea is that a host inside the network can establish an encrypted
   communication channel with other host outside of the network.  A
   middlebox (for example the perimeter firewall) won't be able to
   inspect the contents of such a communication.

   In [3] some possible solutions are outlined, one of them being a host

3.3  Mobility

   In parallel to the increase in the number of devices, IPv6
   facilitates that those devices are "mobile", that is, can easily move
   from one network to another using Mobile IPv6 or just disconnecting
   from one and connecting to another.

Vives, et al.            Expires August 24, 2005               [Page 11]

Internet-Draft       IPv6 Security Problem Statement       February 2005

   Because of the amount of addresses available and the facilities given
   by Autoconfiguration mechanisms together with the mentioned rise of
   the number of IP devices, this kind of behavior should be taken into
   account by the security administrator, as these devices will be
   connected to networks where they have no control and consequently, no

   A possible solution for these devices is the use of host based
   security, enabled in every network it is connected.  The policies and
   mechanisms should be described elsewhere.

3.4  Addresses

   Regarding the addresses in IPv6 must be taken into account that:

   o  The amount of addresses is much bigger for a given network.

   o  Each host will have more than one address which are probably
      globally routable.

   o  An IPv6 node can use randomly generated addresses [4].

   o  The IPv6 addresses are more human error prone that the IPv4 ones.

   That means:

   o  To scan a given network whole range of addresses and ports will
      take a really big effort [5].  It would be easier to do that by
      sniffing a LAN segment looking for existent addresses.

   o  The common way of identifying a host by means of its IP address
      will be more difficult to use.

   o  If a host uses randomly generated addresses [4], it could be
      problematic to identify a host using its IP address for security
      policy matching purposes.

   o  The Security Administrator should be careful when establishing,
      for example, an ACL (Access Control List) as the common practice
      is to use raw IP addresses (instead of DNS names).  Some mechanism
      would be desirable to prevent these mistakes.

   Regarding the scan of addresses, [5] demonstrates that the "brute
   force" scanning would make no sense for an IPv6 address range,
   typically a minimum of /64.

   A host based security scheme would protect the other hosts from the
   compromised one.

Vives, et al.            Expires August 24, 2005               [Page 12]

Internet-Draft       IPv6 Security Problem Statement       February 2005

   The idea behind all this is that the new IPv6 address scheme and
   mechanisms will somehow protect from existent attack techniques but
   we can be sure that they will adapt themselves to the new scheme and
   we have to act consequently being prepared.

   The IPv6 addressing scheme eases the work of identifying a user host,
   becoming a privacy threat.  There are two IPv6 features to be
   considered, the host identifier created from the MAC address by the
   address autoconfiguration and the user network prefix.

   The first one could be used to identify a user independently of the
   network to which it is attached.  As a solution the randomly
   generated addresses were defined.

   The second one refers to the fact that every user will receive at
   least a /64 prefix and so all the hosts coming from one user network
   could be identified by the network prefix.  In IPv4 it is common to
   use a temporary address assignment scheme for the home user,
   resulting in changes of its assigned address.

3.4.1  Link-local addresses

   In IPv6 we have got the link-local addresses that allows a host that
   connects to a network to have IP connectivity without any external

   Even if this is quite useful, also represents a security problem
   because allows a host to attack the network it is connected to.  This
   must be taken into account by the security administrator.

   As a guideline, we should not simply rely on trusting by default
   those sessions which are from link local addresses.  It is better to
   restrict to use link local address to some fundamental services,
   until the host is trusted.

3.4.2  New Multicast addresses

   In IPv6 new multicast addresses are defined than identifies resources
   in a well known manner.  This can enable an enemy to locate and
   attack those key resources with no need of a time consuming address

   This kind of addresses have an scope field.  This means that many of
   such services would have either link-local scope.  Note that these
   addresses are used for the protocol itself, for example in the
   autoconfiguration process.  This kind of addresses must be taken into
   account by a security solution that addresses inside attacks.

Vives, et al.            Expires August 24, 2005               [Page 13]

Internet-Draft       IPv6 Security Problem Statement       February 2005

   There are also global-scope addresses that must be published to the
   outside.  This kind of services must be protected and monitored by a
   security solution that addresses outside attacks.

   For an updated IPv6 multicast addresses list see [6].

3.5  Multihoming

   As said above the IPv6 capable interface could have more than one
   IPv6 global address.  This will be the case in multihomed networks,
   where more than one network prefix could be used to have access to
   the IPv6 world.

   If the security policy is based on rules which use IP addresses as an
   identifier, it must be taken into account that a single host could be
   behind different addresses with different prefixes.

   Also the case of a host with more than one interface, each one with
   one or more different addresses should be taken into account.  If
   more than one interface is using the network infrastructure with
   different addresses, the Security Administrator should be able to
   identify that the same host is behind all these addresses.

3.6  Randomly Generated Addresses

   Whatever security model is being used, in case of using randomly
   generated addresses, the host identifier part is randomly generated
   by the host to be used temporarily [4].

   The consequence is that it will be harder for a security
   administrator to define a policy rule (access rule) in the security
   enforcement point to identify end nodes in all cases.  For example a
   node could generate a DoS attack generating a lot of traffic using a
   random source address.  The security administrator could not just
   block the host's network prefix because there could be other valid
   hosts within that network.  Even in the case of a detection
   mechanism, the attacking node could change its random source address.

   So the Security Administrator should take into account the randomly
   generated addresses when receiving incoming packets from outside of
   its security domain.  Its decision could be for example to allow
   access to public services, like web servers, but not to allow or put
   special attention to connections to end nodes inside its network.  To
   put special attention could be for example, to inspect packets up to
   application level or to dedicate more IDS resources.

Vives, et al.            Expires August 24, 2005               [Page 14]

Internet-Draft       IPv6 Security Problem Statement       February 2005

3.7  Neighbor Discovery Weakness

   As said above, one of the assumptions of the host-based security
   model is that all hosts in the network are non trusted, the possible
   threats coming from the same LAN segment must be taken into account,
   in this case the ones coming from Neighbor Discovery (ND) [7][8].

   Note that this is not possible within the network-based security
   model, although some detection mechanism could be implemented,
   nothing can be done to protect the hosts.

   There are some ways to interfere in the normal behavior of the
   autoconfiguration process, causing redirection of traffic and/or DoS
   (Denial of Service).

   Special attention must be put on Router Advertisement (RA), Router
   Solicitation (RS), Neighbor Solicitation (NS), Neighbor Advertisement
   (NA) and Redirect messages.  See [9] for a detailed explanation of
   possible threats.

   Using host firewalls and/or IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems) for
   protecting hosts against these threats is very likely a wrong
   approach, as that would basically imply reinventing SEND [10][11]; it
   is better to use SEND instead.

   There is no easy protection against these threats as the ND features
   (e.g., using link-local or the unspecified addresses) are needed
   before a host can authorize itself to the other network components.

3.8  Routing Header

   IPv6 protocol defines some extension headers, among them is the
   Routing Header [12].  All IPv6 endpoints are required to process this
   header resulting in the forwarding of the IPv6 packet.

   Using the routing header a list of one or more nodes through which
   the packet must pass, in its path from source to destination, is
   created.  Basically what happens is that the destination address is
   changed in each host where the routing header is processed.  This
   mechanism, for example, could be used to reach hosts beyond
   network-based security mechanisms.

   The security administrator should establish, in the Security Policy,
   which hosts, if any, are allowed to forward IPv6 packets with routing
   header.  The security solution must be able to assure that this
   policy is accomplished by all the hosts under its control.  This can
   be achieved, for example, by disabling IP stack processing of routing
   headers or by filtering packets with routing headers in each host.

Vives, et al.            Expires August 24, 2005               [Page 15]

Internet-Draft       IPv6 Security Problem Statement       February 2005

   The routing header is used in Mobile IPv6.  If this functionality is
   allowed in the network the Security Administrator must take it into
   account.  For example, if administrators filter packets with
   routing-header, but don't filter ICMPv6 packets regarding
   Return-Routability, Mobile IPv6 will succeed in route-optimization
   but can't make the communication because packets with routing-header
   are rejected.  Hence, Mobile IPv6 does not work at all in such

3.9  Home Address Option

   IPv6 protocol defines some extension headers, among them is the Home
   Address [13].  All IPv6 endpoints should accept this header.

   Basically what happens is that the source address of the packet is
   changed by the Home Address option's address.  It is used in a packet
   sent by a mobile node while away from home, to inform the recipient
   of the mobile node's home address.  This could be used for spoofing.

   Because this option was defined for Mobile IPv6 use, the security
   administrator should reject the packet with home address option
   unless Mobile IPv6 is allowed.

3.10  Embedded Devices

   With the deployment of IPv6 we can expect the avenue of a big amount
   of new IPv6-enabled devices with few resources, low computing
   capacity, even low battery capacity.  In some cases, this kind of
   devices will not be able even to perform the minimum set of functions
   required by the Host-based Security Model.

   It also should be taken into account that the convergence of both the
   IPsec capability of every IPv6 stack and the avenue of small devices
   with few CPU resources could be used for DoS attacks.

   This should be taken into account when the security requirements are
   outlined and by the proposed solutions.

4.  Other Issues

   Further elaboration is required (TBD) on:

   o  Malicious users: We can't protect the network from malicious users
      that have physical access to network hosts in the protected
      network.  The objective is to minimize the danger they can cause.

   o  In the host-based security, the host that stores and distributes
      the security policies seems to be the best option to be the one

Vives, et al.            Expires August 24, 2005               [Page 16]

Internet-Draft       IPv6 Security Problem Statement       February 2005

      that acts as IDS information collector.

5.  Security Considerations

   This document is concerned entirely with security.

6.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to acknowledge the inputs of Brian Carpenter,
   Satoshi Kondo, Shinsuke Suzuki, Peter Bieringer and the European
   Commission support in the co-funding of the Euro6IX project, where
   this work is being developed.

7.  References

7.1  Normative References

7.2  Informative References

   [1]   "IETF midcom WG",

   [2]   Bellovin, S., "Distributed Firewalls", November 1999,

   [3]   Savola, P., "Firewalling Considerations for IPv6",
         Internet-Draft draft-savola-v6ops-firewalling-02, October 2003.

   [4]   Narten, T. and R. Draves, "Privacy Extensions for Stateless
         Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 3041, January 2001.

   [5]   Chown, T., "IPv6 Implications for TCP/UDP Port Scanning",
         Internet-Draft draft-chown-v6ops-port-scanning-implications-01,
         July 2004.

   [6]   "IANA's IPv6 Multicast Addresses List",

   [7]   Narten, T., Nordmark, E. and W. Simpson, "Neighbor Discovery
         for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2461, December 1998.

   [8]   Thomson, S. and T. Narten, "IPv6 Stateless Address
         Autoconfiguration", RFC 2462, December 1998.

   [9]   Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D. and B. Aboba,
         "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote Authentication Dial
         In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 3576, July 2003.

Vives, et al.            Expires August 24, 2005               [Page 17]

Internet-Draft       IPv6 Security Problem Statement       February 2005

   [10]  Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Sommerfeld, B., Zill, B. and P. Nikander,
         "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)",
         Internet-Draft draft-ietf-send-ndopt-06, July 2004.

   [11]  Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
         Internet-Draft draft-ietf-send-cga-06, April 2004.

   [12]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
         Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.

   [13]  Johnson, D., Perkins, C. and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support in
         IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.

Authors' Addresses

   Alvaro Vives Martinez
   San Jose Artesano, 1
   Alcobendas - Madrid
   E-28108 - Spain

   Phone: +34 91 151 81 99
   Fax:   +34 91 151 81 98

   Jordi Palet Martinez
   San Jose Artesano, 1
   Alcobendas - Madrid
   E-28108 - Spain

   Phone: +34 91 151 81 99
   Fax:   +34 91 151 81 98

   Pekka Savola


Vives, et al.            Expires August 24, 2005               [Page 18]

Internet-Draft       IPv6 Security Problem Statement       February 2005

Intellectual Property Statement

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information
   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
   found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at

Disclaimer of Validity

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an

Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).  This document is subject
   to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
   except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.


   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.

Vives, et al.            Expires August 24, 2005               [Page 19]