Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring WG D. Waltermire
Internet-Draft NIST
Intended status: Informational A. Montville
Expires: January 16, 2014 TW
D. Harrington
Effective Software
July 15, 2013
Using Security Posture Assessment to Grant Access to Enterprise Network
Resources
draft-waltermire-sacm-use-cases-05
Abstract
This memo documents a sampling of use cases for securely aggregating
configuration and operational data and assessing that data to
determine an organization's security posture. From these operational
use cases, we can derive common functional capabilities and
requirements to guide development of vendor-neutral, interoperable
standards for aggregating and assessing data relevant to security
posture.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 16, 2014.
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document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Endpoint Posture Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Example - Departmental Software Policy Compliance . . . . 6
3.2. Main Success Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Functional Capabilities and Requirements . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Asset Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.1. Example - Asset Discovery within a subnet . . . . . . 7
4.1.2. Example - Asset Discovery by IP Address . . . . . . . 7
4.1.3. Example - Asset Characterization using system
information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.4. Example - Asset Characterization using the ENTITY-MIB 8
4.1.5. Example - Asset Characterization using the HOST-
RESOURCES-MIB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.6. Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.7. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Security Configuration Management . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2.1. Example - ENTITY-MIB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2.2. Example - HOST-RESOURCES-MIB . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2.3. Example - YANG module ietf-interfaces . . . . . . . . 10
4.2.4. Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2.5. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3. Security Change Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3.1. Example - DHCP addressing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3.2. Example - RADIUS network access . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3.3. Example - NAT logging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3.4. Example - SYSLOG Authorization messages . . . . . . . 10
4.3.5. Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3.6. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4. Security Vulnerability Management . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4.1. Example - NIDS response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4.2. Example - Historical vulnerability analysis . . . . . 11
4.4.3. Source Address Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.4.4. Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.4.5. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.5. Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.5.1. Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.5.2. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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4.6. Assessment Result Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.6.1. Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.6.2. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.7. Content Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.7.1. Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.7.2. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.1. -04- to -05- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction
Our goal with this document is to improve our agreement on which
problems we're trying to solve. We need to start with short, simple
problem statements and discuss those by email and in person. Once we
agree on which problems we're trying to solve, we can move on to
propose various solutions and decide which ones to use.
This document describes example use cases for endpoint posture
assessment for enterprises. It provides a sampling of use cases for
securely aggregating configuration and operational data and assessing
that data to determine the security posture of individual endpoints,
and, in the aggregate, the security posture of an enterprise.
These use cases cross many IT security information domains. From
these operational use cases, we can derive common concepts, common
information expressions, functional capabilities and requirements to
guide development of vendor-neutral, interoperable standards for
aggregating and assessing data relevant to security posture.
Using this standard data, tools can analyse the state of endpoints,
user activities and behaviour, and assess the security posture of an
organization. Common expression of information should enable
interoperability between tools (whether customized, commercial, or
freely available), and the ability to automate portions of security
processes to gain efficiency, react to new threats in a timely
manner, and free up security personnel to work on more advanced
problems.
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The goal is to enable organizations to make informed decisions that
support organizational objectives, to enforce policies for hardening
systems, to prevent network misuse, to quantify business risk, and to
collaborate with partners to identify and mitigate threats.
It is expected that use cases for enterprises and for service
providers will largely overlap, but there are additional
complications for service providers, especially in handling
information that crosses administrative domains.
The output of endpoint posture assessment is expected to feed into
additional processes, such as policy-based enforcement of acceptable
state, verification and monitoring of security controls, and
compliance to regulatory requirements.
2. Terms and Definitions
assessment
Defined in [RFC5209] as "the process of collecting posture for a
set of capabilities on the endpoint (e.g., host-based firewall)
such that the appropriate validators may evaluate the posture
against compliance policy."
Within this document the use of the term is expanded to support
other uses of collected posture (e.g. reporting, network
enforcement, vulnerability detection, license management). The
phrase "set of capabilities on the endpoint" includes: hardware
and software installed on the endpoint."
asset
Defined in [RFC4949] as "a system resource that is (a) required to
be protected by an information system's security policy, (b)
intended to be protect by a countermeasure, or (c) required for a
system's mission.
attribute
Defined in [RFC5209] as "data element including any requisite
meta-data describing an observed, expected, or the operational
status of an endpoint feature (e.g., anti-virus software is
currently in use)."
endpoint
Defined in [RFC5209] as "any computing device that can be
connected to a network. Such devices normally are associated with
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a particular link layer address before joining the network and
potentially an IP address once on the network. This includes:
laptops, desktops, servers, cell phones, or any device that may
have an IP address."
Network infrastructure devices (e.g. switches, routers,
firewalls), which fit the definition, are also considered to be
endpoints within this document.
Based on the previous definition of an asset, an endpoint is a
type of asset.
posture
Defined in [RFC5209] as "configuration and/or status of hardware
or software on an endpoint as it pertains to an organization's
security policy."
This term is used within the scope of this document to represent
the state information that is collected from an endpoint (e.g.
software/hardware inventory, configuration settings).
posture attributes
Defined in [RFC5209] as "attributes describing the configuration
or status (posture) of a feature of the endpoint. For example, a
Posture Attribute might describe the version of the operating
system installed on the system."
Within this document this term represents a specific assertion
about endpoint state (e.g. configuration setting, installed
software, hardware). The phrase "features of the endpoint" refers
to installed software or software components.
system resource
Defined in [RFC4949] as "data contained in an information system;
or a service provided by a system; or a system capacity, such as
processing power or communication bandwidth; or an item of system
equipment (i.e., hardware, firmware, software, or documentation);
or a facility that houses system operations and equipment.
2.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
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3. Endpoint Posture Assessment
Endpoint posture assessment involves collecting information about the
posture of a given endpoint. This posture information is gathered
and then published to appropriate data repositories to make collected
information available for further analysis supporting organizational
security processes.
Endpoint posture assessment typically includes:
o Collecting the posture of a given endpoint;
o Making that posture available to the enterprise for further
analysis and action; and
o Assessing that the endpoint's posture is in compliance with
enterprise standards and policy.
3.1. Example - Departmental Software Policy Compliance
In order to meet compliance requirements and ensure that corporate
finance information is not revealed improperly, all computers in the
finance department of Example Corporation are required to run only
software contained on an approved list and to be configured to
download and install software patches every night. Each computer is
checked to make sure it complies with this policy whenever it
connects to the network and at least once a day thereafter. These
daily compliance checks assess the posture of each computer and
report on its compliance with policy.
3.2. Main Success Scenario
1. Define a target endpoint to be assessed
2. Select acceptable state policies to apply to the defined target
3. Identify the endpoint being assessed
4. Collect posture attributes from the target
5. Communicate target identity and collected posture to external
system for evaluation
6. Compare collected posture attributes from the target endpoint
with expected state values as expressed in acceptable state
policies
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4. Functional Capabilities and Requirements
The capabilities in this section support assessing endpoint posture
in an automated manner as described in Section Section 3.
4.1. Asset Management
Organizations manage a variety of assets within their enterprise
including: endpoints, the hardware they are composed of, installed
software, hardware/software licenses used, and configurations.
Managing endpoints and the different types of assets that compose
them involves initially discovering and characterizing each asset
instance, and then identify them in a common way. Characterization
may take the form of logical characterization or security
characterization, where logical characterization may include business
context not otherwise related to security, but which may be used as
information in support of decision making later in risk management.
4.1.1. Example - Asset Discovery within a subnet
Many network management systems detect the presence of assets in a
subnet, such as an Ethernet subnet, by monitoring the MAC addresses
bradcast within the subnet to determine who responds to broadcasts,
and determing the location of the endpoint relative to a bridge.
This information is useful for initally discovering and
characterizing endpoints belonging to a particular type of network
(e.g. Ethernet), and for detecting new nodes in the subnet. This
type of information may be accessible by accessing ARP tables
[RFC0826], Etherlike-MIB [RFC3535], the Link Layer Discovery Protocol
MIB [RFC2922], the Interfaces MIB (IF-MIB) [RFC2863], the YANG module
ietf-interfaces , and others.
4.1.2. Example - Asset Discovery by IP Address
Many network management systems periodically test for the presence of
endpoints or interfaces in a network by broadcasting ICMP echo
commands (pings) to a range of IP addresses and recording the
addresses of nodes that respond. This helps discover the endpoints
in the network, including endpoints that have suddenly appeared in a
network tha are not authorized to be part of the network.
4.1.3. Example - Asset Characterization using system information
The SYSTEM-MIB [RFC1213] contains information to help characterize an
endpoint, including a description of the endpoint, an authoritative
identifier of the type of endpoint assigned by the vendor of the
endpoint, an administrative name for the endpoint, plus the
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endpoint's contact person, the location of the endpoint, system time,
and an enumerator that identifies the layer of services provided by
the endpoint. The system decription includes the vendor, product
type, model number, OS version, and networking software version.
This is a key MIB module mandated for all SNMP-managed endpoints.
Similar information is available via the YANG module ietf-system .
This module includes data node definitions for system identification,
time-of-day management, user management, DNS resolver configuration,
and some protocol operations for system management.
4.1.4. Example - Asset Characterization using the ENTITY-MIB
The ENTITY-MIB [RFC6933] contains information to describe the
components of an endpoint, including physical and logical components,
and the relationships between the components. The information about
the physical entities includes manufacturer-assigned serial number,
manufacture date, administratively-assigned AssetID, and UUID.
Logical entities may be defined, and associated with the physical
entities using a mapping table.
4.1.5. Example - Asset Characterization using the HOST-RESOURCES-MIB
The HOST-RESOURCES-MIB [RFC2790] contains information to describe the
resources of an endpoint, including storage, memory, installed
software, running software, software versions, processes, user
sessions, devices (processors, disks, printers, network interfaces,
etc.). This MIB module also provides monitoring of performance and
error states.
4.1.6. Concepts
Managing endpoints and the different types of assets that compose
them involves initially discovering and characterizing each asset
instance, and then identify them in a common way. Characterization
may take the form of logical characterization or security
characterization, where logical characterization may include business
context not otherwise related to security, but which may be used as
information in support of decision making later in risk management.
Coverage involves understanding what and how many assets are under
control. Assessing 80% of the enterprise assets is better than
assessing 50% of the enterprise assets.
Getting asset details can be comparatively subtle - if an enterprise
does not have a precise understanding of its assets, then all
acquired data and consequent actions taken based on the data are
considered suspect.
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Assessing assets (managed and unmanaged) requires that we have
visibility into the posture of endpoints, the ability to understand
the composition and relationships between different assets types, and
the ability to properly characterize them at the outset and over
time.
The following list details some requisite Asset Management
capabilities:
o Discover assets in the enterprise
o For a given endpoint, understand the composition and relationship
of its constituent assets
o Characterize assets according to security and non-security asset
properties
o Identify and describe assets using a common vocabulary between
implementations
o Reconcile asset representations originating from disparate tools
o Manage asset information throughout the asset's life cycle
4.1.7. Requirements
A method MUST be provided for identifying an endpoint (asset
identification) as a unique entity within the its administrative
domain.
The endpoint identifier SHOULD be able to be determined in an
automated manner.
The endpoint identifier, as communicated between entities, SHOULD
be held to a minimal size.
A method MUST be provided for defining an endpoint (asset
classification) based on a set of organizationally relevant
properties (e.g. organizational affiliation, criticality,
function).
4.2. Security Configuration Management
Organizations manage a variety of configurations within their
enterprise including: endpoints, the hardware they are composed of,
installed software, hardware/software licenses used, and
configurations.
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4.2.1. Example - ENTITY-MIB
4.2.2. Example - HOST-RESOURCES-MIB
4.2.3. Example - YANG module ietf-interfaces
4.2.4. Concepts
Security configuration management (SCM) deals with the configuration
of endpoints, including networking infrastructure devices and
computing hosts. Data will include installed hardware and software,
its configuration, and its use on the endpoint.
The following list details some requisite Configuration Management
capabilities:
o [todo]
4.2.5. Requirements
[todo]
4.3. Security Change Management
Organizations manage a variety of changes within their enterprise
including: [todo]
4.3.1. Example - DHCP addressing
4.3.2. Example - RADIUS network access
4.3.3. Example - NAT logging
4.3.4. Example - SYSLOG Authorization messages
SYSLOG [RFC5424] includes facilities for security authorization
messages. These messages can be used to alert an analysts that an
authorization attempt failed, and the analyst might choose to follow
up and assess potential attacks on the relevant endpoint.
4.3.5. Concepts
[todo]
The following list details some requisite Change Management
capabilities:
o [todo]
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4.3.6. Requirements
[todo]
4.4. Security Vulnerability Management
Vulnerability management involves identifying the patch level of
software installed on the device and the identification of insecure
custom code (e.g. web vulnerabilities). All vulnerabilities need to
be addressed as part of a comprehensive risk management program,
which is a superset of software vulnerabilities. Thus, the
capability of assessing non-software vulnerabilities applicable to
the system is required. Additionally, it may be necessary to support
non-technical assessment of data relating to assets such as aspects
related to operational and management controls.
policy attribute collection
4.4.1. Example - NIDS response
1. An organization's Network Intrusion Detection System detects a
suspect packet received by an endpoint and sends an alert to an
analyst. The analyst looks up the endpoint in the asset inventory
database, looks up the configuration policy associtaed with that
endpoint, and initates an endpoint assessment of installed software
and patches on the endpoint to determine if the endpoint is compliant
with policy.
The analyst reviews the results of the assessment and takes action
according to organization policy and procedures.
4.4.2. Example - Historical vulnerability analysis
When a serious vulnerability or a zero-day attack is discovered, one
of the first priorities in any organization is to determine which
endpoints may have been affected and assess those endpoints to try to
determine whether they were compromised. Checking current endpoint
state is not sufficient because an endpoint may have been temporarily
compromised due to this vulnerability and then the infection may have
removed itself. In fact, the vulnerable software may have been
removed or upgraded since the compromise took place. And if the
endpoint is still compromised, the malware on the endpoint may cause
it to lie about its configuration. In this environment, maintaining
historical information about endpoint configuration is essential.
Such information can be used to find endpoints that had the
vulnerable software installed at some point in time. Those endpoints
can be checked for current or past indicators of compromise such as
files or behavior linked to a known exploit for this vulnerability.
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Endpoints found to be vulnerable can be isolated to prevent infection
while remediation is done. Endpoints believed to be compromised can
be isolated for analysis and to limit the spread of infection.
4.4.3. Source Address Validation
Source Address Validation Improvement methods were developed to
prevent nodes attached to the same IP link from spoofing each other's
IP addresses, so as to complement ingress filtering with finer-
grained, standardized IP source address validation. The framework
document describes and motivates the design of the SAVI methods.
Particular SAVI methods are described in other documents.
4.4.4. Concepts
The following list details some requisite Vulnerability Management
capabilities:
o Collect the state of non-technical controls commonly called
administrative controls (i.e. policy, process, procedure)
o Collect the state of technical controls including, but not
necessarily limited to:
* Software inventory (e.g. operating system, applications,
patches)
* Configuration settings
4.4.5. Requirements
[todo]
4.5. Data Collection
Central to any automated assessment solution is the ability to
collect data from, or related to, an endpoint, such as the security
state of the endpoint and its constituent assets.
4.5.1. Concepts
The following assessment capabilities support SCM:
o [todo]
4.5.2. Requirements
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One or more data formats MUST be identified to describe instructions,
data collection methods, to drive data collection (e.g. technical,
interrogative).
One or more data formats MUST be identified to instruct what posture
attributes need to be collected for a specific set of endpoints.
A method MUST be provided to include OPTIONAL instructions on
describing what content must be run on the endpoint.
A method MUST be provided to include OPTIONAL instructions that
determine how to collect data supporting any particular test for
that endpoint.
A method MUST be provided for retrieving data collection instructions
from a remote host (see Section Section 4.7).
One or more data formats MUST be identified to capture the results of
data collection.
This expression MUST be capable of supporting the characterization
of assets and any related configuration settings that together
compose an endpoint.
A mechanism MUST be provided to identify the software and
hardware asset instances that compose an endpoint.
An asset identifier SHOULD be able to be determined in an
automated manner
An asset identifier, as communicated between entities,
SHOULD be held to a minimal size.
An asset identifier SHOULD be able to represented in a
simple unambiguous manner, such as a reference, so that its
embedded use in places like applicability clauses for
individual benchmark tests can be kept from making their
usage unwieldy.
A mechanism MUST be provided to associate configuration
settings values to the installed software.
A mechanism MUST be provided to identify additional collected
posture attribute/value pairs related to an endpoint.
A mechanism MUST be provided to identify the endpoint the results
pertain to (see Section Section 4.1.
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A mechanism MUST be provided to associate the data collection
method with the collected value.
A mechanism MUST be provided to include provenance information
describing what sensor of software collected the data.
A mechanism MUST be provided to include entailment information,
perhaps by reference, describing the methodology used to collect
the data.
A method of communicating data collection results to another system
for further analysis MUST be identified.
TODO: Communicate, unambiguously and to the necessary level of
detail**, the asset details between software components
4.6. Assessment Result Analysis
The data collected needs to be analyzed for compliance to a standard
stipulated by the enterprise. Analysis methods may vary between
enterprises, but commonly take a similar form.
4.6.1. Concepts
The following capabilities support the analysis of assessment
results:
o Comparing actual state to expected state
o Scoring/weighting individual comparison results
o Relating specific comparisons to benchmark-level requirements
o Relating benchmark-level requirements to one or more control
frameworks
4.6.2. Requirements
A method MUST be provided for selecting acceptable state policy,
describing how to evaluate collected information, based on
characteristics of the endpoint and organizational policy.
A method MUST be provided for comparing collected data to expected
state values (test evaluation).
Any results produced by analysis processes MUST be capable of being
transformed into a human-readable format.
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4.7. Content Management
The capabilities required to support risk management state
measurement will yield volumes of content. The efficacy of risk
management state measurement depends directly on the stability of the
driving content, and, subsequently, the ability to change content
according to enterprise needs.
4.7.1. Concepts
Capabilities supporting Content Management should provide the ability
to create/define or modify content, as well as store and retrieve
said content of at least the following types:
o Configuration checklists
o Assessment rules
o Data collection rules and methods
o Scoring models
o Vulnerability information
o Patch information
o Asset characterization data and rules
Note that the ability to modify content is in direct support of
tailoring content for enterprise-specific needs.
4.7.2. Requirements
A protocol MUST be identified for retrieving SACM content from a
content repository
A protocol MUST be identified for querying SACM content held in a
content repository. The protocol MUST support querying content by
applicability to asset characteristics.
TODO: Determine what content can or must be run on the endpoint
A protocol MUST be identified for curating SACM content in a content
repository. Note: This might be an area where we can limit the scope
of work relative to the initial SACM charter.
5. IANA Considerations
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This memo includes no request to IANA.
6. Security Considerations
This memo documents, for Informational purposes, use cases for
security automation. While it is about security, it does not affect
security.
7. Acknowledgements
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and/or the
MITRE Corporation have developed specifications under the general
term "Security Automation" including languages, protocols,
enumerations, and metrics.
The authors would like to thank Kathleen Moriarty and Stephen Hanna
for contributing text to this document. The author would also like
to acknowledge the members of the SACM mailing list for their keen
and insightful feedback on the concepts and text within this
document.
8. Change Log
8.1. -04- to -05-
o Are we including user activities and behavior in the scope of this
work? That seems to be layer 8 stuff, appropriate to an IDS/IPS
application, not Internet stuff.
o I removed the references to what the WG will do because this
belongs in the charter, not the (potentially long-lived) use cases
document. I removed mention of charter objectives because the
charter may go through multiple iterations over time; there is a
website for hosting the charter; this document is not the correct
place for that discussion.
o I moved the discussion of NIST specifications to the
acknowledgements section.
o Removed the portion of the introduction that describes the
chapters; we have a table of concepts, and the existing text
seemed redundant.
o Removed marketing claims, to focus on technical concepts and
technical analysis, that would enable subsequent engineering
effort.
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o Removed (commented out in XML) UC2 and UC3, and eliminated some
text that referred to these use cases.
o Modified IANA and Security Consideration sections.
o Moved Terms to the front, so we can use them in the subsequent
text.
o Removed the "Key Concepts" section, since the concepts of ORM and
IRM were not otherwise mentioned in the document. This would seem
more appropriate to the arch doc rather than use cases.
o Removed role=editor from David Waltmire's info, since there are
three editors on the document. The editor is most important when
one person writes the document that represents the work of
multiple people. When there are three editors, this role marking
isn't necessary.
o Modified text to describe that this was specific to enterprises,
and that it was expected to overlap with service provider use
cases, and described the context of this scoped work within a
larger context of policy enforcement, and verification.
o The document had asset management, but the charter mentioned
asset, change, configuration, and vulnerability management, so I
added sections for each of those categories.
o Added text to Introduction explaining goal of the document.
o Added sections on various example use cases for asset management,
config management, change management, and vulnerability
management.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
9.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-nea-pt-eap]
Cam-Winget, N. and P. Sangster, "PT-EAP: Posture Transport
(PT) Protocol For EAP Tunnel Methods", draft-ietf-nea-pt-
eap-06 (work in progress), December 2012.
[I-D.ietf-nea-pt-tls]
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Sangster, P., Cam-Winget, N., and J. Salowey, "PT-TLS: A
TLS-based Posture Transport (PT) Protocol", draft-ietf-
nea-pt-tls-08 (work in progress), October 2012.
[I-D.ietf-netmod-interfaces-cfg]
Bjorklund, M., "A YANG Data Model for Interface
Management", draft-ietf-netmod-interfaces-cfg-12 (work in
progress), July 2013.
[I-D.ietf-netmod-system-mgmt]
Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "YANG Data Model for System
Management", draft-ietf-netmod-system-mgmt-08 (work in
progress), July 2013.
[I-D.ietf-savi-framework]
Wu, J., Bi, J., Bagnulo, M., Baker, F., and C. Vogt,
"Source Address Validation Improvement Framework", draft-
ietf-savi-framework-06 (work in progress), January 2012.
[RFC0826] Plummer, D., "Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol: Or
converting network protocol addresses to 48.bit Ethernet
address for transmission on Ethernet hardware", STD 37,
RFC 826, November 1982.
[RFC1213] McCloghrie, K. and M. Rose, "Management Information Base
for Network Management of TCP/IP-based internets:MIB-II",
STD 17, RFC 1213, March 1991.
[RFC2790] Waldbusser, S. and P. Grillo, "Host Resources MIB", RFC
2790, March 2000.
[RFC2863] McCloghrie, K. and F. Kastenholz, "The Interfaces Group
MIB", RFC 2863, June 2000.
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC
2865, June 2000.
[RFC2922] Bierman, A. and K. Jones, "Physical Topology MIB", RFC
2922, September 2000.
[RFC3535] Schoenwaelder, J., "Overview of the 2002 IAB Network
Management Workshop", RFC 3535, May 2003.
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552, July
2003.
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[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC
4949, August 2007.
[RFC5209] Sangster, P., Khosravi, H., Mani, M., Narayan, K., and J.
Tardo, "Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA): Overview and
Requirements", RFC 5209, June 2008.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008.
[RFC5424] Gerhards, R., "The Syslog Protocol", RFC 5424, March 2009.
[RFC5792] Sangster, P. and K. Narayan, "PA-TNC: A Posture Attribute
(PA) Protocol Compatible with Trusted Network Connect
(TNC)", RFC 5792, March 2010.
[RFC5793] Sahita, R., Hanna, S., Hurst, R., and K. Narayan, "PB-TNC:
A Posture Broker (PB) Protocol Compatible with Trusted
Network Connect (TNC)", RFC 5793, March 2010.
[RFC6733] Fajardo, V., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn,
"Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733, October 2012.
[RFC6933] Bierman, A., Romascanu, D., Quittek, J., and M.
Chandramouli, "Entity MIB (Version 4)", RFC 6933, May
2013.
Authors' Addresses
David Waltermire
National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, Maryland 20877
USA
Email: david.waltermire@nist.gov
Adam W. Montville
Tripwire, Inc.
101 SW Main Street, Suite 1500
Portland, Oregon 97204
USA
Email: amontville@tripwire.com
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David Harrington
Effective Software
50 Harding Rd
Portsmouth, NH 03801
USA
Email: ietfdbh@comcast.net
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