Network Working Group S. Weiler
Internet-Draft SPARTA, Inc.
Expires: September 5, 2007 March 4, 2007
DNSSEC Lookaside Validation (DLV)
draft-weiler-dnssec-dlv-02.txt
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Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
Abstract
DNSSEC Lookaside Validation (DLV) is a mechanism for publishing
DNSSEC trust anchors outside of the DNS delegation chain. It allows
resolvers to validate DNSSEC-signed data from zones whose ancestors
either aren't signed or refuse to publish Delegation Signer (DS)
records for their children.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. DLV Domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Overview of Resolver Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Resolver Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Aggressive Negative Caching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. Implementation Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Overlapping DLV Domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 11
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1. Introduction
DNSSEC [RFC4033] [RFC4034] [RFC4035] authenticates DNS data by
building public-key signature chains along the DNS delegation chain
from a trust anchor, ideally a trust anchor for the DNS root.
This document describes a way to publish trust anchors in the DNS but
outside of the normal delegation chain.
Some design trade-offs leading to the mechanism presented here are
described in [INI1999-19].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Architecture
DNSSEC Lookaside Validation allows a set of domains, called "DLV
domains", to publish secure entry points for zones that are not their
own children.
With DNSSEC, validators may expect a zone to be secure when they have
one of two things: a preconfigured trust anchor for the zone or a
validated Delegation Signer (DS) record for the zone in its parent
(which presumes a preconfigured trust anchor for the parent or
another ancestor). DLV adds a third mechanism: a validated entry in
a DLV domain (which presumes a preconfigured trust anchor for the DLV
domain). Whenever a DLV domain publishes a DLV RRset for a zone, a
resolver may expect the named zone to be signed. Absence of a DLV
RRset for a zone does not necessarily mean that the zone should be
expected to be insecure; if the resolver has another reason to
believe the zone should be secured, validation of that zone's data
should still be attempted.
3. DLV Domains
A DLV domain includes trust statements about descendants of a single
zone, called the 'target' zone. For example, the DLV domain
trustbroker.example.com could target the org zone and the DLV domain
bar.example.com could target the root.
A DLV domain contains one or more DLV records [RFC4431] for each of
the target's descendant zones that have registered security
information with it. For a given zone, the corresponding name in the
DLV domain is formed by replacing the target zone name with the DLV
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domain name.
For example, assuming the DLV domain trustbroker.example.com targets
the org zone, any DLV records corresponding to the zone example.org
can be found at example.trustbroker.example.com. DLV records
corresponding to the org zone can be found at the apex of
trustbroker.example.com.
As another example, assuming the DLV domain bar.example.com targets
the root zone, DLV records corresponding to the zone example.org can
be found at example.org.bar.example.com. DLV records corresponding
to the org zone can be found at org.bar.example.com. And DLV records
corresponding to the root zone itself can be found at the apex of
bar.example.com.
A DLV domain need not contain data other than DLV records,
appropriate DNSSEC records validating that data, the apex NS and SOA
records, and, optionally, delegations. In most cases, the operator
of a DLV domain will probably not want to include any other RR types
in the DLV domain.
To gain full benefit from aggressive negative caching, described in
Section 6, a DLV domain SHOULD NOT use minimally-covering NSEC
records, as described in [RFC4470], and it SHOULD NOT use NSEC3
records, as described in [I-D.ietf-dnsext-nsec3].
4. Overview of Resolver Behavior
To minimize load on the DLV domain's authoritative servers as well as
query response time, a resolver SHOULD first attempt validation using
any applicable (non-DLV) trust anchors. If the validation succeeds
(with a result of Secure), DLV processing need not occur.
When configured with a trust anchor for a DLV domain, a resolver
SHOULD attempt to validate all queries at and below the target of
that DLV domain.
To do validation using DLV, a resolver looks for a (validated) DLV
RRset applicable to the query, as described in the following section,
and uses it as though it were a DS RRset to validate the answer using
the normal procedures in RFC4035 Section 5.
For each query, the resolver attempts validation using the "closest
enclosing" DLV RRset, which is the DLV RRset with the longest name
that matches the query or could be an ancestor of the QNAME. For
example, assuming the DLV domain trustbroker.example.com targets the
org zone, and there exist DLV RRsets named trustbroker.example.com
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(applicable to org), example.trustbroker.example.com (applicable to
example.org), and sub.example.trustbroker.example.com (applicable to
sub.example.org), a resolver would use the
sub.example.trustbroker.example.com DLV RRset for validating queries
for sub.example.org.
More detailed discussion of this policy as well as several
alternatives that were considered along the way can be found in
[INI1999-19].
5. Resolver Behavior
As above, to minimize load on the DLV domain's authoritative servers
as well as query response time, a resolver SHOULD first attempt
validation using any applicable (non-DLV) trust anchors. If the
validation succeeds (with a result of Secure), DLV processing need
not occur.
To find the closest enclosing DLV RRset for a given query, the
resolver starts by looking for a DLV RRset corresponding to the
QNAME. If it doesn't find a DLV RRset for that name (as confirmed by
the presence of a validated NSEC record) and that name is not the
apex of the DLV domain, the resolver removes the leading label from
the name and tries again. This process is repeated until a DLV RRset
is found or it is proved that there is no enclosing DLV RRset
applicable to the QNAME. In all cases, a resolver SHOULD check its
cache for the desired DLV RRset before issuing a query. Section 8
discusses a slight optimization to this strategy.
Having found the closest enclosing DLV RRset or received a proof that
no applicable DLV RRset exists, the resolver MUST validate that RRset
or non-existence proof using the normal procedures in Section 5 of
RFC4035. In particular, any delegations within the DLV domain need
to be followed, with normal DNSSEC validation applied. If validation
of the DLV RRset leads to a result of Bogus, then it MUST NOT be used
and the validation result for the original query SHOULD be Bogus,
also. If validation of the DLV RRset leads to a result of Insecure
(the DLV record is in an unsecured portion of the DLV domain), then
it MUST NOT be used and the validation result for the original query
SHOULD be Insecure, also. (It should be very odd, indeed, to find
part of a DLV domain marked as Insecure: this is likely to happen
only when there are delegations within the DLV domain and some
portions of that domain use different cryptographic signing
algorithms.) If the validation of the DLV RRset leads to a result of
Secure, the resolver then treats that DLV RRset as though it were a
DS RRset for the applicable zone and attempts validation using the
procedures described in RFC4035 Section 5.
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In the interest of limiting complexity, resolvers SHOULD NOT attempt
to use DLV to validate data from another DLV domain.
6. Aggressive Negative Caching
To minimize load on authoritative servers for DLV domains,
particularly those with few entries, DLV resolvers SHOULD implement
aggressive negative caching, as defined in this section.
Previously, cached negative responses were indexed by QNAME, QCLASS,
QTYPE, and the setting of the CD bit (see RFC4035 section 4.7) and
only queries matching the index key would be answered from the cache.
With aggressive negative caching, the resolver, in addition to
checking to see if the answer is in its cache before sending a query,
checks to see whether any cached and validated NSEC record denies the
existence of the sought record(s).
Using aggressive negative caching, a resolver will not make queries
for any name covered by a cached and validated NSEC record.
Furthermore, a resolver answering queries from clients will
synthesize a negative answer whenever it has an applicable validated
NSEC in its cache unless the CD bit was set on the incoming query.
6.1. Implementation Notes
Implementing aggressive negative caching suggests that a resolver
will need to build an ordered data structure of NSEC records in order
to efficiently find covering NSEC records. Only NSEC records from
DLV domains need to be included in this data structure
Also note that some DLV resolver implementations do not synthesize
negative answers to insert into outgoing responses -- they only use
aggressive negative caching when looking up DLV RRs as part of their
internal DLV validation.
7. Overlapping DLV Domains
It is possible to have multiple DLV domains targeting overlapping
portions of the DNS hierarchy. For example, two DLV domains, perhaps
operated by different parties, might target the same zone, or one DLV
domain might target the root while another targets org.
If a resolver supports multiple DLV domains, the choice of precedence
in case of overlap is left up to the implementation and SHOULD be
exposed as a configuration option to the user. (As compared to the
choice of DLV records within each domain, a precedence for which is
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clearly specified in this document.) As a very simple default, a
resolver could give precedence to the most specific DLV domain.
Some other reasonable options include:
1. Searching all applicable DLV domains until an applicable DLV
record is found that results in a successful validation of the
query. In the case where no applicable DLV record is found in
any DLV domain, the answer will be treated as Unsecure.
2. Applying some sort of precedence to the DLV domains based on
their perceived trustworthiness.
3. Searching all applicable DLV domains for applicable DLV records
and using only the most specific of those DLV records.
4. If multiple DLV domains provide applicable DLV records, use a
threshold or scoring system (e.g., "best 2 out of 3") to
determine the validation result.
The above list is surely not complete, and it's possible for
resolvers to have different precedence rules and configuration
options for these cases. [INI1999-19] discusses different policies
for selecting from multiple DLV records within the same DLV domain.
That discussion may also be applicable to the question of which DLV
domain to use and may be of interest to implementers of resolvers
that support multiple DLV domains.
8. Optimization
This section documents an optimization to further reduce query load
on DLV servers and improve resolver response time.
Authoritative servers, when processing a query for a DLV RRset,
SHOULD include all DLV RRsets potentially applicable to a query
(specifically, all DLV RRsets application to the QNAME and any of its
ancestors) in the Additional section of the response as well as NSEC
records proving the non-existence of any other applicable DLV records
in the DLV domain. Authoritative servers need only include DLV
RRsets they're aware of -- RRsets in sub-zones may be omitted.
Resolvers still seek out of the closest enclosing DLV RRset first.
If they receive any data about other DLV RRsets in the zone, they MAY
cache and use it (assuming that it validates), thus avoiding further
round-trips to the DLV domain's authoritative servers.
9. Security Considerations
Resolvers MUST NOT use a DLV record unless it has been successfully
authenticated. Normally, resolvers will have a trust anchor for the
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DLV domain and use DNSSEC to validate the data in it.
Aggressive negative caching increases the need for resolvers do some
basic validation of incoming NSEC records before caching them. In
particular, the 'next name' field in the NSEC record MUST be within
the zone that generated (and signed) the NSEC. Otherwise, a
malicious zone operator could generate an NSEC that reaches out of
its zone -- into its ancestor zones, even up into the root zone --
and use that NSEC to spoof away any name that sorts after the name of
the NSEC. We call these overreaching NSECs. More insidiously, an
attacker could use an overreaching NSEC in combination with a signed
wildcard record to substitute a signed positive answer in place of
the real data. This checking is not a new requirement -- these
attacks are a risk even without aggressive negative caching.
However, aggressive negative caching makes the checking more
important. Before aggressive negative caching, NSECs were cached
only as metadata associated with a particular query. An overreaching
NSEC that resulted from a broken zone signing tool or some
misconfiguration would only be used by a cache for those queries that
it had specifically made before. Only an overreaching NSEC actively
served by an attacker could cause misbehavior. With aggressive
negative caching, an overreaching NSEC can cause more broader
problems even in the absence of an active attacker. This threat can
be easily mitigated by checking the bounds on the NSEC.
As a reminder, resolvers MUST NOT use the mere presence of an RRSIG
or apex DNSKEY RRset as a trigger for doing validation, whether
through the normal DNSSEC hierarchy or DLV. Otherwise, an attacker
might perpetrate a downgrade attack by stripping off those RRSIGs or
DNSKEYs.
RFC4034 Section 8 describes security considerations specific to the
DS RR. Those considerations are equally applicable to DLV RRs. Of
particular note, the key tag field is used to help select DNSKEY RRs
efficiently, but it does not uniquely identify a single DNSKEY RR.
It is possible for two distinct DNSKEY RRs to have the same owner
name, the same algorithm type, and the same key tag. An
implementation that uses only the key tag to select a DNSKEY RR might
select the wrong public key in some circumstances.
For further discussion of the security implications of DNSSEC see
RFC4033, RFC4034, and RFC4035.
10. IANA Considerations
IANA is asked to create a DLV registry targeting the root and
containing DLV records for TLDs that ask to have DLV records
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published for their own zones. IANA is instructed to use its own
best practices for authenticating TLD operators' requests to insert,
modify, and delete DLV entries. This DLV registry MUST itself be
signed with DNSSEC. IANA may use its own discretion to choose a
suitable domain name at which to publish this registry; dlv.iana.org
is suggested.
To be clear, IANA is only being asked to publish DLV records for top
level domains, thereby taking advantage of the IANA's existing
relationships with the TLD operators and established procedures for
authenticating requests from the TLD operators.
DLV makes use of the DLV resource record previously assigned by IANA.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, March 2005.
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, March 2005.
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.
[RFC4431] Andrews, M. and S. Weiler, "The DNSSEC Lookaside
Validation (DLV) DNS Resource Record", RFC 4431,
February 2006.
11.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-dnsext-nsec3]
Laurie, B., "DNSSEC Hashed Authenticated Denial of
Existence", draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec3-09 (work in progress),
January 2007.
[INI1999-19]
Weiler, S., "Deploying DNSSEC Without a Signed Root",
Technical Report 1999-19, Information Networking
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Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, April 2004.
[RFC4470] Weiler, S. and J. Ihren, "Minimally Covering NSEC Records
and DNSSEC On-line Signing", RFC 4470, April 2006.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments
Johan Ihren, Paul Vixie, and Suzanne Woolf contributed significantly
to the exploration of possible resolver algorithms that led to this
design. More about those explorations is documented in [INI1999-19].
Johan Ihren and the editor share the blame for aggressive negative
caching.
Thanks to David B. Johnson of Rice University and Marvin Sirbu of
Carnegie Mellon University for their patient review of [INI1999-19]
which led to this specification being far more complete.
Thanks to Mark Andrews, Rob Austein, David Blacka, Stephane
Bortzmeyer, Steve Crocker, Alfred Hoenes, Russ Housley, Olaf Kolkman,
Juergen Quittek, and Suzanne Woolf for their valuable comments on
this document.
Author's Address
Samuel Weiler
SPARTA, Inc.
7110 Samuel Morse Drive
Columbia, Maryland 21046
US
Email: weiler@tislabs.com
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