Internet-Draft DRIP Auth Formats July 2020
Wiethuechter, et al. Expires 11 January 2021 [Page]
Workgroup:
DRIP
Internet-Draft:
draft-wiethuechter-drip-auth-01
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Expires:
Authors:
A. Wiethuechter
AX Enterprize
S. Card
AX Enterprize
R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting

DRIP Authentication Formats

Abstract

This document describes how to include trust into the ASTM Remote ID specification defined in ASTM 3411-19 under a Broadcast Remote ID (RID) scenario. It defines a few different message schemes (based on the authentication message) that can be used to assure past messages sent by a UA and also act as an assurance for UA trustworthiness in the absence of Internet connectivity at the receiving node.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 11 January 2021.

1. Introduction

UA Systems (UAS) are usually in a volatile environment when it comes to communication. UA are generally small with little computational (or flying) horsepower to carry standard communication equipment. This limits the mediums of communication to few viable options.

Observer systems (e.g. smartphones and tablets) place further constraints on the communication options. The Remote ID Broadcast messages MUST be available to applications on these platforms without modifying the devices.

The ASTM standard [F3411-19] focuses on two ways of communicating to a UAS for RID: Broadcast and Network.

This document will focus on adding trust to Broadcast RID in the current (and an expanded) authentication message format.

1.1. DRIP Requirements Addressed

The following [drip-requirements] will be addressed:

  1. GEN 1: Provable Ownership
  2. GEN 2: Provable Binding
  3. GEN 3: Provable Registration

1.2. Terms and Definitions

1.2.1. Requirements Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

1.2.2. Definitions

See [drip-requirements] for common DRIP terms.

2. Background

2.1. Problem Space And Document Focus

The current standard for Remote ID (RID) does not, in any meaningful capacity, address the concerns of trust in the UA space with communication in the Broadcast RID environment. This is a requirement that will need to be addressed eventually for various different parties that have a stake in the UA industry.

The following subsections will provide a high level reference to the ASTM standard for authentication messages and how their current limitations effect trust in the Broadcast RID envirorment.

2.2. ASTM Authentication Message


Page 0:
0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
|  Auth Header  |                                               |
+---------------+  ASTM Authentication Headers  +---------------+
|                                               |               |
+-----------------------------------------------+               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                Authentication Data / Signature                |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+

Page 1 - 4:
0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
|  Auth Header  |                                               |
+---------------+                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                Authentication Data / Signature                |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+

Auth Header (1 byte):
        Contains basic Authentication information such as page
        number and authentication type.

ASTM Authentication Headers: (6 bytes)
        Contains other header information for the authentication
        message from ASTM UAS RID Standard.

Authentication Data / Signature: (109 bytes: 17+23*4)
        Opaque authentication data.

The above diagram is the format defined by ASTM that is the frame which everything this document fits into. The specific details of the ASTM headers are abstracted away as they are not necessarily required for this document.

One important detail that is relevant is the Authentication page has its own 1 byte header (Auth Header) which contains Authentication Type and Data Page Number.

2.3. Thoughts on ASTM Authentication Message

The format standardized by the ASTM is designed with a few major considerations in mind, which the authors feel put significant limitations on the expansion of the standard.

The primary consideration (in this context) is the use of the Bluetooth 5.X Extended Frame format. This method allows for a 255 byte payload to be sent in what the ASTM refers to as a "Message Pack".

The idea is to include up to five standard ASTM Broadcast RID messages (each of which are 25 bytes) plus a single authentication message (5 pages of 25 bytes each) in the Message Pack. The reasoning is then the authentication message is for the entire Message Pack.

The authors have no issues with this proposed approach; this is a valid format to use for the authentication message provided by the ASTM. However, by limiting the authentication message to ONLY five pages in the standard it ignores the possibility of other formatting options to be created and used.

Another issue with this format, not fully addressed in this document is fragmentation. Under Bluetooth 4.X, each page is sent seperately which can result in lose of pages on the reciever. This is disasterous as the loss of even a single page means any signature is incomplete.

With the current limitation of 5 pages, Forward Error Correction (FEC) is nearly impossible without sacrificing the amount of data sent. More pages would allow FEC to be performed on the Authentation message pages so loss of pages can be mitigated.

All these problems are further amplified by the speed at which UA fly and the Oberserver's position to recieve transmissions. There is no guarentee that the Observer will recieve all the pages of even a 5 page Authentication Message in the time it takes a UA to traverse across their line of sight. Worse still is that is not including other UA in the area, which congestes the spectrum and could cause further confusion attempting to collate messages from various UA. This specific problem is out of scope for this document and our solutions in general, but should be noted as a design consideration.

3. DRIP Authentication Framing Formats

Currently the ASTM AuthType of 0xD should be used to denote DRIP based Authentication.

3.1. General Frame


Page 0:
0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
|  Auth Header  |                                               |
+---------------+  ASTM Authentication Headers  +---------------+
|                                               |  DRIP Header  |
+-----------------------------------------------+---------------+
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                    DRIP Authentication Data                   |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+

Page 1 - 9:
0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
|  Auth Header  |                                               |
+---------------+                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                    DRIP Authentication Data                   |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+

DRIP Header (1 byte):
        Message Type (4 bits):
                Message Type                    Values
                ------------                    ------
                Wrapped ASTM Message            0-1, 3-E
                DRIP Authentication Message     2

        DRIP AuthType (4 bits):
                Only used with upper 4 bits are 0x2.

                AuthType                        Values
                --------                        ------
                Certificate                     0
                Message Pack Signature          1
                4 Byte Manifest (cSHAKE128)     2
                8 Byte Manifest (cSHAKE128)     3

DRIP Authentication Data (223 bytes):
        DRIP Authentication data up to 223 bytes long.

3.1.1. DRIP Header

The DRIP Header consists of two 4 bit fields and should be read as follows.

First when wrapping an ASTM Message (see Section 4.3) the DRIP Header is filled with the first byte of the full 25 byte ASTM Message. This first byte is always the ASTM Header, which contains the Message Type and Protocol Version.

To determine if a DRIP Authentication Message is actually wrapping an ASTM Message the upper 4 bits of the DRIP Header should be checked. If these bits are anything but 0x2 then the message is a wrapped message.

When the upper 4 bits are 0x2 then the Authentication Message is a specific DRIP format, which is defined in the lower 4 bits of the DRIP Header.

3.1.2. DRIP Authentication Data

This field has a maximum size of 223 bytes. If the data is less than 223 bytes and a page is only partially filled then the rest of the partially filled page must be null padded.

3.2. Wrapper Frame


0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
|                                                               |
|                        UA Hierarchical                        |
|                       Host Identity Tag                       |
|                                                               |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
|                         Trust Timestamp                       |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
|                                                               |
.                                                               .
.                      Authentication Data                      .
.                                                               .
|                                                               |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                            Signature                          |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                    Forward Error Correction                   |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                               +---------------+
|                                               |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+

UA Hierarchial Host Identity Tag (16 bytes):
        The UAs HHIT in byte form. Hashed from the EdDSA25519
        public key.

Trust Timestamp (4 bytes):
        Timestamp denoting current time plus an offset to trust
        message to.

Authentication Data (116 bytes):
        Opaque authentication data using DRIP format specified in
        the DRIP Header (not shown here). Up to 116 bytes.

Signature (64 bytes):
        Signature over precedding fields using the EdDSA25519
        keypair.

Forward Error Correction (23 bytes):
        Mandatory under Bluetooth 4.X. Always last auth page.
        Reed Solomon across precedding pages.

This framing resides within the General Frame's DRIP Authentication Data section.

3.2.1. UA Hierarchical Host Identity Tag

To avoid needing to the the UAs HHIT via the ASTM Basic ID in a detached fashion the 16 byte HHIT is included in the wrapper frame.

The HHIT for the UA (and other entities in the RID and greater UTM system under DRIP) is an enhancement of the Host Identity Tag (HIT) of HIPv2 [RFC7401] introducing hierarchy as defined in HHIT [hierarchical-hit].

Using Hierarchical HITs for UAS RID is outlined in HHIT based UAS RID [drip-uas-rid].

3.2.2. Trust Timestamp

Trust Timestamp MUST be current UNIX time plus an offset into the future.

To avoid replay attacks the Trust Timestamp field must be well founded. When wrapping a vector (position) message the payload WILL contain (by ASTM rules) constantly changing data, this includes its own timestamp. In this case the Trust Timestamp could be argued as superfoulous.

Other message types, such as Basic ID and Self-ID are static messages with no changing data. To protect a replay of these signed messages the Trust Timestamp is the field during signing to be guarenteed to change.

The offset used against the UNIX timestamp is not defined in this document. Best practices to identify a acceptable offset should be used taking into consideration the UA envirorment, and propgation characteristics of the messages being sent.

3.2.3. Authentication Data

This field has a max of 116 bytes in length.

3.2.4. Signature

The wrapper signature is generated using the private key half of the the UAs Host Identity (HI) and is done over all precedding data. ASTM/DRIP Headers are exclude from this operation.

3.2.5. Forward Error Correction

To help Bluetooth 4 achieve the goal of reliable reciept of paged messages a Forward Error Correction (FEC) scheme is introduced and is mandatory under DRIP.

Due to the nature of Bluetooth 4 and the existing ASTM paging structure an optomization can be used. If a Bluetooth frame fails its CRC check, then the frame is dropped without notification to the upper protocol layers. From the Remote ID perspective this means the loss of a complete frame/message/page. In Authentication messages, each page is already numbered so the loss of a page allows the recieving application to build a "dummy" page filled with nulls (other than the ASTM Header which is known).

The prefered form of FEC is using Reed Solomon. With this the entire authentication message (all pages, including headers) are used to generate 23 bytes of parity. This parity is appended in one full page (always the last) allowing for recovery when any single page is lost in transmission.

If more than one page is lost (>1/5 for 5 page messages, >1/10 for 10 page messages) than the error rate of the link is already beyond saving and the application has more issues to deal with.

4. Bluetooth 4.X Formats

With Bluetooth 4.X formatting the goal is to attempt to bring reliable reciept of paged messages.

4.1. Certificate


0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
|                                                               |
.                                                               .
.                 Certificate: Registry on Aircraft             .
.                                                               .
|                                                               |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                    Forward Error Correction                   |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                               +---------------+
|                                               |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+

Certificate: Registry on Aircraft (200 bytes):
        A certificate granted by the Registry that asserts the
        binding of UA to the given Registry.

Forward Error Correction (23 bytes):
        Mandatory under Bluetooth 4.X. Reed Solomon across precedding
        fields (including ASTM/DRIP Headers).

This DRIP Authentication type uses the General Frame format, filling the DRIP Authentication Data field with a 200 byte Certificate and 23 bytes of Reed Solomon FEC.

What this grants is the ability to authenticate UA information when the receiving device of the observer (e.g. a smartphone with a dedicated RID application) has no Internet service (e.g. LTE signal).

The Certificate: Registry on Aircraft (Cra) is in practice a binding claim between the Registry and the Aircraft, asserting the relationship between the two entities. Cra signs another certificate, Caa (Certificate: Aircraft on Aircraft), that is created during UA provisioning.

Importantly this certificate allows offline signature verification from the UA. This is as the UA HI is included in the certificate. Also included is the HHIT of the Registry to check the local shortlist of Registries that the Observer device trusts (mapping HHITs to HIs).

More details about Caa, Cra, other certificates and the provisioning process can be found in [drip-identity-claims].

4.2. ASTM Message Wrapper


0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
|                                                               |
.                                                               .
.                 ASTM Message: Type 0-1, 3-5                   .
.                                                               .
|                                                               |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+

ASTM Message: Type 0-1, 3-5 (24 bytes):
        A valid ASTM Message of Types 0, 1, 3, 4, or 5. First byte
        (ASTM Header) removed and used as DRIP Header.

This DRIP Authentication type uses the Wrapper Frame format, filling the Authentication Data field with an ASTM Message (all types except Message Pack [0xF] and Authentication [0x2]).

The first byte of the wrapped message should be used to fill in the DRIP Header field. This corresponds directly with the ASTM Header field and can be used by the reciever to decode the wrapped message.

4.3. Manifest

By hashing previously sent messages and signing them we gain trust in UAs previous reports. An observer who has been listening for any length of time can hash received messages and cross check against listed hashes. The signature is signed across the list of hashes.

4.3.1. Hash Algorithm And Operation

The recommended hash to implement as a baseline is cSHAKE128 from [NIST.SP.800-185]. With cSHAKE128, the hash is computed as follows:


        cSHAKE128(MAC|Message, 8*H-Len, "", "RemoteID Auth Hash")

The message MAC is prepended to the message, as the MAC is the only information that links a UA's messages from a specific UA.

Other hash algorithms can be considered and used. In this scenario an unused DRIP AuthType can be allocated for such.

4.3.2. 4 Byte Manifest


0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
|                   Hash of Previous Manifest                   |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
|                    Hash of Current Manifest                   |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
|                         Message Hash 1                        |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
|                         Message Hash 2                        |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
.                                                               .
.                                                               .
.                                                               .
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
|                        Message Hash 27                        |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+

Hash of Previous Manifest: (4 bytes)
        A hash of the previously sent Authentication message.

Hash of Current Manifest: (4 bytes)
        A hash of the current Authentication message.

Message Hash: (4 bytes)
        A hash of a previously sent message. 27 max.

4.3.3. 8 Byte Manifest


0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
|                   Hash of Previous Manifest                   |
|                                                               |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
|                    Hash of Current Manifest                   |
|                                                               |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
|                         Message Hash 1                        |
|                                                               |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
|                         Message Hash 2                        |
|                                                               |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
.                                                               .
.                                                               .
.                                                               .
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
|                        Message Hash 12                        |
|                                                               |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+

Hash of Previous Manifest: (8 bytes)
        A hash of the previously sent Authentication message.

Hash of Current Manifest: (8 bytes)
        A hash of the current Authentication message.

Message Hash: (8 bytes)
        A hash of a previously sent message. 12 max.

4.3.4. Pseudo-blockchain Hashes

Two special hashes are included; a previous manifest hash, which links to the previous manifest message, as well as a current manifest hash. This gives a pseudo-blockchain provenance to the manifest message that could be traced back if the observer was present for extended periods of time.

In regards to the creation and use of the current manifest hash field:

  • During creation and signing of this message format this field MUST be set to 0. So the signature will be based on this field being 0, as well as its own hash. It is an open question of if we compute the hash, then sign or sign then compute.
  • There a few different ways to cycle this message. We can "roll up" the hash of 'current' to 'previous' when needed or to completely recompute the hash. This mostly depends on the previous note.

4.3.5. Limitations

A potentional limitation to this format is dwell time of the UA. If the UA is not sticking to a general area the most likely the Observer will not obtain many (if not all) of the messages in the manifest. Without the original messages recieved no verification can be done. Examples of such scenarios include delivery or survey UA.

4.4. Recommendations

Under ASTM Bluetooth 4.X rules transmission of dynamic messages are at a minumum of 1 per second while static messages (which is what Authentication is classified under) are 3 per second.

Under DRIP the Certificate Message MUST be transmitted to properly meet the GEN 1 and GEN 3 requirement.

The ASTM Message Wrapper and Manifest both satisify the GEN 2 requirement. At least one MUST be implemented to comply with the GEN 2 requirement.

A single Manifest can carry at most (using the full 10 page limit and 8 byte hashes) 12 unique hashes of previously sent messages (of any type). This results in a total of 22 (12 + 10) frames of Bluetooth data being transmitted over Bluetooth.

In comparison the Message Wrapper sends 5 pages (each a single frame) for each wrapped message. For backwards compatibility the implementation should also send the standard ASTM message that was wrapped for non-DRIP compliant recievers to obtain. This method results in 72 total Bluetooth frames (12 + (12 * 5)) sent [this increases to 84 if using FEC].

The question of which is better suited is up to the implementation.

5. Bluetooth 5 Formats

Under ASTM specification, Bluetooth 5 transport of Remote ID is to use the Message Pack (Type 0xF) format for all transmissions. Under Message Pack all messages are sent together (in Message Type order) in a single Bluetooth frame (up to 250 bytes). Message Packs are required by ASTM to be sent at a rate of 1 per second (like dynamic messages).

This gives the benefit of no longer is there any messsage or page fragmentation in transmission. For this reason the recommended use of FEC such as Reed Solomon using in Bluetooth 4.X is not needed here and is impractical.

Any of the Bluetooth 4.X formats can theoretically be used during Bluetooth 5 operation under ASTM, however the following subsections define a number of formats optomized for Message Pack and Bluetooth 5.

5.1. Certificate


0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
|                                                               |
.                                                               .
.                 Certificate: Registry on Aircraft             .
.                                                               .
|                                                               |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+

Certificate: Registry on Aircraft (200 bytes):
        A certificate granted by the Registry that asserts the
        binding of UA to the given Registry.

With Message Pack the following MUST be included in when sending a DRIP Certificate Message: 1x Location Message 1x Authentication Message, DRIP AuthType 0 The Certificate Message (without FEC) only needs 9 pages for transmission, allowing the final 25 bytes to be used for a Location message.

5.2. Message Pack Signature


0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
|                         Trust Timestamp                       |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                            Signature                          |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
|                                                               |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+

Trust Timestamp: (4 bytes)
        Timestamp denoting current time plus an offset to trust
        message to.

Signature: (64 bytes)
        Signature over all messages in Message Pack using the
        EdDSA25519 keypair.

The DRIP Message Pack Signature is a DRIP AuthType 1. All messages in the message pack (excluding the authentication message itself) is signed.

6. Security Considerations

1. Hash lengths (length vs strength/collision rate) 2. replay attacks with timestamps 3. static Cra (issue but nulled if UA signing other stuff dynamically meaning signatures will fail as HI won't match - this is probably a deeper disucssion topic for provisioning security considerations when we get to there)

7. ASTM Considerations

1. Increase Authentication Page Count Max from 5 to 10. 2. Add Authentication Type for DRIP (currently using 0xD)

8. Acknowledgments

Ryan Quigley and James Mussi at AX Enterprize for early prototyping to find holes in the draft specifications.

9. References

9.1. Normative References

[NIST.SP.800-185]
Kelsey, J., Change, S., and R. Perlner, "SHA-3 derived functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and ParallelHash", National Institute of Standards and Technology report, DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-185, , <https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-185>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

9.2. Informative References

[drip-identity-claims]
Wiethuechter, A., Card, S., and R. Moskowitz, "DRIP Identity Claims", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-wiethuechter-drip-identity-claims-00, , <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wiethuechter-drip-identity-claims-00>.
[drip-requirements]
Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., and A. Gurtov, "Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-drip-reqs-01, , <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-drip-reqs-01>.
[drip-uas-rid]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov, "UAS Remote ID", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-drip-uas-rid-02, , <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-drip-uas-rid-02>.
[F3411-19]
ASTM International, "Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking", , <http://www.astm.org/cgi-bin/resolver.cgi?F3411>.
[hierarchical-hit]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter, "Hierarchical HITs for HIPv2", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit-05, , <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit-05>.
[RFC7401]
Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)", RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>.

Authors' Addresses

Adam Wiethuechter
AX Enterprize
4947 Commercial Drive
Yorkville, NY 13495
United States of America
Stuart W. Card
AX Enterprize
4947 Commercial Drive
Yorkville, NY 13495
United States of America
Robert Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
Oak Park, MI 48237
United States of America